17 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Srecko Kovac (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb)
  1.  11
    Srećko Kovač & Kordula Świętorzecka (2015). Gödel's "Slingshot" Argument and His Onto-Theological System. In Kordula Świętorzecka (ed.), Gödel's Ontological Argument: History, Modifications, and Controversies. Semper 123-162.
  2.  8
    Srećko Kovač (2015). Causal Interpretation of Gödel's Ontological Proof. In Kordula Świętorzecka (ed.), Gödel's Ontological Argument: History, Modifications, and Controversies. Semper 163.201.
  3.  95
    Srećko Kovač (2008). Gödel, Kant, and the Path of a Science. Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):147-169.
    Gödel's philosophical views were to a significant extent influenced by the study not only of Leibniz or Husserl, but also of Kant. Both Gödel and Kant aimed at the secure foundation of philosophy, the certainty of knowledge and the solvability of all meaningful problems in philosophy. In this paper, parallelisms between the foundational crisis of metaphysics in Kant's view and the foundational crisis of mathematics in Gödel's view are elaborated, especially regarding the problem of finding the “secure path of a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  34
    Srećko Kovač (2012). Modal Collapse in Gödel's Ontological Proof. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag 50--323.
    After introductory reminder of and comments on Gödel’s ontological proof, we discuss the collapse of modalities, which is provable in Gödel’s ontological system GO. We argue that Gödel’s texts confirm modal collapse as intended consequence of his ontological system. Further, we aim to show that modal collapse properly fits into Gödel’s philosophical views, especially into his ontology of separation and union of force and fact, as well as into his cosmological theory of the nonobjectivity of the lapse of time. As (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  2
    Srećko Kovač (2015). Causality and Attribution in an Aristotelian Theory. In Arnold Koslow & Arthur Buchsbaum (eds.), The Road to Universal Logic: Festschrift for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziauvol. 1, Cham, Heidelberg, etc.: Springer-Birkhäuser. Springer-Birkhäuser 327-340.
  6.  63
    Srećko Kovač (2008). In What Sense is Kantian Principle of Contradiction Non-Classical? Logic and Logical Philosophy 17 (3):251-274.
    On the ground of Kant’s reformulation of the principle of con- tradiction, a non-classical logic KC and its extension KC+ are constructed. In KC and KC+, \neg(\phi \wedge \neg\phi),  \phi \rightarrow (\neg\phi \rightarrow \phi), and  \phi \vee \neg\phi are not valid due to specific changes in the meaning of connectives and quantifiers, although there is the explosion of derivable consequences from {\phi, ¬\phi} (the deduc- tion theorem lacking). KC and KC+ are interpreted as fragments of an S5-based first-order (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  51
    Srećko Kovač (1999). Quine's Platonism and Antiplatonism. Synthesis Philosophica 14 (1999):45-52.
    Quine rejects intensional Platonism and, with it, also rejects attributes (properties) as designations of predicates. He pragmatically accepts extensional Platonism, but conceives of classes as merely auxiliary entities needed to express some laws of set theory. At the elementary logical level, Quine develops an “ontologically innocent” logic of predicates. What in standard quantification theory is the work of variables is in the logic of predicates the work of a few functors that operate on predicates themselves: variables are eliminated. This “predicate (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  44
    Srećko Kovač (2009). First-Order Belief and Paraconsistency. Logic and Logical Philosophy 18 (2):127-143.
    A first-order logic of belief with identity is proposed, primarily to give an account of possible de re contradictory beliefs, which sometimes occur as consequences of de dicto non-contradictory beliefs. A model has two separate, though interconnected domains: the domain of objects and the domain of appearances. The satisfaction of atomic formulas is defined by a particular S-accessibility relation between worlds. Identity is non-classical, and is conceived as an equivalence relation having the classical identity relation as a subset. A tableau (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  29
    Srećko Kovač (2003). Some Weakened Gödelian Ontological Systems. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (6):565-588.
    We describe a K B Gödelian ontological system, and some other weak systems, in a fully formal way using theory of types and natural deduction, and present a completeness proof in its main and specific parts. We technically and philosophically analyze and comment on the systems (mainly with respect to the relativism of values) and include a sketch of some connected aspects of Gidel's relation to Kant.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  24
    Srećko Kovač (2012). Logical Opposition and Collective Decisions. In Jean-Yves Béziau & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Springer 341--356.
    The square of opposition (as part of a lattice) is used as a natural way to represent different and opposite ways of who makes decisions, and in what way, in/for a group or a society. Majority logic is characterized by multiple logical squares (one for each possible majority), with the “discursive dilemma” as a consequence. Three-valued logics of majority decisions with discursive dilemma undecided, of veto, consensus, and sequential voting are analyzed from the semantic point of view. For instance, the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  3
    Srećko Kovač (2015). Logic and Truth in Religious Belief. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. De Gruyter 119-132.
  12.  35
    Srećko Kovač (2007). Contradictions, Objects, and Belief. In Jean-Yves Béziau & Alexandre Costa-Leite (eds.), Perspectives on Universal Logic. 417.
    We show how some model-theoretical devices (local reasoning, modes of presentation, an additional accessibility relation) can be combined in first-order modal logic to formalize the consequence relation that includes de dicto and de re contradictory beliefs. Instead of special ``sense objects'', appearances of objects in an agent's belief are introduced and presented as ordered pairs consisting of an object and an individual constant. A non-classical identity relation is applied. A relation S on the set of possible worlds is introduced, which (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  2
    Srećko Kovač (2014). Forms of Judgment as a Link Between Mind and the Concepts of Substance and Cause. In Marek Rosiak & Miroslaw Szatkowski (eds.), Substantiality and Causality. De Gruyter 51-66.
  14.  3
    Srećko Kovač (2006). Impossibilities, Identities, and Belief. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (3):1079-8986.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  2
    Srećko Kovač (2008). Marijan Cipra (22. 8. 1940. – 2. 5. 2008.). Filozofska Istrazivanja 28 (2):445-448.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Srećko Kovač (2013). Causation and Intensionality in Aristotelian Logic. Studia Philosophiae Christianae 49 (2):117-136.
    We want to show that Aristotle’s general conception of syllogism includes as its essential part the logical concept of necessity, which can be understood in a causal way. This logical conception of causality is more general then the conception of the causality in the Aristotelian theory of proof (“demonstrative syllogism”), which contains the causal account of knowledge and science outside formal logic. Aristotle’s syllogistic is described in a purely intensional way, without recourse to a set-theoretical formal semantics. It is shown (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Srecko Kovac (2005). Što je istina? [REVIEW] Il Pensiero 25 (4):975-977.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography