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Sophie Gibb [7]Sophie C. Gibb [5]
  1. Sophie C. Gibb (2014). Mental Causation. Analysis 74 (2):327-338.
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  2. Sophie C. Gibb (2014). The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Subtraction of Powers. Erkenntnis 79 (1):127-146.
    According to one popular criterion of property identity, where X and Y are properties, X is identical with Y if and only if X and Y bestow the same conditional powers on their bearers. In this paper, I argue that this causal criterion of property identity is unsatisfactory, because it fails to provide a sufficient condition for the identification of properties. My argument for this claim is based on the observation that the summing of properties does not entail the summing (...)
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  3. Sophie C. Gibb (2014). The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization. 92 (3):551-566.
    (2014). The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 92, No. 3, pp. 551-566. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.857701.
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  4. Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.) (2013). Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    This book demonstrates the importance of ontology for a central debate in philosophy of mind. Mental causation seems an obvious aspect of the world.
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  5. Sophie Gibb (2012). Nonreductive Physicalism and the Problem of Strong Closure. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):29-42.
    Closure is the central premise in one of the best arguments for physicalism—the argument from causal overdetermination. According to Closure, at every time at which a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This principle is standardly defended by appealing to the fact that it enjoys empirical support from numerous confirming cases (and no disconfirming cases) in physics. However, in recent literature on mental causation, attempts have been made to provide a stronger argument for it. (...)
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  6. Sophie Gibb (2010). Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum. Dialectica 64 (3):363-384.
    The conservation laws do not establish the central premise within the argument from causal overdetermination – the causal completeness of the physical domain. Contrary to David Papineau (2000 and 2002), this is true even if there is no non-physical energy. The combination of the conservation laws with the claim that there is no non-physical energy would establish the causal completeness principle only if, at the very least, two further causal claims were accepted. First, the claim that the only way that (...)
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  7. Sophie Gibb (2009). The Mind in Nature • by C. B. Martin. Analysis 69 (2):386-388.
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  8. Sophie C. Gibb (2009). Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion. Erkenntnis 71 (2):205 - 221.
    Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This (...)
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  9. Sophie Gibb (2007). Is the Partial Identity Account of Property Resemblance Logically Incoherent? Dialectica 61 (4):539-558.
    According to the partial identity account of resemblance, exact resemblance is complete identity and inexact resemblance is partial identity. In this paper, I examine Arda Denkel's (1998) argument that this account of resemblance is logically incoherent as it results in a vicious regress. I claim that although Denkel's argument does not succeed, a modified version of it leads to the conclusion that the partial identity account is plausible only if the constituents of every determinate property are ultimately quantitative in nature.
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  10. Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
    Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, the second in a (...)
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  11. Sophie Gibb (2006). Space, Supervenence and Entailment. Philosophical Papers 35 (2):171-184.
    Le Poidevin has recently presented an argument that gives rise to a serious problem for relationist theories of space. It appeals to the simple geometrical fact that if A, B and C are three points lying in a straight line, then AB and BC together entail AC. He suggests that an ontological relationship of supervenience must be appealed to to explain this entailment. Given this thesis of supervenience, relationism is implausible. I argue that the problem that Le Poidevin raises for (...)
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  12. Alexander Miller, Tom Stoneham & Sophie Gibb (2005). Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Books 46 (3):278-284.
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