Search results for 'Simulation theory' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Shannon Spaulding (2012). Mirror Neurons Are Not Evidence for the Simulation Theory. Synthese 189 (3):515-534.score: 180.0
    Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate. The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in the Simulation Theory (ST) of mindreading. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over Theory Theory (TT). In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for (...)
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  2. Annika Wallin (2011). Is Egocentric Bias Evidence for Simulation Theory? Synthese 178 (3):503 - 514.score: 180.0
    Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor's genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones' own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to (...)
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  3. Mauro Rossi (2013). Simulation Theory and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons Reconsidered. Synthese 191 (6):1-26.score: 180.0
    According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In (...)
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  4. Theodore Bach (2011). Structure-Mapping: Directions From Simulation to Theory. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):23-51.score: 162.0
    The theory of mind debate has reached a “hybrid consensus” concerning the status of theory-theory and simulation-theory. Extant hybrid models either specify co-dependency and implementation relations, or distribute mentalizing tasks according to folk-psychological categories. By relying on a non-developmental framework these models fail to capture the central connection between simulation and theory. I propose a “dynamic” hybrid that is informed by recent work on the nature of similarity cognition. I claim that Gentner’s model (...)
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  5. John Michael, Simulation as an Epistemic Tool Between Theory and Practice: A Comparison of the Relationship Between Theory and Simulation in Science and Folk Psychology. EPSA07.score: 162.0
    Simulation as an epistemic tool between theory and practice: A Comparison of the Relationship between Theory and Simulation in Science and in Folk Psychology In this paper I explore the concept of simulation that is employed by proponents of the so-called simulation theory within the debate about the nature and scientific status of folk psychology. According to simulation theory, folk psychology is not a sort of theory that postulates theoretical entities (...)
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  6. Josef Perner & Anton Kühberger (2002). Framing and the Theory-Simulation Controversy. Predicting People's Decisions. Mind and Society 3 (2):65-80.score: 156.0
    We introduce a particular way of drawing the distinction between the use of theory and simulation in the prediction of people's decisions and describe an empirical method to test whether theory or simulation is used in a particular case. We demonstrate this method with two effects of decision making involving the choice between a safe option (take amount X) and a risky option (take double the amount X with probability 1/2). People's predictions of choice frequencies for (...)
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  7. Giuseppina D'Oro (2009). Reclaiming the Ancestors of Simulation Theory. History and Theory 48 (1):129-139.score: 156.0
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  8. Brie Gertler (2004). Simulation Theory on Conceptual Grounds. Protosociology 20:261-284.score: 156.0
    I will present a conceptual argument for a simulationist answer to (2). Given that our conception of mental states is employed in attributing mental states to others, a simulationist answer to (2) supports a simulationist answer to (1). I will not address question (3). Answers to (1) and (2) do not yield an answer to (3), since (1) and (2) concern only our actual practices and concepts. For instance, an error theory about (1) and (2) would say that our (...)
     
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  9. Angela Arkway (2000). The Simulation Theory, the Theory Theory and Folk Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):115-137.score: 150.0
  10. Robert M. Gordon (1992). The Simulation Theory: Objections and Misconceptions. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34.score: 150.0
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  11. Justin C. Fisher (2006). Does Simulation Theory Really Involve Simulation? Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.score: 132.0
    This paper contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the cognitive processes involved when one person predicts a target person's behavior and/or attributes a mental state to that target person. According to simulation theory, a person typically performs these tasks by employing some part of her brain as a simulation of what is going on in a corresponding part of the brain of the target person. I propose a general intuitive analysis of what 'simulation' means. Simulation (...)
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  12. William S. Wilkerson (2001). Simulation, Theory, and the Frame Problem: The Interpretive Moment. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153.score: 132.0
    The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the (...)
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  13. Joel Pust (1999). External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Simulation Theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.score: 132.0
    Stich and Ravenscroft (1994) distinguish between internal and external accounts of folk psychology and argue that this distinction makes a significant difference to the debate over eliminative materialism. I argue that their views about the implications of the internal/external distinction for the debate over eliminativism are mistaken. First, I demonstrate that the first of their two external versions of folk psychology is either not a possible target of eliminativist critique, or not a target distinct from their second version of externalism. (...)
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  14. Frank Jackson (1999). All That Can Be at Issue in the Theory-Theory/Simulation Debate. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):77-96.score: 132.0
  15. Josef Perner & Deborrah Howes (1992). He Thinks He Knows: And More Developmental Evidence Against the Simulation (Role Taking) Theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):72-86.score: 132.0
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  16. Robert M. Gordon & Joe Cruz (2002). Simulation Theory. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.score: 120.0
    What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory.
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  17. Anna Christina Ribeiro, Do Mirror Neurons Support a Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading?score: 120.0
    Both macaque monkeys and humans have been shown to have what are called ‘mirror neurons’, a class of neurons that respond to goal-related motor-actions, both when these actions are performed by the subject and when they are performed by another individual observed by the subject. Gallese and Goldman (1998) contend that mirror neurons may be seen as ‘a part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind- reading ability’, and that of the two competing theories of mind-reading, mirror neurons (...)
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  18. Martin Davies & Tony Stone (2000). Simulation Theory. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.score: 120.0
    Mental simulation is the simulation, replication or re-enactment, usually in imagination, of the thinking, decision-making, emotional responses, or other aspects of the mental life of another person. According to simulation theory, mental simulation in imagination plays a key role in our everyday psychological understanding of other people. The same mental resources that are used in our own thinking, decision-making or emotional responses are redeployed in imagination to provide an understanding of the thoughts, decisions or emotions (...)
     
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  19. Albert Newen & Tobias Schlicht (2009). Understanding Other Minds: A Criticism of Goldman's Simulation Theory and an Outline of the Person Model Theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):209-242.score: 120.0
    What exactly do we do when we try to make sense of other people e.g. by ascribing mental states like beliefs and desires to them? After a short criticism of Theory-Theory, Interaction Theory and the Narrative Theory of understanding others as well as an extended criticism of the Simulation Theory in Goldman's recent version (2006), we suggest an alternative approach: the Person Model Theory . Person models are the basis for our ability to (...)
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  20. Anne Germain, Tore A. Nielsen, Antonio Zadra & Jacques Montplaisir (2000). The Prevalence of Typical Dream Themes Challenges the Specificity of the Threat Simulation Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):940-941.score: 120.0
    The evolutionary theory of threat simulation during dreaming indicates that themes appropriate to ancestral survival concerns (threats) should be disproportionately represented in dreams. Our studies of typical dream themes in students and sleep-disordered patients indicate that threatening dreams involving chase and pursuit are indeed among the three most prevalent themes, thus supporting Revonsuo's theory. However, many of the most prevalent themes are of positive, not negative, events (e.g., sex, flying) and of current, not ancestral, threat scenarios (e.g., (...)
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  21. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Attitude and Image, or, What Will Simulation Theory Let Us Eliminate?score: 120.0
    Stich & Ravenscroft (1994) have argued that (contrary to most people's initial assumptions) a simulation account of folk psychology may be consistent with eliminative materialism, but they fail to bring out the full complexity or the potential significance of the relationship. Contemporary eliminativism (particularly in the Churchland version) makes two major claims: the first is a rejection of the orthodox assumption that realistically construed propositional attitudes are fundamental to human cognition; the second is the suggestion that with the advancement (...)
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  22. Meredith R. Wilkinson & Linden J. Ball (2012). Why Studies of Autism Spectrum Disorders Have Failed to Resolve the Theory Theory Versus Simulation Theory Debate. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):263-291.score: 120.0
    The Theory Theory (TT) versus Simulation Theory (ST) debate is primarily concerned with how we understand others’ mental states. Theory theorists claim we do this using rules that are akin to theoretical laws, whereas simulation theorists claim we use our own minds to imagine ourselves in another’s position. Theorists from both camps suggest a consideration of individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) can help resolve the TT/ST debate (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1995; Carruthers 1996a; Goldman 2006). (...)
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  23. Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2012). Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.score: 120.0
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties (...)
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  24. Antti Revonsuo & Katja Valli (2000). Dreaming and Consciousness: Testing the Threat Simulation Theory of the Function of Dreaming. Psyche 6 (8).score: 118.0
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  25. Shaun Gallagher (2006). Logical and Phenomenological Arguments Against Simulation Theory. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers. Kluwer/Springer Press. 63--78.score: 116.0
    Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulation (...)
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  26. Tom Cochrane (2010). A Simulation Theory of Musical Expressivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):191-207.score: 114.0
    This paper examines the causal basis of our ability to attribute emotions to music, developing and synthesizing the existing arousal, resemblance and persona theories of musical expressivity to do so. The principal claim is that music hijacks the simulation mechanism of the brain, a mechanism which has evolved to detect one's own and other people's emotions.
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  27. Sophie Desjardins & Antonio Zadra (2006). Is the Threat Simulation Theory Threatened by Recurrent Dreams? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):470-474.score: 114.0
  28. Bill Wringe (2009). Simulation, Theory and Collapse. Erkenntnis 71 (2):223 - 232.score: 114.0
    Recent philosophical discussions of our capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings, and to produce accurate predictions and informative explanations of their behavior which make reference to the content of those states have focused on two apparently contrasting ways in which we might hope to account for these abilities. The first is that of regarding our competence as being under-girded by our grasp of a tacit psychological theory. The second builds on the idea that in trying to (...)
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  29. M. Lebar (2001). Simulation, Theory, and Emotion. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):423 – 434.score: 114.0
    It seems that in interpreting others we sometimes simulate, sometimes apply theory. Josef Perner has suggested that a fruitful line of inquiry in folk psychology would seek "criteria for problems where we have to use simulation from those where we do without or where it is even impossible to use." In this paper I follow Perner with a suggestion that our understanding of our interpretive processes may benefit from considering their physiological bases. In particular, I claim that it (...)
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  30. Luca Barlassina (2013). Simulation is Not Enough: A Hybrid Model of Disgust Attribution on the Basis of Visual Stimuli. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.score: 108.0
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as (...)
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  31. Mitchell Herschbach (2012). Mirroring Versus Simulation: On the Representational Function of Simulation. Synthese 189 (3):483-513.score: 108.0
    Mirror neurons and systems are often appealed to as mechanisms enabling mindreading, i.e., understanding other people’s mental states. Such neural mirroring processes are often treated as instances of mental simulation rather than folk psychological theorizing. I will call into question this assumed connection between mirroring and simulation, arguing that mirroring does not necessarily constitute mental simulation as specified by the simulation theory of mindreading. I begin by more precisely characterizing “mirroring” (Sect. 2) and “simulation (...)
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  32. Mahin Chenari (2009). Hermeneutics and Theory of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):17-31.score: 108.0
    In contemporary philosophy and psychology there is an ongoing debate around the concept of theory of mind. Theory of mind concerns our ability to understand another person. The two approaches that dominate the debate are “Theory Theory” (TT) and “Simulation Theory” (ST). This paper explores the connection between theory of mind and hermeneutics. Although both speak of the nature of understanding, and the way we gain and organize our knowledge of others, certain aspects (...)
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  33. Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Simulation à la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435 - 446.score: 108.0
    Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986 ) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (...)
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  34. Rebecca Saxe (2009). The Neural Evidence for Simulation is Weaker Than I Think You Think It Is. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):447 - 456.score: 108.0
    Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this (...)
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  35. Mitchell Aboulafia (2011). Through the Eyes of Mad Men: Simulation, Interaction, and Ethics. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (2):133-147.score: 108.0
    Traditionally pragmatists have been favorably disposed to improving our understanding of agency and ethics through the use of empirical research. In the last two decades simulation theory has been championed in certain cognitive science circles as a way of explaining how we attribute mental states and predict human behavior. Drawing on research in psychology and neuroscience, Alvin I. Goldman and Robert M. Gordon have not only used simulation theory to discuss how we “mindread”, but have suggested (...)
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  36. Luca Barlassina (2011). After All, It’s Still Replication: A Reply to Jacob on Simulation and Mirror Neurons. Res Cogitans 8 (1):92-111.score: 108.0
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the simulation theory (ST), mindreading is based on the ability the mind has of replicating others' mental states and processes. Mirror neurons (MNs) are a class of neurons that fire both when an agent performs a goal-directed action and when she observes the same type of action performed by another individual. Since MNs appear to form a replicative mechanism in which a portion of the observer's (...)
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  37. Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Review: Simulation à la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435 - 446.score: 108.0
    Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman (...)
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  38. Uku Tooming (2013). Without Pretense: A Critique of Goldman's Model of Simulation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 108.0
    In this paper I criticize Alvin Goldman's simulation theory of mindreading which involves the claim that the basic method of folk psychologically predicting behaviour is to form pretend beliefs and desires that reproduce the transitions between the mental states of others, in that way enabling to predict what the others are going to do. I argue that when it comes to simulating propositional attitudes it isn't clear whether pretend beliefs need to be invoked in order to explain relevant (...)
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  39. William Child (2002). Reply to Simulation Theory and Mental Concepts. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.score: 108.0
     
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  40. A. Goldman (2002). Simulation Theory and Mental Concepts. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.score: 108.0
     
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  41. A. Goldman (1992). In Defense of the Simulation Theory. Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.score: 102.0
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  42. Martin Davies & Tony Stone (2001). Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse. Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):127-73.score: 102.0
    According to the theory theory of folk psychology, our engagement in the folk psychological practices of prediction, interpretation and explanation draws on a rich body of knowledge about psychological matters. According to the simulation theory, in apparent contrast, a fundamental role is played by our ability to identify with another person in imagination and to replicate or re-enact aspects of the other person’s mental life. But amongst theory theorists, and amongst simulation theorists, there are (...)
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  43. Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (1995). Second Thoughts on Simulation. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.score: 102.0
    The essays in this volume make it abundantly clear that there is no shortage of disagreement about the plausibility of the simulation theory. As we see it, there are at least three factors contributing to this disagreement. In some instances the issues in dispute are broadly empirical. Different people have different views on which theory is favored by experiments reported in the literature, and different hunches about how future experiments are likely to turn out. In 3.1 and (...)
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  44. Theodore R. Schatzki (2000). Simulation Theory and the Verstehen School: A Wittgensteinian Approach. In K. R. Stueber & H. H. Kogaler (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.score: 102.0
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  45. John D. Greenwood (1999). Simulation, Theory-Theory and Cognitive Penetration: No 'Instance of the Fingerpost'. Mind and Language 14 (1):32-56.score: 102.0
  46. Anton Kühberger, Christoph Kogler, H. U. G. Angelika & Evelyne Mösl (2006). The Role of the Position Effect in Theory and Simulation. Mind and Language 21 (5):610–625.score: 102.0
    We contribute to the empirical debate on whether we understand and predict mental states by using simulation (simulation theory) or by relying on a folk psychological theory (theory theory). To decide between these two fundamental positions, it has been argued that failure to predict other people's choices would be challenging evidence against the simulation view. We test the specific claim that people prefer the rightmost position in choosing among equally valued objects, and whether (...)
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  47. Charles H. Powers & Robert A. Hanneman (1983). Pareto's Theory of Social and Economic Cycles: A Formal Model and Simulation. Sociological Theory 1:59-89.score: 102.0
    In his sociological works Pareto developed a theory of cyclical social change within the general equilibrium framework. Building on an earlier propositional formalization, we translate Pareto's theory into a series of simultaneous equations and simulate the equation system. The dynamic behavior of the simulation is consistent with Pareto's predictions and demonstrates the internal logic of the theory.
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  48. R. A. Sharpe (1997). One Cheer for the Simulation Theory. Inquiry 40 (1):115-31.score: 102.0
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  49. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). Folk Psychology Without Theory or Simulation. In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Springer. 115--135.score: 96.0
    This paper spells out just how the Narrative Practice Hypothesis, if true, undercuts any need to appeal to either theory or simulation when it comes to explaining the basis of folk psychological understanding: these heuristics do not come into play other than in cases of in which the framework is used to speculate about why another may have acted. To add appropriate force to this observation, I first say something about why we should reject the widely held assumption (...)
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  50. G. Graham White (1999). Simulation, Theory, and Cut Elimination. The Monist 82 (1):165--184.score: 96.0
    This paper is concerned. with the contrast between simulation- and deduction-based approaches to reasoning about physical objects. We show that linear logic can give a unified account of both simulation and deduction concerning physical objects; it also allows us to draw a principled distinction between simulation and deduction, since simulations correspond to cut-free proofs, whereas deductions correspond to proofs in general.
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