Search results for 'Skepticism' (try it on Scholar)

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Bibliography: Skepticism in Epistemology
Bibliography: Moral Skepticism in Meta-Ethics
Bibliography: Varieties of Skepticism in Epistemology
Bibliography: Replies to Skepticism in Epistemology
Bibliography: Skepticism, Misc in Epistemology
Bibliography: Metaphilosophical Skepticism in Metaphilosophy
Bibliography: Religious Skepticism in Philosophy of Religion
Bibliography: History: Skepticism in Epistemology
Bibliography: Skepticism about Character in Normative Ethics
Bibliography: Dogmatist and Moorean Replies to Skepticism in Epistemology
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  1. Ancient Western Skepticism & Practical Wisdom (2002). Philosophical Skepticism. Hume Studies 28 (2).
     
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  2. Gregg D. Caruso (2016). Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model. Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):25-48.
    One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical (...)
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  3. Susanna Rinard, Reasoning One's Way Out of Skepticism.
    Many have thought that it is impossible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic that we have knowledge of the external world. This paper aims to show how this could be done. I argue, while appealing only to premises that a skeptic could accept, that it is not rational to believe external world skepticism, because doing so commits one to more extreme forms of skepticism in a way that is self-undermining. In particular, the external world skeptic is ultimately (...)
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  4. Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism. In Elizabeth Shaw (ed.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society.
  5. Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). An Argument for External World Skepticism From the Appearance/Reality Distinction. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying (...)
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  6. John Turri (2013). Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):83-98.
    This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.
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  7.  35
    Daniel Immerman (forthcoming). Sensitivity, Reflective Knowledge, and Skepticism. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 17 Michael Huemer, Ernest Sosa, and Jonathan Vogel have offered a critique of the sensitivity condition on knowledge. According to them, the condition implies that you cannot know of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. Their arguments rest on the claim that you cannot sensitively believe of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. However, as we shall see, these philosophers are mistaken. You can do so. That said, these (...)
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  8.  15
    Kevin McCain (2016). Skepticism and Elegance. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):30-43.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 1, pp 30 - 43 Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. First, (...)
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  9. Mikkel Gerken (2012). Critical Notice: Essays on Skepticism. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):65-77.
    This critical study of Anthony Brueckner’s essay collection on skepticism emphasizes interconnections between the various essays. In particular, it considers Brueckner’s discussion of transcendental anti-skeptical arguments from the theses of anti-individualism and privileged self-knowledge. Finally, some overarching methodological lessons are drawn.
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  10.  14
    Mark Walker (2016). Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):1-29.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 1, pp 1 - 29 Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction OR inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler (...)
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  11.  28
    Mark Walker (2014). Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 29 Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical (...)
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  12.  23
    Daniel Immerman (forthcoming). Sensitivity, Reflective Knowledge, and Skepticism. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 17 Michael Huemer, Ernest Sosa, and Jonathan Vogel have offered a critique of the sensitivity condition on knowledge. According to them, the condition implies that you cannot know of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. Their arguments rest on the claim that you cannot sensitively believe of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. However, as we shall see, these philosophers are mistaken. You can do so. That said, these (...)
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  13.  7
    Philip Atkins (forthcoming). In Defense of Piecemeal Skepticism. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 4 Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul suggest a version of skepticism according to which the skeptic posits a distinct skeptical hypothesis for each external world proposition that a person claims to know. In a recent issue of this journal, Eric Yang argues against this piecemeal approach. In this note, I show that Yang’s argument against piecemeal skepticism is fallacious.
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  14.  73
    Guy Axtell (2008). Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
    This chapter focuses on the responses that proponents of virtue epistemology (VE) make to radical skepticism and particularly to two related forms of it, Pyrrhonian skepticism and the “underdetermination-based” argument, both of which have been receiving widening attention in recent debate. Section 1 of the chapter briefly articulates these two skeptical arguments and their interrelationship, while section 2 explains the close connection between a virtue-theoretic and a neo-Moorean response to them. In sections 3 and 4 I advance arguments (...)
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  15.  34
    Andrew Moon (2017). Skepticism and Memory. In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge
    This chapter is an introduction and survey of the topic of skepticism and memory.
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  16.  10
    Daniel Immerman (forthcoming). Sensitivity, Reflective Knowledge, and Skepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 17 Michael Huemer, Ernest Sosa, and Jonathan Vogel have offered a critique of the sensitivity condition on knowledge. According to them, the condition implies that you cannot know of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. Their arguments rest on the claim that you cannot sensitively believe of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. However, as we shall see, these philosophers are mistaken. You can do so. That said, these (...)
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  17.  9
    Susan Feldman (forthcoming). The Failure of Frances’s Live Skepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 12 In his _Scepticism Comes Alive_, Bryan Frances contends that his “live skepticism” poses a genuine challenge to claims of knowledge in a way that classic “brain-in-a-vat” skepticism does not. This is mistaken. In this paper, I argue that Frances’s live skepticism dies on the horns of a dilemma: if we interpret a key premise in Frances’s skeptical argument template sociologically, then it undercuts itself, showing that there is no reason to accept it (...)
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  18.  10
    James R. Beebe (forthcoming). A Priori Skepticism and the Kk Thesis. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 12 In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a priori skepticism’s seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kk thesis. (...)
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  19.  9
    Susan Feldman (forthcoming). The Failure of Frances’s Live Skepticism. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 12 In his _Scepticism Comes Alive_, Bryan Frances contends that his “live skepticism” poses a genuine challenge to claims of knowledge in a way that classic “brain-in-a-vat” skepticism does not. This is mistaken. In this paper, I argue that Frances’s live skepticism dies on the horns of a dilemma: if we interpret a key premise in Frances’s skeptical argument template sociologically, then it undercuts itself, showing that there is no reason to accept it (...)
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  20.  54
    Brian Ribeiro & Scott Aikin (2013). Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Commands. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):77-96.
    Over the last twenty-five years skeptical theism has become one of the leading contemporary responses to the atheological argument from evil. However, more recently, some critics of skeptical theism have argued that the skeptical theists are in fact unwittingly committed to a malignant form of moral skepticism. Several skeptical theists have responded to this critique by appealing to divine commands as a bulwark against the alleged threat of moral skepticism. In this paper we argue that the skeptical theists’ (...)
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  21.  7
    Susan Feldman (forthcoming). The Failure of Frances’s Live Skepticism. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 12 In his _Scepticism Comes Alive_, Bryan Frances contends that his “live skepticism” poses a genuine challenge to claims of knowledge in a way that classic “brain-in-a-vat” skepticism does not. This is mistaken. In this paper, I argue that Frances’s live skepticism dies on the horns of a dilemma: if we interpret a key premise in Frances’s skeptical argument template sociologically, then it undercuts itself, showing that there is no reason to accept it (...)
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  22.  7
    Kevin McCain (2014). Skepticism and Elegance. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 14 Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. First, Gifford argues that Vogel’s strategy (...)
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  23.  27
    Steven Luper (2012). Contrastivism and Skepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):51-58.
    Recently, Jonathan Schaffer has defended a contrastivist analysis of knowledge. By appealing to his account, he has attempted to steer a path between skepticism and Moore-style antiskepticism: much like sensitivity theorists and contextualists, he offers significant concessions to, but ultimately rejects, both. In this essay I suggest that in fact Schaffer ends up succumbing to skepticism.
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  24.  33
    Anthony Brueckner (2012). Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Skepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):145-151.
    In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,“ Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge's views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to comment on a couple of aspects of Barel's article. First, I have my own take, different from Barel's, on the question of whether we can sketch an a priori anti-skeptical argument proceeding from perceptual anti-individualism. Second, I (...)
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  25.  21
    Markus Lammenranta (2011). Disagreement, Skepticism, and the Dialectical Conception of Justification. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):3-17.
    It is a common intuition that at least in some cases disagreement has skeptical consequences: the participants are not justified in persisting in their beliefs. I will argue that the currently popular non-dialectical and individualistic accounts of justification, such as evidentialism and reliabilism, cannot explain this intuition and defend the dialectical conception of justification that can explain it. I will also argue that this sort of justification is a necessary condition of knowledge by relying on Craig's genealogy of the concept (...)
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  26.  18
    Giovanni Mion (2013). Skepticism and Objective Contexts: A Critique of DeRose. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):119-129.
    In the paper, I contrast my contextualist account of Cartesian skepticism with Keith DeRose’s account. I agree with DeRose that when the Cartesian skeptic and her opponent meet in the same context, their claims are truth-value-less. But I agree with him on the basis of different conception of context sensitivity. According to DeRose, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is personally indicated. Instead, for me, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, (...)
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  27.  5
    Brian Ribeiro & Scott Aikin (2013). Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Commands. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):77-96.
    Over the last twenty-five years skeptical theism has become one of the leading contemporary responses to the atheological argument from evil. However, more recently, some critics of skeptical theism have argued that the skeptical theists are in fact unwittingly committed to a malignant form of moral skepticism. Several skeptical theists have responded to this critique by appealing to divine commands as a bulwark against the alleged threat of moral skepticism. In this paper we argue that the skeptical theists’ (...)
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  28.  13
    Daniel M. Johnson (2013). Skepticism and Circular Arguments. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (4):253-270.
    Perhaps the most popular and historically important way of responding to skepticism is by an appeal to non-inferential justification. A problem with this sort of response is that while it may constitute a response to skepticism, it does not constitute a response to the skeptic. At some point, the anti-skeptic must simply fall silent, resigned to the fact that his or her non-inferential justification for the belief challenged by the skeptic is not communicable. I want to point out (...)
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  29.  39
    Stanley Cavell (1979). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford University Press.
    This reissue of an American philosophical classic includes a new preface by Cavell, in which he discusses the work's reception and influence. The work fosters a fascinating relationship between philosophy and literature both by augmenting his philosophical discussions with examples from literature and by applying philosophical theories to literary texts. Cavell also succeeds in drawing some very important parallels between the British analytic tradition and the continental tradition, by comparing skepticism as understood in Descartes, Hume, and Kant with philosophy (...)
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  30. Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji (forthcoming). Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
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  31.  74
    Michael Hannon (forthcoming). Skepticism About Meta-Skepticism: Meditations on Experimental Philosophy. Episteme.
    Drawing on new empirical data, a group of experimental philosophers have argued that one of the most popular and influential forms of skepticism is much less interesting and much less worrisome than philosophers have thought. Contrary to this claim, I argue that this brand of skepticism remains as threatening as ever. My argument also reveals an important limitation of experimental philosophy and sheds light on the way professional philosophers should go about the business of doing philosophy.
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  32.  16
    Margot Strohminger & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (forthcoming). Moderate Modal Skepticism. In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    This paper examines "moderate modal skepticism", a form of skepticism about metaphysical modality defended by Peter van Inwagen in order to blunt the force of certain modal arguments in the philosophy of religion. Van Inwagen’s argument for moderate modal skepticism assumes Yablo's (1993) influential world-based epistemology of possibility. We raise two problems for this epistemology of possibility, which undermine van Inwagen's argument. We then consider how one might motivate moderate modal skepticism by relying on a different (...)
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  33.  88
    Maria Magoula Adamos (2014). The Ancients, the Vulgar, and Hume's Skepticism. In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies. ATINER 5-15.
    Section III of part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise entitled “Of the ancient philosophy” has been virtually ignored by most Hume scholars. Although philosophers seem to concentrate on sections II and VI of part IV and pay little or no attention to section III, the latter section is paramount in showing how serious Hume's skepticism is, and how Hume's philosophy, contrary to his intention, is far removed from "the sentiments of the vulgar". In this paper I shall (...)
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  34.  26
    Scott Hill (forthcoming). From Isolation to Skepticism. Erkenntnis (3):1-20.
    If moral properties lacked causal powers, would moral skepticism be true? I argue that it would. Along the way I respond to various arguments that it would not.
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  35. Katia Vavova (2014). Moral Disagreement and Moral Skepticism. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.
    The fact of moral disagreement when conjoined with Conciliationism, an independently attractive view about the epistemic significance disagreement, seems to entail moral skepticism. This worries those who like Conciliationism, the independently attractive view, but dislike moral skepticism. Others, equally inclined against moral skepticism, think this is a reductio of Conciliationism. I argue that they are both wrong. There is no reductio and nothing to worry about.
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  36. Daniel Callcut (2006). The Value of Teaching Moral Skepticism. Teaching Philosophy 29 (3):223-235.
    This article argues that introductory ethics classes can unwittingly create or confirm skeptical views toward morality. Introductory courses frequently include critical discussion of skeptical positions such as moral relativism and psychological egoism as a way to head off this unintended outcome. But this method of forestalling skepticism can have a residual (and unintended) skeptical effect. The problem calls for deeper pedagogical-cum-philosophical engagement with the underlying sources of skepticism. The paper provides examples of how to do this and explains (...)
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  37. Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy. Episteme:1-15.
    A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.
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  38.  72
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) (2004). Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by (...)
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  39.  9
    Santiago Echeverri (forthcoming). How to Undercut Radical Skepticism. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to (...)
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  40. Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (2013). Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities 2 (3):351-368.
    We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the (...)
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  41. Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism : A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Ars Disputandi 4 (4):1-1.
    Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary moral reasoning. In this reply to Almeida and Oppy's argument we offer some reasons for thinking that skeptical theism need (...)
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  42. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.
    In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of our evidential grounds, (...)
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  43. John Greco (ed.) (2008). The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    In the history of philosophical thought, few themes loom as large as skepticism. Skepticism has been the most visible and important part of debates about knowledge. Skepticism at its most basic questions our cognitive achievements, challenges our ability to obtain reliable knowledge; casting doubt on our attempts to seek and understand the truth about everything from ethics, to other minds, religious belief, and even the underlying structure of matter and reality. Since Descartes, the defense of knowledge against (...)
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  44. Peter Hawke (2011). Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):351-364.
    In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism, offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s (...)
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  45. Jessica M. Wilson (2012). The Regress Argument Against Cartesian Skepticism. Analysis 72 (4):668-673.
    I argue that Cartesian skepticism about the external world leads to a vicious regress of skeptical attitudes, the only principled and unproblematic response to which requires refraining from taking the very first skeptical step.
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  46.  49
    Stanley Cavell (1988). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism. University of Chicago Press.
    These lectures by one of the most influential and original philosophers of the twentieth century constitute a sustained argument for the philosophical basis of romanticism, particularly in its American rendering. Through his examination of such authors as Emerson, Thoreau, Poe, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, Stanley Cavell shows that romanticism and American transcendentalism represent a serious philosophical response to the challenge of skepticism that underlies the writings of Wittgenstein and Austin on ordinary language.
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  47. José L. Zalabardo (2005). Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Review 114 (1):33-61.
    The paper deals with a version of the principle that a belief source can be a knowledge source only if the subject knows that it is reliable. I argue that the principle can be saved from the main objections that motivate its widespread rejection: the claim that it leads to skepticism, the claim that it forces us to accept counterintuitive knowledge ascriptions and the claim that it is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I argue that naturalist epistemologists should (...)
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  48.  64
    Dustin Locke (2014). Darwinian Normative Skepticism. In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press
    Sharon Street (2006) has argued that, given certain plausible evolutionary considerations, normative realism leads to normative skepticism. Street calls this ‘the Darwinian dilemma’. This paper considers the two most popular responses to the Darwinian dilemma and argues that both are problematic. According to the naturalist response, the evolutionary account of our normative dispositions reveals that there was selection for normative dispositions that were reliable with respect to normative truth. According to the minimalist response, the evolutionary account reveals that there (...)
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  49.  21
    Guido Melchior (2016). Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma. Metaphilosophy 47 (2):214-232.
    This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite (...)
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  50. Michael Blome-Tillmann (forthcoming). Skepticism and Contextualism. In Baron Reed & Diego Manchuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Continuum
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