Search results for 'Smolenski, P' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. John Hawthorne (1989). On the Compatibility of Connectionist and Classical Models. Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):5-16.score: 66.0
    This paper presents considerations in favour of the view that traditional (classical) architectures can be seen as emergent features of connectionist networks with distributed representation. A recent paper by William Bechtel (1988) which argues for a similar conclusion is unsatisfactory in that it fails to consider whether the compositional syntax and semantics attributed to mental representations by classical models can emerge within a connectionist network. The compatibility of the two paradigms hinges largely, I suggest, on how this question is answered. (...)
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  2. Jerry A. Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin (1990). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work. Cognition 35 (2):183-205.score: 32.0
  3. Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (1995). Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do Connectionist Minds Have Beliefs? In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.score: 32.0
  4. Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work. Cognition 62 (1):109-19.score: 30.0
  5. Istvan S. N. Berkeley (2000). What the #$*%! Is a Subsymbol? Minds and Machines 10 (1):1-13.score: 22.0
    In 1988, Smolensky proposed that connectionist processing systems should be understood as operating at what he termed the `subsymbolic'' level. Subsymbolic systems should be understood by comparing them to symbolic systems, in Smolensky''s view. Up until recently, there have been real problems with analyzing and interpreting the operation of connectionist systems which have undergone training. However, recently published work on a network trained on a set of logic problems originally studied by Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) seems to offer the potential (...)
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  6. Marin Marinov (1993). On the Spuriousness of the Symbolic/Subsymbolic Distinction. Minds and Machines 3 (3):253-70.score: 22.0
    The article criticises the attempt to establish connectionism as an alternative theory of human cognitive architecture through the introduction of thesymbolic/subsymbolic distinction (Smolensky, 1988). The reasons for the introduction of this distinction are discussed and found to be unconvincing. It is shown that thebrittleness problem has been solved for a large class ofsymbolic learning systems, e.g. the class oftop-down induction of decision-trees (TDIDT) learning systems. Also, the process of articulating expert knowledge in rules seems quite practical for many important domains, (...)
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  7. Andy Clark (1990). Belief, Opinion and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):139-154.score: 22.0
    Abstract The paper considers two recent accounts of the difference between human and animal thought. One deflationary account, due to Daniel Dennett, insists that the only real difference lies in our ability to use words and sentences to give artificial precision and determinacy to our mental contents. The other, due to Paul Smolensky, conjectures that we at times deploy a special purpose device (the Conscious Rule Interpreter) whose task is to deal with public, symbolically coded data and commands. Both these (...)
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  8. Robert J. Matthews (1997). Can Connectionists Explain Systematicity? Mind and Language 12 (2):154-77.score: 20.0
  9. P. K. Monteiro, M. R. Pascoa & P. Smolensky (1999). Grammar-Based Connectionist Approaches to Language-A Connectionist Representation of Rule, Variables, and Dynamic Bindings Using Temporal Synchrony. Cognitive Science 23 (4):589-613.score: 10.0
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  10. D. E. Rumelhart, P. Smolensky, J. L. McClelland & G. E. Hinton (2004). Is Achieved. Prior to Stabilization, Neural Networks Do Not Jump Around Between Points in Activation Space. Stabiliza-Tion is the Process Whereby a Network First Generates a de-Terminate Activation Pattern, and Thereby Arrives at a Point in Activation Space. [REVIEW] Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27:2.score: 10.0
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  11. Murat Aydede (1995). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. CSLI Technical Report.score: 8.0
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical.
     
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  12. Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences 34:217-234.score: 4.0
    Smolensky's (1995) proposal for a connectionist explanation of systematicity doesn't work.
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