Search results for 'Social Cognition' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  80
    Hanne de Jaegher, Ezequiel di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
    An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – (...)
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  2. Bertram F. Malle (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press 225-255.
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any (...)
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  3. Shannon Spaulding (2013). Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition. Mind and Language 28 (2):233-257.
    Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to (...)
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  4. Leon De Bruin & Sanneke De Haan (2012). Enactivism and Social Cognition: In Search for the Whole Story. Journal of Cognitive Semiotics (1):225-250.
    Although the enactive approach has been very successful in explaining many basic social interactions in terms of embodied practices, there is still much work to be done when it comes to higher forms of social cognition. In this article, we discuss and evaluate two recent proposals by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto that try to bridge this ‘cognitive gap’ by appealing to the notion of narrative practice. Although we are enthusiastic about these proposals, we argue that (i) (...)
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  5.  77
    Mitchell Herschbach (2012). On the Role of Social Interaction in Social Cognition: A Mechanistic Alternative to Enactivism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):467-486.
    Researchers in the enactivist tradition have recently argued that social interaction can constitute social cognition, rather than simply serve as the context for social cognition. They contend that a focus on social interaction corrects the overemphasis on mechanisms inside the individual in the explanation of social cognition. I critically assess enactivism’s claims about the explanatory role of social interaction in social cognition. After sketching the enactivist approach to cognition (...)
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  6.  7
    Eric Luis Uhlmann, David A. Pizarro & Paul Bloom (2008). Varieties of Social Cognition. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (3):293-322.
    Recent work within psychology demonstrates that unconscious cognition plays a central role in the judgments and actions of individuals. We distinguish between two basic types unconscious social cognition: unconsciousness of the influences on judgments and actions, and unconscious of the mental states that give rise to judgments and actions. Influence unconsciousness is corroborated by strong empirical evidence, but unconscious states are difficult to verify. We discuss procedures aimed at providing conclusive evidence of state unconsciousness, (...)
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  7. Shannon Spaulding (2011). Embodied Social Cognition. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):141-162.
    In this paper I evaluate embodied social cognition, embodied cognition’s account of how we understand others. I identify and evaluate three claims that motivate embodied social cognition. These claims are not specific to social cognition; they are general hypotheses about cognition. As such, they may be used in more general arguments for embodied cognition. I argue that we have good reasons to reject (...)
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  8. Shannon Spaulding (2015). Phenomenology of Social Cognition. Erkenntnis 80 (5):1069-1089.
    Can phenomenological evidence play a decisive role in accepting or rejecting social cognition theories? Is it the case that a theory of social cognition ought to explain and be empirically supported by our phenomenological experience? There is serious disagreement about the answers to these questions. This paper aims to determine the methodological role of phenomenology in social cognition debates. The following three features are characteristic of evidence capable of playing a substantial (...)
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  9.  28
    Karen Danna Lynch (2007). Modeling Role Enactment: Linking Role Theory and Social Cognition. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (4):379–399.
    In our dynamic social world, a premium is placed on the individual's ability to innovate and to change . Yet traditional role theory has difficulty accounting for innovation, leaving unanswered the question of how individual level negotiations affect social-structural processes . This study addresses this tension by linking role theory with social cognition. By positioning behavior and cognition as two interrelated continuums, I stretch the meaning of role enactment to include 4 role typologies. I utilize (...)
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  10.  23
    Daniel Wodak, Sarah‐Jane Leslie & Marjorie Rhodes (2015). What a Loaded Generalization: Generics and Social Cognition. Philosophy Compass 10 (9):625-635.
    This paper explores the role of generics in social cognition. First, we explore the nature and effects of the most common form of generics about social kinds. Second, we discuss the nature and effects of a less common but equally important form of generics about social kinds. Finally, we consider the implications of this discussion for how we ought to use language about the social world.
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  11.  16
    Jennifer Jordan (2009). A Social Cognition Framework for Examining Moral Awareness in Managers and Academics. Journal of Business Ethics 84 (2):237 - 258.
    This investigation applies a social cognition framework to examine moral awareness in business situations. Using a vignette-based instrument, the investigation compares the recall, recognition, and ascription of importance to moral-versus strategy-related issues in business managers (n = 86) and academic professors (n = 61). Results demonstrate that managers recall strategy-related issues more than moral-related issues and recognize and ascribe importance to moral-related issues less than academics. It also finds an inverse relationship between socialization in the business context and (...)
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  12.  4
    Vivian Bohl & Wouter van den Bos (2012). Toward an Integrative Account of Social Cognition: Marrying Theory of Mind and Interactionism to Study the Interplay of Type 1 and Type 2 Processes. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience:1-15.
    Traditional theory of mind (ToM) accounts for social cognition have been at the basis of most studies in the social cognitive neurosciences. However, in recent years, the need to go beyond traditional ToM accounts for understanding real life social interactions has become all the more pressing. At the same time it remains unclear whether alternative accounts, such as interactionism, can yield a sufficient description and explanation of social interactions. We argue (...)
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  13.  34
    Nicki Marquardt & Rainer Hoeger (2009). The Effect of Implicit Moral Attitudes on Managerial Decision-Making: An Implicit Social Cognition Approach. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 85 (2):157 - 171.
    This article concerns itself with the relationship between implicit moral cognitions and decisions in the realm of business ethics. Traditionally, business ethics research emphasized the effects of overt or explicit attitudes on ethical decision-making and neglected intuitive or implicit attitudes. Therefore, based on an implicit social cognition approach it is important to know whether implicit moral attitudes may have a substantial impact on managerial ethical decision-making processes. To test this thesis, a study with 50 participants was conducted. In (...)
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  14.  16
    Daniel D. Hutto (forthcoming). Basic Social Cognition Without Mindreading: Minding Minds Without Attributing Contents. Synthese:1-20.
    This paper argues that mind-reading hypotheses, of any kind, are not needed to best describe or best explain basic acts of social cognition. It considers the two most popular MRHs: one-ToM and two-ToM theories. These MRHs face competition in the form of complementary behaviour reading hypotheses. Following Buckner, it is argued that the best strategy for putting CBRHs out of play is to appeal to theoretical considerations about the psychosemantics of basic acts of social cognition. In (...)
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  15.  6
    Joel Krueger (2012). Gestural Coupling and Social Cognition: Moebius Syndrome as a Case Study. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6 (81).
    Social cognition researchers have become increasingly interested in the ways that behavioral, physiological, and neural coupling facilitate social interaction and interpersonal understanding. We distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the role of such coupling processes in social cognition: strong and moderate interactionism. According to strong interactionism (SI), low-level coupling processes are alternatives to higher-level individual cognitive processes; the former at least sometimes render the latter superfluous. Moderate interactionism (MI) on the other hand, is an integrative approach. (...)
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  16.  89
    L. Woolfolk Robert, M. Doris John & M. Darley John (2007). Identification, Situational Constraint, and Social Cognition : Studies in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility. In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press
    In three experiments we studied lay observers’ attributions of responsibility for an antisocial act (homicide). We systematically varied both the degree to which the action was coerced by external circumstances and the degree to which the actor endorsed and accepted ownership of the act, a psychological state that philosophers have termed ‘identification’. Our findings with respect to identification were highly consistent. The more an actor was identified with an action, the more likely observers were to assign responsibility to the actor, (...)
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  17.  43
    Jane Suilin Lavelle (2012). Two Challenges to Hutto's Enactive Account of Pre-Linguistic Social Cognition. Philosophia 40 (3):459-472.
    Daniel Hutto’s Enactive account of social cognition maintains that pre- and non-linguistic interactions do not require that the participants represent the psychological states of the other. This goes against traditional ‘cognitivist’ accounts of these social phenomena. This essay examines Hutto’s Enactive account, and proposes two challenges. The account maintains that organisms respond to the behaviours of others, and in doing so respond to the ‘intentional attitude’ which the other has. The first challenge argues that (...)
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  18.  78
    Shannon Spaulding (2012). Introduction to Debates on Embodied Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):431-448.
    Embodied social cognition (ESC) aims to explicate how our embodiment shapes our knowledge of others, and in what this knowledge of others consists. Although there is much diversity amongst ESC accounts, common to all these accounts is the idea that our normal everyday interactions consist in non-mentalistic embodied engagements. In recent years, several theorists have developed and defended innovative and controversial accounts of ESC. These accounts challenge, and offer deflationary alternatives to, the standard cognitivist accounts of social (...)
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  19.  83
    Joshua Shepherd (2012). Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.
    One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call (...)
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  20.  15
    Jeppe Sinding Jensen (forthcoming). How Institutions Work in Shared Intentionality and ‘We-Mode’ Social Cognition. Topoi:1-12.
    The topics of social ontology, culture, and institutions constitute a problem complex that involves a broad range of human social and cultural cognitive capacities. We-mode social cognition and shared intentionality appear to be crucial in the formation of social ontology and social institutions, which, in turn, provide the bases for the social manifestation of collective and shared psychological attitudes. Humans have ‘hybrid minds’ that inhabit cultural–cognitive ecosystems. Essentially, these consist of social institutions (...)
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  21. Somogy Varga (2011). Pretence, Social Cognition and Self-Knowledge in Autism. Psychopathology 44 (1):45-52..
    This article suggests that an account of pretence based on the idea of shared intentionality can be of help in understanding autism. In autism, there seems to be a strong link between being able to engage in pretend play, understanding the minds of others and having adequate access to own mental states. Since one of the first behavioral manifestations of autism is the lack of pretend play, it therefore seems natural to investigate pretence in order to identify the nature of (...)
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  22.  32
    Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2014). Introduction: Embodiment and Empathy, Current Debates in Social Cognition. Topoi 33 (1):117-127.
    This special issue targets two topics in social cognition that appear to increasingly structure the nature of interdisciplinary discourse but are themselves not very well understood. These are the notions of empathy and embodiment. Both have a history rooted in phenomenological philosophy and both have found extensive application in contemporary interdisciplinary theories of social cognition, at times to establish claims that are arguably contrary to the ones made by the phenomenologists credited with giving us these notions. (...)
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  23.  42
    Beata Stawarska (2006). Mutual Gaze and Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):17-30.
    I examine the role of mutual gaze in social cognition. I start by discussing recent studies of joint visual attention in order to show that social cognition is operative in infancy prior to the emergence of theoretical skills required to make judgments about other people's states of mind. Such social cognition depends on the communicative potential inherent in human bodies. I proceed to examine this embodied social cognition in the context of Merleau-Ponty's (...)
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  24.  17
    Marek Pokropski (2015). Timing Together, Acting Together. Phenomenology of Intersubjective Temporality and Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):897-909.
    In this article I consider how the problem of social (intersubjective) cognition relates to time-consciousness. In the first part, I briefly introduce Husserl’s account of intersubjective cognition. I discuss the concept of empathy (Einfühlung) and its relation with time-consciousness. I argue that empathy is based on pre-reflective awareness of the other’s harmony of behaviour. In the second part, I distinguish pre-reflective (passive) and reflective (active) empathy and consider recent empirical research in the field of social (...). I argue that these levels of empathy are related with different levels of intersubjective temporality. By the intersubjective temporality I do not understand being in the same moment of objective time (so called clock time) but rather the shared experience of time and sharing temporal structure of actions. In the final part, I gather my considerations together and propose a general three-level framework of intersubjective temporality. (shrink)
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  25.  47
    Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki (2012). Unlikely Allies: Embodied Social Cognition and the Intentional Stance. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506.
    I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from (...)
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  26.  20
    Jack Reynolds (2015). Direct Perception, Inter-Subjectivity, and Social Cognition: Why Phenomenology is a Necessary but Not Sufficient Condition. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research:333-354.
    In this paper I argue that many of the core phenomenological insights, including the emphasis on direct perception, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for an adequate account of inter-subjectivity today. I take it that an adequate account of inter-subjectivity must involve substantial interaction with empirical studies, notwithstanding the putative methodological differences between phenomenological description and scientific explanation. As such, I will need to explicate what kind of phenomenology survives, and indeed, thrives, in a milieu that necessitates engagement with (...)
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  27.  63
    Christian Onof & Leslie Marsh (2008). Introduction to the Special Issue “Perspectives on Social Cognition”. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).
    No longer is sociality the preserve of the social sciences, or ‘‘culture’’ the preserve of the humanities or anthropology. By the same token, cognition is no longer the sole preserve of the cognitive sciences. Social cognition (SC) or, sociocognition if you like, is thus a kaleidoscope of research projects that has seen exponential growth over the past 30 or so years.
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  28.  37
    Marco Fenici (2012). Embodied Social Cognition and Embedded Theory of Mind. Biolinguistics 6 (3--47):276--307.
    Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these two principles. In agreement with available evidence, embodied cognitive processes may underlie the earliest manifestations of social cognitive abilities such as infants’ selective behaviour in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. Instead, late theory-of-mind abilities, such as the capacity to pass the (elicited-response) false (...)
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  29.  19
    L. SchiLbach, S. Eickhoff, A. RotArskajagiela, G. Fink & K. Vogeley (2008). Minds at Rest? Social Cognition as the Default Mode of Cognizing and its Putative Relationship to the "Default System" of the Brain. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):457--467.
    The “default system” of the brain has been described as a set of regions which are ‘activated’ during rest and ‘deactivated’ during cognitively effortful tasks. To investigate the reliability of task-related deactivations, we performed a meta-analysis across 12 fMRI studies. Our results replicate previous findings by implicating medial frontal and parietal brain regions as part of the “default system”.However, the cognitive correlates of these deactivations remain unclear. In light of the importance of social cognitive abilities for human beings and (...)
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  30. Joel Krueger (2011). Extended Cognition and the Space of Social Interaction. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):643-657.
    The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management—the negotiation and management of ‘‘we-space”—and that some of the expressive actions involved in the negotiation and management of we-space (gesture, touch, (...)
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  31. Jakob Hohwy & Colin Palmer (forthcoming). Social Cognition as Causal Inference: Implications for Common Knowledge and Autism. In John Michael & Mattia Gallotti (eds.), Social Objects and Social Cognition. Springer
    This chapter explores the idea that the need to establish common knowledge is one feature that makes social cognition stand apart in important ways from cognition in general. We develop this idea on the background of the claim that social cognition is nothing but a type of causal inference. We focus on autism as our test-case, and propose that a specific type of problem with common knowledge processing is implicated in challenges to social (...) in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This problem has to do with the individual’s assessment of the reliability of messages that are passed between people as common knowledge emerges. The proposal is developed on the background of our own empirical studies and outlines different ways common knowledge might be comprised. We discuss what these issues may tell us about ASD, about the relation between social and non-social cognition, about social objects, and about the dynamics of social networks. (shrink)
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  32.  7
    Vittorio Gallese (2000). The Acting Subject: Toward the Neural Basis of Social Cognition. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 325--333.
  33.  2
    Tadeusz Wies aw Zawidzki (2013). Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition. A Bradford Book.
    Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.
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  34. Shaun Gallagher (2008). Inference or Interaction: Social Cognition Without Precursors. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):163 – 174.
    In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue (...)
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  35.  14
    A. Olsson & K. N. Ochsner (2008). The Role of Social Cognition in Emotion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):65-71.
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  36.  97
    Shaun Gallagher (2012). In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition: Interacting with the Critics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):187-212.
    I clarify recently developed phenomenological approaches to social cognition. These are approaches that, drawing on developmental science, social neuroscience, and dynamic systems theory, emphasize the involvement of embodied and enactive processes together with communicative and narrative practices in contexts of intersubjective understanding. I review some of the evidence that supports these approaches. I consider a variety of criticisms leveled against them, and defend the role of phenomenology in the explanation of social cognition. Finally, I show (...)
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  37. Alvin Goldman & Frederique de Vignemont (2009). Is Social Cognition Embodied? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (10):154-159.
    Theories of embodied cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear how to understand them. We offer several interpretations of embodiment, the most interesting being the thesis that mental representations in bodily formats (B-formats) have an important role in cognition. Potential B-formats include motoric, somatosensory, affective and interoceptive formats. The literature on mirroring and related phenomena provides support for a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition under the B-format interpretation. It is questionable, however, whether (...)
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  38.  37
    Noah D. Goodman & Andreas Stuhlmüller (2013). Knowledge and Implicature: Modeling Language Understanding as Social Cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science 5 (1):173-184.
    Is language understanding a special case of social cognition? To help evaluate this view, we can formalize it as the rational speech-act theory: Listeners assume that speakers choose their utterances approximately optimally, and listeners interpret an utterance by using Bayesian inference to “invert” this model of the speaker. We apply this framework to model scalar implicature (“some” implies “not all,” and “N” implies “not more than N”). This model predicts an interaction between the speaker's knowledge state and the (...)
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  39.  40
    Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2005). The Motor Theory of Social Cognition: A Critique. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):21-25.
    Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. Since human social cognition includes the ability to mindread, (...)
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  40.  53
    Pierre Jacob (2009). The Tuning-Fork Model of Human Social Cognition: A Critique☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.
    The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After (...)
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  41.  4
    Raymond M. Bergner (2006). Cognition: Unobservable Information Processing or Private Social Practice? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 26 (1-2):154-171.
    This paper presents a critique of cognitive psychology's micro-process program, as well as suggestions for a more scientifically and pragmatically viable approach to cognition. The paper proceeds in the following sequence. First, the mainstream point of view of contemporary cognitive psychology regarding cognitive micro-processes is summarized. Second, this view is criticized. Third and finally, cognitive science's neuropsychology program is discussed, not with respect to the considerable value of its findings, but with respect to the interpretation that would appropriately be (...)
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  42.  48
    Daniel D. Hutto, Mitchell Herschbach & Victoria Southgate (2011). Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):375-395.
    Human beings, even very young infants, and members of several other species, exhibit remarkable capacities for attending to and engaging with others. These basic capacities have been the subject of intense research in developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, comparative psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind over the last several decades. Appropriately characterizing the exact level and nature of these abilities and what lies at their basis continues to prove a tricky business. The contributions to this special issue investigate whether and to (...)
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  43. Vittorio Gallese, Christian Keysers & Giacomo Rizzolatti (2004). A Unifying View of the Basis of Social Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (9):396-403.
    In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. Our main claim is that the fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding of others' actions is the activation of the mirror neuron system. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero-motor centers, underlies the experiential understanding of the emotions of others.
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  44.  20
    Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.) (2001). Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press.
    Highlights the roles of intention and intentionality in social cognition.
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  45.  28
    J. Bickle (2008). The Molecules of Social Recognition Memory: Implications for Social Cognition, Extended Mind, and Neuroethics. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):468-474.
    Social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroethics have reached a synthesis of late, but some troubling features are present. The neuroscience that currently dominates the study of social cognition is exclusively cognitive neuroscience, as contrasted with the cellular and increasingly molecular emphasis that has gripped mainstream neuroscience over the past three decades. Furthermore, the recent field of molecular and cellular cognition has begun to unravel some molecular mechanisms involved in social cognition, especially pertaining to (...)
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  46. John A. Bargh (1994). The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum
  47.  37
    Marc Bekoff (1999). Social Cognition: Exchanging and Sharing Information on the Run. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):617-632.
    In this essay I consider various aspects of the rapidly growing field of cognitive ethology, concentrating mainly on evolutionary and comparative discussion of the notion of intentionality. I am not concerned with consciousness, per se, for a concentration on consciousness deflects attention from other, and in many cases more interesting, problems in the study of animal cognition. I consider how, when, where, and (attempt to discuss) why individuals from different taxa exchange social information concerning their beliefs, (...)
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  48.  23
    Michelle Maiese (2013). Embodied Social Cognition, Participatory Sense-Making, and Online Learning. Social Philosophy Today 29:103-119.
    I will argue that the asynchronous discussion format commonly used in online courses has little hope of bringing about transformative learning, and that this is because engaging with another as a person involves adopting a personal stance, comprised of affective and bodily relatedness (Ratcliffe 2007, 23). Interpersonal engagement ordinarily is fully embodied to the extent that communication relies heavily on individuals’ postures, gestures, and facial expressions. Subjects involved in face-to-face interaction can perceive others’ desires and feelings on the basis of (...)
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  49.  5
    Shaun Gallagher (2007). Social Cognition and Social Robots. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 15 (3):435-453.
    Social robots are robots designed to interact with humans or with each other in ways that approximate human social interaction. It seems clear that one question relevant to the project of designing such robots concerns how humans themselves interact to achieve social understanding. If we turn to psychology, philosophy, or the cognitive sciences in general, we find two models of social cognition vying for dominance under the heading of theory of mind: theory theory and simulation (...)
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  50.  1
    Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki (2013). Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition. A Bradford Book.
    Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.
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