Search results for 'Social norms' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey (2010). Social Norms and the Traditional Deterrence Game. Synthese 176 (1):105 - 123.score: 240.0
    Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers the questions of "when, how, and to what degree" norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37: 1-27, 1993; Morrow, (...)
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  2. Marco F. H. Schmidt & Michael Tomasello (2012). Young Children Enforce Social Norms. Current Directions in Psychological Science 21 (4):232-236.score: 240.0
    Social norms have played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation, serving to stabilize prosocial and egalitarian behavior despite the self-serving motives of individuals. Young children’s behavior mostly conforms to social norms, as they follow adult behavioral directives and instructions. But it turns out that even preschool children also actively enforce social norms on others, often using generic normative language to do so. This behavior is not easily explained by individualistic motives; it (...)
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  3. Donna D. Bobek, Robin W. Roberts & John T. Sweeney (2007). The Social Norms of Tax Compliance: Evidence From Australia, Singapore, and the United States. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 74 (1):49 - 64.score: 240.0
    Tax compliance is a concern to governments around the world. Prior research (Alm, J. and I. Sanchez: 1995, KYKLOS 48, 3–19) has attributed unexplained inter-country differences in compliance rates to differences in social norms. Economics researchers studying tax compliance in the United States (U.S.) (see for example J. Andreoni et al.: 1998, Journal of Economic Literature 36, 818–860) have called for more attention to social (as opposed to economic) influences on tax compliance. In this study, we extend (...)
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  4. Donna D. Bobek, Amy M. Hageman & Charles F. Kelliher (2013). Analyzing the Role of Social Norms in Tax Compliance Behavior. Journal of Business Ethics 115 (3):451-468.score: 240.0
    The purpose of this study is to explore with more rigor and detail the role of social norms in tax compliance. This study draws on Cialdini and Trost’s (The Handbook of Social Psychology: Oxford University Press, Boston, MA, 1998) taxonomy of social norms to investigate with more specificity this potentially decisive (Alm and McKee, Managerial and Decision Economics, 19:259–275, 1998) influence on tax compliance. We test our research hypotheses regarding the direct and indirect influences of (...)
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  5. Bryan H. Druzin (2013). Eating Peas with One's Fingers: A Semiotic Approach to Law and Social Norms. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 26 (2):257-274.score: 240.0
    This paper proposes a semiotic theory of norms—what I term normative semiotics. The paper’s central contention is that social norms are a language. Moreover, it is a language that we instinctively learn to speak. Normative behaviour is a mode of communication, the intelligibility of which allows us to establish cooperative relationships with others. Normative behaviour communicates an actor’s potential as a cooperative partner. Compliance with a norm is an act of communication: compliance signals cooperativeness; noncompliance signals uncooperativeness. (...)
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  6. Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gächter (2002). Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation, and the Enforcement of Social Norms. Human Nature 13 (1):1-25.score: 240.0
    This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity “strong reciprocity” and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who (...)
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  7. Carla C. J. M. Millar & Chong Ju Choi (2009). Networks, Social Norms and Knowledge Sub-Networks. Journal of Business Ethics 90 (4):565 - 574.score: 240.0
    Networks and the World Wide Web seem to provide an answer to efficiently creating and disseminating knowledge resources. Knowledge, however, is ambiguous in character, and contains both explicit (information) and tacit dimensions - the latter being difficult to value as well as to transfer. Participant identity, commitment and behaviour within the network also affect the sharing of knowledge. Hence, existing laws and norms (including property rights) which have been established on the basis of discrete transactions and monetary value-oriented exchange (...)
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  8. Patricia S. Greenspan (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.score: 212.0
    P.S. Greenspan uses the treatment of moral dilemmas as the basis for an alternative view of the structure of ethics and its relation to human psychology. In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a socially based version of moral realism.
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  9. Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan (forthcoming). Social Norms: The Invisible Hand of the Law. University of Queensland Law Review 33.score: 210.0
  10. B. D. Earp (2014). Hymen 'Restoration' in Cultures of Oppression: How Can Physicians Promote Individual Patient Welfare Without Becoming Complicit in the Perpetuation of Unjust Social Norms? Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (6):431-431.score: 210.0
  11. Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan (forthcoming). Social Norms, The Invisible Hand, and the Law. University of Queensland Law Journal 33.score: 210.0
  12. Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte (2013). Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence. Public Reason 5 (1):3-13.score: 210.0
  13. Sandrine Gaymard (2014). The Theory of Conditionality: An Illustration of the Place of Norms in the Field of Social Thinking. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 44 (2):229-247.score: 198.0
    In the field of the central core theory of social representations, research which has focused on the normative aspects is relatively recent as it dates back little more than ten years. The theory of conditionality which developed from research into the periphery of representation results from this. It is a particularly fruitful theory to explain “normative latitudes” and the behaviour accruing to them. One of the particularities of these works stresses the importance of linking the normative aspects with specific (...)
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  14. Daniel M. Hausman (2008). Fairness and Social Norms. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):850-860.score: 180.0
    This essay comments on the theory of social norms developed by Cristina Bicchieri in The Grammar of Society ( 2006 ). It applauds her theory of norms but argues that it cannot account for the experimental results concerning ultimatum games. A theory of fairness is also needed. It develops a number of specific criticisms of her way of incorporating the influence of norms into preferences. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of (...)
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  15. Richard Arneson (2003). Equality, Coercion, Culture and Social Norms. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2 (2):139-163.score: 180.0
    Against the libertarian view, this essay argues that coercion aimed at bringing about a more equal distribution across persons can be morally acceptable. Informal social norms might lead toward equality (or another social justice goal) without coercion. If coercion were unnecessary, it would be morally undesirable. A consequentialist integration of social norms and principles of social justice is proposed. The proposal is provided with a preliminary defense against the non-consequentialist egalitarianism of G.A. Cohen and (...)
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  16. Horacio Arló-Costa, Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.score: 180.0
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen’s more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent (...)
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  17. Gralf-peter Calliess & Moritz Renner (2009). Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance. Ratio Juris 22 (2):260-280.score: 180.0
    Abstract. It is commonplace that economic globalization poses new challenges to legal theory. But instead of responding to these challenges, legal scholars often get caught up in heated yet purely abstract discussions of positivist and legal pluralist conceptions of the law. Meanwhile, economics-based theories such as "Law and Social Norms" have much less difficulty in analysing the newly arising forms of private and hybrid "governance without government" from a functional perspective. While legal theory has much to learn from (...)
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  18. Ken Binmore (2010). Social Norms or Social Preferences? Mind and Society 9 (2):139-157.score: 180.0
    Some behavioral economists argue that the honoring of social norms can be adequately modeled as the optimization of social utility functions in which the welfare of others appears as an explicit argument. This paper suggests that the large experimental claims made for social utility functions are premature at best, and that social norms are better studied as equilibrium selection devices that evolved for use in games that are seldom studied in economics laboratories.
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  19. Claudia Rudolf von Rohr, Judith Burkart & Carel van Schaik (2011). Evolutionary Precursors of Social Norms in Chimpanzees: A New Approach. Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):1-30.score: 180.0
    Moral behaviour, based on social norms, is commonly regarded as a hallmark of humans. Hitherto, humans are perceived to be the only species possessing social norms and to engage in moral behaviour. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting their presence in chimpanzees, but systematic studies are lacking. Here, we examine the evolution of human social norms and their underlying psychological mechanisms. For this, we distinguish between conventions, cultural social norms and universal social (...)
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  20. Horacio Arlo-Costa & Arthur Paul Pedersen, Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.score: 180.0
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent (...)
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  21. Derek Ettinger (2012). Genes, Gestation, and Social Norms. Law and Philosophy 31 (3):243-268.score: 180.0
    The case law surrounding surrogacy, in vitro fertilization, genetic donation, and legal parenthood is notoriously confused. Yet the issues involved in these cases are of fundamental importance to our most basic rights. To make matters worse, ongoing developments in technology continue to push the conceptual limits of both our legal and moral schemes. In this paper I argue that the concept of ‘parenthood’ is deeply ambiguous and attempt to carefully untangle the notion into two distinct concepts – one biological and (...)
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  22. Daniel Kelly, Social Norms & Independent Normativity: Moving Beyond the Moral/Conventional Distinction.score: 180.0
    A venerable tradition in philosophy sees significance in the fact that, from a subjective viewpoint, some rules seem to impress themselves upon us with a distinctive kind of authority or normative force: one feels their pull and is drawn to act in accordance with such rules unconditionally, and violations strike one as egregious. Though the first person experience of it can be mystifying, I believe this phenomenology is just one aspect of the operation of a psychological system crucial to morality. (...)
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  23. H. Gintis (2010). Social Norms as Choreography. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):251-264.score: 180.0
    This article shows that social norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational agents playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we interpret as induced by the cultural system of the society in question. When the correlating device has perfect information, we need in addition (...)
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  24. Cedric Paternotte & Jonathan Grose (2013). Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):551-587.score: 180.0
    Recent years have witnessed an increased number of game-theoretic approaches to social norms, which apparently share some common vocabulary and methods. We describe three major approaches of this kind (due to Binmore, Bicchieri and Gintis), before comparing them systematically on five crucial themes: generality of the solution, preference transformation, punishment, epistemic conditions and type of explanation. This allows us to show that these theories are, by and large, less compatible than they seem. We then argue that those three (...)
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  25. Alan M. S. J. Coffee (2013). Two Spheres of Domination: Republican Theory, Social Norms and the Insufficiency of Negative Freedom. Contemporary Political Theory.score: 180.0
    Republicans understand freedom as the guaranteed protection against any arbitrary use of coercive power. This freedom is exercised within a political community, and the concept of arbitrariness is defined with reference to the actual ideas of its citizens about what is in their shared interests. According to many current defenders of the republican model, this form of freedom is understood in strictly negative terms representing an absence of domination. I argue that this assumption is misguided. First, it is internally inconsistent. (...)
     
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  26. Benoît Dubreuil & Jean-François Grégoire (2013). Are Moral Norms Distinct From Social Norms? A Critical Assessment of Jon Elster and Cristina Bicchieri. Theory and Decision 75 (1):137-152.score: 178.0
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  27. Patrizio Lo Presti (2013). Situating Norms and Jointness of Social Interaction. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 9 (1):225-248.score: 176.0
    0 false 18 pt 18 pt 0 0 false false false /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ascii-font-family:Cambria; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Cambria; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} The paper argues that contexts of interaction are structured in a way that coordinates part actions into normatively guided joint action without agents having common knowledge or mutual beliefs about intentions, beliefs, or commitments to part (...)
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  28. Patrizio Lo Presti (2013). Situating Norms and Jointness of Social Interaction. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 9 (1):225-248.score: 176.0
    0 false 18 pt 18 pt 0 0 false false false /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ascii-font-family:Cambria; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Cambria; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} The paper argues that contexts of interaction are structured in a way that coordinates part actions into normatively guided joint action without agents having common knowledge or mutual beliefs about intentions, beliefs, or commitments to part (...)
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  29. Marcel Scheele (2006). Social Norms in Artefact Use. Techne 10 (1):53-65.score: 176.0
    The use of artefacts by human agents is subject to human standards or norms of conduct. Many of those norms are provided by the social context in which artefacts are used. Others are provided by the proper functions of the artefacts. This article argues for a general framework in which norms that are provided by proper functions are related to norms provided by the (more general) social context of use. Departing from the concept, developed (...)
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  30. Erik J. Olsson & Aron Vallinder (2013). Norms of Assertion and Communication in Social Networks. Synthese 190 (13):2557-2571.score: 174.0
    Epistemologists can be divided into two camps: those who think that nothing short of certainty or (subjective) probability 1 can warrant assertion and those who disagree with this claim. This paper addressed this issue by inquiring into the problem of setting the probability threshold required for assertion in such a way that that the social epistemic good is maximized, where the latter is taken to be the veritistic value in the sense of Goldman (Knowledge in a social world, (...)
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  31. Meredith Williams (1990). Social Norms and Narrow Content. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):425-462.score: 174.0
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  32. Laetitia B. Mulder & Rob M. A. Nelissen (2010). When Rules Really Make a Difference: The Effect of Cooperation Rules and Self-Sacrificing Leadership on Moral Norms in Social Dilemmas. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 95 (1):57 - 72.score: 174.0
    If self-interested behavior conflicts with the collective welfare, rules of cooperation are often installed to prevent egoistic behavior. We hypothesized that installing such rules may instigate personal moral norms of cooperation, but that they fail in doing so when installed by a leader who is self-interested rather than self-sacrificing. Three studies confirmed this and also showed that, consequently, only self-sacrificing leaders were able to install rules that increase cooperation without the need for a perfectly operating monitoring system.
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  33. Ullin T. Place (1992). The Role of the Ethnomethodological Experiment in the Empirical Investigation of Social Norms and its Application to Conceptual Analysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 22 (4):461-474.score: 170.0
    It is argued that conceptual analysis as practiced by the philosophers of ordinary language, is an empirical procedure that relies on a version of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment. The ethnomethodological experiment is presented as a procedure in which the existence and nature of a social norm is demonstrated by flouting the putative convention and observing what reaction that produces in the social group within which the convention is assumed to operate. Examples are given of the use of ethnomethodological experiments, (...)
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  34. Pascal Engel (2002). The Norms of Thought: Are They Social? Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148.score: 168.0
    A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It (...)
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  35. J. Krause (2012). Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms: The Scope for a Critical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):323-355.score: 168.0
    This article aims to contribute to a critical ontology of social objects. Recent works on collective intentionality and norm-following neglect the question how free agents can be brought to collectively intend to x , although x is not in their own interest. By arguing for a natural disposition to empathic understanding and drawing on recent research in the neurosciences, this article outlines an ontological framework that extends collective intentionality to questions of oppression and status asymmetries. In a contribution to (...)
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  36. Miroslav Popper (2013). Social Trust, Norms and Morality. Human Affairs 23 (3):443-457.score: 168.0
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  37. Rolf E. Sartorius (1975). Individual Conduct and Social Norms: A Utilitarian Account of Social Union and the Rule of Law. Dickenson Pub. Co..score: 162.0
     
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  38. Matteo Colombo (2014). Two Neurocomputational Building Blocks of Social Norm Compliance. Biology and Philosophy 29 (1):71-88.score: 160.0
    Current explanatory frameworks for social norms pay little attention to why and how brains might carry out computational functions that generate norm compliance behavior. This paper expands on existing literature by laying out the beginnings of a neurocomputational framework for social norms and social cognition, which can be the basis for advancing our understanding of the nature and mechanisms of social norms. Two neurocomputational building blocks are identified that might constitute the core of (...)
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  39. David L. Hull (2001). The Success of Science and Social Norms. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 23 (3/4):341 - 360.score: 156.0
    In this paper I characterize science in terms of both invisible hand social organization and selection. These two processes are responsible for different features of science. Individuals working in isolation cannot produce much in the way of the warranted knowledge. Individual biases severely limit how much secure knowledge an individual can generate on his or her own. Individuals working in consort are required, but social groups can be organized in many different ways. The key feature of the (...) organization in science is that only working scientists can confer the most important reward in science — use — and scientists must use each other's work in order to succeed in realizing this goal. An analysis of science as a selection process serves quite a different function. Individual scientists strive to come up with novel solutions to significant problems. The question then becomes how to be creative. From a selective perspective, science as a process involves the production of numerous alternatives and a selection among them. A single scientist solving an important problem makes science look very efficient. Treating science as a selection process casts it in a very different light. In this paper I combine an invisible hand mechanism with a selective perspective in order to explain why science is as successful as it is. I do not make recourse to evolutionary epistemology in any of its traditional senses. (shrink)
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  40. Kristin Andrews, Ape Autonomy? Social Norms and Moral Agency in Other Species.score: 156.0
    Once upon a time, not too long ago, the question about apes and ethics had to do with moral standing—do apes have interests or rights that humans ought to respect? Given the fifty years of research on great ape cognition, life history, social organization, and behavior, the answer to that question seems obvious. Apes have emotions and projects, they can be harmed, and they have important social relationships.
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  41. Amy Mullin (2005). Trust, Social Norms, and Motherhood. Journal of Social Philosophy 36 (3):316–330.score: 156.0
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  42. Emily McTernan (2014). How to Make Citizens Behave: Social Psychology, Liberal Virtues, and Social Norms. Journal of Political Philosophy 22 (1):84-104.score: 156.0
    It is widely conceded by liberals that institutions alone are insufficient to ensure that citizens behave in the ways required for a liberal state to flourish, be stable, or function at all. A popular solution proposes cultivating virtues in order to secure the desired behaviours of citizens, where institutions alone would not suffice. A range of virtues are proposed to fill a variety of purported gaps in the liberal political order. Some appeal to virtues in order to secure state stability; (...)
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  43. Immo Fritsche (2002). Account Strategies for the Violation of Social Norms: Integration and Extension of Sociological and Social Psychological Typologies. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32 (4):371–394.score: 156.0
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  44. Jeremy Hall & Philip Rosson (2006). The Impact of Technological Turbulence on Entrepreneurial Behavior, Social Norms and Ethics: Three Internet-Based Cases. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 64 (3):231 - 248.score: 156.0
    We investigate the entrepreneurial opportunities and ethical dilemmas presented by technological turbulence. More specifically we investigate the line between Baumol’s [J. Polit. Econ. 98 (1990) 893] productive (e.g. innovation), unproductive (e.g. rent seeking) and destructive (e.g. criminal) entrepreneurship through three examples of Internet innovation – spam (destructive), music file sharing (unproductive), and Internet pharmacies (potentially productive). The emergence of accessible Internet technologies, under present norms, has created the potential for all three entrepreneurial activities. Because of the propensity for self-serving (...)
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  45. Deborah A. Prentice (2012). The Psychology of Social Norms and the Promotion of Human Rights. In Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods (eds.), Understanding Social Action, Promoting Human Rights. Oup Usa. 23.score: 156.0
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  46. B. Skyrms & K. J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):265-273.score: 152.0
    In this article, we aim to illustrate evolutionary explanations for the emergence of framing effects, discussed in detail in Cristina Bicchieri’s The Grammar of Society . We show how framing effects might evolve which coalesce two economically distinct interactions into a single one, leading to apparently irrational behavior in each individual interaction. Here we consider the now well-known example of the ultimatum game, and show how this ‘irrational’ behavior might result from a single norm which governs behavior in multiple games. (...)
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  47. Jon Elster (1994). Rationality, Emotions, and Social Norms. Synthese 98 (1):21 - 49.score: 150.0
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  48. Elizabeth Anderson (2000). Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2):170–200.score: 150.0
  49. Patricia Greenspan (1995). Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
    In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a ...
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  50. Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon, Social Norms.score: 150.0
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