The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of the epistemic (...) justification of democracy and the best theoretical framework for harmonizing political and epistemic values. I also inquire whether the proposed division of epistemic labour and the inclusion of experts can indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without jeopardizing political justification. More specifically, I argue in favour of three theses. First, not only democratic procedures but also the outcomes of democracy, as a social system, need to be epistemically virtuous. Second, democracy’s epistemic virtues are more than just a tool for achieving political goals. Third, an appropriate division of epistemic labour has to overcome the limitations of both individual and collective intelligence. (shrink)

The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. (...) In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy. (shrink)

This is the first edited scholarly collection devoted solely to the epistemology of democracy. Its 15 chapters, published here for the first time and written by an international team of leading researchers, will interest scholars and advanced students working in democratic theory, the harrowing crisis of democracy, political philosophy, social epistemology, and political epistemology. The volume is structured into three parts, each offering five chapters. The first part, Democratic Pessimism, covers the crisis of democracy, the rise of authoritarianism, public epistemic (...) vices, misinformation and disinformation, civic ignorance, and the lacking quantitative case for democratic decision-making. The second part, Democratic Optimism, discusses the role of hope and positive emotions in rebuilding democracy, proposes solutions to myside bias, and criticizes dominant epistocratic approaches to forming political administrations. The third and final part, Democratic Realism, assesses whether we genuinely require emotional empathy to understand the perspectives of our political adversaries, discusses the democratic tension between mutual respect for others and a quest for social justice, and evaluates manifold top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy making. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to apply the general idea of contextualism, as a theory of knowledge attribution, to the very specific case of testimony and trust characterized as being the procedure of the attribution of knowledge (and sincerity) to the informant. In the first part, I argue in favor of evidentialism, a viewpoint that takes epistemically responsible trust as a matter of evidence. In the second part, I consider the question of how strong an evidential basis has to (...) be for epistemically responsible trust. I have briefly registered two main tendencies in contemporary debates regarding trust and testimony: (i) the non-unitary character of our trust; (ii) and the requirement for a refinement of evidential standards. In short, I argue in favor of the stance that any ‘undiscriminatory generalization’ (both Redian or anti-reductivist and Humean or reductivist) concerning epistemically responsible trust is a kind of inappropriate theoretical idealization, and that a certain theoretical reconciliation has to be offered. Finally, in the third part, I propose trust-contextualism as the viewpoint that optimally harmonizes both our intuitive and theoretical requirements about epistemically responsible trust. (shrink)

In debates about trust and testimony, epistemologists have traditionally been divided into two groups: those who hold that accepting the testimony of other people should be a kind of credulity without evidence (anti-reductivism) and those who assert that we shouldn't recognize any testimony as true or justified without appropriate evidence (reductivism). I will argue in favour of the evidentialist position about trust, or the stance that epistemically responsible trust is a matter of evidence, but also in favour of the thesis (...) that the position assumed by anti-reductivists is not necessarily an anti-evidentialist position. The crucial difference between anti-reductivism and reductivism does not pertain to the question of evidence, but to epistemic agency. Finally, I will argue against anti-reductivism and in favour of agency evidentialism, wherein it is assumed that accepting testimony is a kind of agency where our (reflective) control is strong enough to ensure that our trust is responsible. The version of agency evidentialism which I here support presumes: (i) doxastic voluntarism, or the existence of intellectual freedom in the sense that we have to be capable of certain intellectual choices or decisions, and (ii) virtue epistemology, or the normative approach according to which the target of epistemic evaluation is an epistemic agent to whom we ascribe epistemic or intellectual virtues or vices (epistemic responsibility, epistemic conscientiousness or like.). (shrink)

Temeljni je cilj ovog rada primjena općenite ideje evidencijalizma na poseban slučaj svjedočanstva i povjerenja koje određujem kao postupak prihvaćanja iskaza drugih ljudi. U prvom dijelu, zagovaram poziciju evidencijalizma u pogledu povjerenja, odnosno stav da je epistemički odgovorno povjerenje stvar posjedovanja odgovarajuće evidencije ili epistemičkih razloga. U drugom dijelu, razmatram primjedbe koje mogu biti upućene ovoj poziciji od strane anti redukcionista i nihilista. Konačno, u trećem dijelu nastojim braniti evidencijalizam protiv upućenih kritika, te predlažem kriterij primjerene evidencije za epistemički odgovorno (...) povjerenje.The main purpose of this paper is to apply the general idea of evidentialism to the very specific case of testimony and trust characterized as being the procedure of acceptance the other people reports. In the first part, I argue in favour of evidentialism concerning trust, a viewpoint that takes epistemically responsible trust as a matter of evidence. In the second part, I analyze the objections that can be put on this kind of evidentialism by anti-reductionism and nihilism. In the third part, I try to defend evidentialism against this critique and I propose the evidential standard of epistemically responsible trust. (shrink)

The value turn in epistemology generated a particularly influential new position - virtue epistemology. It is an increasingly influential epistemological normative approach that opts for the intellectual virtues of the epistemic agent, rather than the truth-value of the proposition, as the central epistemic value. In the first part of this article we will attempt to briefly explain the value turn and outline the basic aspects of virtue epistemology, underlining the diversity of epistemic attitudes associated with this approach and their positive (...) impact on expanding epistemological horizons. The second part will be focused on the virtues of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice as particularly appropriate for evaluating social processes such as, for example, testimony and conversational practices in general. In the third section we will show how the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic communicational act can be more efficiently analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of the virtue of epistemic justice, than from the traditional epistemic approach based on a monist concept of truth. The fourth and fifth section synthesize the discussion by introducing the concept of hermeneutic psychotherapy as a therapeutically and epistemically favorable framework for evaluating communicational acts in psychotherapy. nema. (shrink)

Ovaj je zbornik nastao kao rezultat istraživanja provedenog unutar istoimenoga znanstveno-istraživačkoga projekta na kojemu su urednici istovremeno bili i glavni istraživači, a ostali autori članovi istraživačke skupine. Kao svjedoci različitih vrsta otklona od prevladavajućeg, uobičajenoga, normalnoga, pozitivnog ili ponašanja koje se karakterizira kao asocijalno, zapitali smo se – što postojeće čini normom, treba li odstupanje od norme nužno smatrati devijacijom i kakvi su poželjni društveni odgovori na odstupanja od normi. Često se smatra ispravnim upravo ono što je prevladavajuće, a ono (...) što predstavlja otklon označava se kao devijacija u negativnome značenju onoga što nije ispravno, nije posve ispravno, ili čak onoga što treba sankcionirati. Naš je početni stav bio da ono što prevladava ne smije biti neupitna norma, kao što ni ono što je otklon nije po automatizmu devijacija. Međutim, ne smatramo ni da prevladavajuću normu, samom tom činjenicom što je prevladavajuća, nužno treba kritizirati te da je svaki otklon po sebi poželjan. Cilj našeg istraživanja bio je istražiti različite oblike deficita i devijacijau u domeni formiranja vjerovanja individualnih, grupnih, kolektivnih i institucijskih epistemičkih aktera (socijalna epistemologija) i u domeni društvenog i institucijskoga djelovanja (filozofija politike i filozofija psihijatrije). Nastavno na to, pokušali smo identificirati vrijednosti postojećih normi, koliko odgovaraju poželjnim vrijednostima te koji su poželjni društveni odgovori na otklone od normi. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is an analysis of the Continuity Argument, one of the most influential arguments upon which the moral condemnation of scientific and medical practices such as embryo research and experimentation, assisted reproduction, abortion, therapeutic cloning, etc. are based. I have firstly given a very brief account of the approach that attributes the status of marker event to fertilization, identifying the Continuity Argument between other argumentation. Further, I have tried to distinguish the three possible interpretations of (...) the notion of continuity assumed in the Continuity Argument, and to isolate the most persuasive formulation of Continuity Argument. Finally, I argue that even from the most convincing philosophical and scientific interpretation of the post-fertilization continuity, it does not follow: that fertilization is a necessary determinant of moral status; that fertilization is the most reasonable determinant of moral status. In short, this article has two goals: to show that this very argument does not entail the stance that the above mentioned practices are morally impermissible; to suggest that some pragmatic strategies which treat sorites-infected paradoxes could insure a philosophically and scientifically appropriate framework for an alternative approach. (shrink)

Glavna je svrha ovoga članka analizati Argument kontinuiteta, jedan od najutjecajnijih argumenata na kojemu su utemeljeni moralna osuda znanstvenih i medicinskih praksi poput istraživanja i eksperimenata s embrijem, potpomognuta reprodukcije, pobačaja, terapeutskog kloniranja, itd. Prvo se daje vrlo kratko objašnjenje pristupa koji pripisuje status markirajućeg događaja fertilizaciji, identificirajući Argument kontinuiteta među drugim argumentacijama. Nadalje, pokušava se razdvojiti tri moguće interpretacije pojma kontinuiteta pretpostavljenog u Argumentu kontinuiteta, te izdvojiti najuvjerljiviju filozofsku i znanstvenu interpretaciju postfertilizacijskog kontinuiteta. Naposljetku, tvrdim da iz filozofski i (...) znanstveno najprihvatljivije interpretacije ne slijedi: 1) da je fertilizacija nužna odrednica moralnog statusa; 2) da je fertilizacija najrazboritija odrednica moralnog statusa. Ukratko, ovaj članak ima dva cilja: I) pokazati da upravo taj argument ne povlači za sobom stajalište da su gore spomenute prakse moralno nedopustive; II) sugerirati da bi neke pragmatičke strategije koje se bave soritom-prouzročenim paradoksima mogle osigurati filozofijski i znanstveno primjeren okvir za alternativni pristup. (shrink)

Das Hauptanliegen dieses Artikels ist, dem Argument der Kontinuität nachzugehen, weil es eines der einflussreichsten Argumente ist, auf denen die moralische Verwerfung von wissenschaftlichen und methodischen Praxen beruht. Zu diesen werden z.B. die Embryonenforschung, Experimente an Embryonen, die assistierte Reproduktion, die Abtreibung, das Klonen zu therapeutischen Zwecken u.a. gezählt. Zunächst wird eine sehr kurze Erklärung des Ansatzes gegeben, der der Fertilisation den Status eines einschneidenden Ereignisses einräumt, indem das Argument der Kontinuität als eines unter vielen identifiziert wird. Weiterhin wird versucht, (...) die drei möglichen Auslegungen des Kontinuitätsbegriffs, die im Kontinuitätsargument enthalten sind, auseinander zu halten. Es wird auch versucht, die überzeugendste philosophische und wissenschaftliche Auslegung der Postfertilisationskontinuität zu widerlegen. Denn letztlich folgt aus der philosophisch und wissenschaftlich naheliegendsten Interpretation nicht: 1) dass die Fertilisation eine notwendige Determinante des moralischen Status ist; 2) dass die Fertilisation die sinnvollste Determinante des moralischen Status ist. Kurzum, der Artikel hat sich zwei Ziele gesetzt: I. zu beweisen, dass gerade aus diesem Argument nicht folgt, dass die oben erwähnten Praxen moralisch unzulässig seien; II. nahezulegen, dass einige pragmatische Strategien, die sich der Sorites-Paradoxa bedienen, einen philosophisch und wissenschaftlich adäquaten Rahmen für alternative Ansätze bereitstellen könnten. (shrink)

U suvremene rasprave o svjedočanstvu C. A. J. Coady uveo je pojam patologije. Radi se o stanovitim otklonima od normalnih slučajeva svjedočenja zbog kojih epistemička vrijednost takvih iskaza postaje dvojbena. Temeljem Coadyjeve analize komunikacijskih akata pokušale smo identificirati uvjete ne-patološkog svjedočanstva kako bismo propitale može li se fikcija smatrati svjedočanstvom. U članku argumentiramo u prilog stava da je moguće govoriti o fikcijskom svjedočanstvu jer praksa fikcije ne krši postavljene uvjete epistemičke odgovornosti govornika/autora; proizvodi epistemičku korist za čitatelja koja predstavlja legitimni (...) epistemički cilj. (shrink)

Le présent article a pour objectif d’analyser l’Argument de la continuité, qui est l’un des arguments les plus influents sur lequel repose la condamnation morale des pratiques scientifiques et médicales, telles que les recherches et les expérimentations sur les embryons, la reproduction assistée, l’avortement, le clonage thérapeutique, etc. D’abord sera donnée une brève explication de l’approche qui attribue le statut d’un événement marquant à la fertilisation, en identifiant l’Argument de la continuité parmi d’autres argumentations. En second lieu, je vais essayer (...) de distinguer les trois interprétations possibles de la notion de la continuité présumée dans l’Argument de la continuité, ainsi que d’isoler la formulation la plus persuasive de l’Argument de la continuité. Finalement, je soutiens que, même provenant de l’interprétation philosophique et scientifique la plus convaincante de la continuité de la période postérieure à la fertilisation, il ne s’ensuit pas 1) que la fertilisation soit une déterminante nécessaire du statut moral; 2) que la fertilisation soit la déterminante la plus raisonnable du statut moral. Bref, cet article a deux objectifs: celui de démontrer que justement cet argument n’implique pas que les pratiques mentionnées ci-dessus soient moralement inadmissibles et celui de suggérer que certaines stratégies pragmatiques qui traitent les paradoxes dus aux sorites puissent assurer un cadre philosophique et scientifique approprié à une approche alternative. (shrink)

The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. (...) In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy. (shrink)

Seeking whether our perception produces knowledge which is not only relative or subjective perspective on things, is to be engaged in the realist/anti-realist debate regarding perception. In this article I pursue the naturalistic approach according to which the question whether perception delivers objective knowledge about the external world is inseparable from empirical investigation into mechanisms of perception. More precisely, I have focused on the dual aspect theory of perception, one of the most influential recent theories of perception which unifies two (...) traditionally opposite approaches to perception: ecological and constructivist. I have tried to show that the dualistic model of human vision does not support the majority of realist theses aimed at non-relativism, but supports only pragmatic realism about observational reports (dorsal system) and the moderate realism about observational reports (ventral system). (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a certain moderate version of Humean evidentialism against a Reidian non-evidentialist’s position. My proposal of cooperative viewpoint of trust is based on the following theses: (i) epistemic cooperation is a necessary condition for us to attain knowledge (because of the scope and complexity of the task, capacity inequalities and background information, etc.), (ii) any form of cooperative activity, including division of labor, requires that cooperators trust one another, (iii) in contrast to Reidian non-evidentialism, justified trust (...) cannot be blind but has to rely on some evidence, (iv) crucial evidence that the hearer can have is evidence about the trustworthiness of informants, i.e., their moral and epistemic character, (v) the fact that we depend on other people for most of our knowledge can be a good reason to weaken Humean epistemic self-reliance and to accept as epistemically responsible and rational the trusting partly based on epistemic forward looking reasons (gathering of information). (shrink)

Moralna prihvatljivost kontracepcije kao metode kontrole radjanja usko je povezana s pitanjem moralnog opravdanja reproduktivne autonomije, odnosno s pitanjem treba li pojedincima dopustiti da autonomno i slobodno odlucuju o tome hoce li imati djece, kada i koliko. Razvoj medicinskih i znanstvenih tehnologija doveo je do upotrebe umjetnih metoda kontracepcije koji sprjecavaju zacece s ciljem odgadjanja i planiranja radjanja djece. U prvom dijelu clanka analiziram bioeticke argumente koji se iznose u raspravi o reproduktivnoj autonomiji, a koji bi mogli biti mobilizirani protiv (...) dopustanja upotrebe umjetne kontracepcije. U drugom dijelu, usporedjujem bioeticke argumente s daleko razradjenijim argumentima protiv umjetne kontracepcijekoji se pojavljuju u raspravama u filozofiji seksualnosti. U trecem i posljednjem dijelu, iznosim argumente protiv stavova G.E.M. Anscombe i J. Finnisa koji opravdavaju upotrebu prirodne metode kontrole radjanja, ali ne i umjetnih sredstva na nacin da ukazujem da nema moralno relevantne razlike izmedju ove dvije metode kontrole zaceca i radjanja. (shrink)

The prevalence and characteristics of research misconduct have mainly been studied in highly developed countries. In moderately or poorly developed countries such as Croatia, data on research misconduct are scarce. The primary aim of this study was to determine the rates at which scientists report committing or observing the most serious forms of research misconduct, such as falsification, fabrication, plagiarism, and violation of authorship rules in the Croatian scientific community. Additionally, we sought to determine the degree of development and the (...) extent of implementation of the system for defining and regulating research misconduct in a typical scientific community in Croatia. An anonymous questionnaire was distributed among 1232 Croatian scientists at the University of Rijeka in 2012/2013 and 237 returned the survey. Based on the respondents who admitted having committed research misconduct, 9 admitted to plagiarism, 22 to data falsification, 9 to data fabrication, and 60 respondents admitted to violation of authorship rules. Based on the respondents who admitted having observed research misconduct of fellow scientists, 72 observed plagiarism, 69 observed data falsification, 46 observed data fabrication, and 132 respondents admitted having observed violation of authorship rules. The results of our study indicate that the efficacy of the system for managing research misconduct in Croatia is poor. At the University of Rijeka there is no document dedicated exclusively to research integrity, describing the values that should be fostered by a scientist and clarifying the forms of research misconduct and what constitutes a questionable research practice. Scientists do not trust ethical bodies and the system for defining and regulating research misconduct; therefore the observed cases of research misconduct are rarely reported. Finally, Croatian scientists are not formally educated about responsible conduct of research at any level of their formal education. All mentioned indicate possible reasons for higher rates of research misconduct among Croatian scientists in comparison with scientists in highly developed countries. (shrink)

Seeking whether our perception produces knowledge which is not only relative or subjective perspective on things, is to be engaged in the realist/anti-realist debate regarding perception. In this article I pursue the naturalistic approach according to which the question whether perception delivers objective knowledge about the external world is inseparable from empirical investigation into mechanisms of perception. More precisely, I have focused on the dual aspect theory of perception, one of the most influential recent theories of perception which unifies two (...) traditionally opposite approaches to perception: ecological and constructivist. I have tried to show that the dualistic model of human vision does not support the majority of realist theses aimed at non-relativism, but supports only pragmatic realism about observational reports (dorsal system) and the moderate realism about observational reports (ventral system). (shrink)

Seeking whether our perception produces knowledge which is not only relative or subjective perspective on things, is to be engaged in the realist/anti-realist debate regarding perception. In this article I pursue the naturalistic approach according to which the question whether perception delivers objective knowledge about the external world is inseparable from empirical investigation into mechanisms of perception. More precisely, I have focused on the dual aspect theory of perception, one of the most influential recent theories of perception which unifies two (...) traditionally opposite approaches to perception: ecological and constructivist. I have tried to show that the dualistic model of human vision does not support the majority of realist theses aimed at non-relativism, but supports only pragmatic realism about observational reports (dorsal system) and the moderate realism about observational reports (ventral system). (shrink)

Foucault’s philosophy and history of science offer contradictory suggestions. His history of science is erudite, challenging, interesting, uncovering new and rich analogies between various disciplines. But his philosophy of science fosters problematic extreme anti-realism combined with elements of strong relativism. The style is rich in ambiguous, even dark pronouncements, often sounding bombastic. In the paper I develop the hypothesis that there are two opposing pressures coming all the way from the early structuralist model which I sketch briefly. On the one (...) hand, structuralist approach is good for suggesting organizational principles, on the other bad in excluding issues of truth, explanatory potential of theories, and even their empirical adequacy. It has proved quite poor in offering explanatory tools on meta-level. If the pressure of evidence is,not seen as the prime mover of scientific change, and if change has nothing to do with the search for more adequate picture then the seduction of the power-model, with its political potential, becomes very strong. It is ubiquitous in continental philosophy of 20th century. I am afraid that the two components of structuralist heritage have been yielding a very mixed result: bad philosophy of science disfiguring the history of science. The interesting and challenging material from the latter is used for very dubious generalizations in the former. (shrink)

Snježana Prijić-Samaržija’s book discusses the epistemic grounding of democracy, stressing the epistemic role of experts in her political-epistemological favorite, the project of “reliability democracy”. Her proposal, inspired by Christiano, lets citizens play an important role in setting the aims, whereas experts deliberate about means of reaching them. I argue that it is not easy to reach consensus about goals and values. What is needed is democratic deliberation in deciding, encompassing both experts and laypersons. We should retain the duality of less (...) ideal deliberation in real world and of hypothetical contractualist deliberation, within moral-political thought-experiments, in the tradition of Habermas and Scanlon in the ideal theory. I leave it open whether our author might ultimately agree with this picture of reliability democracy. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall present the theoretical view on the reliability democracy as presented in Prijić Samaržija’s book Democracy and Truth, and examine its validity through the case of the division of epistemic labour in the process of deliberation on autism treatment policies. It may appear that because of their strong demands, namely, the demand for rejection of medical authority and for exclusive expertise on autism, autistic individuals gathered around the neurodiversity movement present a threat to the reliability democracy.

In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snjezana Prijic Samarzija advocates that a purely procedural justification which defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself is not enough for a full justification of democracy. Some epistemic values should also be included. This epistemic quality of democracy depends on the quality of the decisions that the democratic procedures produce. In that sense, the author is advocating (...) a hybrid theory that secures harmony between political and epistemic values, favoring deliberative procedure for this purpose, and thus promotes equal respect for both democratic values. In doing so, she is advocating the specific type of division of epistemic labor that I will attempt to critically re-examine here, as well as to bring into question the privileged role of the experts in democratic decision-making. (shrink)

In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snjezana Prijic Samarzija advocates a stance that not only political, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of democracy. Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of public deliberation on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I will discuss the following issue: What connects this type of public deliberation to the wider context of justification of democracy? I will attempt to explain why Prijic Samarzija's (...) stance can be understood as a version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and to discuss the role played by the public deliberation within this framework. (shrink)

The usual justifi cations of democracy attach central importance to fair decision-making procedures. However, it is being increasingly emphasized that it is necessary to address epistemic considerations to justify democracy and democratic authority. In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Prijić-Samaržija defends the view which places emphasis on the necessity of epistemic justification of democracy. In this paper, I will discuss her criticism of epistemic proceduralism, which can be considered major contemporary framework for epistemic (...) justification of democracy. Within the framework of epistemic proceduralism, for justifying democracy and democratic authority it is necessary to take into account both political and epistemic values. Nevertheless, Prijić-Samaržija thinks that epistemic proceduralism is not sufficiently epistemic and that it reduces epistemic to political values. I shall argue that epistemic proceduralism can be defended from this kind of criticism. (shrink)