Search results for 'Stan Williamson' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.) (2009). Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
    16 leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today.
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  2. Timothy Williamson (2009). The Philosophy of Philosophy • by Timothy Williamson • Blackwell, 2007. X + 332 Pp. £ 15.99 Paper: Summary. [REVIEW] Analysis 69 (1):99-100.score: 120.0
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  3. Robert E. Stevens, O. Jeff Harris & Stan Williamson (1993). A Comparison of Ethical Evaluations of Business School Faculty and Students: A Pilot Study. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 12 (8):611 - 619.score: 120.0
    This paper reports the results of a pilot study of differences in ethical evaluations between business faculty and students at a Southern university. Data were collected from 137 business students (46 freshmen and 67 seniors) and 34 business faculty members. Significant differences were found in 7 of the 30 situations between freshmen and faculty and four situations between seniors and faculty. When the combined means for each group were tested, there was no significant difference in the means at the 0.05 (...)
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  4. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):534-542.score: 120.0
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  5. Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2012). EnviroGenomarkers: The Interplay Between Mechanisms and Difference Making in Establishing Causal Claims. Medicine Studies 3 (4):249-262.score: 120.0
    According to Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007, Hist Philos Life Sci 33:389–396, 2011a, Philos Sci 1(1):47–69, 2011b), in order to establish a causal claim of the form, ‘C is a cause of E’, one typically needs evidence that there is an underlying mechanism between C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This thesis has been used to argue that hierarchies of evidence, as championed by evidence-based movements, tend to (...)
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  6. Timothy Williamson, B. O. Chen & Koji Nakatogawa (2009). Thinking Deeply, Contributing Originally: An Interview with Timothy Williamson (Special Contribution). Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 18:57-87.score: 120.0
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  7. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):498-506.score: 120.0
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  8. Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.score: 60.0
    Vagueness provides the first comprehensive examination of a topic of increasing importance in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic and language. Timothy Williamson traces the history of this philosophical problem from discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece to modern formal approaches such as fuzzy logic. He illustrates the problems with views which have taken the position that standard logic and formal semantics do not apply to vague language, and defends the controversial realistic view that vagueness is a (...)
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  9. Timothy Williamson (1999). Logic and Existence. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):181–203.score: 60.0
    [Ian Rumfitt] Frege's logicism in the philosophy of arithmetic consisted, au fond, in the claim that in justifying basic arithmetical axioms a thinker need appeal only to methods and principles which he already needs to appeal in order to justify paradigmatically logical truths and paradigmatically logical forms of inference. Using ideas of Gentzen to spell out what these methods and principles might include, I sketch a strategy for vindicating this logicist claim for the special case of the arithmetic of the (...)
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  10. Jon Williamson, From Bayesian Epistemology to Inductive Logic.score: 60.0
    Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al., 2011, Part 1). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010, Chapter 7). §1 introduces the semantics and then, in §2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008). §3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (...)
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  11. George Darby & Jon Williamson (2011). Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality. Philosophy and Technology 24 (2):115-136.score: 60.0
    Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) put forward the thesis that, at least in the health sciences, to establish the claim that C is a cause of E, one normally needs evidence of an underlying mechanism linking C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This epistemological thesis poses a problem for most current analyses of causality which, in virtue of analysing causality in terms of just one of mechanisms or (...)
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  12. Timothy Williamson (2005). Replies to Commentators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):468–491.score: 60.0
    The core of Tony Brueckner’s critique in ‘Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism according to Williamson’ is his claim in section 5 that my account of perceptual knowledge has an unacceptable consequence. My reply will concentrate on that claim and largely ignore the rest of Brueckner’s interesting discussion, for it is easy to check that the claim is essential to Brueckner’s argument against my analysis of skepticism and evidence.
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  13. Timothy Williamson (1997). Reply to Commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):945-953.score: 60.0
    The core of Tony Brueckner’s critique in ‘Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism according to Williamson’ is his claim in section 5 that my account of perceptual knowledge has an unacceptable consequence. My reply will concentrate on that claim and largely ignore the rest of Brueckner’s interesting discussion, for it is easy to check that the claim is essential to Brueckner’s argument against my analysis of skepticism and evidence. The alleged consequence at issue concerns a case in which Brueckner knows by (...)
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  14. Jon Williamson (2011). Imaging Technology and the Philosophy of Causality. Philosophy and Technology 24 (2):115-136.score: 60.0
    Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) put forward the thesis that, at least in the health sciences, to establish the claim that C is a cause of E, one normally needs evidence of an underlying mechanism linking C and E as well as evidence that C makes a difference to E. This epistemological thesis poses a problem for most current analyses of causality which, in virtue of analysing causality in terms of just one of mechanisms or (...)
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  15. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). In Memoriam: Ruth Barcan Marcus 1921-2012. Association for Symbolic Logic: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.score: 60.0
    Timothy Williamson The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 123-126, March 2013.
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  16. Jon Williamson, Special Issue on Combining Probability and Logic Introduction.score: 60.0
    This volume arose out of an international, interdisciplinary academic network on Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks involving four of us (Haenni, Romeijn, Wheeler and Williamson), called Progicnet and funded by the Leverhulme Trust from 2006–8. Many of the papers in this volume were presented at an associated conference, the Third Workshop on Combining Probability and Logic (Progic 2007), held at the University of Kent on 5–7 September 2007. The papers in this volume concern either the special focus on the (...)
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  17. Rosanna Keefe & Timothy Williamson (1995). Vagueness. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):392.score: 60.0
    If you keep removing single grains of sand from a heap, when is it no longer a heap? From discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece, to modern formal approaches like fuzzy logic, Timothy Williamson traces the history of the problem of vagueness. He argues that standard logic and formal semantics apply even to vague languages and defends the controversial, realist view that vagueness is a form of ignorance - there really is a grain of sand whose removal (...)
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  18. Ronald Williamson (1989). Jews in the Hellenistic World: Philo. Cambridge University Press.score: 60.0
    An extremely important Jewish writer and thinker of the first century AD, Philo of Alexandria exercised through his ideas and language a lasting influence on the development and growth of Christianity in the New Testament period and later. This book provides an introduction to the major themes and ideas in the religious and philosophical thinking of Philo and outlines the importance of his thought by means of introductory treatments and sections of freshly translated text and commentary. Dr Williamson illustrates (...)
     
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  19. Timothy Williamson (2013). Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oup Oxford.score: 60.0
    Timothy Williamson gives an original and provocative treatment of deep metaphysical questions about existence, contingency, and change, using the latest resources of quantified modal logic. Contrary to the widespread assumption that logic and metaphysics are disjoint, he argues that modal logic provides a structural core for metaphysics.
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  20. George Hunt Williamson (1953/1965). Other Tongues--Other Flesh. London, Spearman.score: 60.0
    ABOUT THE AUTHOR George Hunt Williamson served with the Army Air Corps during World War II as Radio Director for the Army Air Forces Technical Training ...
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  21. Timothy Williamson (2009). Replies to Critics. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 279--384.score: 60.0
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  22. Timothy Williamson (2009). Reponses to Critics. In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oup Oxford.score: 60.0
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  23. Timothy Williamson (2009). Reply to Goldman. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 305--312.score: 60.0
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  24. Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..score: 60.0
    The second volume in the Blackwell Brown Lectures in Philosophy, this volume offers an original and provocative take on the nature and methodology of philosophy. Based on public lectures at Brown University, given by the pre-eminent philosopher, Timothy Williamson Rejects the ideology of the 'linguistic turn', the most distinctive trend of 20th century philosophy Explains the method of philosophy as a development from non-philosophical ways of thinking Suggests new ways of understanding what contemporary and past philosophers are doing.
     
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  25. Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.score: 30.0
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  26. Timothy Williamson, How Deep is the Distinction Between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?score: 30.0
    The paper argues that, although a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge (or justification) can be drawn, it is a superficial one, of little theoretical significance. The point is not that the distinction has borderline cases, for virtually all useful distinctions have such cases. Rather, it is argued by means of an example, the differences even between a clear case of a priori knowledge and a clear case of a posteriori knowledge may be superficial ones. In both cases, (...)
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  27. Timothy Williamson (2003). Everything. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.score: 30.0
    On reading the last sentence, did you interpret me as saying falsely that everything — everything in the entire universe — was packed into my carry-on baggage? Probably not. In ordinary language, ‘everything’ and other quantifiers (‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘every dog’, ...) often carry a tacit restriction to a domain of contextually relevant objects, such as the things that I need to take with me on my journey. Thus a sentence of the form ‘Everything Fs’ is true as uttered in a (...)
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  28. Timothy Williamson (2000). Existence and Contingency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):117–139.score: 30.0
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  29. Timothy Williamson (2002). Necessary Existents. In A. O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language. Cambridge University Press. 269-87.score: 30.0
    It seems obvious that I could have failed to exist. My parents could easily never have met, in which case I should never have been conceived and born. The like applies to everyone. More generally, it seems plausible that whatever exists in space and time could have failed to exist. Events could have taken an utterly different course. Our existence, like most other aspects of our lives, appears frighteningly contingent. It is therefore surprising that there is a proof of my (...)
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  30. Timothy Williamson (2011). Précis of The Philosophy of Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):470-471.score: 30.0
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  31. Timothy Williamson (2004). Philosphical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism About Judgement. Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.score: 30.0
    1. What are called ‘intuitions’ in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the pressure should be resisted, for it (...)
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  32. Timothy Williamson (2006). Must Do Better. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. 278--92.score: 30.0
    Imagine a philosophy conference in Presocratic Greece. The hot question is: what are things made of? Followers of Thales say that everything is made of water, followers of Anaximenes that everything is made of air, and followers of Heraclitus that everything is made of fire. Nobody is quite clear what these claims mean, and some question whether the founders of the respective schools ever made them. But amongst the groupies there is a buzz about all the recent exciting progress. The (...)
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  33. Timothy Williamson (2005). I *-Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):1-23.score: 30.0
    A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. The use of such examples is often thought to involve some sort of a priori rational intuition, which crude rationalists regard as a virtue and crude empiricists as a vice. It is argued here that, on the contrary, what is involved is simply an application of our general cognitive capacity (...)
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  34. Timothy Williamson (2007). Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):89-123.score: 30.0
    Metaphysical modalities are definable from counterfactual conditionals, and the epistemology of the former is a special case of the epistemology of the latter. In particular, the role of conceivability and inconceivability in assessing claims of possibility and impossibility can be explained as a special case of the pervasive role of the imagination in assessing counterfactual conditionals, an account of which is sketched. Thus scepticism about metaphysical modality entails a more far-reaching scepticism about counterfactuals. The account is used to question the (...)
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  35. Timothy Williamson (2005). Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.score: 30.0
    §I schematises the evidence for an understanding of ‘know’ and other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute metalinguistic errors to speakers. §III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of (...)
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  36. Timothy Williamson (2011). Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.score: 30.0
    Abstract: Some proponents of “experimental philosophy” criticize philosophers' use of thought experiments on the basis of evidence that the verdicts vary with truth-independent factors. However, their data concern the verdicts of philosophically untrained subjects. According to the expertise defence, what matters are the verdicts of trained philosophers, who are more likely to pay careful attention to the details of the scenario and track their relevance. In a recent article, Jonathan M. Weinberg and others reply to the expertise defence that there (...)
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  37. Timothy Williamson (2006). Conceptual Truth. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):1–41.score: 30.0
    The paper criticizes epistemological conceptions of analytic or conceptual truth, on which assent to such truths is a necessary condition of understanding them. The critique involves no Quinean scepticism about meaning. Rather, even granted that a paradigmatic candidate for analyticity is synonymy with a logical truth, both the former and the latter can be intelligibly doubted by linguistically competent deviant logicians, who, although mistaken, still constitute counterexamples to the claim that assent is necessary for understanding. There are no analytic or (...)
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  38. Michael Fara & Timothy Williamson (2005). Counterparts and Actuality. Mind 114 (453):1-30.score: 30.0
    Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue (...)
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  39. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Objects, Properties and Contingent Existence. In W. K. Essler (ed.), Themes from Barcan Marcus.score: 30.0
    Second-order logic and modal logic are both, separately, major topics of philosophical discussion. Although both have been criticized by Quine and others, increasingly many philosophers find their strictures uncompelling, and regard both branches of logic as valuable resources for the articulation and investigation of significant issues in logical metaphysics and elsewhere. One might therefore expect some combination of the two sorts of logic to constitute a natural and more comprehensive background logic for metaphysics. So it is somewhat surprising to find (...)
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  40. Timothy Williamson (1996). Knowing and Asserting. Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.score: 30.0
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  41. Timothy Williamson (2003). Understanding and Inference. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249–293.score: 30.0
    The paper challenges the inferentialist account of concept possession that Paul Boghossian takes as a premise in his account of the transmission of justification by deductive reasoning in his paper 'Blind Reasoning'. Unorthodox speakers who reject the inferences in an alleged possession condition can still have the concept by understanding a word for it. In that sense, the inferences are not analytic. Inferentialist accounts of logical constants, theoretical terms (using the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method) and pejorative expressions such as 'Boche' are examined (...)
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  42. Timothy Williamson (2013). Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality. Erkenntnis:1-21.score: 30.0
    The paper is a critique of the widespread conception of logic as a neutral arbiter between metaphysical theories, one that makes no `substantive’ claims of its own (David Kaplan and John Etchemendy are two recent examples). A familiar observation is that virtually every putatively fundamental principle of logic has been challenged over the last century on broadly metaphysical grounds (however mistaken), with a consequent proliferation of alternative logics. However, this apparent contentiousness of logic is often treated as though it were (...)
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  43. Timothy Williamson (2004). Past the Linguistic Turn? In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Clarendon Press.score: 30.0
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  44. Timothy Williamson (2006). Indicative Versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):310–333.score: 30.0
    §0. A familiar if obscure idea: an indicative conditional presents its consequent as holding in the actual world on the supposition that its antecedent so holds, whereas a subjunctive conditional merely presents its consequent as holding in a world, typically counterfactual, in which its antecedent holds. Consider this pair.
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  45. T. Williamson (2010). Necessitism, Contingentism, and Plural Quantification. Mind 119 (475):657-748.score: 30.0
    Necessitism is the view that necessarily everything is necessarily something; contingentism is the negation of necessitism. The dispute between them is reminiscent of, but clearer than, the more familiar one between possibilism and actualism. A mapping often used to ‘translate’ actualist discourse into possibilist discourse is adapted to map every sentence of a first-order modal language to a sentence the contingentist (but not the necessitist) may regard as equivalent to it but which is neutral in the dispute. This mapping enables (...)
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  46. Timothy Williamson (2009). Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 137--159.score: 30.0
    Two opposing tendencies in the philosophy of language go by the names of ‘referentialism’ and ‘inferentialism’ respectively. In the crudest version of the contrast, the referentialist account of meaning gives centre stage to the referential semantics for a language, which is then used to explain the inference rules for the language, perhaps as those which preserve truth on that semantics (since a referential semantics for a language determines the truth-conditions of its sentences). By contrast, the inferentialist account of meaning gives (...)
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  47. Timothy Williamson (2007). On Being Justified in Ones Head. In Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press. 106--122.score: 30.0
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  48. Timothy Williamson (2011). Improbable Knowing. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    Can we turn the screw on counter-examples to the KK principle (that if one knows that P, one knows that one knows that P)? The idea is to construct cases in which one knows that P, but the epistemic status for one of the proposition that one knows that P is much worse than just one’s not knowing it. Of course, since knowledge is factive, there can’t be cases in which one knows that P and knows that one doesn’t know (...)
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  49. Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson (2006). Generalizing the Lottery Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.score: 30.0
    This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing that a broad class of similar solutions faces the same problem. An argument against some formal solutions to the lottery paradox The (...)
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  50. Timothy Williamson (2009). Conditionals and Actuality. Erkenntnis 70 (2):135 - 150.score: 30.0
    It is known that indicative and subjunctive conditionals interact differently with a rigidifying "actually" operator. The paper studies this difference in an abstract setting. It does not assume the framework of possible world semantics, characterizing "actually" instead by the type of logically valid formulas to which it gives rise. It is proved that in a language with such features all sentential contexts that are congruential (in the sense that they preserve logical equivalence) are extensional (in the sense that they preserve (...)
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