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  1. Sophie C. Gibb (2014). Mental Causation. Analysis 74 (2):327-338.
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  2. Sophie C. Gibb (2014). The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Subtraction of Powers. Erkenntnis 79 (1):127-146.
    According to one popular criterion of property identity, where X and Y are properties, X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y bestow the same conditional powers on their bearers. In this paper, I argue that this causal criterion of property identity is unsatisfactory, because it fails to provide a sufficient condition for the identification of properties. My argument for this claim is based on the observation that the summing of properties does not entail the summing (...)
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  3. Sophie C. Gibb (2014). The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):551-566.
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  4. Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.) (2013). Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    This book demonstrates the importance of ontology for a central debate in philosophy of mind. Mental causation seems an obvious aspect of the world.
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  5. Sophie C. Gibb (2009). Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion. Erkenntnis 71 (2):205 - 221.
    Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This (...)
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