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  1. Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms (forthcoming). Learning to Transfer Information. Studia Logica.
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  2. Simon M. Huttegger (2014). How Much Rationality Do We Need to Explain Conventions? Philosophy Compass 9 (1):11-21.
    This article surveys the main philosophical and formal ideas revolving around language as being conventional from the perspective of game theory. For very basic situations, this leads to a coherent view of conventions that offers interesting insights. Although there exist many open problems, this article will argue by outlining partial solution attempts that there is no principled reason for not applying methods from game theory to them.
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  3. Justin Garson, Yasha Rohwer, Collin Rice, Matteo Colombo, Peter Brössel, Davide Rizza, Simon M. Huttegger, Richard Healey, Alyssa Ney & Kathryn Phillips (2013). 10. Referees for Philosophy of Science Referees for Philosophy of Science (Pp. 479-482). Philosophy of Science 80 (3).
     
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  4. Simon M. Huttegger (2013). In Defense of Reflection. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):413-433.
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  5. Simon M. Huttegger (2013). Learning Experiences and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    Generalized probabilistic learning takes place in a black-box where present probabilities lead to future probabilities by way of a hidden learning process. The idea that generalized learning can be partially characterized by saying that it doesn’t foreseeably lead to harmful decisions is explored. It is shown that a martingale principle follows for finite probability spaces.
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  6. Simon M. Huttegger (2013). Probe and Adjust. Biological Theory 8 (2):195-200.
    How can players reach a Nash equilibrium? I offer one possible explanation in terms of a low-rationality learning method called probe and adjust by proving that it converges to strict Nash equilibria in an important class of games. This demonstrates that decidedly limited learning methods can support Nash equilibrium play.
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  7. Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms (2013). Strategic Interaction in Humans and Other Animals. Biological Theory 8 (2):125-126.
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  8. Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2013). Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games. Erkenntnis:1-19.
    We study a low-rationality learning dynamics called probe and adjust. Our emphasis is on its properties in games of information transfer such as the Lewis signaling game or the Bala-Goyal network game. These games fall into the class of weakly better reply games, in which, starting from any action profile, there is a weakly better reply path to a strict Nash equilibrium. We prove that probe and adjust will be close to strict Nash equilibria in this class of games with (...)
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  9. Brian Skyrms & Simon M. Huttegger (2013). Emergence of a Signaling Network with Probe and Adjust. In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press. 265.
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  10. Simon Huttegger & Rory Smead (2011). Efficient Social Contracts and Group Selection. Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):517-531.
    We consider the Stag Hunt in terms of Maynard Smith’s famous Haystack model. In the Stag Hunt, contrary to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a cooperative equilibrium besides the equilibrium where every player defects. This implies that in the Haystack model, where a population is partitioned into groups, groups playing the cooperative equilibrium tend to grow faster than those at the non-cooperative equilibrium. We determine under what conditions this leads to the takeover of the population by cooperators. Moreover, we compare (...)
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  11. Simon M. Huttegger (2010). Generic Properties of Evolutionary Games and Adaptationism. Journal of Philosophy 107 (2):80-102.
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  12. Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (1):177 - 191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  13. Simon M. Huttegger (2009). On the Relation Between Games in Extensive Form and Games in Strategic Form. In. In Hieke Alexander & Leitgeb Hannes (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos Verlag. 11--377.
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  14. Philipp Mitteroecker & Simon M. Huttegger (2009). The Concept of Morphospaces in Evolutionary and Developmental Biology: Mathematics and Metaphors. Biological Theory 4 (1):54-67.
  15. Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms (2008). Emergence of Information Transfer by Inductive Learning. Studia Logica 89 (2):237 - 256.
    We study a simple game theoretic model of information transfer which we consider to be a baseline model for capturing strategic aspects of epistemological questions. In particular, we focus on the question whether simple learning rules lead to an efficient transfer of information. We find that reinforcement learning, which is based exclusively on payoff experiences, is inadequate to generate efficient networks of information transfer. Fictitious play, the game theoretic counterpart to Carnapian inductive logic and a more sophisticated kind of learning, (...)
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  16. Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives. Erkenntnis 66 (3):409 - 436.
    Recently there has been some interest in studying the explanation of meaning by using signaling games. I shall argue that the meaning of signals in signaling games remains sufficiently unclear to motivate further investigation. In particular, the possibility of distinguishing imperatives and indicatives at a fundamental level will be explored. Thereby I am trying to preserve the generality of the signaling games framework while bringing it closer to human languages. A number of convergence results for the evolutionary dynamics of our (...)
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  17. Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Robustness in Signaling Games. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):839-847.
    The spontaneous emergence of signaling has already been studied in terms of standard evolutionary dynamics of signaling games. Standard evolutionary dynamics is given by the replicator equations. Thus, it is not clear whether the results for standard evolutionary dynamics depend crucially on the functional form of the replicator equations. In this paper I show that the basic results for the replicator dynamics of signaling games carry over to a number of other evolutionary dynamics. ‡This research was supported by the Konrad (...)
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  18. Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Selection at Multiple Levels: Evolution and the Levels of Selection, Samir Okasha . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, (288 Pp; £32.00 Hbk; ISBN 978-0-19-926797-2). [REVIEW] Biological Theory 2 (4):429-431.
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  19. Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1-27.
    Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game theory. It is argued that an evolutionary approach provides better explanations for the emergence of simple communication systems. To substantiate these arguments, I will look at models similar to those of Skyrms (2000) and Komarova and Niyogi (2004) and study their dynamical properties. My results will lend partial support to the (...)
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