Search results for 'Socratic paradox' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Roger Wertheimer (1993). Socratic Scepticism. Metaphilosophy 24 (4):344-62.score: 54.0
    The Socratic Paradox (that only Socrates is wise, and only because only he recognizes our lack of wisdom) is explained, elaborated and defended. His philosophical scepticism is distinguished from others (Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, Humean, Kripkean Wittgenstein, etc.): the doubt concerns our understanding of our beliefs, not our justification for them; the doubt is a posteriori and inductive, not a priori. Post-Socratic philosophy confirms this scepticism: contra-Descartes, our ideas are not transparent to us; contra-Verificationism, no criterion distinguishes sense from (...)
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  2. George Nakhnikian (1973). The First Socratic Paradox. Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (1).score: 45.0
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  3. Renford Bambrough (1960). Socratic Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 10 (41):289-300.score: 45.0
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  4. David Gallop (1964). The Socratic Paradox in the "Protagoras". Phronesis 9 (2):117 - 129.score: 45.0
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  5. Paula Gottlieb (2009). The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies – Roslyn Weiss. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):168-170.score: 45.0
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  6. Maureen Eckert (2008). The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (3):pp. 476-477.score: 45.0
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  7. C. G. Luckhardt (1975). Remorse, Regret and the Socratic Paradox. Analysis 35 (5):159 - 166.score: 45.0
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  8. Irving Thalberg (1965). The Socratic Paradox and Reasons for Action. Theoria 31 (3):242-254.score: 45.0
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  9. James King (1987). Elenchus, Self-Blame and the Socratic Paradox. Review of Metaphysics 41 (1):105 - 126.score: 45.0
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  10. Sung-Hoon Kang (2008). Review of Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).score: 45.0
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  11. Kenneth R. Seeskin (1976). Courage and Knowledge: A Perspective on the Socratic Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):511-521.score: 45.0
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  12. David Wolfsdorf (2008). Weiss (R.) The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. Pp. Xii + 235. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006. Cased, £22.50, US$35. ISBN: 978-0-226-89172-. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 58 (01).score: 45.0
  13. Thomas M. Tuozzo (2009). The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies. Ancient Philosophy 29 (1):203-208.score: 45.0
  14. David Gallop (1964). The Socratic Paradox in the Protagoras. Phronesis 9 (2):117-129.score: 45.0
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  15. Alex Long (2008). Philosophy (R.) Weiss The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2006. Pp. Xii + 235. £22.50. 9780226891729. [REVIEW] Journal of Hellenic Studies 128:277-.score: 45.0
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  16. Robin Waterfield (2007). The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. By Roslyn Weiss. Heythrop Journal 48 (4):615–617.score: 45.0
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  17. Sara Ahbel-Rappe (2010). Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 29 (1):76-78.score: 45.0
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  18. Sara Ahbel-Rappe (2009). Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies. Philosophy in Review 29 (1):76.score: 45.0
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  19. Annas Cooper (1998). Socratic Paradox and Stoic Theory1. Ethics 4:151.score: 45.0
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  20. Michael T. Ferejohn (1984). Socratic Thought-Experiments and the Unity of Virtue Paradox. Phronesis 29 (2):105 - 122.score: 36.0
  21. Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith (1984). The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato's Apology. History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (2):125 - 131.score: 36.0
  22. Rod Jenks (1992). On the Sense of the Socratic Reply to Meno's Paradox. Ancient Philosophy 12 (2):317-330.score: 36.0
  23. Scott Austin (1987). The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance (How to Know That You Don't Know). Philosophical Topics 15 (2):23-34.score: 36.0
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  24. Gail Fine (2014). The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox From Socrates to Sextus. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus Gail Fine. sense that they consider the issues it raises; and they argue, against its conclusion, that inquiry is possible. Like Plato and Aristotle, they also explain what makes inquiry possible; and they do ...
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  25. Thomas C. Brickhouse (2010). Socratic Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.score: 22.0
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction; Acknowledgements; 1. Apology of Socratic studies; 2. Motivational intellectualism; 3. The 'prudential paradox'; 4. Wrongdoing and damage to the soul; 5. Educating the appetites and passions; 6. Virtue intellectualism; 7. Socrates and his intellectual heirs: Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; Appendix: Is Plato's Gorgias consistent with the other early or Socratic dialogues?; Bibliography of works cited; Index of passages; General index.
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  26. Gareth Matthews (2009). Whatever Became of the Socratic Elenchus? Philosophical Analysis in Plato. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):439-450.score: 21.0
    Readers who are introduced to philosophical analysis by reading the early Platonic dialogues may be puzzled to find that Plato, in his middle and late periods, largely abandons the style of analysis characteristic of early Plato, namely, the 'Socratic elenchus'. This paper undertakes to solve the puzzle. In contrast to what is popularly called 'the Socratic method', the elenchus requires that Socrates, the lead investigator, not have a satisfactory answer to his 'What is F-ness?' question. Here is the (...)
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  27. Gail Fine (2010). Signification, Essence, and Meno's Paradox: A Reply to David Charles's 'Types of Definition in the Meno'. Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.score: 21.0
    According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno's paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn't conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno's paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.
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  28. Roy A. Sorensen (2003). A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    Can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift? Can time have a beginning? Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Riddles, paradoxes, conundrums--for millennia the human mind has found such knotty logical problems both perplexing and irresistible. Now Roy Sorensen offers the first narrative history of paradoxes, a fascinating and eye-opening account that extends from the ancient Greeks, through the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, and into the twentieth century. When Augustine asked what God was doing before (...)
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  29. Joe Salerno (ed.) (2009). New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    This collection assembles Church's referee reports, Fitch's 1963 paper, and nineteen new papers on the knowability paradox.
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  30. Daniel Watts (2007). The Paradox of Beginning: Hegel, Kierkegaard and Philosophical Inquiry. Inquiry 50 (1):5 – 33.score: 21.0
    This paper reconsiders certain of Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's theoretical philosophy in the light of recent interpretations of the latter. The paper seeks to show how these criticisms, far from being merely parochial or rhetorical, turn on central issues concerning the nature of thought and what it is to think. I begin by introducing Hegel's conception of "pure thought" as this is distinguished by his commitment to certain general requirements on a properly philosophical form of inquiry. I then outline (...)
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  31. David Ebrey (2014). Meno's Paradox in Context. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):4-24.score: 21.0
    I argue that Meno’s Paradox targets the type of knowledge that Socrates has been looking for earlier in the dialogue: knowledge grounded in explanatory definitions. Socrates places strict requirements on definitions and thinks we need these definitions to acquire knowledge. Meno’s challenge uses Socrates’ constraints to argue that we can neither propose definitions nor recognize them. To understand Socrates’ response to the challenge, we need to view Meno’s challenge and Socrates’ response as part of a larger disagreement about the (...)
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  32. Robert Talisse (2006). Socratic Citizenship. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (2):4-10.score: 21.0
    For contemporary democrats, Socrates is a paradox: he is both the paragon of intellectual integrity and the archenemy of democracy. In this essay, the author attempts to navigate this paradox. By offering a revised account of the Socratic elenchus and an examination of Socrates’ objections to democracy, the author proposes a view according to which Socrates provides a compelling image of democracy citizenship. This image is then used to criticize and inform current versions of deliberative democracy.
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  33. Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.score: 18.0
    We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that knowledge is the norm of belief. The first draws on observations concerning belief's aim and the parallels between belief and assertion. The second appeals to observations concerning Moore's Paradox. Neither of these strategies gives us good reason to accept the knowledge account. The considerations offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief.
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  34. Matt Leonard (2012). Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox. In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications.score: 18.0
    One recently proposed solution to the Liar paradox is the contextual theory of truth. Tyler Burge (1979) argues that truth is an indexical notion and that the extension of the truth predicate shifts during Liar reasoning. A Liar sentence might be true in one context and false in another. To many, contextualism seems to capture our pre-theoretic intuitions about the semantic paradoxes; this is especially due to its reliance on the so-called Revenge phenomenon. I, however, show that Super-Liar sentences (...)
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  35. Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett, Multi-Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox.score: 18.0
    One problem in the epistemology of disagreement (Kelly 2005, Feldman 2006, Christensen 2007) concerns peer disagreement, and the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe p and disagree with an “epistemic peer” of yours (more on which notion in a moment), who believes ~p. Another (Elga 2007, pp. 486-8, Kelly 2010, pp. 160-7) concerns serial peer disagreement, and the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe p1 … pn and disagree with an “epistemic peer” of yours, (...)
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  36. Jennifer Nagel (2011). The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (5):1-28.score: 18.0
    Harman’s lottery paradox, generalized by Vogel to a number of other cases, involves a curious pattern of intuitive knowledge ascriptions: certain propositions seem easier to know than various higher-probability propositions that are recognized to follow from them. For example, it seems easier to judge that someone knows his car is now on Avenue A, where he parked it an hour ago, than to judge that he knows that it is not the case that his car has been stolen and (...)
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  37. Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa (2010). The Whole Truth About Linda: Probability, Verisimilitude and a Paradox of Conjunction. In Marcello D'Agostino, Federico Laudisa, Giulio Giorello, Telmo Pievani & Corrado Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications. 603--615.score: 18.0
    We provide a 'verisimilitudinarian' analysis of the well-known Linda paradox or conjunction fallacy, i.e., the fact that most people judge the probability of the conjunctive statement "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement" (B & F) as more probable than the isolated statement "Linda is a bank teller" (B), contrary to an uncontroversial principle of probability theory. The basic idea is that experimental participants may judge B & F a better hypothesis about Linda as (...)
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  38. Andrew Bacon (2013). Curry's Paradox and Omega Inconsistency. Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.score: 18.0
    In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes. In this paper I show that a number of logics are susceptible to a strengthened version of Curry's paradox. This can be adapted to provide a proof theoretic analysis of the omega-inconsistency in Lukasiewicz's continuum valued logic, allowing us to better evaluate which logics are suitable for a naïve truth theory. On this basis I identify two natural subsystems of Lukasiewicz logic which individually, (...)
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  39. Riccardo Strobino (2012). Truth and Paradox in Late XIVth Century Logic : Peter of Mantua’s Treatise on Insoluble Propositions. Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 23:475-519.score: 18.0
    This paper offers an analysis of a hitherto neglected text on insoluble propositions dating from the late XiVth century and puts it into perspective within the context of the contemporary debate concerning semantic paradoxes. The author of the text is the italian logician Peter of Mantua (d. 1399/1400). The treatise is relevant both from a theoretical and from a historical standpoint. By appealing to a distinction between two senses in which propositions are said to be true, it offers an unusual (...)
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  40. Timothy Chan (2010). Moore's Paradox is Not Just Another Pragmatic Paradox. Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.score: 18.0
    One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, (...)
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  41. Aaron Smuts (2007). The Paradox of Painful Art. Journal of Aesthetic Education 41 (3):59-77.score: 18.0
    Many of the most popular genres of narrative art are designed to elicit negative emotions: emotions that are experienced as painful or involving some degree of pain, which we generally avoid in our daily lives. Melodramas make us cry. Tragedies bring forth pity and fear. Conspiratorial thrillers arouse feelings of hopelessness and dread, and devotional religious art can make the believer weep in sorrow. Not only do audiences know what these artworks are supposed to do; they seek them out in (...)
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  42. Salvatore Florio & Julien Murzi (2009). The Paradox of Idealization. Analysis 69 (3):461-469.score: 18.0
    A well-known proof by Alonzo Church, first published in 1963 by Frederic Fitch, purports to show that all truths are knowable only if all truths are known. This is the Paradox of Knowability. If we take it, quite plausibly, that we are not omniscient, the proof appears to undermine metaphysical doctrines committed to the knowability of truth, such as semantic anti-realism. Since its rediscovery by Hart and McGinn ( 1976), many solutions to the paradox have been offered. In (...)
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  43. Stewart Shapiro (2010). So Truth is Safe From Paradox: Now What? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 147 (3):445 - 455.score: 18.0
    The article is part of a symposium on Hartry Field’s “Saving truth from paradox”. The book is one of the most significant intellectual achievements of the past decades, but it is not clear what, exactly, it accomplishes. I explore some alternatives, relating the developed view to the intuitive, pre-theoretic notion of truth.
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  44. Roger Clarke (2010). “The Ravens Paradox” is a Misnomer. Synthese 175 (3):427-440.score: 18.0
    I argue that the standard Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox— generally accepted as the most successful solution to the paradox—is insufficiently general. I give an instance of the paradox which is not solved by the standard Bayesian solution. I defend a new, more general solution, which is compatible with the Bayesian account of confirmation. As a solution to the paradox, I argue that the ravens hypothesis ought not to be held equivalent to its contrapositive; more (...)
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  45. Jack Woods (2014). Expressivism and Moore's Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (5):1-12.score: 18.0
    Expressivists explain the expression relation which obtains between sincere moral assertion and the conative or affective attitude thereby expressed by appeal to the relation which obtains between sincere assertion and belief. In fact, they often explicitly take the relation between moral assertion and their favored conative or affective attitude to be exactly the same as the relation between assertion and the belief thereby expressed. If this is correct, then we can use the identity of the expression relation in the two (...)
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  46. Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.score: 18.0
    The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility (...)
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  47. Peter Boghossian (2011). Socratic Pedagogy: Perplexity, Humiliation, Shame and a Broken Egg. Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (7):710-720.score: 18.0
    This article addresses and rebuts the claim that the purpose of the Socratic method is to humiliate, shame, and perplex participants. It clarifies pedagogical and exegetical confusions surrounding the Socratic method, what the Socratic method is, what its epistemological ambitions are, and how the historical Socrates likely viewed it. First, this article explains the Socratic method; second, it clarifies a misunderstanding regarding Socrates' role in intentionally perplexing his interlocutors; third, it discusses two different types of perplexity (...)
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