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Profile: Simon Robertson (Cardiff University)
  1. Simon Robertson, Nietzsche Vs Kant on Normativity and Moral Psychology.
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  2. Simon Robertson & David Owen (2013). Historical Relations: Nietzsche and the Greeks / Jessica N. Berry ; Nietzsche and Romanticism : Goethe, Holderlin, and Wagner / Adrian Del Caro ; Nietzsche the Kantian? / Tom Bailey ; Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's "Great Teacher" and "Antipode" / Ivan Soll ; Influence on Analytic Philosophy. In Ken Gemes & John Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Oup Oxford.
     
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  3. Simon Robertson & David Owen, Influence on Analytic Philosophy.
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  4. Simon Robertson, The Scope Problem - Nietzsche, the Moral, Ethical and Quasi-Aesthetic.
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  5. Simon Robertson & Christopher Janaway, Introduction: Nietzsche on Naturalism and Normativity.
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  6. Simon Robertson & Christopher Janaway (eds.) (2012). Nietzsche, Naturalism & Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    This volume comprises ten original essays on Nietzsche, one of the western canon's most controversial ethical thinkers. An international team of experts clarify Nietzsche's own views, both critical and positive, ethical and meta-ethical, and connect his philosophical concerns to contemporary debates in and about ethics, normativity, and value.
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  7. Simon Robertson (2011). A Nietzschean Critique of Obligation-Centred Moral Theory. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):563 - 591.
    Abstract The focal objection of Nietzsche?s critique of morality is that morality is disvaluable because antagonistic to the highest forms of human excellence. Recent advances in Nietzsche commentary have done much to unpack this objection ? an objection which, at first blush, shares certain affinities with worries developed by a number of more recent morality critics. Some, though, have sought to disassociate Nietzsche from these more recent critics, claiming that his critique is directed mainly against moralized culture and that it (...)
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  8. Simon Robertson (2011). Epistemic Constraints on Practical Normativity. Synthese 181 (Supp.1):81-106.
    What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent (...)
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  9. Simon Robertson (2011). Normativity for Nietzschean Free Spirits. Inquiry 54 (6):591 - 613.
    Abstract A significant portion of recent literature on Nietzsche is devoted to his metaethical views, both critical and positive. This article explores one aspect of his positive metaethics. The specific thesis defended is that Nietzsche is, or is plausibly cast as, a reasons internalist. This, very roughly, is the view that what an agent has normative reason to do depends on that agent's motivational repertoire. Section I sketches some of the metaethical terrain most relevant to Nietzsche's organising ethical project, his (...)
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  10. Philip A. Ebert & Simon Robertson (2010). Mountaineering and the Value of Self-Sufficiency. In Stephen E. Schmid (ed.), Climbing - Philosophy for Everyone: Because It's There. Wiley-Blackwell.
  11. Simon Robertson (2010). Reasons, Values and Morality. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
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  12. Simon Robertson (2009). Introduction: Normativity, Reasons, Rationality. In , Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.
     
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  13. Simon Robertson (2009). Nietzsche's Ethical Revaluation. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 37 (37):66-90.
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  14. Simon Robertson (ed.) (2009). Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    Spheres of Reason comprises nine new articles on normativity. They make a timely and distinctive contribution to our understanding of how normative thought may or may not be unified across the spheres of actions, belief and feeling. It is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature of normativity and the bearing it has on human thought.
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  15. Jens Timmerman, John Skorupski & Simon Robertson (2009). 1. General Constraints on a Cognitivist Account of Intentions. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oup Oxford. 4--243.
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  16. Simon Robertson (2008). How to Be an Error Theorist About Morality. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):107-125.
    This paper clarifies how to be an error theorist about morality. It takes as its starting point John Mackie’s error theory of the categoricity of moral obligation, defending Mackie against objections from both naturalist moral realists and minimalists about moral discourse. However, drawing upon minimalist insights, it argues that Mackie’s focus on the ontological status of moral values is misplaced, and that the underlying dispute between error theorist and moralist is better conducted at the level of practical reason.
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  17. Simon Robertson (2008). Not so Enticing Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):263 - 277.
    A common view of the relation between oughts and reasons is that you ought to do something if and only if that is what you have most reason to do. One challenge to this comes from what Jonathan Dancy calls ‘enticing reasons.’ Dancy argues that enticing reasons never contribute to oughts and that it is false that if the only reasons in play are enticing reasons then you ought to do what you have most reason to do. After explaining how (...)
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  18. Philip Ebert & Simon Robertson (2007). Adventure, Climbing Excellence and the Practice of 'Bolting'. In M. J. McNamee (ed.), Philosophy, Risk and Adventure Sports. London ;Routledge. 56.
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  19. Simon Robertson & Philip A. Ebert (2007). Adventure, Climbing Excellence and the Practice of Bolting. In M. J. McNamee (ed.), Philosophy, Risk, and Adventure Sports. London ;Routledge. 56.
    forthcoming in M. McNamee (ed) Philosophy, Risk and Adventure Sports, Routledge The final draft of a co-authored article with Simon Robertson (Leeds). In this paper we examine a recent version of an old controversy within climbing ethics. Our organising topic is the ‘bolting’….
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  20. Simon Robertson (2006). Reasons and Motivation—Not a Wrong Distinction. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):391–397.
    This paper responds to Susan Hurley’s attempt to undermine the adequacy of the distinction at the heart of the internalism–externalism debate about reasons for action. The paper shows that Hurley’s argument fails and then, more positively, indicates a neat way to characterize the distinction.
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