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Profile: Stacie Friend
  1. Stacie Friend (2014). Believing in Stories. In Greg Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin & Jon Robson (eds.), Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind. Oxford University Press. 227-248.
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  2. Stacie Friend (2012). Fiction as a Genre. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):179--209.
    Standard theories define fiction in terms of an invited response of imagining or make-believe. I argue that these theories are not only subject to numerous counterexamples, they also fail to explain why classification matters to our understanding and evaluation of works of fiction as well as non-fiction. I propose instead that we construe fiction and non-fiction as genres: categories whose membership is determined by a cluster of nonessential criteria, and which play a role in the appreciation of particular works. I (...)
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  3. Stacie Friend (2011). Fictive Utterance and Imagining II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):163-180.
    The currently standard approach to fiction is to define it in terms of imagination. I have argued elsewhere (Friend 2008) that no conception of imagining is sufficient to distinguish a response appropriate to fiction as opposed to non-fiction. In her contribution Kathleen Stock seeks to refute this objection by providing a more sophisticated account of the kind of propositional imagining prescribed by so-called ‘fictive utterances’. I argue that although Stock's proposal improves on other theories, it too fails to provide an (...)
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  4. Stacie Friend (2011). The Great Beetle Debate: A Study in Imagining with Names. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):183-211.
    Statements about fictional characters, such as “Gregor Samsa has been changed into a beetle,” pose the problem of how we can say something true (or false) using empty names. I propose an original solution to this problem that construes such utterances as reports of the “prescriptions to imagine” generated by works of fiction. In particular, I argue that we should construe these utterances as specifying, not what we are supposed to imagine—the propositional object of the imagining—but how we are supposed (...)
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  5. Stacie Friend (2010). Getting Carried Away: Evaluating the Emotional Influence of Fiction Film. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):77-105.
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  6. Stacie Friend (2008). Hermeneutic Moral Fictionalism as an Anti-Realist Strategy. Philosophical Books 49 (1):14-22.
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  7. Stacie Friend (2008). Imagining Fact and Fiction. In Kathleen Stock & Katherine Thomsen-Jones (eds.), New Waves in Aesthetics. Palgrave Macmillan. 150-169.
  8. Stacie Friend (2007). Fictional Characters. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156.
    If there are no fictional characters, how do we explain thought and discourse apparently about them? If there are, what are they like? A growing number of philosophers claim that fictional characters are abstract objects akin to novels or plots. They argue that postulating characters provides the most straightforward explanation of our literary practices as well as a uniform account of discourse and thought about fiction. Anti-realists counter that postulation is neither necessary nor straightforward, and that the invocation of pretense (...)
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  9. Stacie Friend (2007). Review of Shaun Nichols (Ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).
  10. Stacie Friend (2007). The Pleasures of Documentary Tragedy. British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2):184-198.
    Two assumptions are common in discussions of the paradox of tragedy: (1) that tragic pleasure requires that the work be fictional or, if non-fiction, then non-transparently represented; and (2) that tragic pleasure may be provoked by a wide variety of art forms. In opposition to (1) I argue that certain documentaries could produce tragic pleasure. This is not to say that any sad or painful documentary could do so. In considering which documentaries might be plausible candidates, I further argue, against (...)
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  11. Stacie Friend & Peter Ludlow (2003). Disagreement and Deference: Is Diversity of Opinion a Precondition for Thought? Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):115–139.
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