Search results for 'Socratic paradox' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  40
    Maureen Eckert (2008). The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (3):pp. 476-477.
    This is an important book. Its author, Roslyn Weiss, contends that the Socratic Paradox, "No one does wrong willingly," and related Socratic views about the virtues have been seriously misinterpreted. Socrates is not the moral intellectualist, ethical/psychological egoist, and eudaimonist generations of scholars have believed him to be. The arguments in which Socrates articulates versions of the Socratic Paradox must be examined with respect to their overall agonistic contexts. The Socratic Paradox, when it (...)
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  2. Roslyn Weiss (2006). The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. University of Chicago Press.
    In The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies, Roslyn Weiss argues that the Socratic paradoxes—no one does wrong willingly, virtue is knowledge, and all the virtues are one—are best understood as Socrates’ way of combating sophistic views: ...
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  3. Roslyn Weiss (2008). The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. University of Chicago Press.
    In_ The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies_, Roslyn Weiss argues that the Socratic paradoxes—no one does wrong willingly, virtue is knowledge, and all the virtues are one—are best understood as Socrates’ way of combating sophistic views: that no one is willingly _just_, those who are just and temperate are ignorant fools, and only some virtues but not others are marks of true excellence. _ In Weiss’s view, the paradoxes express Socrates’ belief that wrongdoing fails to yield the (...)
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  4.  56
    C. G. Luckhardt (1975). Remorse, Regret and the Socratic Paradox. Analysis 35 (5):159 - 166.
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  5.  35
    Irving Thalberg (1965). The Socratic Paradox and Reasons for Action. Theoria 31 (3):242-254.
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  6.  19
    Thomas M. Tuozzo (2009). The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies. Ancient Philosophy 29 (1):203-208.
  7.  41
    George Nakhnikian (1973). The First Socratic Paradox. Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (1):1.
  8.  20
    Renford Bambrough (1960). Socratic Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 10 (41):289-300.
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  9.  5
    David Gallop (1964). The Socratic Paradox in the Protagoras. Phronesis 9 (2):117-129.
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  10.  14
    David Wolfsdorf (2008). Weiss (R.) The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. Pp. Xii + 235. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006. Cased, £22.50, US$35. ISBN: 978-0-226-89172-. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 58 (01):72-74.
  11.  16
    James King (1987). Elenchus, Self-Blame and the Socratic Paradox. Review of Metaphysics 41 (1):105 - 126.
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  12.  19
    David Gallop (1964). The Socratic Paradox in the "Protagoras". Phronesis 9 (2):117 - 129.
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  13.  11
    Kenneth R. Seeskin (1976). Courage and Knowledge: A Perspective on the Socratic Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):511-521.
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  14.  16
    Paula Gottlieb (2009). The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies – Roslyn Weiss. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):168-170.
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  15.  9
    Sung-Hoon Kang (2008). Review of Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).
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  16.  7
    Robin Waterfield (2007). The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. By Roslyn Weiss. Heythrop Journal 48 (4):615–617.
  17.  1
    Annas Cooper (1998). Socratic Paradox and Stoic Theory1. Ethics 4:151.
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  18.  3
    Alex Long (2008). Philosophy (R.) Weiss The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2006. Pp. Xii + 235. £22.50. 9780226891729. [REVIEW] Journal of Hellenic Studies 128:277-.
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  19. Sara Ahbel-Rappe (2010). Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 29 (1):76-78.
     
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  20. Sara Ahbel-Rappe (2009). Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. Philosophy in Review 29 (1):76.
     
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  21. Reginald E. Allen (1960). The Socratic Paradox. Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1/4):256.
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  22. Roger Wertheimer (1993). Socratic Scepticism. Metaphilosophy 24 (4):344-62.
    The Socratic Paradox (that only Socrates is wise, and only because only he recognizes our lack of wisdom) is explained, elaborated and defended. His philosophical scepticism is distinguished from others (Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, Humean, Kripkean Wittgenstein, etc.): the doubt concerns our understanding of our beliefs, not our justification for them; the doubt is a posteriori and inductive, not a priori. Post-Socratic philosophy confirms this scepticism: contra-Descartes, our ideas are not transparent to us; contra-Verificationism, no criterion distinguishes sense from (...)
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  23.  18
    Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith (1984). The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato's Apology. History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (2):125 - 131.
  24.  39
    Rod Jenks (1992). On the Sense of the Socratic Reply to Meno's Paradox. Ancient Philosophy 12 (2):317-330.
  25.  23
    Michael T. Ferejohn (1984). Socratic Thought-Experiments and the Unity of Virtue Paradox. Phronesis 29 (2):105 - 122.
  26.  13
    Scott Austin (1987). The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance (How to Know That You Don't Know). Philosophical Topics 15 (2):23-34.
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  27.  89
    Richard Oxenberg, Einstein's Quandary, Socrates' Irony, and Jesus' Laughter: A 'Post-Modern' Meditation on Faith, Reason, Love, and the Paradox of the One and the Many.
    The paradox of 'the One and the Many' might, more generally, be understood as the paradox of relationship. In order for there to be relationship there must be at least two parties in relation. The relation must, at once, hold the parties apart (otherwise they would collapse into unity) while holding them together (otherwise relationship itself would cease). It must do so, further, without itself becoming a third party which would then, itself, need to be related. This paper (...)
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  28.  91
    Daniel Watts (2007). The Paradox of Beginning: Hegel, Kierkegaard and Philosophical Inquiry. Inquiry 50 (1):5 – 33.
    This paper reconsiders certain of Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's theoretical philosophy in the light of recent interpretations of the latter. The paper seeks to show how these criticisms, far from being merely parochial or rhetorical, turn on central issues concerning the nature of thought and what it is to think. I begin by introducing Hegel's conception of "pure thought" as this is distinguished by his commitment to certain general requirements on a properly philosophical form of inquiry. I then outline Hegel's (...)
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  29.  31
    Robert Talisse (2006). Socratic Citizenship. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (2):4-10.
    For contemporary democrats, Socrates is a paradox: he is both the paragon of intellectual integrity and the archenemy of democracy. In this essay, the author attempts to navigate this paradox. By offering a revised account of the Socratic elenchus and an examination of Socrates’ objections to democracy, the author proposes a view according to which Socrates provides a compelling image of democracy citizenship. This image is then used to criticize and inform current versions of deliberative democracy.
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  30. Gareth Matthews (2009). Whatever Became of the Socratic Elenchus? Philosophical Analysis in Plato. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):439-450.
    Readers who are introduced to philosophical analysis by reading the early Platonic dialogues may be puzzled to find that Plato, in his middle and late periods, largely abandons the style of analysis characteristic of early Plato, namely, the 'Socratic elenchus'. This paper undertakes to solve the puzzle. In contrast to what is popularly called 'the Socratic method', the elenchus requires that Socrates, the lead investigator, not have a satisfactory answer to his 'What is F-ness?' question. Here is the (...)
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  31.  83
    Alejandro Farieta (2013). Knowledge, Discovery and Reminiscence in Plato's Meno. Universitas Philosophica 30 (60):205-234.
    This work articulates two thesis: one Socratic and one Platonic; and displays how the first one is heir of the second. The Socratic one is called the principle of priority of definition; the Platonic one is the Recollection theory. The articulation between both theses is possible due to the Meno’s paradox, which makes a criticism on the first thesis, but it is solved with the second one. The consequence of this articulation is a new interpretation of the (...)
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  32.  21
    Alejandro Farieta (2013). Conocimiento, descubrimiento Y reminiscencia en el menón de platón. Universitas Philosophica 30 (60):205-234.
    This work articulates two thesis: one Socratic and one Platonic; and displays how the first one is heir of the second. The Socratic one is called the principle of priority of definition; the Platonic one is the Recollection theory. The articulation between both theses is possible due to the Meno’s paradox, which makes a criticism on the first thesis, but it is solved with the second one. The consequence of this articulation is a new interpretation of the (...)
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  33.  46
    Jonathan Malesic (2007). Illusion and Offense in Philosophical Fragments : Kierkegaard's Inversion of Feuerbach's Critique of Christianity. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 62 (1):43 - 55.
    The article shows the "Appendix" to Søren Kierkegaard's "Philosophical Fragments" to be a response to Ludwig Feuerbach's critique of Christianity. While previous studies have detected some influence by Feuerbach on Kierkegaard, they have so far discovered little in the way of specific responses to Feuerbach's ideas in Kierkegaard's published works. The article first makes the historical argument that Kierkegaard was very likely reading Feuerbach's "Essence of Christianity" while he was writing "Philosophical Fragments", as several of Kierkegaard's journal entries from that (...)
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  34.  8
    Mehmet Metin Erginel (2016). Akrasia and Conflict in the Nicomachean Ethics. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (4):573-593.
    ABSTRACTIn Nicomachean Ethics VII, Aristotle offers an account of akrasia that purports to salvage the kernel of truth in the Socratic paradox that people act against what is best only through ignorance. Despite Aristotle’s apparent confidence in having identified the sense in which Socrates was right about akrasia, we are left puzzling over Aristotle’s own account, and the extent to which he agrees with Socrates. The most fundamental interpretive question concerns the sense in which Aristotle takes the akratic (...)
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  35.  1
    Kath Jones, Socrates and Plato on Asking ‘What is X?’.
    The Socratic elenchus is a method of philosophical enquiry attributed by Plato, in his dialogues, to his teacher Socrates. It is a method that uses a dialectic technique of questioning and answering to try to discover the truth of the issue under investigation. For Plato’s Socrates, the fundamental question for human beings is that of how to live, thus the enquiries he initiates concern our understanding of what it is to act ethically. In order to begin to enquire into (...)
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  36.  33
    John M. Armstrong (2001). Review of Stephen Everson, Ed., Ethics, Companions to Ancient Thought 4 (Cambridge University Press, 1998). [REVIEW] Ancient Philosophy 21 (1):237–245.
    I review this fine collection of articles on ancient ethics ranging from the Presocratics to Sextus Empiricus. Eight of the nine chapters are published here for the first time. Contributors include Charles H. Kahn on "Pre-Platonic Ethics," C. C. W. Taylor on "Platonic Ethics," Stephen Everson on "Aristotle on Nature and Value," John McDowell on "Some Issues in Aristotle's Moral Psychology," David Sedley on "The Inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics," T. H. Irwin on "Socratic Paradox and Stoic Theory," (...)
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  37.  4
    Paul Elmer More (1931). Platonism. New York, Greenwood Press.
    The three Socratic theses.--The Socratic quest.--The Platonic quest.--The Socratic paradox: the dualism of Plato.--Psychology.--The doctrine of ideas.--Science and cosmogony.--Metaphysics.--Conclusion.
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  38.  86
    Hartry H. Field (2008). Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford University Press.
  39. Jc Beall & Julien Murzi (2013). Two Flavors of Curry's Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
    In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: c-Curry, the standard conditional-Curry paradox, and v-Curry, a validity-involving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving c-curry. A unified treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a unified treatment of both c-Curry and v-Curry. If, as is often thought, c-Curry paradox is to be solved via non-classical logic, then v-Curry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity relation itself.
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  40.  62
    Joe Salerno (ed.) (2008). New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    This collection assembles Church's referee reports, Fitch's 1963 paper, and nineteen new papers on the knowability paradox.
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  41.  52
    Kaave Lajevardi, Kripke and the Dogmatism Paradox.
    I aim at dissolving Kripke's dogmatism paradox by arguing that, with respect to any particular proposition p which is known by a subject A, it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p. Along the way, I offer a definition of 'A is dogmatic with respect to p', and make a distinction between an objective and a subjective sense of 'should' in the statement 'A should ignore all the evidence against p'. For the most part, I (...)
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  42. Alex Worsnip (2015). Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.
    ABSTRACTMany discussions of the ‘preface paradox’ assume that it is more troubling for deductive closure constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All that we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. The only view that escapes my way of formulating the problem for the deductive closure constraint is in fact itself a (...)
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  43. Gabriel Uzquiano (2015). Modality and Paradox. Philosophy Compass 10 (4):284-300.
    Philosophers often explain what could be the case in terms of what is, in fact, the case at one possible world or another. They may differ in what they take possible worlds to be or in their gloss of what is for something to be the case at a possible world. Still, they stand united by the threat of paradox. A family of paradoxes akin to the set-theoretic antinomies seem to allow one to derive a contradiction from apparently plausible (...)
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  44. Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
    The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility (...)
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  45.  96
    Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne & Gabriel Uzquiano (2016). Higher-Order Free Logic and the Prior-Kaplan Paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):493-541.
    The principle of universal instantiation plays a pivotal role both in the derivation of intensional paradoxes such as Prior’s paradox and Kaplan’s paradox and the debate between necessitism and contingentism. We outline a distinctively free logical approach to the intensional paradoxes and note how the free logical outlook allows one to distinguish two different, though allied themes in higher-order necessitism. We examine the costs of this solution and compare it with the more familiar ramificationist approaches to higher-order logic. (...)
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  46. Susanna Rinard (2014). A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens. Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.
    The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black non-ravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens confirm that all ravens are black, while non-black non-ravens and black non-ravens are neutral. My approach is grounded in certain relations of epistemic dependence, which, in turn, are grounded in the fact that the kind raven is more natural than the kind (...)
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  47. Jennifer Nagel (2011). The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (5):1-28.
    Harman’s lottery paradox, generalized by Vogel to a number of other cases, involves a curious pattern of intuitive knowledge ascriptions: certain propositions seem easier to know than various higher-probability propositions that are recognized to follow from them. For example, it seems easier to judge that someone knows his car is now on Avenue A, where he parked it an hour ago, than to judge that he knows that it is not the case that his car has been stolen and (...)
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  48. Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Why the Vagueness Paradox is Amazing. Think.
    One of the hardest problems in philosophy, one that has been around for over two thousand years without generating any significant consensus on its solution, involves the concept of vagueness: a word or concept that doesn’t have a perfectly precise meaning. There is an argument that seems to show that the word or concept simply must have a perfectly precise meaning, as violently counterintuitive as that is. Unfortunately, the argument is usually so compressed that it is difficult to see why (...)
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  49.  96
    Declan Smithies (2016). Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that what I call the simple theory of introspection can be extended to account for our introspective knowledge of what we believe as well as what we consciously experience. In section one, I present the simple theory of introspection and motivate the extension from experience to belief. In section two, I argue that extending the simple theory provides a solution to Moore’s paradox by explaining why believing Moorean conjunctions always involves some (...)
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  50.  39
    Seiki Akama (1996). Curry's Paradox in Contractionless Constructive Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):135 - 150.
    We propose contractionless constructive logic which is obtained from Nelson's constructive logic by deleting contractions. We discuss the consistency of a naive set theory based on the proposed logic in relation to Curry's paradox. The philosophical significance of contractionless constructive logic is also argued in comparison with Fitch's and Prawitz's systems.
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