Extends the ideas of social constructivism to the philosophy of mathematics, developing a powerful critique of traditional absolutist conceptions of mathematics, and proposing a reconceptualization of the philosophy of mathematics.

Social constructivists maintain that we invent the properties of the world rather than discover them. Is reality constructed by our own activity? Or, more provocatively, are scientific facts--is everything --constructed? Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science is a clear assessment of this critical and increasingly important debate. Andre Kukla presents a comprehensive discussion of the philosophical issues involved and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of a range of constructivist arguments, illustrating the divide between the sociology and (...) the philosophy of science through examples as varied as laboratory science, time, and criminality. He argues that current philosophical objections to constructivism are drastically inconclusive, while offering and developing new objections. Throughout, Kukla distinguishes between the social causes of scientific beliefs and the view that all ascertainable facts are constructed. (shrink)

Social constructionists maintain that we invent the properties of the world rather than discover them. Is reality constructed by our own activity? Do we collectively invent the world rather than discover it? André Kukla presents a comprehensive discussion of the philosophical issues that arise out of this debate, analysing the various strengths and weaknesses of a range of constructivist arguments and arguing that current philosophical objections to constructivism are inconclusive. However, Kukla offers and develops new objections to (...) class='Hi'>constructivism, distinguishing between the social causes of scientific beliefs and the view that all ascertainable facts are constructed. (shrink)

The core idea of social constructivism in mathematics is that mathematical entities are social constructs that exist in virtue of social practices, similar to more familiar social entities like institutions and money. Julian C. Cole has presented an institutional version of social constructivism about mathematics based on John Searle’s theory of the construction of the social reality. In this paper, I consider what merits social constructivism has and examine how well (...) Cole’s institutional account meets the challenge of accounting for the characteristic features of mathematics, especially objectivity and applicability. I propose that in general social constructivism shows promise as an ontology of mathematics, because the view can agree with mathematical practice and it offers a way of understanding how mathematical entities can be real without conflicting with a scientific picture of reality. However, I argue that Cole’s specific theory does not provide an adequate social constructivist account of mathematics. His institutional account fails to sufficiently explain the objectivity and applicability of mathematics, because the explanations are weakened and limited by the three-level theoretical model underlying Cole’s account of the construction of mathematical reality and by the use of the Searlean institutional framework. The shortcomings of Cole’s theory give reason to suspect that the Searlean framework is not an optimal way to defend the view that mathematical reality is socially constructed. (shrink)

Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science by Andre Kukla The Social Construction of What? by Ian Hacking.

Social constructivists claim that many phenomena that we normally assume to exist independently are really just created by collective human action, thought and language. Constructivists deploy a number of sophisticated philosophical arguments to support this thesis and, in so far as their reasoning typically serves an ulterior ideological purpose, it may fairly be called applied philosophy. The goal is to change various aspects of the existing order of things; constructivist arguments are used to show that this order is a (...) human creation and is hence modifiable by human effort. A number of such “deconstructive” agendas are presented. The first deals with natural science and its privileged societal status; the next critiques orthodox Marxism; the third is the feminist campaign against patriarchal society. While these critical efforts have had considerable impact, their protagonists have been less successful in constructing alternatives to the items deconstructed. (shrink)

Berger and Luckmann’s concept of “social construction” has been widely adopted in many fields of the humanities and social sciences in the half-century since they wrote The Social Construction of Reality. One field in which constructivism was especially provocative was in Science and Technology Studies, where it was expanded beyond the social domain to encompass the practices and contents of contemporary natural science. This essay discusses the relationship between social construction in STS and Berger (...) and Luckmann’s original conception of it, and identifies problems that arose from indiscriminate uses of constructivism. (shrink)

What exactly is it to be a social constructivist in Metaphysics? In this brief note I try to introduce a few acclamatory distinctions that I have identified as having generated a lot of confusion in recent literature as well as serving to better frame current debates within metaphysical social constructivism. I also illustrate it with an example from the ontology of disability/.

In this essay, I provide normative guidelines for developing a philosophically interesting and plausible version of social constructivism as a philosophy of science, wherein science aims for social-epistemic values rather than for truth or empirical adequacy. This view is more plausible than the more radical constructivist claim that scientific facts are constructed. It is also more interesting than the modest constructivist claim that representations of such facts emerge in social contexts, as it provides a genuine rival (...) to the scientific axiologies of scientific realists and constructive empiricists. I further contrast my view with positions holding that the aims of science are context dependent, that the unit of normative analysis is the scientific community, and that the aims of science are non-epistemic social values. (shrink)

Scientific practice is a type of social practice, and every enterprise of knowledge in general exhibits important social dimensions. But should the fact that scientific practice is born out of and tied to the collaborative efforts of the members of a social group be taken to affect the products of these practices as well? In this paper, I will try in to give an affirmative answer to this question. My strategy will be to argue that the aim (...) of science is partially determined by a socio-historical context and that this aim, together with the available background knowledge, stands behind a methodology that is responsible for empirically and aim-adequate theoretical results. (shrink)

There are important synergies for the next generation of ethical leaders based on the alignment of modified or adjusted mental models. This entails a synergistic application of moral imagination through collaborative input and critique, rather than "me too" obedience. In this article, we will analyze the Milgram results using frameworks relating to mental models (Werhane et al., Profitable partnerships for poverty alleviation, 2009), as well as work by Moberg on "ethics blind spots'' (Organizational Studies 27(3): 413-428, 2006), and by Bazerman (...) and Chugh on "bounded awareness" (Harvard Business Review, 2006; Mind & Society 6: 1-18, 2007) Using these constructs to examine the Milgram experiment, we will argue that the ways in which the experiments are framed, the presence of an authority figure, the appeal to the authority of science, and the situation in which the naïve participant finds herself or himself, all create a bounded awareness, a narrow blind spot that encourages a climate for obedience, brackets out the opportunity to ask the moral question: "Am I hurting another fellow human being?" and may preclude the subject from utilizing moral imagination to opt out of the experiment. We will conclude that these forms of almost blind obedience to authority are correctable, but with difficulty. We will argue that linking the modification of mental models to an unbinding of awareness represents an important synergistic relationship and one that can build effectively on the lessons learned from our experience with moral imagination. (shrink)

Introduction. Starting from R. Merton’s pioneer works, social studies of science have been a major part of Western intellectual and scientific life. The total number of periodicals on the subject, that is over 20, illustrates the point best. Meanwhile Russian social studies of science are far less intensive. Moreover Western studies of social constructivist type still haven’t received sufficient coverage in Russian scientific literature. Our article is an attempt to somewhat reverse the situation. The aim of the (...) article is to analyze social constructivism evolution in the English speaking countries starting from Berger and Luckmann’s seminal work “The Social Construction of Reality” in 1966; to classify social constructivist versions of science together with their most prominent traits. Methods. When considering the problem, the author uses Y. Hacking’s schematic definition of social construction, P. Kitcher’s scheme of “socio-historical cluster” and M. Baghramian’s “objectivist conception of science”. Scientific novelty of the research. The analysis provides reasons for social constructivism popularity during the “science wars”; specifies social ontology and epistemic status of scientific knowledge in moderate versions of social constructivism; specifies some discourse peculiarities of radical versions of social constructivism (the consequence of somewhat unusual reception of continental tradition) and its view of the science. Results. The basic results are: a) certain convergence of ontological positions in analytic and moderate versions of social constructivist type, b) controversial issues of social (historical) approach to scientific explanation and c) controversial issues of postmodern rhetoric in radical versions. Conclusions. Social studies of science play an important role in science and society, the critical comments towards social constructivist versions notwithstanding. (shrink)

Mahoney undertakes the wide-reaching project of providing foundations for the social sciences by building on the set-theoretic framework. I enjoyed reading the book and laud the accessible writing style and the wealth of examples from case studies, making it an engaging read despite its methodological aim. The main aims of the book are threefold: (1) to introduce the theory of scientific constructivism, (2) to introduce the set-theoretic methodology that captures the logic of scientific-constructivist research, and (3) to provide (...) and develop practical tools for researchers in the social sciences. On my view, the book succeeds on all three counts. I will elaborate on each of these claims. (shrink)

Functional magnetic resonance imaging is a powerful tool used in cognitive neuroscientific research. fMRI is noninvasive, safe, and relatively accessible, making it an ideal method to draw inferences about the brain–behavior relationship. When conducting fMRI research, scientists must consider risks associated with brain imaging. In particular, the risk of potentially identifying an abnormal brain finding in an fMRI research scan poses a complex problem that researchers should be prepared to address. This article illustrates how a social constructivism decision-making (...) model can be used as a framework to guide researchers as they develop protocols to address this issue. (shrink)

Money is a cultural construction, leukemia is not. In which category does phenomenal consciousness fit? The issue is clarified by a distinction between what cultural phenomena causally influence and what culture constitutes. Culture affects phenomenal consciousness but it is ridiculous to suppose that culture constitutes it, even in part.

This paper presents a challenge to the coherence of social constructivism about science. It introduces an objection according to which social constructivism appeals to the authority of science regarding the nature of reality and so cannot coherently deny that authority. The challenge is how to avoid this incoherence.

This essay will examine some rather serious trouble confronting claims that mathematicalia might be social constructs. Because of the clarity with which he makes the case and the philosophical rigor he applies to his analysis, our exemplar of a social constructivist in this sense is Julian Cole, especially the work in his 2009 and 2013 papers on the topic. In a 2010 paper, Jill Dieterle criticized the view in Cole’s 2009 paper for being unable to account for the (...) atemporality of mathematical existents. Cole’s 2013 paper addresses this objection, providing a modification of his 2009 paper allowing for atemporal mathematicalia. An unusual consequence of Cole’s account is that at least some existential claims about mathematicalia used to be false but now have always been true. By examining the semantics of such claims, we demonstrate that social constructivism is in fact, despite Cole’s attempts to rectify matters, incompatible with atemporal mathematicalia. In the course of examining these semantic details, however, an alternative hybrid view of fictionalism and social constructivism emerges. Those tempted by social constructivism, while perhaps disappointed by the negative results of the paper, may be encouraged by how much of their view can be recovered in this alternative account. (shrink)

Moving beyond the post-political framing of the climate change debate, scholars have tried to show that scientific practice is based on politically significant forms of social construction. While sympathizing with this attempt, this paper questions their use of the term ‘political’. Drawing on post-foundational political theory and focusing on the example of climate denialism, it argues that the relation between science and the political constitutes a double bind: while upholding an original distinction between science and the political is untenable, (...) representing science in political terms is impossible, because of the specific way the scientific field is symbolically instituted. (shrink)

To systematically answer two questions “how does language work?” and “where does linguistic meaning come from?” this paper argues for SocialConstructivism of Language and Meaning which consists of six theses: the primary function of language is communication rather than representation, so language is essentially a social phenomenon. Linguistic meaning originates in the causal interaction of humans with the world, and in the social interaction of people with people. Linguistic meaning consists in the correlation of language to the world (...) established by collective intentions of a language community. Linguistic meaning is based on the conventions produced by a language community in their long process of communication. Semantic knowledge is empirical and encyclopedic knowledge distilled and condensed, and the uses of language accepted by a linguistic community. Language and meaning change rapidly or slowly as the communicative practice of a linguistic community does. The crucial point of SCLM is to focus on the triadic relation among language, humans and the world, rather than the dyadic relation between language and the world. (shrink)

This is a co-authored dialogue which explores epistemological and metaphysical questions raised by a social constructivist approach to science.

The growing trend of shifting from classroom to distance learning in ethics education programs raises the need to examine ways for adapting best instructional practices to online modes. To address this need, the current study was set to apply a social constructivist approach to an online course in research ethics and to examine its effect on the learning outcomes of science and engineering graduate students. The study applied a pre-test post-test quasi-experimental research design within a framework of a mixed-methods (...) approach. The study compared the learning outcomes of students who participated in a social constructivist online course with those who studied in a conventional online course. The data were collected via questionnaires and interviews. The findings indicated that both the conventional and the social constructivist online learners gained knowledge of facts and regulations. Yet, the social constructivist learners were more successful in demonstrating knowledge of practices that are used to establish research ethics, and in understanding the importance of conducting research in a responsible manner. The social constructivist online learners were also more successful in demonstrating awareness of ethical dilemmas, by identifying ethical dilemmas and providing solutions to ethical problems. (shrink)

The power and the promise of deep ecology is seen, by its supporters and detractors alike, to lie in its claims to speak on behalf of a natural world threatened by human excesses. Yet, to speak of trees as trees or nature as something worthy of respect in itself has appeared increasingly difficult in the light of social constructivist accounts of “nature.” Deep ecology has been loath to take constructivism’s insightsseriously, retreating into forms of biological objectivism and reductionism. (...) Yet, deep ecology actually has much in common with, and much to gain from, some varieties of constructivism and can add a new dimension to constructivism’s own critique of current ideologies. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to reconcile two important, current intellectual traditions: Darwinism and social constructionism. We believe that these two schools have important points of contact that have been obscured because each school has feared that the other wanted to put it out of business. We try to show that both traditions have much to of offer psychology, a discipline that has often been too individualistic, too concerned with the private and the subjective. The spirit of American pragmatism (...) can be found in both camps; like the social constructivists, pragmatists focused on social transaction rather than internal happening, and like the Darwinian they were rooted in functionalism and the biological. (shrink)

Integrating Rorty and (Social) Constructivism: A View from Harrisian Semiology. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2013.782587.

In recent years, many scholars have offered innovative accounts of social categories such as gender, race, and disability. By contrast, comparatively little work has been done on the category of children. The goal of our paper is to offer a new account of what children are. We start by discussing the two main accounts that have been put forward so far in the literature: naturalistic accounts and normative accounts. According to the former, to be a child is a matter (...) of possessing, or lacking, some ‘natural’ and ‘objective’ properties. According to the latter, to be a child is to possess a particular normative status. We argue that both naturalistic and normative accounts are subject to a variety of objections. We then propose our own social constructivist account. According to it, to be a child in any given society is to be regarded by the dominant ideology of that society as the target of a set of broadly paternalistic norms, in virtue of the possession of a cluster of natural properties such that, according to the dominant ideology of that society, it is justified to subject that individual to such norms. We conclude our paper by showing that our account meets the criteria of success for an account of what it is to be a child and by addressing some objections. (shrink)

Annotation Contains 17 contributions which together aim to speed the process of epistemological reform of undergraduate science teaching in order to align it with the social constructivist reform goals of the science education community. Chapters include impressionistic accounts, studies of recent transformative teaching endeavors, and radical new approaches to learner-sensitive science teaching. Of likely interest to graduate teaching students, science educators, and the educational discourse community. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

In a recent paper in this journal, Jim Garrison (1997) opines that a Deweyan social constructivism ought to be embraced by science educators in preference to the subjectivist variety espoused by Ernst von Glasersfeld as it '. . . retains all [of the latter's] virtues and does not get caught up in its confusions' (p. 543), In this response, I argue that key elements of Garrison's complaints are misguided and that his preferred Deweyan social constructivism is (...) a theoretical framework without apparent superiority and with enough flaws that it is best eschewed by science educators (and metascientists, generally). © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. (shrink)

Social constructivist approaches to science have often been dismissed as inaccurate accounts of scientific knowledge. In this article, we take the claims of robust social constructivism (SC) seriously and attempt to find a theory which does instantiate the epistemic predicament as described by SC. We argue that Freudian psychoanalysis, in virtue of some of its well-known epistemic complications and conceptual confusions, provides a perfect illustration of what SC claims is actually going on in science. In other words, (...) the features SC mistakenly ascribes to science in general correctly characterize the epistemic status of Freudian psychoanalysis. This sheds some light on the internal disputes in the field of psychoanalysis, on the sociology of psychoanalytic movement, and on the “war” that has been waged over Freud's legacy with his critics. In addition, our analysis offers an indirect and independent argument against SC as an account of bona fide science, by illustrating what science would look like if it were to function as SC claims it does. (shrink)

Attempts have been made to analyse features in mathematics within a social constructivist context. In this paper we critically examine some of those attempts recently made with focus on problems of the objectivity, ontology, necessity, and atemporality of mathematics. Our conclusion is that these attempts fare no better than traditional alternatives, and that they, furthermore, create new problems of their own.

This article considers questions of epistemology and ontology within the work of philosopher Richard Rorty from a hitherto unexplored perspective. In fact, it constitutes the present author’s attempt to come to terms with Rorty’s own brand of constructivism, termed “pragmatism”, by means of an integrational linguistic approach, as laid out by its founder Roy Harris. The paper aims at shedding light on how an integrational critique of Rortian constructivism differs epistemologically from a realist critique when it comes to (...) the notions of what constitutes knowledge, reality and truth. What emerges from the present intellectual endeavour to align these two important thinkers is a very complex picture of two positions with strong affinities but also with different points of emphasis. In this respect, the present paper is also an attempt at placing Harrisian integrationism in its proper context within the History of Idea. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: The fore going is intended to claim a place for a radically social constructivism that does not rely on the metaphysical assumption of ontological givens, avoids on cognitivist abstractions from the communication processes in which we realize ourselves as human beings, but on the embodied and largely linguistic practices of conversing with one another. Languaging is an intrinsically social phenomenon and so (...) are all explanations that are grounded in language. As Ludwig Wittgenstein said about language, everything worth talking about is there, nothing is hidden; there is no private language; to which I would add that the cognition we talk of is not private either. (shrink)

Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science by Andre Kukla The Social Construction of What? by Ian Hacking.

In contrast to evidence for evolved sex differences, support for the argument that female aggression was suppressed by patriarchial ideologies is thin. One empirical test of the differential stigmatization hypothesis is proposed, utilizing the four standard criteria for judgments of abnormality.