Search results for 'Simple View' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  92
    Ezio Di Nucci (2010). Rational Constraints and the Simple View. Analysis 70 (3):481-486.
    According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to switch on the light. The idea that intending to is necessary for intentionally -ing has been challenged by Bratman (1984, 1987) with a counter-example in which a videogame player is trying to hit either of two targets while knowing that she cannot hit both targets. When a target is hit, the game finishes. And if both targets are about (...)
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  2.  95
    Steve Matthews (2010). Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View. Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208.
    Among theories of personal identity over time the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But (...)
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  3.  63
    Eric T. Olson (forthcoming). In Search of the Simple View. In G. Gasser & M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge University Press
    Accounts of personal identity over time are supposed to fall into two broad categories: 'complex views' saying that our persistence consists in something else, and 'simple views' saying that it doesn' t. But it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed. After arguing for this claim, the paper says something about how the debate might be better characterized.
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  4.  20
    Lilian O'Brien (2014). Mutually Exclusive Planning and the Simple View. Topoi 33 (1):47-55.
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  5.  71
    Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006). On Trying to Save the Simple View. Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.
    According to the analysis of intentional action that Michael Bratman has dubbed the 'Simple View', intending to x is necessary for intentionally x-ing. Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that when people are presented with cases involving moral considerations, they are much more likely to judge that the action (or side effect) in question was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that the agent intended to do it. This suggests that (...)
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  6.  61
    H. J. McCann (2011). The Simple View Again: A Brief Rejoinder. Analysis 71 (2):293-295.
    In a recent issue of Analysis I gave a critique of some arguments made by Di Nucci concerning the so-called Simple View – the view that an agent performs an action intentionally only if he intends so to act. In turn Di Nucci offers a reply that concentrates on two points. The first has to do with a group of examples, one having to do with waking a flatmate, and the others with routine actions such as shifting (...)
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  7.  54
    J. Edwards (2003). A Reply to de Anna on the Simple View of Colour. Philosophy 78 (303):99-114.
    John Campbell proposed a so-called simple view of colours according to which colours are categorical properties of the surfaces of objects just as they normally appear to be. I raised an invertion problem for Campbell's view according to which the senses of colour terms fail to match their references, thus rendering those terms meaningless—or so I claimed. Gabriele de Anna defended Campbell's view against my example by contesting two points in particular. Firstly, de Anna (...)
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  8.  30
    G. de Anna (2002). The Simple View of Colour and the Reference of Perceptual Terms. Philosophy 77 (299):87-108.
    This essay deals with the problem of the status of colours, traditionally considered as the paradigmatic case of secondary qualities: do colours exist only as aspects of experience or are they real properties of objects, existing independently of human and animal perception? Recently, John Campbell has argued in favour of the simple view of colours, according to which colours are real properties of objects. I discuss the place of Campbell's position in a debated which was started by John (...)
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  9.  3
    Gabriele Anndea (2002). The Simple View of Colours and the Reference of Perceptual Terms. Philosophy 77 (1):87-108.
    This essay deals with the problem of the status of colours, traditionally considered as the paradigmatic case of secondary qualities: do colours exist only as aspects of experience or are they real properties of objects, existing independently of human and animal perception? Recently, John Campbell has argued in favour of the simple view of colours, according to which colours are real properties of objects. I discuss the place of Campbell's position in a debated which was started by John (...)
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  10.  18
    Keith Graham (1989). Class - a Simple View. Inquiry 32 (4):419 – 436.
    The aim is to defend the starting?point of Marx's theory of class, which is located in a definition of the working class in the Communist Manifesto. It is a definition solely in terms of separation from productive resources and a need to sell one's labour power, and it is closely connected with Marx's thesis that the population in capitalism has a tendency to polarize. That thesis conflicts with the widely?held belief in the growth of a large middle class, unaccounted for (...)
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  11. Geoffrey Madell (2014). The Essence of the Self: In Defense of the Simple View of Personal Identity. Routledge.
    In this volume, Geoffrey Madell develops a revised account of the self, making a compelling case for why the "simple" or "anti-criterial" view of personal identity warrants a robust defense. Madell critiques recent discussions of the self for focusing on features which are common to all selves, and which therefore fail to capture the uniqueness of each self. In establishing his own view of personal identity, Madell proposes that there is always a gap between ‘A is f (...)
     
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  12. Geoffrey Madell (2014). The Essence of the Self: In Defense of the Simple View of Personal Identity. Routledge.
    In this volume, Geoffrey Madell develops a revised account of the self, making a compelling case for why the "simple" or "anti-criterial" view of personal identity warrants a robust defense. Madell critiques recent discussions of the self for focusing on features which are common to all selves, and which therefore fail to capture the uniqueness of each self. In establishing his own view of personal identity, Madell proposes that there is always a gap between ‘A is _f_ (...)
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  13. Adam Pautz (2009). A Simple View of Consciousness. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau’s worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are ’reference magnets’.
     
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  14. John Campbell (1993). A Simple View of Colour. In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. OUP 257-268.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  15.  12
    Christopher Tollefsen (2006). Fission, Fusion, and the Simple View. Christian Bioethics 12 (3):255-263.
    In this essay, I defend three Simple Views concerning human beings. First, that the human embryo is, from the one-cell stage onwards, a single unitary organism. Second, that when an embryo twins, it ceases to exist and two new embryos come into existence. And third, that you and I are essentially human organisms. This cluster of views shows that it is not necessary to rely on co-location, or other obscure claims, in understanding human embryogenesis.
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  16.  62
    Frederick Adams (1986). Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View. Mind and Language 1 (4):281-301.
  17. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2015). Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View. Mind 124 (496):1221-1230.
    Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has presented a series of examples that are meant to spell trouble for Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism. In this short article I aim to establish two things. First, I argue that even if Ichikawa’s examples were viable counterexamples to PEC, they would not threaten the key ideas underlying the account in my 2009 article ‘Knowledge and Presuppositions’. The philosophically interesting work that is done in that article remains unaffected by Ichikawa’s alleged counterexamples. In the second part of the (...)
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  18.  47
    Hugh J. McCann (2010). Di Nucci on the Simple View. Analysis 70 (1):53-59.
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  19.  14
    David K. Chan (1999). A Not-so-Simple View of International Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):1–16.
  20.  96
    John Campbell (1997). The Simple View of Colour. In Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color. MIT Press 177-90.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  21.  12
    Steven Sverdlik (1996). Consistency Among Intentions and the 'Simple View'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):515 - 522.
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  22.  7
    Ezio Di Nucci (2010). Rational Constraints and the Simple View. Analysis 70 (3):481 - 486.
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  23.  5
    Daniel L. Hartl (1982). A Too Simple View of Population Genetics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (1):13.
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  24. Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006). On Trying to Save the Simple View. Mind Language 21 (5):565-586.
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  25.  4
    J. H. Vince (1905). Two Anthologies Myths From Pindar. Chosen and Edited by H. R. King, M.A. Geo. Bell & Sons, 1904. Pp. Xii + 96. 2s. 6d. Net. Florilegium Tironis Grascum. Simple Passages for Greek Unseen Translation Chosen with a View to Their Literary Interest. By R. M. Burrows and W. C. Flamstead Walters. Pp. Ix + 271. Macmillan & Co., 1904. 4s. 6d. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 19 (05):269-270.
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  26.  96
    Ezio Di Nucci (2009). Simply, False. Analysis 69 (1):69-78.
    According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), A-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to A. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman's counter-example – McCann's (1991), Garcia's (1990), Sverdlik's (1996), Stout's (2005), and Adams's (1986) – works. Therefore Bratman's contention that SV is false still stands.
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  27.  41
    Hugh J. McCann (1991). Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):25-36.
    Some authors reject what they call the "Simple View"---i.e., the principle that anyone who A's intentionally intends to A. My purpose here is to defend this principle. Rejecting the Simple View, I shall claim, forces us to assign to other mental states the functional role of intention: that of providing settled objectives to guide deliberation and action. A likely result is either that entities will be multiplied, or that the resultant account will invite reassertion of reductionist (...)
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  28.  10
    Andrew F. G. Bourke (2014). The Gene’s-Eye View, Major Transitions and the Formal Darwinism Project. Biology and Philosophy 29 (2):241-248.
    I argue that Grafen’s formal darwinism project could profitably incorporate a gene’s-eye view, as informed by the major transitions framework. In this, instead of the individual being assumed to maximise its inclusive fitness, genes are assumed to maximise their inclusive fitness. Maximisation of fitness at the individual level is not a straightforward concept because the major transitions framework shows that there are several kinds of biological individual. In addition, individuals have a definable fitness, exhibit individual-level adaptations and arise (...)
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  29.  3
    Emily Kelahan (forthcoming). Simple Ideas and Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue. Philosophia:1-17.
    This paper provides support for the unorthodox view that Hume’s simple ideas are most fruitfully understood as theoretical posits by showing that adopting this interpretation solves a lingering interpretive difficulty, the missing shade of blue. The missing shade of blue is thought to pose a serious challenge to the legitimacy of Hume’s copy principle. Thinking of Humean simple ideas as theoretical posits reveals a dialectical mismatch between Hume and his envisioned reader that, once understood, makes it clear (...)
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  30. Kirk A. Ludwig (1995). Trying the Impossible: Reply to Adams. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:563-570.
    This paper defends the autonomy thesis, which holds that one can intend to do something even though one believes it to be impossible, against attacks by Fred Adams. Adams denies the autonomy thesis on the grounds that it cannot, but must, explain what makes a particular trying, a trying for the aim it has in view. If the autonomy thesis were true, it seems that I could try to fly across the Atlantic ocean merely by typing out this abstract, (...)
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  31.  88
    Jan Plate (2016). Logically Simple Properties and Relations. Philosophers' Imprint 16 (1):1-40.
    This paper presents an account of what it is for a property or relation (or ‘attribute’ for short) to be logically simple. Based on this account, it is shown, among other things, that the logically simple attributes are in at least one important way sparse. This in turn lends support to the view that the concept of a logically simple attribute can be regarded as a promising substitute for Lewis’s concept of a perfectly natural attribute. At (...)
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  32. H. W. Noonan (2010). The Complex and Simple Views of Personal Identity. Analysis 71 (1):72-77.
    What is the difference between the complex view of personal identity over time and the simple view? Traditionally, the defenders of the complex view are said to include Locke and Hume, defenders of the simple view to include Butler and Reid. In our own time it is standard to think of Chisholm and Swinburne as defenders of the simple view and Shoemaker, Parfit, Williams and Lewis as defenders of the complex view. (...)
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  33.  32
    Nick Wiltsher (2016). Against the Additive View of Imagination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):266-282.
    According to the additive view of <span class='Hi'>sensory</span> <span class='Hi'>imagination</span>, mental imagery often involves two elements. There is an image-like element, which gives the experiences qualitative phenomenal character akin to that of perception. There is also a non-image element, consisting of something like suppositions about the image's object. This accounts for extra-<span class='Hi'>sensory</span> features of imagined objects and situations: for example, it determines whether an image of a grey horse is an image of Desert Orchid, or of (...)
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  34.  73
    David Liebesman (2011). Simple Generics. Noûs 45 (3):409-442.
    Consensus has it that generic sentences such as “Dogs bark” and “Birds fly” contain, at the level of logical form, an unpronounced generic operator: Gen. On this view, generics have a tripartite structure similar to overtly quantified sentences such as “Most dogs bark” and “Typically, birds fly”. I argue that Gen doesn’t exist and that generics have a simple bipartite structure on par with ordinary atomic sentences such as “Homer is drinking”. On my view, the subject terms (...)
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  35.  14
    Shieva Kleinschmidt (forthcoming). Simple Trinitarianism and Feature-Placing Sentences. Faith and Philosophy.
    Some trinitarians, such as Thomas Aquinas, wish to claim that God is mereologically simple; that is, God has no parts distinct from Himself. In this paper, I present Simple Trinitarianism, a view that takes God to be simple but, unlike Aquinas, does not identify the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with anything in our ontology. Instead, the view incorporates resources used in metaphysical debates about Ontology to produce the right results for claims about the (...)
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  36.  10
    Robert W. Spekkens (2007). Evidence for the Epistemic View of Quantum States: A Toy Theory. Physical Review A 75:032110.
    We present a toy theory that is based on a simple principle: the number of questions about the physical state of a system that are answered must always be equal to the number that are unanswered in a state of maximal knowledge. Many quantum phenomena are found to have analogues within this toy theory. These include the noncommutativity of measurements, interference, the multiplicity of convex decompositions of a mixed state, the impossibility of discriminating nonorthogonal states, the impossibility of a (...)
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  37.  56
    Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer (2000). Précis of Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):727-741.
    How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et (...)
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  38. Michael Murray, The God's I Point of View.
    Recent non-representationalists and metaphysical anti-realists have argued that the “Enlightenment notion” of a “God’s eye” point of view of the world is unsustainable. Deployment of conceptual schemes and/or intersubjective assent both constitute the world and fix the truth value of our statements about it. Many theists, on the contrary, hold an equally extreme realist position according to which God has a view of the world as it is “in itself" which provides an exhaustive description of the world. Furthermore, (...)
     
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  39.  4
    Pablo Razeto-Barry (2013). Complexity, Adaptive Complexity and the Creative View of Natural Selection. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (3):312-315.
    In this paper, I respond to arguments proposed by Brunnander in this journal issue concerning my position regarding the Creative View of natural selection . Brunnander argues that the Creative View we defend does not serve to answer William Paley’s question because Paley’s question is “why there are complex things rather than simple ones” and natural selection cannot answer this question. Brunnander’s arguments for defend a Non-creative View of natural selection . Here I claim that Brunnander’s (...)
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  40. Alexander Rueger & W. David Sharp (1996). Simple Theories of a Messy World: Truth and Explanatory Power in Nonlinear Dynamics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):93-112.
    Philosophers like Duhem and Cartwright have argued that there is a tension between laws' abilities to explain and to represent. Abstract laws exemplify the first quality, phenomenological laws the second. This view has both metaphysical and methodological aspects: the world is too complex to be represented by simple theories; supplementing simple theories to make them represent reality blocks their confirmation. We argue that both aspects are incompatible with recent developments in nonlinear dynamics. Confirmation procedures and modelling strategies (...)
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  41.  4
    Valtteri Arstila (2015). Keeping Postdiction Simple. Consciousness and Cognition 38:205-216.
    abstract Postdiction effects are phenomena in which a stimulus influences the appearance of events taking place before it. In metacontrast masking, for instance, a masking stimulus can ren- der a target stimulus shown before the mask invisible. This and other postdiction effects have been considered incompatible with a simple explanation according to which (i) our perceptual experiences are delayed for only the time it takes for a distal stimulus to reach our sensory receptors and for our neural mechanisms to (...)
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  42.  22
    A. M. Soto & C. Sonnenschein (2006). Emergentism by Default: A View From the Bench. [REVIEW] Synthese 151 (3):361-376.
    For the last 50 years the dominant stance in experimental biology has been reductionism in general, and genetic reductionism in particular. Philosophers were the first to realize that the belief that the Mendelian genes were reduced to DNA molecules was questionable. Soon, experimental data confirmed these misgivings. The optimism of molecular biologists, fueled by early success in tackling relatively simple problems has now been tempered by the difficulties encountered when applying the same simple ideas to complex problems. We (...)
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  43.  2
    Jennifer Smalligan Marušić (2016). Locke's Simple Account of Sensitive Knowledge. Philosophical Review 125 (2):205-239.
    Locke seems to hold that we have knowledge of the existence of external objects through sensation. Two problems face Locke's account. The first problem concerns the logical form of knowledge of real existence. Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas. However, perceiving agreements between ideas seems to yield knowledge only of analytic truths, not propositions about existence. The second problem concerns the epistemic status of sensitive knowledge: How could the senses yield certain knowledge? This (...)
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  44.  37
    Stefano Predelli (2010). Malapropisms and the Simple Picture of Communication. Mind and Language 25 (3):329-345.
    This essay defends an analysis of malapropisms consistent with the Simple Picture of communication, namely the view that speakers communicate that P by employing expressions associated with P by the regularities appropriate for the linguistic community to which they belong. My analysis, grounded on the distinction between traces, shapes, and forms, is consistent with an intuitive assessment of the contents conveyed by instances of malapropisms, and with a standard, ‘fully articulated’ approach to semantic interpretation.
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  45.  6
    Rune Nyrup, Pursuing and Accepting Hypotheses: A Peircean View of IBE.
    It is often observed that explanatory reasoning, especially the so-called inference to best explanation, plays a crucial role in theory choice in scientific practice. This paper defends an alternative account of the justificatory role of explanatory reasoning in general, and IBE in particular, inspired by C.S. Peirce's account of abduction. Most contemporary proponents of IBE take it to provide justification for accepting hypotheses as true. In contrast to this, the Peircean view defended here takes explanatory reasoning to first and (...)
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  46.  10
    Jean-Yves Béziau (2003). Logic May Be Simple. Logic, Congruence and Algebra. Logic and Logical Philosophy 5:129-147.
    This paper is an attempt to clear some philosophical questions about the nature of logic by setting up a mathematical framework. The notion of congruence in logic is defined. A logical structure in which there is no non-trivial congruence relation, like some paraconsistent logics, is called simple. The relations between simplicity, the replacement theorem and algebraization of logic are studied (including MacLane-Curry’s theorem and a discussion about Curry’s algebras). We also examine how these concepts are related to such notions (...)
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  47.  5
    Pierre Bourdieu & Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson (1988). Flaubert's Point of View. Critical Inquiry 14 (3):539-562.
    The break necessary to establish a rigorous science of cultural works is something more and something else than a simple methodological reversal.1 It implies a true conversion of the ordinary way of thinking and living the intellectual enterprise. It is a matter of breaking the narcissistic relationship inscribed in the representation of intellectual work as a “creation” and which excludes as the expression par excellence of “reductionist sociology” the effort to subject the artist and the work of art to (...)
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  48.  41
    Jani Hakkarainen (2011). Hume's Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties. Metaphysica 12 (2):197-212.
    In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature , Book 1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his atomistic (...)
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  49.  23
    Jeffrey Dunn (2012). Reliabilism: Holistic or Simple? Episteme 9 (3):225-233.
    Simple versions of Reliabilism about justification say that S's believing that p is justified if and only if the belief was produced by a belief-forming process that is reliable above some high threshold. Alvin Goldman, in Epistemology and Cognition, argues for a more complex version of the view according to which it is total epistemic systems that are assessed for reliability, rather than individual processes. Why prefer this more complex version of Reliabilism? Two reasons suggest themselves. First, it (...)
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  50.  15
    J. Ostrowick (2012). Is Theism a Simple, and Hence Probable, Explanation for the Universe? South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):354-368.
    Richard Swinburne, in his The Existence of God (2004), presents a cosmological argument in defence of theism (Swinburne 1991: 119, 135). God, Swinburne argues, is more likely to bring about an ordered universe than other states (ibid.: 144, 299). To defend this view, Swinburne presents the following arguments: (1) That this ordered universe is a priori improbable (2004: 49, 150, 1991: 304 et seq.), given the stringent requirements for life (cf. also Leslie 2000: 12), and the Second Law of (...)
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