9 found
Sort by:
See also:
  1. Simon Langford (2014). Is Personal Identity Analysable? Acta Analytica 29 (3):309-316.
    Trenton Merricks has argued that given endurantism personal identity is unanalysable in terms of psychological continuity, while Anthony Brueckner has argued against this claim. This article shows that neither philosopher has made a compelling case and also shows what it would take to settle the issue either way. It is then argued that whether personal identity is analysable or not may not be of crucial importance to those wanting to defend a psychological continuity approach to personal identity.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Simon Langford (2014). On What We Are and How We Persist. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):356-371.
    This article defends novel approaches to what we are and how we persist. First it is claimed that we have disjunctive persistence conditions: we can persist by way of either biological continuity or psychological continuity. Then it is claimed that we are neither human beings nor persons essentially. Rather, we are essentially bio-psycho-continuers, a concept to be explained along the way. A variety of objections are considered and found wanting.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran (2013). The Products of Fission, Fusion, and Teletransportation: An Occasional Identity Theorist's Perspective. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):105 - 117.
    Advocates of occasional identity have two ways of interpreting putative cases of fission and fusion. One way?we call it the Creative view?takes fission to involve an object really dividing (or being replicated), thereby creating objects which would not otherwise have existed. The more ontologically parsimonious way takes fission to involve merely the ?separation? of objects that were identical before: strictly speaking, no object actually divides or is replicated, no new objects are created. In this paper we recommend the Creative approach (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Chris Daly & Simon Langford (2011). Two Anti-Platonist Strategies. Mind 119 (476):1107-1116.
    This paper considers two strategies for undermining indispensability arguments for mathematical Platonism. We defend one strategy (the Trivial Strategy) against a criticism by Joseph Melia. In particular, we argue that the key example Melia uses against the Trivial Strategy fails. We then criticize Melia’s chosen strategy (the Weaseling Strategy.) The Weaseling Strategy attempts to show that it is not always inconsistent or irrational knowingly to assert p and deny an implication of p . We argue that Melia’s case for this (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran (2011). Occasional Identity: A Tale of Two Approaches. Analytic Philosophy 52 (3):175-187.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Chris Daly & Simon Langford (2009). Mathematical Explanation and Indispensability Arguments. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):641-658.
    We defend Joseph Melia's thesis that the role of mathematics in scientific theory is to 'index' quantities, and that even if mathematics is indispensable to scientific explanations of concrete phenomena, it does not explain any of those phenomena. This thesis is defended against objections by Mark Colyvan and Alan Baker.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Simon Langford (2007). How to Defend the Cohabitation Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):212–224.
    David Lewis's cohabitation theory suffered damaging criticism from Derek Parfit. Though many have defended versions of Lewis's theory Parfit's criticism has not been answered. This paper shows how to defend the cohabitation theory against Parfit's criticism.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Simon Langford (2005). Three-Dimensionalism and Counterpart Theory. Analysis 65 (288):321–325.
    Jim Stone argues that one cannot combine three-dimensionalism with counterpart theory. This paper argues to the contrary.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran (2000). Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):518-526.
    André Gallois (1998) attempts to defend the occasional identity thesis (OIT), the thesis that objects which are distinct at one time may nonetheless be identical at another time, in the face of two influential lines of argument against it. One argument involves Kripke’s (1971) notion of rigid designation and the other, Leibniz’s law (affirming the indiscernibility of identicals). It is reasonable for advocates of (OIT) to question the picture of rigid designation and the version of Leibniz’s law that these arguments (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation