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Profile: Sigrun Svavarsdottir (Ohio State University)
  1. Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2009). The Practical Role Essential to Value Judgments. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):299-320.
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  2. Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2008). The Virtue of Practical Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):1-33.
    Practical rationality is best regarded as a virtue: an excellence in the exercise of one's cognitive capacities in one's practical endeavors. The author develops this idea so as to yield a Humean conception of practical rationality. Nevertheless, one of the crucial features of the approach is not distinctively Humean and sets it apart from the most familiar neo-Humean approaches: an agent's practical rationality has to do with the presence and form of his cognitive activity, as well as with how it (...)
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  3. Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2006). Evaluations of Rationality. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 121-136.
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  4. Sigrun Svavarsdottir (2006). How Do Moral Judgments Motivate? In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Wiley-Blackwell. 6--163.
  5. Sigrun Svavarsdóttir (2001). On Simon Blackburn's Ruling Passions. Philosophical Books 108:18-26.
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  6. Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2001). Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake? In Brian Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge University Press. 144--193.
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  7. Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2001). Thinking in Moral Terms. Garland Pub..
    Issues such as moral motivation, the nature of desire and the difference between moral and scientific inquiry are discussed in this work, among others.
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  8. Sigrun Svavarsdottir (1999). Moral Cognitivism and Motivation. Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.
    The impact moral judgments have on our deliberations and actions seems to vary a great deal. Moral judgments play a large part in the lives of some people, who are apt not only to make them, but also to be guided by them in the sense that they tend to pursue what they judge to be of moral value, and shun what they judge to be of moral disvalue. But it seems unrealistic to claim that moral judgments play a pervasive (...)
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