Search results for 'Solipsism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Living Alone & I. N. Solipsism (2005). Symposium: Wittgenstein, Solitude, and the Human Voice. Philosophy and Literature 29:409-427.
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  2. Of Solipsism (forthcoming). cuiiMwr wiMowcAis, OCT o L Lggg. European Journal of Philosophy.
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  3.  2
    Stephen Buckle, Miracles Marvels, Mundane Order, Temporal Solipsism, Robert Kirk, Nonreductive Physicalism, Strict Implication, Donald Mertz Individuation, Instance Ontology & Dale E. Miller (2001). Index of Volume 79, 2001. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):594-596.
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  4.  97
    J. A. Fodor (1980). Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63.
  5. Lucy F. O'Brien (1996). Solipsism and Self-Reference. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):175-194.
    In this paper I want to propose that we see solipsism as arising from certain problems we have about identifying ourselves as subjects in an objective world. The discussion will centre on Wittgenstein.
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  6.  30
    Jeremy E. Henkel (2011). How to Avoid Solipsism While Remaining an Idealist: Lessons From Berkeley and Dharmakīrti. Comparative Philosophy 3 (1):58-73.
    This essay examines the strategies that Berkeley and Dharmakīrti utilize to deny that idealism entails solipsism. Beginning from similar arguments for the non-existence of matter, the two philosophers employ markedly different strategies for establishing the existence of other minds. This difference stems from their responses to the problem of intersubjective agreement. While Berkeley’s reliance on his Cartesian inheritance does allow him to account for intersubjective agreement without descending into solipsism, it nevertheless prevents him from establishing the existence of (...)
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  7.  6
    Markus Schrenk, Ernst Mach on the Self. The Deconstruction of the Ego as an Attempt to Avoid Solipsism. Deutscher Kongress Für Philosophie, 11. - 15. September 2011, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
    In his Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations (Mach 1885) the phenomenalist philosopher Ernst Mach confronts us with a difficulty: “If we regard the Ego as a real unity, we become involved in the following dilemma: either we must set over against the Ego a world of unknowable entities […] or we must regard the whole world, the Egos of other people included, as comprised in our own Ego.” (Mach 1885: 21) In other words, if we start from a (...)
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  8.  38
    Raimo Tuomela (1989). Methodological Solipsism and Explanation in Psychology. Philosophy of Science 56 (March):23-47.
    This paper is a discussion of the tenability of methodological solipsism, which typically relies on the so-called Explanatory Thesis. The main arguments in the paper are directed against the latter thesis, according to which internal (or autonomous or narrow) psychological states as opposed to noninternal ones suffice for explanation in psychology. Especially, feedback-based actions are argued to require indispensable reference to noninternal explanantia, often to explanatory common causes. Thus, to the extent that methodological solipsism is taken to require (...)
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  9.  61
    Katherine J. Morris (1984). In Defense of Methodological Solipsism: A Reply to Noonan. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):399-412.
    Noonan's arguments against methodological solipsism ("methodological solipsism," "philosophical studies" 4, 1981) assumes that mental states are individuated by (russellian) content; this assumption entails that narrowness and wideness are intrinsic to mental states. I propose an alternative "extrinsic" reading of methodological solipsism, According to which narrowness and wideness are modes of attribution of mental states, And thus reject the doctrine of individuation by russellian content. Noonan's arguments fail against this version of methodological solipsism.
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  10.  35
    J. Christopher Maloney (1985). Methodological Solipsism Reconsidered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Philosophy of Science 52 (September):451-69.
    Current computational psychology, especially as described by Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981), Pylyshyn (1980), and Stich (1983), is both a bold, promising program for cognitive science and an alternative to naturalistic psychology (Putnam 1975). Whereas naturalistic psychology depends on the general scientific framework to fix the meanings of general terms and, hence, the content of thoughts utilizing or expressed in those terms, computational cognitive theory banishes semantical considerations in psychological investigations, embracing methodological, not ontological, solipsism. I intend to argue that (...)
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  11.  11
    Takashi Yagisawa (1993). The Cost of Meaning Solipsism. In Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LaPore (eds.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi 213-230.
    Meaning Solipsism says that it is possible for there to be a meaningful state without any other meaningful state. The meaning of such a solo meaningful state should be non-natural. The best strategy for establishing Meaning Solipsism is to argue for the determination of the meaning of a possible solo meaningful state via the set of entities the meaning of the state fits. Embracing merely possible and impossible entities is the most straightforward way to do so. Also, a (...)
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  12.  11
    Ausonio Marras (1985). The Churchlands on Methodological Solipsism and Computational Psychology. Philosophy of Science 52 (June):295-309.
    This paper addresses a recent argument of the Churchlands against the "linguistic-rationalist" tradition exemplified by current cognitive-computational psychology. Because of its commitment to methodological solipsism--the argument goes--computational psychology cannot provide an account of how organisms are able to represent and "hook up to" the world. First I attempt to determine the exact nature of this charge and its relation to the Churchlands' long-standing polemic against 'folk psychology' and the linguistic-rationalist methodology. I then turn my attention to the Churchlands' account (...)
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  13. Josef Parnas & Louis A. Sass (2001). Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):101-120.
  14.  68
    Mark Rowlands (1995). Against Methodological Solipsism: The Ecological Approach. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):5-24.
    This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made (...)
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  15. Stephen P. Thornton, Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  16.  86
    Harold W. Noonan (1981). Methodological Solipsism. Philosophical Studies 40 (September):269-274.
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  17. Kent Bach (1982). "De Re" Belief and Methodological Solipsism. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. Clarendon Press
  18.  47
    J. Christopher Maloney (1991). Saving Psychological Solipsism. Philosophical Studies 61 (March):267-83.
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  19.  48
    Michael Ridge (2001). Taking Solipsism Seriously: Nonhuman Animals and Meta-Cognitive Theories of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 103 (3):315-340.
  20.  31
    Mark Rowlands (1991). Towards a Reasonable Version of Methodological Solipsism. Mind and Language 6 (1):39-57.
  21.  47
    Harold W. Noonan (1984). Methodological Solipsism: A Reply to Morris. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):285-290.
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  22. Margaret Simonton (1996). Nabokov, Vian, and Kharms: From Solipsism to Dialogue. P. Lang.
     
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  23. E. Teensma (1974). Solipsism and Induction. Assen,Van Gorcum.
     
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  24. William Lewis Todd (1969). Analytical Solipsism. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
     
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  25.  6
    Roy A. Sorensen (2016). Diary of a Telepathic Solipsist. Ratio 29 (3).
    A thorough telepath in an otherwise mindless world would have an observational basis for solipsism. He would perceive an absence of other minds. How would things appear to the lone telepath? Given sufficient scepticism about introspection, exactly as they now seem to you. This perceptual solipsist would exclude other minds on the basis of evidence rather than the absence of evidence. He would be open-minded, ready to revise his opinion as rapidly as any perceiver. Any intransigence would be a (...)
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  26.  7
    Hervé Zwirn (2016). The Measurement Problem: Decoherence and Convivial Solipsism. Foundations of Physics 46 (6):635-667.
    The problem of measurement is often considered an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism. Many attempts to solve it have been made since the inception of quantum mechanics. The form of these attempts depends on the philosophical position that their authors endorse. I will review some of them and analyze their relevance. The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution lying inside the pure quantum formalism and not demanding any particular philosophical assumption. Nevertheless, a widely debated question is to (...)
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  27.  37
    Robert Stern (2012). Is Hegel's Master–Slave Dialectic a Refutation of Solipsism? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):333-361.
    This paper considers whether Hegel's master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit should be considered as a refutation of solipsism. It focuses on a recent and detailed attempt to argue for this sort of reading that has been proposed by Frederick Beiser ? but it argues that this reading is unconvincing, both in the historical motivations given for it in the work of Jacobi and Fichte, and as an interpretation of the text itself. An alternative reading of the dialectic (...)
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  28.  98
    Jaakko Hintikka (1958). On Wittgenstein's `Solipsism'. Mind 67 (265):88-91.
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  29.  77
    Michael Kremer, To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth?
    My title1 is taken from one of the most obscure, and most discussed, sections of an already obscure and much discussed work, the discussion of the self, the world, and solipsism in sections 5.6-5.641 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus.2 Wittgenstein writes: 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. 5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in (...)
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  30.  42
    Włodzimierz Heflik (2011). Subject: Construct or Acting Being? The Status of the Subject and the Problem of Solipsism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):49-67.
    In his Tractatus and Notebooks 1914-1916, Wittgenstein develops some themes concerning the nature of the subject, transcendentalism, solipsism and mysticism. Though Wittgenstein rejects a naive, psychological understanding of the subject, he preserves the idea of the metaphysical subject, so-called “philosophical I”. The present investigations exhibit two ways of grasping the subject: (1) subject as a boundary (of the world); (2) subject (I) as the world. The author of the paper aims to analyze different methods of conceiving the subject, both (...)
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  31.  98
    Pete Mandik (2007). Picturing, Showing, and Solipsism in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Analysis and Metaphysics 6 (1).
    Of all the enigmatic remarks running through Wittgensteinís Tractatus, none are a greater source of puzzlement to this reader than the endorsement of solipsism in 5.6-5.641. Wittgenstein writes ìI am my worldî, but, even though ìwhat solipsism means, is quite correct...it cannot be said, but it shows itselfî (5.63; 5.62). More intriguing still, he writes.
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  32.  92
    Irwin Goldstein (2007). Solipsism and the Solitary Language User. Philosophical Papers 36 (1):35-47.
    A person skeptical about other minds supposes it is possible in principle that there are no minds other than his. A person skeptical about an external world thinks it is possible there is no world external to him. Some philosophers think a person can refute the skeptic and prove that his world is not the solitary scenario the skeptic supposes might be realized. In this paper I examine one argument that some people think refutes solipsism. The argument, from Wittgenstein, (...)
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  33.  42
    Edward H. Minar (1998). Wittgenstein on the Metaphysics of the Self: The Dialectic of Solipsism in Philosophical Investigations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):329–354.
    Wittgenstein's later efforts to exorcise the attractions of solipsism involve descriptions of the uses of 'I' which may be taken to show that 'I' does not refer in its philosophically most salient uses. This point of "grammar," however, would not by itself provide a direct refutation of solipsism; _Philosophical Investigations, Sections 398-410, of which this paper is a reading, traces a complex dialectic by which Wittgenstein elicits and questions the solipsist's commitments. In challenging the intelligibility of the solipsist's (...)
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  34.  54
    Lucy O'Brien, Final Version: O'Brien, L. F. , 'Solipsism and Self-Reference', European Journal of Philosophy 4:175-194.
    In this paper I want to propose that we see solipsism as arising from certain problems we have about identifying ourselves as subjects in an objective world. The discussion will centre on Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism in his Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus. In that work Wittgenstein can be seen to express an unusually profound understanding of the problems faced in trying to give an account of how we, who are subjects, identify ourselves as objects in the world. We have (...)
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  35.  18
    Christian H. Sötemann (2011). The Immortal Solipsist. Think 10 (27):73-76.
    Philosophers have been known to sometimes conjure up world-views which seem dazzlingly at odds with our everyday take on the world. Among the more, if not most drastic ???-isms??? to be found in the history of philosophy, then, is the standpoint of solipsism, derived from the Latin words ???solus??? and ???ipse??? . What is that supposed to mean? It adopts a position that only acknowledges the existence of one's very own mind and opposes that there is anything beyond the (...)
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  36.  7
    Sami Pihlstrom (2011). Guilt: Facing the Problem of Ethical Solipsism. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 7 (2):114-135.
    : This article deals with the constitutive role played by the emotion of guilt, or the capacity of experiencing such emotions, in our moral life. The deeply personal nature of moral guilt leads to the problem of ethical solipsism: it seems that guilt can in the end concern only me, not anyone else, in a morally profound sense. Echoing Dostoevsky, the truly ethical thinker ought to acknowledge that everyone is guilty in front of the entire mankind, “and I more (...)
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  37.  30
    Ian I. Mitroff (1971). Solipsism: An Essay in Psychological Philosophy. Philosophy of Science 38 (3):376-394.
    The thesis of this paper is that in dealing with problems of "mind," the philosopher of mind needs to be as well grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. psychology, anthropology) as the philosopher of the physical sciences needs to be grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. physics). The thesis of this paper is also that the psychological analysis of solipsism and the philosophical analysis are not independent (or at least not independent in all of their aspects), and that therefore (...)
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  38.  11
    Daniel King (2004). Methodological Solipsism and the Multiverse. Philosophy Today 48 (3):255-263.
    "Methodological Solipsism and the Multiverse" defends the many-universes interpretation of quantum physics, but draws attention to a major philosophical obstacle to the interpretation's acceptance: the question of why, if there are many universes, all on a par with one another, at a particular time the 'I' is manifest in only one. This is known as the 'preferred basis' problem. The so-called methodological solipsism approach, introduced by Driesch and employed by philosophers, such as Putnam and Fodor, is used to (...)
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  39.  30
    H. O. Mounce (1997). Philosophy, Solipsism and Thought. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):1–18.
    Wittgenstein's view of philosophy in the Tractatus presupposes that thought may be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. It is commonly held, however, that in the Tractatus he treated thought as logically prior to language. If this view, expressed most lucidly by Norman Malcolm, were correct, Wittgenstein would be inconsistent in holding that thought can be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. I argue that this is not correct. Thought may be prior to language in time (...)
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  40.  15
    Brook Ziporyn (2012). Spinoza and the Self-Overcoming of Solipsism. Comparative and Continental Philosophy 4 (1):125 - 140.
    Spinoza, as a monist and a rationalist, seems unlikely to have occasion to confront any form of the solipsism problem. However, a close examination of his epistemology reveals that he does in fact confront a very radical form of this problem, and offers an equally radical solution to it, derived from the very epistemological premises that make it a potential problem for him. In particular, we find that the conception of the mind as the “idea of the body,” premised (...)
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  41.  15
    Albert A. Johnstone (1991). Rationalized Epistemology: Taking Solipsism Seriously. State University of New York Press.
    Roughly characterized, solipsism is the skeptical thesis that there is no reason to think that anything exists other than oneself and one’s present experience. Since its inception in the reflections of Descartes, the thesis has taken three broad and sometimes overlapping forms: Internal World Solipsism that arises from an account of perception in terms of representations of an external world; Observed World Solipsism that arises from doubts as to the existence of what is not actually present sensuously (...)
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  42.  6
    Roy W. Perrett (1981). Solipsism and Religious Belief. Sophia 20 (3):17-26.
    In "arguments for the existence of god" and "faith and knowledge", john hick argues for the rationality of religious belief on the basis of an analogy between religious and perceptual belief. i reply that the analogy does not obtain because there is no alternative solipsistic interpretation of perceptual belief possible. this is because (a) hick's phenomenology of dreaming is unsatisfactory and (b) wittgenstein's "private language" argument shows solipsism to be an unintelligible option.
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  43. Sami Pihlström (1996). A Solipsist in a Real World. Dialectica 50 (4):275-290.
    It is trivially true that solipsism, the view that “the world is my world” and that whatever there is is ontologically dependent on my thought or language, cannot be conclusively refuted. The issue of solipsism is, however, an important one. The paper considers this issue mainly from the point of view of Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism in the Tractatus and in his early Notebooks. It is argued that we should not accept the Wittgensteinian idea that solipsism (...)
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  44.  15
    Saul Traiger, Solipsism, Individualism and Cognitive Science.
    Solipsism, Individualism and Cognitive Science [1] "Artificial Intelligence cannot ignore philosophy" - John McCarthy I shall challenge the claim that Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence, or GOFAI is solipsistic while more recent neural or "brain-style" approaches to AI are not. After distinguishing GOFAI from connectionism, I will first show that GOFAI is not committed to solipsism but rather to what is more properly called individualism.
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  45.  15
    Miriam Franchella (1995). Like a Bee on a Windowpane: Heyting's Reflections on Solipsism. Synthese 105 (2):207 - 251.
    This paper presents the content of the unpublished notes that the Dutch mathematician Arend Heyting wrote in different periods of his life on solipsism and that are preserved in Heyting's archive at the University of Amsterdam. Most of the notes are quoted here and translated into English. Their study shows the originality of Heyting's reflections on a subject that was typical of his master, L. E. J. Brouwer, the father of intuitionism.
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  46. Albert Arnold Johnstone (1984). Cartesian Solipsism: An Analytic/Phenomenological Refutation. Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)
    The skeptical doubts entertained by Descartes give rise to seven distinct theses characterizable as solipsistic, each focused on one of three general epistemological problems, that of the reality of the perceived, that of the existence of the unperceived, and the so-called problem of the existence of an external world. The skeptical challenge in each case is concerned not with absolute certainty, but with the question of whether there is any warrant whatever for bridging the evidential gap between data and common-sense (...)
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  47. Denis McManus (2004). Solipsism and Scepticism in the Tractatus. In Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge
  48. Rae Langton (2009). Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. OUP Oxford.
    Rae Langton here draws together her ground-breaking and contentious work on pornography and objectification. She shows how women come to be objectified -- made subordinate and treated as things -- and she argues for the controversial feminist conclusions that pornography subordinates and silences women, and women have rights against pornography.
     
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  49. Michael W. Kraus, Paul K. Piff, Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton, Michelle L. Rheinschmidt & Dacher Keltner (2012). Social Class, Solipsism, and Contextualism: How the Rich Are Different From the Poor. Psychological Review 119 (3):546-572.
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  50. Steffen Borge (1999). All You Zombies. David Chalmers’ Metaphysical Solipsism. In Uwe Meixner Peter Simons (ed.), Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
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