The author examines three models of protestant ethics asking the following questions: how do they conceive the distinctive character of the christian ethos, how do they understand the relationship between christian ethos and public sphere and are they capable of refusing the liberal demand for self-restriction. All of these models can be interpreted as attempts to describe the distinctive feature of the christian ethos as something which is an essential element all moralities have in common. Although the autor regards the (...) intuist model as the most plausible, he argues that it is not able to reject the liberal demand for self-restriction. Therefore, this challenge can be met only by demonstrating that the restriction of religious and other comprehensive doctrines does not necessarily follow from the liberal principle of legitimacy. The author outlines how this can done be done. (shrink)

Von Unternehmen und ihrer Verantwortung ist in der Öffentlichkeit viel die Rede. Während Nichtregierungsorganisationen das Geschäftsgebaren von Konzernen kritisieren, verweisen diese gern auf ihr gesellschaftliches Engagement. Längst sind private Unternehmen zum dominierenden Faktor innerhalb der Wirtschaft geworden. Dennoch spielen sie in der theologischen Wirtschaftsethik bislang kaum eine Rolle. Inwieweit können Unternehmen als solche überhaupt Träger moralischer Verantwortung sein? Wie lässt sich eine solche Verantwortung ethisch begründen und wie weit reicht sie gegebenenfalls? In seiner Studie beleuchtet Stefan Grotefeld Unternehmensethik aus theologischer (...) Perspektive und strukturiert das weite Feld um Verantwortung, Moral und Kapital. (shrink)

This article discusses the legitimacy argument on which many liberals ground their demand for restraining the use of religious convictions in processes of political deliberation and decision making. According to this argument the exercise of political power can only be justified by 'neutral' grounds, i.e. grounds that are able to find reciprocal, hypothetical consent. The author argues that this understanding of political legitimacy is not distinctive of the liberal tradition. His thesis is that reciprocal, hypothetical consent is not sufficient and (...) only in a certain, restricted sense necessary for justifying the use of political power. (shrink)