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Sydney Shoemaker [142]S. Shoemaker [3]Stephen J. Shoemaker [1]
  1. Sydney Shoemaker, Content, Color, and Character I: Against Standard Representationalism.
     
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  2. Sydney Shoemaker, Content, Color, and Character II: A Better Sort of Representationalism.
     
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  3. Sydney Shoemaker, Content, Character and Color I: Against Standard Representationalism.
    The words “content” and “character” in my title refer to the representational content and phenomenal character of color experiences. So my topic concerns the nature of our experience of color. But I will, of course, be talking about colors as well as color experience. Let me set the stage by mentioning some things, some more controversial than others, that I will be taking for granted. I assume, to begin with, that objects in the world have colors, and have them independently (...)
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  4. Sydney Shoemaker, Content, Character, and Color Ii: A Better Kind of Representationalism.
    From now on I will assume that it is possible in principle for there to be cases of spectrum inversion in which the invertees are equally good perceivers of the colors. What I want to show next is that while allowing this possibility is incompatible with standard representationalism, it requires acceptance of a different version of representationalism. Consider the standard way of describing a case of spectrum inversion. Returning to Jack and Jill, we say that red things look to Jack (...)
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  5. Sydney Shoemaker, Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.
    These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different stereotypes of sense perception. One of these, based primarily on the case of vision, is what I called the object perceptual model -- it takes (...)
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  6. Sydney Shoemaker (forthcoming). Commentary in Symposium on Chalmers= The Conscious Mind. Forthcoming In. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  7. S. Shoemaker (2013). The Evident Connexion. Philosophical Review 122 (2):314-317.
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  8. Sydney Shoemaker (2013). Physical Realization Without Preemption. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  9. Sydney Shoemaker (2012). 8. Coincidence Through Thick and Thin. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:227.
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  10. Sydney Shoemaker (2011). On What We Are. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
  11. Sydney Shoemaker (2011). Review of Tim Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (1).
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  12. Sydney Shoemaker (2011). Realization, Powers and Property Identity. The Monist 94 (1):3-18.
    This paper is about the relation between two metaphysical topics: the nature of properties, and way the instantiation of a property is sometimes “realized in” something more fundamental. It is partly an attempt to develop further, but also to correct, my earlier treatments of these topics. In my published work on realization, including my book Physical Realization, I was at pains to insist that acceptance of my view about this does not commit one to the causal theory of properties I (...)
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  13. Sydney Shoemaker (2010). Comments on Alyssa Ney. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):446-449.
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  14. Sydney Shoemaker (2010). Reply to My Critics. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):125 - 132.
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  15. Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Book Review. Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Galen Strawson. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review 2009.
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  16. Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Careers and Quareers: A Reply to Burge. Philosophical Review 118 (1):87-102.
    Tyler Burge argues on the basis of an account of memory that the notion of quasimemory cannot be used to answer the circularity objection to psychological accounts of personal identity. His account implies the impossibility of the "Parfit people," creatures psychologically like us who undergo amoeba-like fission at the age of twenty-one, with only one offshoot allowed to survive, and who have "quareers," made up of the career of the original person and the career of the sole survivor, that exhibit (...)
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  17. Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Review of Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11).
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  18. Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Self-Knowing Agents – Lucy O'Brien. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):752-754.
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  19. Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief. Erkenntnis 71 (1):35 - 51.
    The paper defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are “available” in the sense that (...)
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  20. Stephen J. Shoemaker (2008). Early Christian Apocryphal Literature. In Susan Ashbrook Harvey & David G. Hunter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies. Oup Oxford.
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  21. Sydney Shoemaker (2008). Persons, Animals, and Identity. Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.
    The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and (...)
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  22. Sydney Shoemaker (2008). Self-Intimation. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):315-327.
    The sense in which having the available belief that P gives one a reason for believing that one believes that P is just that if one has that available belief one is thereby justified, or warranted, in believing that one has it. In explaining why it is so it helps to bring in the notion of rationality. We noted earlier that it is a requirement of full human rationality that one regularly revise one’s belief system in the direction of greater (...)
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  23. Sydney Shoemaker (2007). A Case for Qualia. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
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  24. Sydney Shoemaker (2007). Czas bez zmiany. Roczniki Filozoficzne 55 (1):265-285.
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  25. Sydney Shoemaker (2007). Physical Realization. Oxford University Press.
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be ...
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  26. Sydney Shoemaker (2007). Review: Thau on Perception. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 132 (3):595 - 606.
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  27. Sydney Shoemaker (2007). Thau on Perception. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 132 (3):595-606.
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  28. Sydney Shoemaker (2006). On the Way Things Appear. In John Hawthorne (ed.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
     
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  29. Sydney Shoemaker (2006). The Frege-Schlick View. In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 18-33.
  30. Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Brown-Brownson Revisited. The Monist 87 (4):573-593.
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  31. Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Functionalism and Personal Identity: A Reply. Noûs 38 (3):525-533.
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  32. Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Since the appearance of a widely influential book, Self-Knowledge and Self-ldentity, Sydney Shoemaker has continued to work on a series of interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This volume contains a collection of the most important essays he has published since then. The topics that he deals with here include, among others, the nature of personal and other forms of identity, the relation of time to change, the nature of properties and causality and the relation between the (...)
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  33. Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Reply to Wiggins. The Monist 87 (4):610-613.
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  34. Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Consciousness and Co-Consciousness. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. S31 - S32.
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  35. Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Content, Character, and Color. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-78.
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  36. Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Moran on Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):391-401.
  37. Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):1-23.
    Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in which mental properties (...)
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  38. Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Self, Body, and Coincidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:287-306.
     
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  39. Sydney Shoemaker (2002). Kim on Emergence. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):53-63.
    Emergence requires that the ultimate physical micro-entities have micro-latent causal powers, which manifest themselves only when the entities are combined in ways that are emergence-engendering, in addition to the micro-manifest powers that account for their behavior in other circumstances. Subjects of emergent properties will have emergent micro-structural properties, specified partly in terms of these micro-latent powers, each of which will be determined by a micro-structural property specified only in terms of the micro-manifest powers of the constituents and the way they (...)
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  40. Sydney Shoemaker (2002). Reply to Leeds. Noûs 36 (1):130-136.
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  41. Sydney Shoemaker (2001). Introspection and Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.
    […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to give an account which makes (...)
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  42. Sydney Shoemaker (2001). Realization and Mental Causation. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. 23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  43. Sydney Shoemaker (2000). Book Review. Self-Concern by Raymond Martin. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):718-20.
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  44. Sydney Shoemaker (2000). Phenomenal Character Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465-467.
  45. Sydney Shoemaker (2000). Self-Concern. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):718-720.
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  46. Carl Ginet, Scott MacDonald & Sydney Shoemaker (1999). Norman Kretzmann 1928-1998. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5):210 - 212.
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  47. Jaegwon Kim & Sydney Shoemaker (1999). Mind-Body Problems. The Philosophers' Magazine 5 (5):42-44.
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  48. S. Shoemaker (1999). Physicalism. In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 706--707.
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