Search results for 'Social choice' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jacob Stegenga (forthcoming). Theory Choice and Social Choice: Okasha Versus Sen. Mind.score: 240.0
    A platitude that took hold with Kuhn is that there can be several equally good ways of balancing theoretical virtues for theory choice. Okasha recently modelled theory choice using technical apparatus from the domain of social choice: famously, Arrow showed that no method of social choice can jointly satisfy four desiderata, and each of the desiderata in social choice has an analogue in theory choice. Okasha suggested that one can avoid the (...)
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  2. Marc Pauly (2008). On the Role of Language in Social Choice Theory. Synthese 163 (2):227 - 243.score: 240.0
    Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory are usually compared either regarding the normative plausibility or regarding the logical strength of the axioms involved. Here, instead, we propose to compare axiomatizations according to the language used for expressing the axioms. In order to carry out such a comparison, we suggest a formalist approach to axiomatization results which uses a restricted formal logical language to express axioms. Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory then turn into definability (...)
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  3. Christian List & John Dryzek (2003). Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation. British Journal of Political Science 33 (1):1-28.score: 240.0
    The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation (...)
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  4. Paul Anand, Prastanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.) (2009). The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press, USA.score: 240.0
    The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice provides an overview of issues arising in work on the foundations of decision theory and social choice over the past ...
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  5. Nicolas Troquard, Wiebe Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (2011). Reasoning About Social Choice Functions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):473-498.score: 240.0
    We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove (...)
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  6. Yasuhito Tanaka (2003). Garchy for Social Choice Correspondences and Strategy-Proofness. Theory and Decision 55 (3):273-287.score: 240.0
    We study the existence of a group of individuals which has some decisive power for social choice correspondences that satisfy a monotonicity property which we call modified monotonicity. And we examine the relation between modified monotonicity and strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences according to the definition by Duggan and Schwartz (2000). We will show mainly the following two results. (1) Modified monotonicity implies the existence of an oligarchy. An oligarchy is a group of individuals such that (...)
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  7. Michael Morreau (2013). Mr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and Mr. Scope: From Social Choice to Theory Choice. Erkenntnis:1-16.score: 216.0
    An analogue of Arrow’s theorem has been thought to limit the possibilities for multi-criterial theory choice. Here, an example drawn from Toy Science, a model of theories and choice criteria, suggests that it does not. Arrow’s assumption that domains are unrestricted is inappropriate in connection with theory choice in Toy Science. There are, however, variants of Arrow’s theorem that do not require an unrestricted domain. They require instead that domains are, in a technical sense, ‘rich’. Since there (...)
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  8. Boniface Mbih (1995). On Admissible Strategies and Manipulation of Social Choice Procedures. Theory and Decision 39 (2):169-188.score: 216.0
    A collective choice mechanism can be viewed as a game in normal form; in this article it is shown, for very attractive rules and for sets with any number of alternatives, how individuals involved in a collective decision problem can construct the preferences they choose to express. An example is given with a version of plurality rule. Manipulability results are deduced from such a characterization.
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  9. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly (1996). Independent Social Choice Correspondences. Theory and Decision 41 (1):1-11.score: 210.0
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  10. Taradas Bandyopadhyay & Larry Samuelson (1992). Weakly Implementable Social Choice Rules. Theory and Decision 33 (2):135-151.score: 210.0
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  11. Ivan Mladenovic (2011). A Deliberative Solution to the Social Choice Problem. Filozofija I Društvo 22 (1):123-142.score: 210.0
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  12. Taradas Bandyopadhyay (1989). Weak Strategy Proofness: The Case of Nonbinary Social Choice Functions. Theory and Decision 27 (3):193-205.score: 210.0
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  13. Milena Ivanova & Cedric Paternotte (2013). Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social Consensus. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1109-1132.score: 204.0
    There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem’s notion of ‘good sense’. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes to good sense in different contexts, before examining its current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense, seen as promoting social consensus (...)
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  14. Fernando Aguiar & Andrés de Francisco (2009). Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):547-571.score: 198.0
    Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to (...)
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  15. Nadia Chernyak, Tamar Kushnir, Katherine M. Sullivan & Qi Wang (2013). A Comparison of American and Nepalese Children's Concepts of Freedom of Choice and Social Constraint. Cognitive Science 37 (7):1343-1355.score: 192.0
    Recent work has shown that preschool-aged children and adults understand freedom of choice regardless of culture, but that adults across cultures differ in perceiving social obligations as constraints on action. To investigate the development of these cultural differences and universalities, we interviewed school-aged children (4–11) in Nepal and the United States regarding beliefs about people's freedom of choice and constraint to follow preferences, perform impossible acts, and break social obligations. Children across cultures and ages universally endorsed (...)
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  16. Anne West (2006). School Choice, Equity and Social Justice: The Case for More Control. British Journal of Educational Studies 54 (1):15 - 33.score: 192.0
    This paper focuses on school choice and the extent to which admissions to publicly-funded secondary schools in England address issues of equity and social justice. It argues that schools with responsibility for their own admissions are more likely than others to act in their own self interest by 'selecting in' or 'creaming' particular pupils and 'selecting out' others. Given this, it is argued that individual schools should not be responsible for admissions. Instead, admissions should be the responsibility of (...)
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  17. S. Okasha (2011). Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn Versus Arrow. Mind 120 (477):83-115.score: 180.0
    Kuhn’s famous thesis that there is ‘no unique algorithm’ for choosing between rival scientific theories is analysed using the machinery of social choice theory. It is shown that the problem of theory choice as posed by Kuhn is formally identical to a standard social choice problem. This suggests that analogues of well-known results from the social choice literature, such as Arrow’s impossibility theorem, may apply to theory choice. If an analogue of Arrow’s (...)
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  18. Christian List (2003). Distributed Cognition: A Perspective From Social Choice Theory. In M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S. Voigt (eds.), Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy. Mohr Siebeck.score: 180.0
    Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive (...)
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  19. Samir Okasha (2009). Individuals, Groups, Fitness and Utility: Multi-Level Selection Meets Social Choice Theory. Biology and Philosophy 24 (5):561-584.score: 180.0
    In models of multi-level selection, the property of Darwinian fitness is attributed to entities at more than one level of the biological hierarchy, e.g. individuals and groups. However, the relation between individual and group fitness is a controversial matter. Theorists disagree about whether group fitness should always, or ever, be defined as total (or average) individual fitness. This paper tries to shed light on the issue by drawing on work in social choice theory, and pursuing an analogy between (...)
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  20. Kenneth J. Arrow (2006). Freedom and Social Choice: Notes in the Margin. Utilitas 18 (1):52-60.score: 180.0
    I comment on Amartya Sen's study of the relations between the analysis of freedom and the theory of social choice. Two of his themes are analysed with regard to their contribution to an analytic understanding of the issues. These are: (1) the multiple interpretations of the concept of ‘preferences’ as a foundation for the formal conceptualizations of social choice and freedom; and (2) some issues in the formalization of freedom as a value to be compared with (...)
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  21. Mozaffar Qizilbash (2007). Social Choice and Individual Capabilities. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):169-192.score: 180.0
    Amartya Sen has recently suggested that certain issues which arise in the application of the capability approach can be seen in terms of social choice. This article explores certain connections and tensions between Kenneth Arrow's celebrated discussion of social choice and the capability approach while focusing on one central link: pluralism. Given the variety of values people hold, substantive issues which arise in the application of the capability approach can be seen as social choice (...)
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  22. Marc Fleurbaey (2007). Social Choice and Just Institutions: New Perspectives. Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):15-43.score: 180.0
    It has become accepted that social choice is impossible in the absence of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. This view is challenged here. Arrow obtained an impossibility theorem only by making unreasonable demands on social choice functions. With reasonable requirements, one can get very attractive possibilities and derive social preferences on the basis of non-comparable individual preferences. This new approach makes it possible to design optimal second-best institutions inspired by principles of fairness, while traditionally the analysis (...)
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  23. Gabriella Pigozzi, Belief Merging, Judgment Aggregation and Some Links with Social Choice Theory.score: 180.0
    In this paper we explore the relation between three areas: judgment aggregation, belief merging and social choice theory. Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may however give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). Starting from this so-called doctrinal paradox, the paper surveys the literature on judgment (...)
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  24. John S. Dryzek & Christian List (2004). Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy : A Response to Aldred. British Journal of Political Science 34 (4):752-758.score: 180.0
    Jonathan Aldred shares our desire to promote a reconciliation between social choice theory and deliberative democracy in the interests of a more comprehensive and compelling account of democracy.1 His comments on some details of our analysis – specifically, our use of Arrow’s conditions of universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives – give us an opportunity to clarify our position. His discussion of the independence condition in particular identifies some ambiguity in our exposition, and as such is useful. (...)
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  25. Paul Weirich (1984). Interpersonal Utility in Principles of Social Choice. Erkenntnis 21 (3):295 - 317.score: 180.0
    This paper summarizes and rebuts the three standard objections made by social choice theorists against interpersonal utility. The first objection argues that interpersonal utility is measningless. I show that this objection either focuses on irrelevant kinds of meaning or else uses implausible criteria of meaningfulness. The second objection argues that interpersonal utility has no role to play in social choice theory. I show that on the contrary interpersonal utility is useful in formulating goals for social (...)
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  26. Paul Weirich (1988). A Game-Theoretic Comparison of the Utilitarian and Maximin Rules of Social Choice. Erkenntnis 28 (1):117 - 133.score: 180.0
    I will characterize the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice game-theoretically. That is, I will introduce games whose solutions are the utilitarian and maximin distributions respectively. Then I will compare the rules by exploring similarities and differences between these games. This method of comparison has been carried out by others. But I characterize the two rules using games that involve bargaining within power structures. This new characterization better highlights the ethical differences between the rules.
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  27. Jonathan Pressler (1987). Rights and Social Choice: Is There a Paretian Libertarian Paradox? Economics and Philosophy 3 (01):1-.score: 180.0
    In 1970 Amartya Sen exposed an apparent antinomy that has come to be known as the Paradox of the Paretian Libertarian (Sen, 1970b, pp. 152–57). Sen introduced his paradox by establishing a simple but startling theorem. Roughly put, what he proved was that if a mechanism for selecting social choice functions satisfies two standard adequacy conditions, there are possible situations in which it will violate either the very weak libertarian precept that every individual has at least some rights (...)
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  28. Wulf Gaertner (2009). A Primer in Social Choice Theory: Revised Edition. OUP Oxford.score: 180.0
    Processes of collective decision making are seen throughout modern society. How does a government decide on an investment strategy within the health care and educational sectors? Should a government or a community introduce measures to combat climate change and CO2 emissions, even if others choose not too? Should a country develop a nuclear capability despite the risk that other countries may follow their lead? -/- This introductory text explores the theory of social choice. Social choice theory (...)
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  29. Ariel Rubinstein, On the Question "Who is a J?"* A Social Choice Approach.score: 180.0
    The determination of “who is a J” within a society is treated as an aggregation of the views of the members of the society regarding this question. Methods, similar to those used in Social Choice theory are applied to axiomatize three criteria for determining who is a J: 1) a J is whoever defines oneself to be a J. 2) a J is whoever a “dictator” determines is a J. 3) a J is whoever an “oligarchy” of individuals (...)
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  30. Walter Bossert, Chloe X. Qi & John A. Weymark (2013). Measuring Group Fitness in a Biological Hierarchy: An Axiomatic Social Choice Approach. Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):301-323.score: 180.0
    This article illustrates how axiomatic social choice theory can be used in the evaluation of measures of group fitness for a biological hierarchy, thereby contributing to the dialogue between the philosophy of biology and social choice theory. It provides an axiomatic characterization of the ordering underlying the MichodSolariNedelcu index of group fitness for a multicellular organism. The MVSHN index has been used to analyse the germ-soma specialization and the fitness decoupling between the cell and organism levels (...)
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  31. Susumu Cato (2013). Social Choice, the Strong Pareto Principle, and Conditional Decisiveness. Theory and Decision 75 (4):563-579.score: 180.0
    This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity.
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  32. Bruce Chapman (1998). More Easily Done Than Said: Rules, Reasons and Rational Social Choice. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18 (2):293-329.score: 180.0
    Legal decision-making emphasizes, in a very self-conscious way, the justificatory significance of reasons. This paper argues that the obligation to provide reasons for choices, which must be articulated and structured around a set of generally shared and publicly comprehensible categories of thought, can serve to make the space of possible choices ‘concept sensitive’ in a very useful way. In particular, concept sensitivity has the effect of restricting certain movements within the choice space so that some of the systematic difficulties (...)
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  33. Luc Lauwers (2002). A Note on Chichilnisky's Social Choice Paradox. Theory and Decision 52 (3):261-266.score: 180.0
    One of the main results in topological social choice states the non-existence of a continuous, anonymous, and unanimous aggregation rule on spheres. This note provides a proof based upon simple methods such as integration.
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  34. Marc Fleurbaey, Social Choice and the Indexing Dilemma.score: 180.0
    This paper distinguishes an index ordering and a social ordering function as a simple way to formalize the indexing problem in the social choice framework. Two main conclusions are derived. First, the alleged dilemma between welfarism and perfectionism is shown to involve a third possibility, exemplified by the fairness approach to social choice. Second, the idea that an individual is better off than another whenever he has more (goods, functionings, etc.) in all dimensions, which is (...)
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  35. I. D. A. Macintyre (1998). Two-Person and Majority Continuous Aggregation in 2-Good Space in Social Choice: A Note. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 44 (2):199-209.score: 180.0
    Impossibility theorems for 2-person and majority continuous games on the unit circle are presented. The emphasis is on simple methods, albeit generating new results, to offer insights into the sophisticated results of theorists in topological social choice.
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  36. Arkadii Slinko (2002). On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules. Theory and Decision 52 (4):389-398.score: 180.0
    We show that, when the number of participating agents n tends to infinity, all classical social choice rules are asymptotically strategy-proof with the proportion of manipulable profiles being of order O (1/vn).
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  37. Paul Anand (2000). Decisions Vs. Willingness-to-Pay in Social Choice. Environmental Values 9 (4):419 - 430.score: 180.0
    The paper compares use of willingness to pay values with multi-attribute utility as ways of modelling social choice problems in the environment. A number of reasons for moving away from willingness to pay are reviewed. The view proposed is that social choice is about the integration of competing claim types (utilities, rights, social contracts and beliefs about due process). However, willingness to pay is only indirectly related to the first of these and assumes an Arrovian (...)
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  38. Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.) (2009). Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    This volume provides an overview of issues arising in work on the foundations of decision theory and social choice. The collection will be of particular value to researchers in economics with interests in utility or welfare, but also to any social scientist or philosopher interested in theories of rationality or group decision-making.
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  39. Aki Tsuchiya & John Miyamoto (2009). Social Choice in Health and Healthcare. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oup Oxford.score: 180.0
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  40. Marcel Weber (2011). Experimentation Versus Theory Choice: A Social-Epistemological Approach. In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology. Ontos. 20--203.score: 168.0
  41. Victor R. Fuchs (2011). Who Shall Live?: Health, Economics, and Social Choice. World Scientific.score: 164.0
    Problems and choices -- Who shall live? -- The physician : the captain of the team -- The hospital : the house of hope -- Drugs : the key to modern medicine -- Paying for medical care.
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  42. Allan F. Gibbard (1979). Disparate Goods and Rawls' Difference Principle: A Social Choice Theoretic Treatment. Theory and Decision 11 (3):267-288.score: 156.0
    Rawls' Difference Principle asserts that a basic economic structure is just if it makes the worst off people as well off as is feasible. How well off someone is is to be measured by an ‘index’ of ‘primary social goods’. It is this index that gives content to the principle, and Rawls gives no adequate directions for constructing it. In this essay a version of the difference principle is proposed that fits much of what Rawls says, but that makes (...)
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  43. Bruce Chapman (1982). Individual Rights, Good Consequences, and the Theory of Social Choice. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 12 (3):317–323.score: 156.0
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  44. Kenneth J. Arrow (forthcoming). Current Developments in the Theory of Social Choice. Social Research.score: 156.0
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  45. Thomas V. Bonoma (1975). A Methodology for the Study of Individual and Social Choice Behaviour. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 5 (1):49–62.score: 156.0
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  46. Maurice Salles & Antoinette Baujard (2011). Normative Criteria of Social Choice. In Ian Jarvie Jesus Zamora Bonilla (ed.), The Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. 362.score: 156.0
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  47. William Vickrey (forthcoming). Economic Rationality and Social Choice. Social Research.score: 156.0
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  48. Amartya Sen (1983). Liberty and Social Choice. Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):5-28.score: 150.0
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  49. Jules L. Coleman & John Ferejohn (1986). Democracy and Social Choice. Ethics 97 (1):6-25.score: 150.0
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  50. Mortimer R. Kadish (1983). Practice and Paradox: A Comment on Social Choice Theory. Ethics 93 (4):680-694.score: 150.0
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