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Profile: Simone Gozzano (Università degli Studi dell'Aquila)
  1. Mario De Caro & Simone Gozzano (2013). Presentazione. Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):361-366.
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  2. Simone Gozzano (2013). Reconsidering the Logic of Emotion. Philosophia 41 (3):787-794.
    It is customarily assumed that propositional attitudes present two independent components: a propositional component and a psychological component, in the form of an attitudes. These two components are caught by means of two different methods: propositions by some model theoretic theory, psychological attitudes by making appeal to their functional or psychological role. Some authors have seek a convergence by individuating propositions by some Functional role semantics. In this paper I show that when it comes to emotional attitudes with propositional content, (...)
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  3. Simone Gozzano (2012). L'essenzialismo scientifico e il mentale. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):201-226.
    The major objection for including mental properties, and laws, within the domain of scientific essentialism concerns phenomenal properties, and such an objection is often raised via the intuition that zombies are conceivable. However, if these properties can be individuated in terms of roles and establish nomological relations, zombies are not possible because they would be nomologically identical to us but property different, an independence that essentialism denies. If there are not nomological relations, the essentialist denies that there are phenomenal properties, (...)
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  4. Simone Gozzano (2012). Scientific Essentialism and the Mental. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):201-226.
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  5. Simone Gozzano (2012). Type-Identity Conditions for Phenomenal Properties. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspective on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 111.
    In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of the appearance/reality distinction in the case of phenomenal states and the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch a version of the type-identity (...)
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  6. Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) (2012). New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press.
    Th e type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, fi nding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics, and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. Th is volume (...)
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  7. Simone Gozzano (2011). Autonomia della filosofia e neuroscienze. Rivista di Filosofia 102 (2):277-291.
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  8. Simone Gozzano (2010). Emergence: Laws and Properties: Comments on Noordhof. In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press. 100.
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  9. Simone Gozzano (2010). Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity. In. In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. 119--127.
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  10. Simone Gozzano (2009). La Coscienza. Carocci.
    Quale sia la natura della coscienza è uno dei problemi più analizzati e discussi sia nella ricerca filosofica sia in quella scientifica. Ogni mese nel mondo vengono pubblicati diversi libri dedicati a questo argomento, e decine di riviste specialistiche ospitano articoli e saggi volti a chiarirne le varie componenti; sotto una tale pressione sono nate alcune riviste scientifiche dedicate esclusivamente all'argomento. A questo fiorire di ricerche corrisponde una quantità altrettanto elevata di approcci. Una rivista come il Journal of consciousness studies, (...)
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  11. Simone Gozzano (2009). Levels, Orders and the Causal Status of Mental Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):347-362.
    In recent years Jaegwon Kim has offered an argument – the ‘supervenience argument’ – to show that supervenient mental properties, construed as second- order properties distinct from their first-order realizers, do not have causal powers of their own. In response, several philosophers have argued that if Kim’s argument is sound, it generalizes in such a way as to condemn to causal impotency all properties above the level of basic physics. This paper discusses Kim’s supervenience argument in the context of his (...)
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  12. Simone Gozzano (2009). Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity. In Marcelo Suarez, Miklos Redei & Mauro Dorato (eds.), Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the a European Philosophy of Science Association. Kluwer.
    In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. If properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
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  13. Simone Gozzano (2008). In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content. Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.
    In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine (...)
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  14. Simone Gozzano (2008). Tropes' Simplicity and Mental Causation. Ontos Verlag.
    In this paper I first try to clarify the essential features of tropes and then I use the resulting analysis to cope with the problem of mental causation. As to the first step, I argue that tropes, beside being essentially particular and abstract, are simple, where such a simplicity can be considered either from a phenomenal point of view or from a structural point of view. Once this feature is spelled out, the role tropes may play in solving the problem (...)
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  15. Simone Gozzano & Francesco Orilia (eds.) (2008). Universals, Tropes and the Philosophy of Mind. Ontos Verlag.
    Table of Contents; Introduction by Francesco Orilia and Simone Gozzano; Modes and Mind by John Heil; Does Ontology Matter? by Anna-Sofia Maurin; Basic Ontology, Multiple Realizability and Mental Causation by Francesco Orilia; The “Supervenience Argument”:Kim’s Challenge to Nonreductive Physicalism by Ausonio Marras and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri; Tropes’ Simplicity and Mental Causation by Simone Gozzano; Zombies from Below by David Robb; Tropes and Perception by E. Jonathan Lowe; About the authors.
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  16. Simone Gozzano (2007). Pensieri Materiali: Corpo, Mente E Causalità. Utet Università.
    Un uomo in cappa e cilindro di fronte a voi promette: “muoverò la materia con la sola forza del pensiero”. Scettici aspettate la prova. Ed ecco che, mirabilmente, egli alza un braccio. Un braccio, il suo braccio! Un pezzo di materia, dotato di massa, carica elettrica, proprietà magnetiche e quant’altro, si è mosso solo grazie alla sua volontà di alzarlo. Con la sola forza del pensiero il braccio si è sollevato! Per quanti sforzi retorici faccia, nessuno riterrà particolarmente sorprendente l’esperimento. (...)
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  17. Simone Gozzano (2007). The Beliefs of Mute Animals. In Mario De Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind. Kluwer.
    In this paper I argue that it is possible to attribute beliefs and other intentional states to mute animals. This kind of attribution is substantial, in that it does not allow for some minimal form of co referential failure.
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  18. Simone Gozzano (2006). Functional Role Semantics and Reflective Equilibrium. Acta Analytica 21 (38):62-76.
    In this paper it is argued that functional role semantics can be saved from criticisms, such as those raised by Putnam and Fodor and Lepore, by indicating which beliefs and inferences are more constitutive in determining mental content. The Scylla is not to use vague expressions; the Charybdis is not to endorse the analytic/synthetic distinction. The core idea is to use reflective equilibrium as a strategy to pinpoint which are the beliefs and the inferences that constitute the content of a (...)
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  19. Simone Gozzano (2005). Mente-corpo: identità e spiegazione. Rivista di Filosofia 96 (3):483-496.
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  20. Simone Gozzano (2003). Second Order Properties: Why Kim's Reduction Does Not Work. Logic and Philosophy of Science 1 (1):1-15.
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  21. Simone Gozzano (2000). Animali intenzionali. Rivista di Estetica 40 (14):16-34.
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  22. Simone Gozzano (1999). Davidson on Rationality and Irrationality. In Mario de Caro (ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
    The separation view of the mind, advanced by Davidson in order to face the problem of irrationality, is criticized. Against it, I argue that it is not consistent with Davidson's holism.
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  23. Simone Gozzano (1997). The Chinese Room Argument: Consciousness and Understanding. In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press. 43--231.
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn (...)
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  24. Simone Gozzano (1997). Theory of Mind and the Ontology of Belief. Il Cannocchiale 2 (May-August):145-156.
    In this paper I discuss the problem of animals' beliefs and the ontology associated with the idea of having non propositional content. It is argue that the beliefs of mute animals mainly serve an explanatory purpose.
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  25. Simone Gozzano (1995). Consciousness and Understanding in the Chinese Room. Informatica 19:653-56.
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn (...)
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  26. Simone Gozzano (1994). Attualmente. Filosofia 85:411-37.
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  27. Simone Gozzano (1994). Le immagini mentali E la loro ontologia. Epistemologia 17:225-252.
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  28. Simone Gozzano (1994). Rationality, Folk Psychology, and the Belief-Opinion Distinction. Acta Analytica 12 (12):113-123.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the distinction between belief and opinion in the light of Dennett's intentional stance. In particular, I consider whether the distinction could be used for a defence of the stance from various criticisms. I will then apply the distinction to the so-called `paradoxes of irrationality'. In this context I will propose that we should avoid the postulation of `boundaries' or `gaps' within the mind, and will attempt to show that a (...)
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