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Profile: Spyridon Orestis Palermos (University of Edinburgh)
  1. Spyridon Orestis Palermos (2013). Could Reliability Naturally Imply Safety? European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):n/a-n/a.
    The aim of the present paper is to argue that robust virtue epistemology is correct. That is, a complete account of knowledge is not in need for an additional modal criterion in order to account for knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. I begin by presenting the problems facing robust virtue epistemology by examining two prominent counterexamples—the Barney and ‘epistemic twin earth’ cases. After proposing a way in which virtue epistemology can explain away these two problematic cases, thereby, implying that cognitive abilities are (...)
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  2. Spyridon Orestis Palermos, Extending Cognition in Epistemology : Towards an Individualistic Social Epistemology.
    The aim of the present thesis is to reconcile two opposing intuitions; one originating from mainstream individualistic epistemology and the other one from social epistemology. In particular, conceiving of knowledge as a cognitive phenomenon, mainstream epistemologists focus on the individual as the proper epistemic subject. Yet, clearly, knowledge-acquisition many times appears to be a social process and, sometimes, to such an extent—as in the case of scientific knowledge—that it has been argued there might be knowledge that is not possessed by (...)
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  3. Spyridon Orestis Palermos (2011). Belief-Forming Processes, Extended. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):741-765.
    We very often grant that a person can gain knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts such as telescopes, microscopes and so on. However, this intuition threatens to undermine virtue reliabilism according to which one knows that p if and only if one’s believing the truth that p is the product of a reliable cognitive belief-forming process; in an obvious sense epistemic artifacts are not parts of one’s overall cognitive system. This is so, unless the extended cognition hypothesis (HEC) is (...)
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  4. Spyridon Orestis Palermos (2011). Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony and the Ability Intuition. Philosophia 39 (3):597-613.
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