Franz Brentano was a systematic philosopher, in the sense that he presented his views in an orderly manner and considered it important to work out the significant regularities, where the significance was to be seen in relation to the whole of the problem considered at the moment, and ultimately, in relation to the entire field in which the problem arose. He was not a system-builder, in that he did not seek to produce an all-embracing philosophical answer. He was concerned with (...) truth rather than with elegance, and he distrusted philosophical flights of fancy. According to him, philosophy ought to be built up by collective, carefully considered and checked labours of a number of researchers. In an age when philosophy was largely characterised by imaginative systems of poetic appeal and based on bold armchair theorising, he was concerned with making it scientific and dependable. -/- The intention in this book is to re-interpret and re-emphasise some aspects of Brentano's philosophy. Another purpose is to provide a contemporary introduction to Brentano for the English-speaking reader. The third, and perhaps the most important, is to present, to analyse and to learn something from Brentano's analysis of truth. (shrink)

Philosophy flourished in Australia after the war. There was spectacular growth in both the number of departments and the number of philosophers. On top of this philosophy spread beyond the philosophy departments. Serious studies, and interest in philosophy is now common in faculties as diverse as law, science and education. Neither is this development merely quantitative, the Australian researcher has come of age and contributes widely to international debates. At least one movement originated in Australia. This makes the study of (...) philosophy in Australia timely, evidenced by the number of articles concerned with this area that begin to appear in international journals. In Australia itself there is growing interest in the history of the country's philosophical development. There are discussions in conferences and meetings: the matter is now the subject of courses. (shrink)

There were 180 applications from prospective contestants of the StawellGift in 1978. The race limit, imposed in the interests of safety, is just 60 runners. Of the 60 acceptances Richard Roe was the hotfavourite, but healong with six others fell victim to the great oyster poisoning, and had towithdraw on the day of the race, along with five of the others; the sixth died of the poisoning just as the race was run. In the event the winner was John Doe, (...) the second favourite according to the bookmakers. (shrink)

A VERSION OF CARTESIAN METHOD RODERICK H. CHISHQLM Introduction In one of his many profound discussions of the method of philosophy, Korner makes the ...

My text is written to answer the questions asked at the APA Meeting's presentation of the book Moral Textures: Feminist Narratives in the Public Sphere by professors María Lugones and Eduardo Mendieta. The answer seeks to clarify that Lugones's infrapolitics position is not so distant from mine. I also address Mendieta's question directed more to the aesthetic domain. There, I seek to show how my position could be taken as a creative effort to extend some of Habermas's early work on (...) the public sphere, and to develop the thesis of the important relations between the aesthetic and the moral realms. (shrink)

The question of [metaphysical logic] is how cogitatio is possible in the first place (Überhaupt – Kant) as it constitutes reaction to the real (whatever that may be) by the Ego (a subject possessed of cognitive potential). Is that reaction dependable?Ego can only react to the World. All systems of thought/cognition come from this only impact of reality.The question is its own reliability and legitimacy. The first can deliver reliably something quite illegitimate (the whole art of propaganda (advertising) is based (...) on this simple fact).The ability to cognize/think, at least at the level of [modern Ego] assumes the technique/capacity’s independence from that come from [categorical truisms]. To manipulate this is to think/cognize. Possible just when, the (shape of) the real resonates with Ego’s cognitive sensitivity. This needs to be shown to obtain.(Assuming per impossibile that the contrary obtains at the [archetypal] beginning our thinking could not find an adequate basis so it could not occur—which supposition is absurd.). (shrink)

The general purpose of this book differs from those of most of the works found traditionally in the field of political philosophy. Firstly, the present approach is in no way prescriptive or normative, as the interest centres on explication rather than an evaluative assess ment of this, that or another type of arrangement, or act. 1 It will be clear that I am in complete disagreement with Gewirth when he claims that "The central concern of political philosophy is the moral (...) evaluation of political power. " It seems obvious that the under standing of political and social forms of life, and a fortiori of political power, must come before its evaluation. This cannot be provided by moral assessment alone. Thus an analytical or explicative approach which promotes such understanding must come first, and must be the "central concern" of the appropriate philosophical discipline. This is not to say that moral assessment is illegitimate, nor even that it cannot be one of the concerns of political philosophy, but it is to deny that it can be central, even though it might be somebody's central interest. To the extent to which this book is successful it will provide an argu mentin my favour - if the job can be done, obviously it is of primary importance. But we should not assume that it cannot be done unless we can show that there is no separate sphere of political and/or social phenomena. (shrink)

', the reviewed collection may be recommended as an important contribution to the history as well as a description of some recent logical investigations. ' Studia Logica 12 1990.

The volume collects many of the most significant commentaries on, and contributions to, Protothetic. A Protothetic Bibliography is included.

Whereas at the roots of the Western way of thinking, in particular, at the roots of philosophy and epistemology lies a notion of the one/over/many, in Asiatic cultures, it is an idea of one/and/many, represented by Japanese (Chinese) Ma. In the paper it is argued that Japanese Ma is not only broader than epistemological reality (the world) but also more basic. To overcome Wittgenstein’s skepticism we have to return to a noncognitive idea of the ontic presence. Our thinking and cognition (...) is deeply rooted in the imperceptible and indiscernible ontic flexibility and generality which is not conceptual or linguistic. This essay presents another interesting aspect of my metaphysical project showing that we cannot infer cognition either from the object level or from a meta-level. (shrink)

Section 1 One of the big problems facing us is the need to plan for the betterment and improvement of society. In any status quo there are many unsatisfactory moments and experience shows that with changing conditions, even those elements of our communal structure that work well will often get out of step and become a problem. We need then to introduce devices both to alleviate present troubles and, if possible, to anticipate future ones. On the whole, it might appear (...) to the untutored eye that the matter is relatively simple. For instance, if we keep increasing prices of commodities without increasing incomes, and especially if we allow inflation to proceed unfettered as well, the situation will certainly deteriorate. What we need to. (shrink)

l. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF EPISTEMOLOGY There is a philosophical issue that surely precedes all other possible questions. It concerns the very possibility of our thinking about some thing to some purpose. Short of this no philosophy, theory or research would be possible. But it is not immediately clear that we are assured that what purports to be effective thought, and cognition is such in reality. What guarantee is there for instance that when one is under the impression that one (...) is thinking that "the cat is on the mat" it is in fact the case that one is thinking this? One could not be thinking at all, only having a misleading mystic experience. And then even if one was thinking, one might not be really thinking of the cat being on the mat, but only that one wishes there was a cat, and wonders whether if there was it would be on the mat, and yet the subjective impression was that one was thinking: "The cat is on the mat". Then one might in some way try to think 'the cat is on the mat. ' yet be mistaken in that there aren't any material objects at all, and all one does is to inventory god's perceptions. And so on, and so on! These are of course the kind of problem that the layman habitually views with disdainful alarm. (shrink)

The book is divided into chapters, but several themes run across them. This is, in fact, the reason for writing a book rather than a number of independent articles; for it appears that several moments of Kant's work are characterized by similar problems, and consequently we might be unable to see the impact of these on a more 1 i mi ted canvas. But further, and perhaps no less importantly, the shared problems are likely to be indicative of the nature (...) of the whole area under discussion. Given this, to concentrate our attention on them should provide clarification not accessible in any other way. It is one of the objects of the present book to obtai n thi s clarification, and to apply it to the area itself, rather than merely to utilize the results in Kantian exegesis and elucidation. Thus the aim is not predominantly historical. Of the various themes, the theme of Space and Time turns out to be of prime importance to the whole picture presented, and within it, the theme of space. This is not perhaps surprising, for Kant's central task is to provide for objectivity; i. e. , to explain how a "subjective" stream of perceptions can amount to a perception of the world in which there are both subjective and objective moments. (shrink)