33 found
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  1.  38
    Hannah Rubin, Justin Bruner, Cailin O'Connor & Simon Huttegger, Communication Without the Cooperative Principle: A Signaling Experiment.
    According to Grice's `Cooperative Principle', human communicators are involved in a cooperative endeavor. The speaker attempts to make herself understood and the listener, in turn, assumes that the speaker is trying to maximize the ease and effectiveness of communication. While pragmatists recognize that people do not always behave in such a way, the Cooperative Principle is generally assumed to hold. However, it is often the case that the interests of speakers and listeners diverge, at least to some degree. Communication can (...)
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  2.  46
    Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1-27.
    Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game theory. It is argued that an evolutionary approach provides better explanations for the emergence of simple communication systems. To substantiate these arguments, I will look at models similar to those of Skyrms (2000) and Komarova and Niyogi (2004) and study their dynamical properties. My results will lend partial support to the (...)
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  3.  77
    Justin Bruner, Cailin O’Connor, Hannah Rubin & Simon M. Huttegger (forthcoming). David Lewis in the Lab: Experimental Results on the Emergence of Meaning. Synthese:1-19.
    In this paper we use an experimental approach to investigate how linguistic conventions can emerge in a society without explicit agreement. As a starting point we consider the signaling game introduced by Lewis (Convention 1969). We find that in experimental settings, small groups can quickly develop conventions of signal meaning in these games. We also investigate versions of the game where the theoretical literature indicates that meaning will be less likely to arise—when there are more than two states for actors (...)
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  4.  31
    Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2013). Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games. Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-19.
    We study a low-rationality learning dynamics called probe and adjust. Our emphasis is on its properties in games of information transfer such as the Lewis signaling game or the Bala-Goyal network game. These games fall into the class of weakly better reply games, in which, starting from any action profile, there is a weakly better reply path to a strict Nash equilibrium. We prove that probe and adjust will be close to strict Nash equilibria in this class of games with (...)
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  5.  16
    Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms (forthcoming). Learning to Transfer Information. Studia Logica.
  6.  49
    Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (1):177 - 191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  7.  4
    Justin Bruner, Cailin O'Connor, Hannah Rubin & Simon Huttegger, David Lewis in the Lab: An Experimental Study of Signaling Convention.
    In this paper we use an experimental approach to investigate how linguistic conventions can emerge in a society without explicit agreement. As a starting point we consider the signaling game introduced by Lewis. We find that in experimental settings, small groups can quickly develop conventions of signal meaning in these games. We also investigate versions of the game where the theoretical literature indicates that meaning will be less likely to arise---when there are more than two states for actors to transfer (...)
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  8. Simon M. Huttegger (2010). Generic Properties of Evolutionary Games and Adaptationism. Journal of Philosophy 107 (2):80-102.
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  9.  19
    Simon M. Huttegger (2013). In Defense of Reflection. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):413-433.
  10.  31
    Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives. Erkenntnis 66 (3):409 - 436.
    Recently there has been some interest in studying the explanation of meaning by using signaling games. I shall argue that the meaning of signals in signaling games remains sufficiently unclear to motivate further investigation. In particular, the possibility of distinguishing imperatives and indicatives at a fundamental level will be explored. Thereby I am trying to preserve the generality of the signaling games framework while bringing it closer to human languages. A number of convergence results for the evolutionary dynamics of our (...)
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  11.  3
    Simon M. Huttegger (2015). Bayesian Convergence to the Truth and the Metaphysics of Possible Worlds. Philosophy of Science 82 (4):587-601.
    In a recent paper, Belot argues that Bayesians are epistemologically flawed because they believe with probability 1 that they will learn the truth about observational propositions in the limit. While Belot’s considerations suggest that this result should be interpreted with some care, the concerns he raises can largely be defused by putting convergence to the truth in the context of learning from an arbitrarily large but finite number of observations.
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  12.  8
    Brian Skyrms & Simon M. Huttegger (2013). Emergence of a Signaling Network with Probe and Adjust. In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press 265.
  13.  13
    Simon M. Huttegger (2014). Learning Experiences and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):279-288.
    Generalized probabilistic learning takes place in a black-box where present probabilities lead to future probabilities by way of a hidden learning process. The idea that generalized learning can be partially characterized by saying that it doesn’t foreseeably lead to harmful decisions is explored. It is shown that a martingale principle follows for finite probability spaces.
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  14.  5
    Simon M. Huttegger, Justin P. Bruner & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2015). The Handicap Principle Is an Artifact. Philosophy of Science 82 (5):997-1009.
    The handicap principle is one of the most influential ideas in evolutionary biology. It asserts that when there is conflict of interest in a signaling interaction signals must be costly in order to be reliable. While in evolutionary biology it is a common practice to distinguish between indexes and fakable signals, we argue this dichotomy is an artifact of existing popular signaling models. Once this distinction is abandoned, we show one cannot adequately understand signaling behavior by focusing solely on cost. (...)
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  15.  33
    Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Robustness in Signaling Games. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):839-847.
    The spontaneous emergence of signaling has already been studied in terms of standard evolutionary dynamics of signaling games. Standard evolutionary dynamics is given by the replicator equations. Thus, it is not clear whether the results for standard evolutionary dynamics depend crucially on the functional form of the replicator equations. In this paper I show that the basic results for the replicator dynamics of signaling games carry over to a number of other evolutionary dynamics. ‡This research was supported by the Konrad (...)
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  16.  30
    Philipp Mitteroecker & Simon M. Huttegger (2009). The Concept of Morphospaces in Evolutionary and Developmental Biology: Mathematics and Metaphors. Biological Theory 4 (1):54-67.
    Formal spaces have become commonplace conceptual and computational tools in a large array of scientific disciplines, including both the natural and the social sciences. Morphological spaces are spaces describing and relating organismal phenotypes. They play a central role in morphometrics, the statistical description of biological forms, but also underlie the notion of adaptive landscapes that drives many theoretical considerations in evolutionary biology. We briefly review the topological and geometrical properties of the most common morphospaces in the biological literature. In contemporary (...)
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  17. Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. Synthese 172 (1):177-191.
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  18.  1
    Simon M. Huttegger (2015). Inductive Learning in Small and Large Worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1).
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  19.  6
    Simon M. Huttegger (2013). Probe and Adjust. Biological Theory 8 (2):195-200.
    How can players reach a Nash equilibrium? I offer one possible explanation in terms of a low-rationality learning method called probe and adjust by proving that it converges to strict Nash equilibria in an important class of games. This demonstrates that decidedly limited learning methods can support Nash equilibrium play.
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  20.  33
    Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms (2008). Emergence of Information Transfer by Inductive Learning. Studia Logica 89 (2):237 - 256.
    We study a simple game theoretic model of information transfer which we consider to be a baseline model for capturing strategic aspects of epistemological questions. In particular, we focus on the question whether simple learning rules lead to an efficient transfer of information. We find that reinforcement learning, which is based exclusively on payoff experiences, is inadequate to generate efficient networks of information transfer. Fictitious play, the game theoretic counterpart to Carnapian inductive logic and a more sophisticated kind of learning, (...)
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  21.  26
    Simon Huttegger & Rory Smead (2011). Efficient Social Contracts and Group Selection. Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):517-531.
    We consider the Stag Hunt in terms of Maynard Smith’s famous Haystack model. In the Stag Hunt, contrary to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a cooperative equilibrium besides the equilibrium where every player defects. This implies that in the Haystack model, where a population is partitioned into groups, groups playing the cooperative equilibrium tend to grow faster than those at the non-cooperative equilibrium. We determine under what conditions this leads to the takeover of the population by cooperators. Moreover, we compare (...)
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  22.  18
    Simon M. Huttegger (2014). How Much Rationality Do We Need to Explain Conventions? Philosophy Compass 9 (1):11-21.
    This article surveys the main philosophical and formal ideas revolving around language as being conventional from the perspective of game theory. For very basic situations, this leads to a coherent view of conventions that offers interesting insights. Although there exist many open problems, this article will argue by outlining partial solution attempts that there is no principled reason for not applying methods from game theory to them.
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  23.  2
    Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms (2008). Emergence of Information Transfer by Inductive Learning. Studia Logica 89 (2):237-256.
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  24.  8
    Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms (2013). Strategic Interaction in Humans and Other Animals. Biological Theory 8 (2):125-126.
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  25. Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives. Erkenntnis 66 (3):409-436.
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  26.  1
    Simon M. Huttegger (2015). Merging of Opinions and Probability Kinematics. Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):611-648.
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  27.  1
    Simon M. Huttegger (2015). Inductive Learning in Small and Large Worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
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  28.  7
    Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Selection at Multiple Levels: Evolution and the Levels of Selection, Samir Okasha . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, (288 Pp; £32.00 Hbk; ISBN 978-0-19-926797-2). [REVIEW] Biological Theory 2 (4):429-431.
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  29.  1
    Simon M. Huttegger (2009). On the Relation Between Games in Extensive Form and Games in Strategic Form. In Hieke Alexander & Leitgeb Hannes (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos Verlag 11--377.
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  30. Justin Garson, Yasha Rohwer, Collin Rice, Matteo Colombo, Peter Brössel, Davide Rizza, Simon M. Huttegger, Richard Healey, Alyssa Ney & Kathryn Phillips (2013). 10. Referees for Philosophy of Science Referees for Philosophy of Science (Pp. 479-482). Philosophy of Science 80 (3).
     
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  31. Simon M. Huttegger & Kevin J. S. Zollman, Dynamic Stability and Basins of Attraction in the Sir Philip Sidney Game.
    We study the handicap principle in terms of the Sir Philip Sidney game. The handicap principle asserts that cost is required to allow for honest signalling in the face of conflicts of interest. We show that the significance of the handicap principle can be challenged from two new directions. Firstly, both the costly signalling equilibrium and certain states of no communication are stable under the replicator dynamics ; however, the latter states are more likely in cases where honest signalling should (...)
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  32. Simon M. Huttegger & Kevin J. S. Zollman, The Limits of ESS Methodology.
    In this paper we show that there are certain limits as to what applications of Maynard Smith’s concept of evolutionarily stable strategy can tell us about evolutionary processes. We shall argue that ESS is very similar in spirit to a particular branch of rational choice game theory, namely, the literature on refinements of Nash equilibrium. In the first place, ESS can also be viewed as a Nash equilibrium refinement. At a deeper level, ESS shares a common structure with other rational (...)
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  33. Kevin J. S. Zollman, Carl T. Bergstrom & Simon M. Huttegger, Between Cheap and Costly Signals: The Evolution of Partially Honest Communication.
    Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.
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