Search results for 'Skepticism' (try it on Scholar)

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Bibliography: Skepticism in Epistemology
Bibliography: Moral Skepticism in Meta-Ethics
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  1. Ancient Western Skepticism & Practical Wisdom (2002). Philosophical Skepticism. Hume Studies 28 (2).score: 180.0
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  2. John Turri (2013). Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):83-98.score: 27.0
    This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.
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  3. Anthony Brueckner (2012). Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Skepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):145-151.score: 27.0
    In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,“ Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge's views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to comment on a couple of aspects of Barel's article. First, I have my own take, different from Barel's, on the question of whether we can sketch an a priori anti-skeptical argument proceeding from perceptual anti-individualism. Second, I (...)
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  4. Giovanni Mion (2013). Skepticism and Objective Contexts: A Critique of DeRose. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):119-129.score: 27.0
    In the paper, I contrast my contextualist account of Cartesian skepticism with Keith DeRose’s account. I agree with DeRose that when the Cartesian skeptic and her opponent meet in the same context, their claims are truth-value-less. But I agree with him on the basis of different conception of context sensitivity. According to DeRose, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is personally indicated. Instead, for me, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, (...)
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  5. Guy Axtell (2008). Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.score: 27.0
    This chapter focuses on the responses that proponents of virtue epistemology (VE) make to radical skepticism and particularly to two related forms of it, Pyrrhonian skepticism and the “underdetermination-based” argument, both of which have been receiving widening attention in recent debate. Section 1 of the chapter briefly articulates these two skeptical arguments and their interrelationship, while section 2 explains the close connection between a virtue-theoretic and a neo-Moorean response to them. In sections 3 and 4 I advance arguments (...)
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  6. Daniel Callcut (2006). The Value of Teaching Moral Skepticism. Teaching Philosophy 29 (3):223-235.score: 24.0
    This article argues that introductory ethics classes can unwittingly create or confirm skeptical views toward morality. Introductory courses frequently include critical discussion of skeptical positions such as moral relativism and psychological egoism as a way to head off this unintended outcome. But this method of forestalling skepticism can have a residual (and unintended) skeptical effect. The problem calls for deeper pedagogical-cum-philosophical engagement with the underlying sources of skepticism. The paper provides examples of how to do this and explains (...)
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  7. Peter Hawke (2011). Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):351-364.score: 24.0
    In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism, offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s (...)
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  8. Patrick Hawley (2007). Skepticism and the Value of Knowledge. In Chienkuo Mi Ruey-lin Chen (ed.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.score: 24.0
    The main claim of this essay is that knowledge is no more
    valuable than lasting true belief.
    This claim is surprising. Doesn't knowledge have a unique
    and special value? If the main claim is correct and if, as it seems,
    knowledge is not lasting true belief, then knowledge does not have a unique value:
    in whatever way knowledge is valuable, lasting true belief is just as valuable.
    However, this result does not show that knowledge is worthless, nor does it undermine
    our knowledge gathering practices. There (...)
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  9. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2009). Epistemic Humility, Arguments From Evil, and Moral Skepticism. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2:17-57.score: 24.0
    Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth, 2013, 6th edition, eds. Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. In this essay, I argue that the moral skepticism objection to what is badly named "skeptical theism" fails.
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  10. Tim Willenken (2011). Moorean Responses to Skepticism: A Defense. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.score: 24.0
    Few philosophers believe that G. E. Moore's notorious proof of an external world can give us justification to believe that skepticism about perceptual beliefs is false. The most prominent explanation of what is wrong with Moore's proof—as well as some structurally similar anti-skeptical arguments—centers on conservatism: roughly, the view that someone can acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of E only if he has p-independent justification to believe that all of the skeptical hypotheses that undermine the (...)
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  11. Manuel Vargas (2004). Libertarianism and Skepticism About Free Will: Some Arguments Against Both. Philosophical Topics 32 (1&2):403-26.score: 24.0
    In this paper I criticize libertarianism and skepticism about free will. The criticism of libertarianism takes some steps towards filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail, the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say "take some steps" because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe (...)
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  12. Alexander S. Harper (2010). Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism. Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.score: 24.0
    Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains-in-vats (BIVs), it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge-claims is much (...)
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  13. Evelyn Brister (2009). Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism. Metaphilosophy 40 (5):671-688.score: 24.0
    Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an (...)
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  14. Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism : A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Ars Disputandi 4 (4):1-1.score: 24.0
    Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy's argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical theism need (...)
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  15. Santiago Echeverri (2011). McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.score: 24.0
    Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could (...)
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  16. Jessica M. Wilson (2012). The Regress Argument Against Cartesian Skepticism. Analysis 72 (4):668-673.score: 24.0
    I argue that Cartesian skepticism about the external world leads to a vicious regress of skeptical attitudes, the only principled and unproblematic response to which requires refraining from taking the very first skeptical step.
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  17. John Greco (ed.) (2008). The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    In the history of philosophical thought, few themes loom as large as skepticism. Skepticism has been the most visible and important part of debates about knowledge. Skepticism at its most basic questions our cognitive achievements, challenges our ability to obtain reliable knowledge; casting doubt on our attempts to seek and understand the truth about everything from ethics, to other minds, religious belief, and even the underlying structure of matter and reality. Since Descartes, the defense of knowledge against (...)
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  18. Adrian Bardon (2006). The Aristotelian Prescription: Skepticism, Retortion, and Transcendental Arguments. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):263-276.score: 24.0
    From a number of quarters have come attempts to answer some form of skepticism—about knowledge of the external world, freedom of the will, or moral reasons—by showing it to be performatively self-defeating. Examples of this strategy are subject to a number of criticisms, in particular the criticism that they fail to shift the burden of proof from the anti-skeptical position, and so fail to establish the epistemic entitlement they seek. To these approaches I contrast one way of understanding Kant’s (...)
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  19. Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (2013). Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities 2 (3):351-368.score: 24.0
    We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the (...)
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  20. Otávio Bueno (2009). Sosa on Skepticism. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):195-202.score: 24.0
    Abstract: Ernest Sosa has recently articulated an insightful response to skepticism and, in particular, to the dream argument. The response relies on two independent moves. First, Sosa offers the imagination model of dreaming according to which no assertions are ever made in dreams and no beliefs are involved there. As a result, it is possible to distinguish dreaming from being awake, and the dream argument is blocked. Second, Sosa develops a virtue epistemology according to which in appropriately normal conditions (...)
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  21. Stephen Maitzen (2006). The Impossibility of Local Skepticism. Philosophia 34 (4):453-464.score: 24.0
    According to global skepticism, we know nothing. According to local skepticism, we know nothing in some particular area or domain of discourse. Unlike their global counterparts, local skeptics think they can contain our invincible ignorance within limited bounds. I argue that they are mistaken. Local skepticism, particularly the kinds that most often get defended, cannot stay local: if there are domains whose truths we cannot know, then there must be claims outside those domains that we cannot know (...)
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  22. Mikkel Gerken (2012). Critical Notice: Essays on Skepticism. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):65-77.score: 24.0
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  23. James R. Beebe (2007). BonJour's Abductivist Reply to Skepticism. Philosophia 35 (2):181-196.score: 24.0
    The abductivist reply to skepticism is the view that commonsense explanations of the patterns and regularities that appear in our sensory experiences should be rationally preferred to skeptical explanations of those same patterns and regularities on the basis of explanatory considerations. In this article I critically examine Laurence BonJour’s rationalist version of the abductivist position. After explaining why BonJour’s account is more defensible than other versions of the view, I argue that the notion of probability he relies upon is (...)
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  24. Igor Douven & Diederik Olders (2008). Unger's Argument for Skepticism Revisited. Theoria 74 (3):239-250.score: 24.0
    Unger (1974/2000) presents an argument for skepticism that significantly differs from the more traditional arguments for skepticism. The argument is based on two premises, to wit, that knowledge would entitle the knower to absolute certainty, and that an attitude of absolute certainty is always inadmissible from an epistemic viewpoint. The present paper scrutinizes the arguments that Unger provides in support of these premises and shows that none of them is tenable. It thus concludes that Unger's argument for (...) fails to threaten the possibility of knowledge. (shrink)
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  25. Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2013). Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):605-623.score: 24.0
    Abstract Timothy Williamson has recently proposed to undermine modal skepticism by appealing to the reducibility of modal to counterfactual logic ( Reducibility ). Central to Williamson’s strategy is the claim that use of the same non-deductive mode of inference ( counterfactual development , or CD ) whereby we typically arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals suffices for arriving at knowledge of metaphysical necessity via Reducibility. Granting Reducibility, I ask whether the use of CD plays any essential role in a Reducibility-based (...)
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  26. Christoph Jäger (2004). Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske's Theory of Knowledge. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):187 - 201.score: 24.0
    According to Fred Dretskes externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretskes epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known logical entailment. I argue that, given Dretskes construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. This has far-reaching consequences. (...)
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  27. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) (2004). Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by (...)
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  28. Huaping Wang (2011). Disjunctivism and Skepticism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):443-464.score: 24.0
    Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, (...)
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  29. Baron Reed (2009). A New Argument for Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.score: 24.0
    The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new (...)
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  30. Michael Blome-Tillmann (forthcoming). Skepticism and Contextualism. In Baron Reed & Diego Manchuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Continuum.score: 24.0
  31. Michael Forster (2009). Kant and Skepticism. Princeton University Press.score: 24.0
    This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth principally in the Critique of Pure Reason.
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  32. Dylan Dodd (2012). Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries. Erkenntnis 77 (1):95-120.score: 24.0
    Several philosophers have claimed that S knows p only if S’ s belief is safe, where S's belief is safe iff (roughly) in nearby possible worlds in which S believes p, p is true. One widely held intuition many people have is that one cannot know that one's lottery ticket will lose a fair lottery prior to an announcement of the winner, regardless of how probable it is that it will lose. Duncan Pritchard has claimed that a chief advantage of (...)
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  33. Owen Ware (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility. Dissertation, University of Torontoscore: 24.0
    In his early writings, Kant says that the solution to the puzzle of how morality can serve as a motivating force in human life is nothing less than the “philosophers’ stone.” In this dissertation I show that for years Kant searched for the philosophers’ stone in the concept of “respect” (Achtung), which he understood as the complex effect practical reason has on feeling. I sketch the history of that search in Chapters 1-2. In Chapter 3 I show that Kant’s analysis (...)
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  34. Pirooz Fatoorchi (2013). On Intellectual Skepticism: A Selection of Skeptical Arguments and Ṭūsī's Criticisms, with Some Comparative Notes. Philosophy East and West 63 (2):213-250.score: 24.0
    This essay deals with a selected part of an epistemological controversy provided by Tūsī in response to the skeptical arguments reported by Rāzī that is related to what might be called "intellectual skepticism," or skepticism regarding the judgments of the intellect, particularly in connection with self-evident principles. It will be shown that Rāzī has cited and exposed a position that seems to be no less than a medieval version of empiricism. Tūsī, in contrast, has presented us with a (...)
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  35. Brian Ribeiro (2002). Cartesian Skepticism and the Epistemic Priority Thesis. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):573-586.score: 24.0
    In ' Unnatural Doubts' Michael Williams argues that Cartesian skepticism is not truly an "intuitive problem" (that is, one which we can state with little or no appeal to contentious theories) at all. According to Williams, the skeptic has rich theoretical commitments all his own, prominent among which is the epistemic priority thesis. I argue, however, that Williams's diagnostic critique of the epistemic priority thesis fails on his own conception of what is required for success. Furthermore, in a brief (...)
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  36. Eisuke Sakakibara (2013). Incarnating Kripke's Skepticism About Meaning. Erkenntnis 78 (2):277-291.score: 24.0
    Although Kripke’s skepticism leads to the conclusion that meaning does not exist, his argument relies upon the supposition that more than one interpretation of words is consistent with linguistic evidence. Relying solely on metaphors, he assumes that there is a multiplicity of possible interpretations without providing any strict proof. In his book The Taming of the True, Neil Tennant pointed out that there are serious obstacles to this thesis and concluded that the skeptic’s nonstandard interpretations are “will o’ wisps.” (...)
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  37. Matthew B. Gifford (2013). Skepticism and Elegance: Problems for the Abductivist Reply to Cartesian Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):685-704.score: 24.0
    Some philosophers argue that we are justified in rejecting skepticism because it is explanatorily inferior to more commonsense hypotheses about the world. Focusing on the work of Jonathan Vogel, I show that this “abductivist” or “inference to the best explanation” response rests on an impoverished explanatory framework which ignores the explanatory gap between an object's having certain properties and its appearing to have those properties. Once this gap is appreciated, I argue, the abductivist strategy is defeated.
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  38. Brian Ribeiro & Scott Aikin (2013). Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Commands. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):77-96.score: 24.0
  39. Kirk Ludwig, Skepticism, Logical Independence, and Epistemic Priority.score: 24.0
    Radical skepticism about the external world is founded on two assumptions: one is that the mind and the external world are logically independent; the other is that all our evidence for the nature of that world consists of facts about our minds. In this paper, I explore the option of denying the epistemic, rather than the logical assumption. I argue that one can do so only by embracing externalism about justification, or, after all, by rejecting the logical independence assumption. (...)
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  40. Igor Douven (2009). Can the Skepticism Debate Be Resolved? Synthese 168 (1):23 - 52.score: 24.0
    External world skeptics are typically opposed to admitting as evidence anything that goes beyond the purely phenomenal, and equally typically, they disown the use of rules of inference that might enable one to move from premises about the phenomenal alone to a conclusion about the external world. This seems to bar any a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate. This paper argues that the situation is not quite so hopeless, and that an a posteriori resolution of the debate becomes (...)
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  41. Jay Newhard (2012). The Argument From Skepticism for Contextualism. Philosophia 40 (3):563-575.score: 24.0
    Epistemic contextualism was originally motivated and supported by the response it provides to skeptical paradox. Although there has been much discussion of the contextualist response to skeptical paradox, not much attention has been paid to the argument from skepticism for contextualism. Contextualists argue that contextualism accounts for the plausibility and apparent inconsistency of a set of paradoxical claims better than any classical invariantist theory. In this paper I focus on and carefully examine the argument from skepticism for contextualism. (...)
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  42. Peter J. Graham (2007). The Theoretical Diagnosis of Skepticism. Synthese 158 (1):19 - 39.score: 24.0
    Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion). Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in (...)
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  43. Thomas M. Lennon (2008). The Plain Truth: Descartes, Huet, and Skepticism. Brill.score: 24.0
    People -- Who was Huet? -- The censura : why and when? -- The birth of skepticism -- Malebranche's surprising silence -- The downfall of cartesianism -- Kinds -- Huet a cartesian? -- Descartes and skepticism : the standard interpretation -- Descartes and skepticism : the texts -- Thoughts -- The cogito : an inference? -- The transparency of mind -- The cogito as pragmatic tautology -- Doubts -- The reality of doubt -- The generation of doubt (...)
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  44. Tim Black (2008). A Warranted-Assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):187-205.score: 24.0
    According to a Moorean response to skepticism, the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively low, and we can know across contexts all that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon the Moorean to defend his position by explaining how, in contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p, it can seem (...)
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  45. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of our evidential grounds, (...)
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  46. Diego E. Machuca (ed.) (2013). Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge.score: 24.0
    Disagreement is a pervasive feature of human life whose skeptical implications have been emphasized particularly by the ancient Pyrrhonists and by contemporary moral skeptics. Although the connection between disagreement and skepticism is also a focus of analysis in the emerging and burgeoning area of epistemology concerned with the significance of controversy, it has arguably not received the full attention it deserves. The present volume explores for the first time the possible skeptical consequences of disagreement in different areas and from (...)
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  47. Stanley Cavell (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism. University of Chicago Press.score: 24.0
    These lectures by one of the most influential and original philosophers of the twentieth century constitute a sustained argument for the philosophical basis of romanticism, particularly in its American rendering. Through his examination of such authors as Emerson, Thoreau, Poe, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, Stanley Cavell shows that romanticism and American transcendentalism represent a serious philosophical response to the challenge of skepticism that underlies the writings of Wittgenstein and Austin on ordinary language.
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  48. Steven M. Duncan, Why Skepticism Fails.score: 24.0
    Do skeptical arguments undermine reason, as Hume supposes? In this paper, I argue that they do not and that skepticism is thus no threat to dogmatism about the possibility of knowledge.
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  49. Italo Testa (2009). Recognition, Skepticism and Self-Consciousness in the Young Hegel. Fenomenologia E Società 32 (2):117-132.score: 24.0
    The theory of recognition arises within Hegel's confrontation with epistemological skepticism and aims at responding to the questions raised by modern skepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. This is possible to the extent that the theory of recognition is the guiding thread of a critique of the modern foundational theory of knowledge and, at the same time, the point of departure for an alternative approach. In this article I (...)
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  50. Brian Ribeiro (2010). Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed's Long Road to Skepticism. Philosophia 38 (4):789-793.score: 24.0
    Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: (1) contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, (2) these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, (3) knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributabilism that is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful that many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any (...)
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