The aim of this review is to assess the ethical implications of finfish aquaculture, regarding fish welfare and environmental aspects. The finfish aquaculture industry has grown substantially the last decades, both as a result of the over-fishing of wild fish populations, and because of the increasing consumer demand for fish meat. As the industry is growing, a significant amount of research on the subject is being conducted, monitoring the effects of aquaculture on the environment and on animal welfare. The areas (...) of concern when it comes to animal welfare have here been divided into four different stages: breeding period; growth period; capturing and handling; and slaughter. Besides these stages, this report includes a chapter on the current evidence of fish sentience, since this issue is still being debated among biologists. However, most biologists are at present acknowledging the probability of fish being sentient creatures. Current aquaculture practices are affecting fish welfare during all four of the cited stages, both on physical and mental levels, as well as on the ability of fish to carry out natural behaviors. The effect fish farming has on the environment is here separated into five different categories: the decline of wild fish populations; waste and chemical discharge; loss of habitat; spreading of diseases; and invasion of exotic organisms. There is evidence of severe negative effects on the environment when looking at these five categories, even when considering the difficulty of studying environmental effects, due to the closely interacting variables. The ethical arguments and scientific evidences here reviewed have not all come to the same conclusions. Nevertheless, the general agreement is that current aquaculture practices are neither meeting the needs of fish nor environment. Thus, the obvious environmental and animal welfare aspects of finfish aquaculture make it hard to ethically defend a fish diet. (shrink)
Is it rational to be moral? Can moral disputes be settled rationally? Which criteria determine what we have a good reason to do? In this innovative book, Logi Gunnarsson takes issue with the assumption made by many philosophers faced with the problem of reconciling moral norms with a scientific world view, namely that morality must be offered a non-moral justification based on a formal concept of rationality. He argues that the criteria for the rationality of an action are irreducibly (...) substantive, rather than purely formal, and that assuming that morality must be given a non-moral justification amounts to a distortion of both rationality and morality. His discussion includes substantial critical engagement with major thinkers from two very different philosophical traditions, and is notable for its clear and succinct account of Habermas' discourse ethics. It will appeal to anyone interested in practical reason and the rational credentials of morality. (shrink)
Tim Henning, Person sein und Geschichten erzählen: Eine Studie über personale Autonomie und narrative Gründe Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10677-012-9341-z Authors Logi Gunnarsson, Department of Philosophy, University of Potsdam, 14469 Potsdam, Germany Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820.
The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral (...) status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role. (shrink)
One way to understand philosophy as a form of therapy is this: it involves a philosopher who is trying to cure himself. He has been drawn into a certain philosophical frame of mind—the ‘disease’—and has thus infected himself with this illness. Now he is sick and trying to employ philosophy to cure himself. So philosophy is both: the ailment and the cure. And the philosopher is all three: pathogenic agent, patient, and therapist.
Against influential strands of feminist theory, I argue that there is nothing essentialist or homogenising about the category ‘women’. I show that both intersectional claims that it is impossible to separate out the ‘woman part’ of women, and deconstructionist contentions that the category ‘women’ is a fiction, rest on untenable meta-theoretical assumptions. I posit that a more fruitful way of approaching this disputed category is to treat it as an abstraction. Drawing on the philosophical framework of critical realism I elucidate (...) the nature of the vital and inevitable process of abstraction, as a means of finding a way out of the theoretical and methodological impasse that the ‘ban’ on the category ‘women’ has caused. Contrary to many contemporary feminist theorists, I contend that, although the category ‘women’ does not reflect the whole reality of concrete and particular women, it nevertheless refers to something real, namely the structural position as woman. (shrink)
This paper is the work of two fictional authors, the late Johannes Philologus and Johannes Commentarius. One part consists of Philologus’s philosophical reflections on a fragment that, unbeknownst to him, is identical to the first four paragraphs of the Preface and the last two numbered propositions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Commentarius writes a preface to Philologus’s article and a commentary on it, in which he, like Philologus, addresses the question of how a work consisting of nonsense can be elucidatory. By (...) publishing his contribution together with that of Philologus, Commentarius wants to produce a work mirroring the structure of the Tractatus itself. (shrink)
In this article I attempt to reconcile two seemingly conflicting theorisations of love, the one elaborated by Roy Bhaskar as part of his philosophy of meta-Reality and Anna G. Jónasdóttir’s historical materialist-radical feminist theory of love power. While Bhaskar emphasises the essentially non-dual character of love, envisioning it as a ‘no-lose situation’, Jónasdóttir stresses the antagonistic features structuring love relations by conceptualising love as a productive power that men tend to exploit women of. Rather than seeing these accounts as mutually (...) exclusive I show that they can be reconciled by aid of the general ontology elaborated by Bhaskar in his philosophy of meta-Reality. (shrink)
Introduction -- Am I alone in my body? -- Multiple personality -- Personal identity -- Diachronic identity -- What am I fundamentally? -- Empirical discernability and fission -- My body -- The various senses of personal identity -- Multiple personality and individuation -- Morton Prince's seminal case study the dissociation of a personality -- Philosophical theories of multiple personality -- The coexistence thesis -- Sharing my body -- A criterion of individuation -- Multiple personality in therapeutic and biographic discourses -- (...) Multiple personality in literary discourses. (shrink)
In his Menschenwürde nach Nietzsche: Die Geschichte eines Begriffes (Human Dignity According to/after Nietzsche: The History of a Concept), Stefan Lorenz Sorgner conceives a bold plan and executes it remarkably well, with noteworthy results. His plan entails describing four paradigmatic notions of human dignity, then presenting Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of the notion of human dignity in relation to the four paradigms, and finally, reflecting on Nietzsche’s criticism in a way that embraces much of it and, consequently, largely rejects the (...) humanist notion of the dignity of man. Sorgner takes the additional steps of arguing for a posthumanism to replace the outmoded humanist notion of human dignity. Each phase .. (shrink)
Mark Colyvan (University of Sydney)∗ Stefan Linquist (University of Queensland) William Grey (University of Queensland) Paul E. Griffiths (University of Sydney) Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis and Clark College).
In this original and eye-opening study, Stefan Morawski sheds light on the notoriously inconclusive--and all too often confused--debate about the cultural significance of postmodernism and postmodernity. He shows how large the volume of historical and artistic knowledge needs to be to seriously grapple with the issues. Morawski unravels the complex strands which link our perception of postmodernism and postmodernity with aesthetic and human values whose roots lie deep in history. He discusses daily life in a consumer society, science and (...) religion, visual arts, literature, film, television and the most arcane works of contemporary music and offers an impassioned interrogation of the ways in which we understand, evaluate and use contemporary culture. (shrink)
Marx for a Post-Communist Era: On Poverty, Corruption and Banality is a clear and accessible exploration of why Marx still matters today. Despite the countless autopsies on Marx that followed the collapse of the iron curtain, many argue that Marxist ideas are as relevant as ever in the post-communist world. Stefan Sullivan begins with a historical overview of Marx and the development of Marxist thought, before concentrating on the application of Marx's ideas to specific post-1989 features of global capitalism. (...) He shows that that core capitalist obstacles to freedom predicted by Marx - poverty, corruption and banality - continue to hold relevance in the modern world. By examining each of these themes in turn, Sullivan demonstrates the critical potential of Marxist thought in the twenty-first century and sheds light on our understanding of contemporary economics, politics and culture. Marx for a Post Communist Era combines a deep understanding of Marxist thought with journalistic engagement in real world themes. Stefan Sullivan draws on examples including the 2000 US Presidential elections, Russian tax evasion, the recent protests against the World Bank and the IMF, the ascent of Hollywood and Silicon Valley, and the fascination with fake theme bars, ethno-chic fashion and the retro-trend in design. In doing so, he highlights Marx's legacy outside the academic world. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: -- The Roots of Diversity in Pragmatist Thought--James Campbell * The Context of Diversity vs. The Problem of Diversity--William J. Gavin * Reading Dewey and Mouffe on Democratic Norms--Larry A. Hickman * Cultivating Pragmatist Cosmopolitanism: The Diverse Democratic Community after Huntington and Benhabib--Judith M. Green * Democracy: Practice as Needed--Michael Eldridge * Dewey and Levinas on Pluralism, the Other, and Democracy--Jim Garrison * Reconstruction of Philosophy and Inquiry into Human Affairs: Deweyan Pragmatism in Dialogue with the (...) Postmodern Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman--Stefan Neubert and Kersten Reich * Diverse Communities-Dewey's Theory of Democracy as a Challenge for Foucault, Bourdieu, and Rorty--Kersten Reich * The Future of Democratic Diversity. (shrink)
Abstract In this paper I offer an anti-Humean interpretation of the causal interactions in somatic medicine. I focus on life-threatening pathological states and show how Nancy Cartwright’s capacities can offer a plausible epistemology for medical processes and the singular causal claims advanced in medical diagnoses. I argue that the capacities manifested in the emergence of symptoms and signs could be tracked down if healthy organisms are construed as nomological machines and suggest that the causal reasoning from current medical practice bears (...) a tacit adherence to anti-Humean assumptions. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-28 DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0141-1 Authors Stefan Dragulinescu, Drumul Taberei 20, Bucharest, Romania Journal Acta Analytica Online ISSN 1874-6349 Print ISSN 0353-5150. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: -- The Roots of Diversity in Pragmatist Thought--James Campbell * The Context of Diversity vs. The Problem of Diversity--William J. Gavin * Reading Dewey and Mouffe on Democratic Norms--Larry A. Hickman * Cultivating Pragmatist Cosmopolitanism: The Diverse Democratic Community after Huntington and Benhabib--Judith M. Green * Democracy: Practice as Needed--Michael Eldridge * Dewey and Levinas on Pluralism, the Other, and Democracy--Jim Garrison * Reconstruction of Philosophy and Inquiry into Human Affairs: Deweyan Pragmatism in Dialogue with the (...) Postmodern Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman--Stefan Neubert and Kersten Reich * Diverse Communities-Dewey's Theory of Democracy as a Challenge for Foucault, Bourdieu, and Rorty--Kersten Reich * The Future of Democratic Diversity. (shrink)
The current issue of the Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kulturforschung presents a discussion of social media's future. Geert Lovink and Stefan Heidenreich debate the sense and non-sense of network-critique in light of the internet's modified usage and perception, which is commonly labeled Web 2.0. Lovink is critical about the increasing tendency towards monopolization in Web 2.0. Users, he contends, become thrilled by walled gardens , which are presented to them by big companies. Independent of the question whether the need (...) for practical information and the prevalence of economical interests is understandable or not, Lovink is most of all concerned with artistic alternatives and an activist usage of the nets. According to him, it is time for developers, programmers, freaks and nerds of all nations to become conscious of and active against the dark sides of economical and political control over the internet. Heidenreich, on the other hand, is skeptical. In contrast to the project of network-critique, he pursues a rigorously medial approach, which presents itself as unimpressed by ethical or engaged observations of social media. In his view, the heroization of hackers and nerds is informed by Science Fiction and nostalgia, both of which miss Reality 2.0. Heidenreich asserts that the internet's new generation, which has grown up with the new media, is not particularly interested in network-critique, but uses the given internetservices in various ways. German In der aktuellen Ausgabe der Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kulturforschung wird über die Zukunft der Social Media gestritten. Geert Lovink und Stefan Heidenreich debattieren über den Sinn und Unsinn von Netzkritik angesichts einer veränderten Nutzung und Wahrnehmung des Internets, die sich hinter dem Schlagwort Web 2.0 verbirgt. Lovink sieht die zunehmende Tendenz zur Monopolisierung im Web 2.0 kritisch. Die Nutzer lassen sich von walled gardens begeistern, die Großunternehmen ihnen vorsetzen. Netzkritik solle sich daher nicht in der Frage erschöpfen, wie man Facebook und Twitter am besten nutzen kann, sondern sich mit echten Alternativen im Netz auseinandersetzen. Unabhängig davon, wie nachvollziehbar der Bedarf an praktischen Informationen und die Dominanz ökonomischer Interessen ist, geht es Lovink vor allem um künstlerische Alternativen und eine aktivistische Nutzung der Netze. Es sei an der Zeit, dass Entwickler, Programmierer, Freaks und Nerds aller Nationen sich die dunklen Seiten der ökonomisch-staatlichen Kontrolle des Internets bewusst machen und dagegen aktiv werden. Heidenreich ist dagegen skeptisch. Im Gegensatz zum Projekt der Netzkritik verfolgt er einen strikt medialen Ansatz, der sich gegenüber einer ethischen oder engagierten Beobachtung sozialer Medien kühl gibt. Die Heroisierung von Hackern und Nerds ist aus seiner Sicht von Science Fiction und Nostalgie geprägt, die an der Realität 2.0 vorbeigeht. Die neue Internetgeneration, die mit dem Medium aufgewachsen ist, habe gar kein ausgeprägtes Interesse an Netzkritik, sondern nutze die gegebenen Netzwerkfunktionen auf unterschiedliche Weise. (shrink)
Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one’s theory of semantics determines what one’s theory of justification must be is mistaken. Though it has been the case (...) that there are ‘typical’ combinations of semantic and justificational theories this is by no means forced on one. In the third chapter I examine two current kinds of expressivism; that of Blackburn and Copp. Each gives us an example of different combinations of semantic and justificatory theory. In Blackburn’s case he combines a use theory of meaning with a classic emotivist theory of justification, In Copp’s case it is a neo-Gricean philosophy of language with a realist’s theory of justification. I find both of these wanting as they ultimately collapse into relativistic subjectivism. In the fourth and fifth chapter I turn to developing Emotive Realism. The basic idea behind this view is that when someone says ‘x is wrong/right’ that person has (a) expressed a moral emotion about x and at the same time (b) expressed the belief that the emotion in (a) is the correct one to have. The belief expressed in (b) will be true or false depending on one’s theory of justification. In the fourth chapter I argue that we need separate semantic theories for thoughts and sentences. In the fifth chapter I fill in the details of Emotive Realism as I see it. (shrink)
In this review article I refer to some of the most relevant recent publications in the field of practical rationality, mainly drawing on two new anthologies by Wallace and Millgram that contain the principal arguments in the current debate, and on new books and articles by Bittner, Dancy, Nida-Rümelin and Raz. The purpose of the article is to offer an overview of the relevant positions in the current debate, to clarify the main arguments against the belief-desire model, and to situate (...) some of the problems - e.g. what counts as a reason - within the wider field of practical rationality as a whole - e.g. how to argue about practical reasoning from the point of view of our self-understanding as autonomous agents. (shrink)
The inference from determinism to predictability, though intuitively plausible, needs to be qualified in an important respect. We need to distinguish between two different kinds of predictability. On the one hand, determinism implies external predictability , that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe. Yet, on the other hand, embedded predictability as the possibility for an embedded subsystem in the universe to make such predictions, does (...) not obtain in a deterministic universe. By revitalizing an older result—the paradox of predictability —we demonstrate that, even in a deterministic universe, there are fundamental, non-epistemic limitations on the ability of one subsystem embedded in the universe to predict the future behaviour of other subsystems embedded in the same universe. As an explanation, we put forward the hypothesis that these limitations arise because the predictions themselves are physical events which are part of the law-like causal chain of events in the deterministic universe. While the limitations on embedded predictability cannot in any direct way show evidence of free human agency, we conjecture that, even in a deterministic universe, human agents have a take-it-or-leave-it control over revealed predictions of their future behaviour. (shrink)
The proposal that the concept of innateness expresses a 'folk biological' theory of the 'inner natures' of organisms was tested by examining the response of biologically naive participants to a series of realistic scenarios concerning the development of birdsong. Our results explain the intuitive appeal of existing philosophical analyses of the innateness concept. They simultaneously explain why these analyses are subject to compelling counterexamples. We argue that this explanation undermines the appeal of these analyses, whether understood as analyses of the (...) vernacular concept or as explications of that concept for the purposes of science. (shrink)
A good philosophical understanding of ecology is important for a number of reasons. First, ecology is an important and fascinating branch of biology, with distinctive philosophical issues. Second, ecology is only one small step away from urgent political, ethical, and management decisions about how best to live in an apparently fragile and increasingly-degraded environment. Third, philosophy of ecology, properly conceived, can contribute directly to both our understanding of ecology and help with its advancement. Philosophy of ecology can thus be seen (...) as part of the emerging discipline of “biohumanities”, where biology and humanities disciplines together advance our understanding and knowledge of biology (Stotz and Griffiths 2008). In this paper, we focus primarily on this third role of the philosophy of ecology and consider a number of places where philosophy can play an important role in ecology. In the process, we survey some of the current research being done in philosophy of ecology, as well as make suggestions about the agenda for future research in this area. We also hope to help clarify what philosophy of ecology is and what it should aspire to be. In what follows, we discuss several topics in the philosophy of ecology and conservation biology, starting with the role and understanding of mathematical models. This is followed by a discussion of a couple of practical problems involving the standard model of hypothesis testing and the use of decision-theoretic methods in environmental science. We then move on to discuss the issue of how we should understand biodiversity, and why this matters for conservation management. Finally, we look at environmental ethics and its relationship with ecology and conservation biology. These four topics were chosen because they are all of contemporary interest in philosophy of ecology circles and are ones where there is much fruitful work still to be done. The topics in question are also useful vehicles for highlighting the variety of issues in ecology and conservation biology where philosophy might prove useful.. (shrink)
Philosophical interest in ecology is relatively new. Standard texts in the philosophy of biology pay little or no attention to ecology (though Sterelny and Griffiths 1999 is an exception). This is in part because the science of ecology itself is relatively new, but whatever the reasons for the neglect in the past, the situation must change. A good philosophical understanding of ecology is important for a number of reasons. First, ecology is an important and fascinating branch of biology with distinctive (...) philosophical issues that arise from its study. Second, ecology is only one small step away from urgent political, ethical, and management decisions about how best to live in an apparently increasingly-fragile environment. Third, philosophy of ecology, properly conceived, can contribute directly to both our understanding of ecology and help with its advancement. Philosophy of ecology can thus be seen as part of the emerging discipline of “biohumanities”, where biology and humanities disciplines together advance our understanding and knowledge of biology (Stotz and Griffiths forthcoming). In this paper, we focus primarily on this third role of the philosophy of ecology and consider a number of places where philosophy can play an important role in ecology. In the process, we.. (shrink)
There is no consensus as to whether a Liar sentence is meaningful or not. Still, a widespread conviction with respect to Liar sentences (and other ungrounded sentences) is that, whether or not they are meaningful, they are useless . The philosophical contribution of this paper is to put this conviction into question. Using the framework of assertoric semantics , which is a semantic valuation method for languages of self-referential truth that has been developed by the author, we show that certain (...) computational problems, called query structures , can be solved more efficiently by an agent who has self-referential resources (amongst which are Liar sentences) than by an agent who has only classical resources; we establish the computational power of self-referential truth . The paper concludes with some thoughts on the implications of the established result for deflationary accounts of truth. (shrink)
In dialogue with the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib the author draws on the idea of a right to have rights and raises the question under which political conditions asylum can be a subjective right for political refugees. He argues that mere spontaneous acts of humanitarianism will not suffice to define the institutional commitments of liberal democracies in refugee policy. At the same time, no duty for any particular state to take up refugees can be derived from (...) a right to have rights. The quest for institutional solutions for a timely migration and asylum policy will rather enhance the discourses on the self-understanding of liberal democracies. With a critical eye on German asylum legislation and legal practice, the author contends that it will be a task of any co-ordinated European right of asylum to define political persecution in relation to the first dimension of human rights in order to differentiate the right of asylum from immigration legislation. (shrink)
This note is a reply to "On the Lumping Semantics of Counterfactuals" by Makoto Kanazawa, Stefan Kaufmann, and Stanley Peters. It shows first that the first triviality result obtained by Kanazawa, Kaufmann, and Peters is already ruled out by the constraints on admissible premise sets listed in Kratzer (1989). Second, and more importantly, it points out that the results obtained by Kanazawa, Kaufmann, and Peters are obsolete in view of the revised analysis of counterfactuals in Kratzer..
In this article I confront Jürgen Habermas' deliberative model of democracy with Claude Lefort's analysis of democracy as a regime in which the locus of power remains an empty place. This confrontation reveals several structural similarities between the two authors and explains how the proceduralization of popular sovereignty provides a discourse-theoretical interpretation of the empty place of power. At the same time, Lefort's insistence on the open-ended nature of the democratic struggle also points towards an unresolved tension at the core (...) of Habermas' model between the cognitive nature of deliberation on the one hand and the freedom of moral and political agents on the other. A proper solution of this tension requires a full appreciation of the ineliminable gap between actual and ideal deliberation. Because actual deliberation can never result in an ideal consensus, the actual exercise of democratic power should be understood as an unavoidable interruption of deliberation. Key Words: consensus • deliberation • democracy • empty place of power • Jürgen Habermas • Claude Lefort. (shrink)
Abstract: We are all familiar with the way in which social roles, such as mother, father, professor, club football coach, citizen, and so on, confront us with clusters of duties that purport to bind us. Though we generally experience these role-duties as normatively binding, we might question this. What reason do role-occupants have for conforming to the duties that define their roles? I argue that the agent who identifies with her role thereby has a weighty and important justificatory reason for (...) conforming to the role's defining duties: namely, the identifying agent realizes the fundamental goods of meaning and self-determination by doing so. This is an important normative ground of role-duties because it, unlike the grounds of natural duty or voluntary assumption, ensures that the duties it grounds are not alien impositions but rather are elements of the identifying agent's wellbeing. I also argue that role-identification provides a reason that shares many of the characteristics of a moral reason, and I argue that role-identification in tandem with the principle of fair play grounds a moral duty to conform to one's role-duties. (shrink)
Uzquiano (Analysis 70:39–44, 2010 ) showed that the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever ( HLPE ) [in its amended form due to Rabern and Rabern (Analysis 68:105–112, 2008 )] has a solution in only two questions. Uzquiano concludes his paper by noting that his solution strategy naturally suggests a harder variation of the puzzle which, as he remarks, he does not know how to solve in two questions. Wheeler and Barahona (J Philos Logic, to appear, 2011 ) formulated a three question (...) solution to Uzquiano’s puzzle and gave an information theoretic argument to establish that a two question solution for Uzquiano’s puzzle does not exist. However, their argument crucially relies on a certain conception of what it means to answer self-referential yes–no questions truly and falsely . We propose an alternative such conception which, as we show, allows one to solve Uzquiano’s puzzle in two questions. The solution strategy adopted suggests an even harder variation of Uzquiano’s puzzle which, as we will show, can also be solved in two questions. Just as all previous solutions to versions of HLPE , our solution is presented informally. The second part of the paper investigates the prospects of formally representing solutions to HLPE by exploiting theories of truth. (shrink)
This paper presents a substantivist construal of discourse ethics, which claims that we should see our engagement in public deliberation as expressing and elaborating a substantive commitment to basic moral ideas of solidarity, equality, and freedom. This view is different from Habermas's standard formalist defence of discourse ethics, which attempts to derive the principle of discursive moral justification from primarily non-moral presuppositions of rational argumentation as such. After explicating the difference between the substantivist and the formalist construal, I (...) defend the former by showing that it is not only intuitively compelling, but also particularly well equipped for addressing four important objections recently levelled against discourse ethics and its political applications (Rawls's concern that it lacks substantive guidelines, Gunnarsson's challenge that it has not been proven to be superior to alternative moral conceptions such as utilitarianism, Scanlon's complaint that it lacks an account of moral motivation, and Galston's and Young's worries that it could lead to political practices of cultural imposition). I conclude by pointing out some consequences of the previous discussion for the future of Critical Theory. (shrink)
In this paper, I focus on life-threatening medical conditions and argue that from the point of view of natural properties, induction(s), and participation in laws, at least some of the ill organisms dealt with in somatic medicine form natural kinds in the same sense in which the kinds in the exact sciences are thought of as natural. By way of comparing two ‘divisions of nature’, viz., a ‘classical’ exact science kind (gold) and a kind of disease (Graves disease), I show (...) that there is no justifiable ‘ontological gap’ between disease kinds and exact sciences kinds. We have instead a difference of degree. (shrink)
The year 1905 has been called Einstein's annus mirabilis in virtue of three ground-breaking works completed over the span of a few months --- the light quantum paper (Einstein, 1905a), the Brownian motion paper (Einstein, 1905c), and the paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies introducing the special theory of relativity (Einstein, 1905d). There are prima facie reasons for thinking that the origins of these papers cannot be understood in isolation from one another. Due to space limitations, we concentrate primarily (...) on the light quantum paper, since, in key respects, it marks the turning point for the annus mirabilis. The task is to probe, not just how the idea of the light quantum might have occurred to Einstein, but, more importantly, what convinced him that the idea was not just a quixotic hypothesis, but an unavoidable and demonstrable feature of radiation. The crucial development, we suggest, arose from comparing the energy fluctuations that following rigorously from the Stefan-Boltmann law, as well as from Wien's distribution formula for blackbody radiation, with what it is reasonable to expect from Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light. A special case of this is addressed in (Einstein, 1904). The outcome for the general case leads naturally to the central theoretical argument of the light quantum paper, the expectation of Brownian-like motion, and several of the key results for the electrodynamics of moving bodies. (shrink)
A measure of coherence is said to be reliability conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) among testimonies implies a higher probability that the witnesses are reliable. Recently, it has been proved that several coherence measures proposed in the literature are reliability conducive in scenarios of equivalent testimonies (Olsson and Schubert 2007; Schubert, to appear). My aim is to investigate which coherence measures turn out to be reliability conducive in the more general scenario where the (...) testimonies do not have to be equivalent. It is shown that four measures are reliability conducive in the present scenario, all of which are ordinally equivalent to the Shogenji measure. I take that to be an argument for the Shogenji measure being a fruitful explication of coherence. (shrink)
