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Stefanie Rocknak [21]Stefanie A. Rocknak [1]
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Profile: Stefanie Rocknak (Hartwick College)
  1. Stefanie Rocknak (2007). The Vulgar Conception of Objects in 'Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses. Hume Studies 33 (1):67-90.
    In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise (“Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses”), Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume’s position on objects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents the first (...)
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  2. Stefanie Rocknak (2002). Husserl’s Phenomenologization of Hume; Reflections on Husserl’s Method of Epoché. Philosophy Today 45 (5):28-36.
    This paper argues that Husserl’s method is partially driven by an attempt to avoid certain absurdities inherent in Hume’s epistemology. In this limited respect, we may say that Hume opened the door to phenomenology, but as a sacrificial lamb. However, Hume was well aware of his self-defeating position, and perhaps, in some respects, the need for an alternative. Moreover, Hume’s “mistakes” may have incited Husserl’s discovery of the epoche, and thus, transcendental phenomenology.
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  3.  5
    Stefanie Rocknak (forthcoming). Review of Locke, Hume, and the Treacherous Logos of Atomism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  4.  31
    Stefanie Rocknak (2013). Constancy and Coherence in 1.4.2 of Hume’s Treatise: The Root of “Indirect” Causation and Hume’s Position on Objects. The European Legacy (4):444-456.
    This article shows that in 1.4.2.15-24 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents his own position on objects, which is to be distinguished from both the vulgar and philosophical conception of objects. Here, Hume argues that objects that are effectively imagined to have a “perfect identity” are imagined due to the constancy and coherence of our perceptions (what we may call ‘level 1 constancy and coherence’). In particular, we imagine that objects cause such perceptions, via what I call ‘indirect (...)
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  5.  20
    Stefanie Rocknak (2015). Review of Beauty Unlimited, Peg Zeglin Brand, Ed. [REVIEW] Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 15 (1):14-16.
  6. Stefanie Rocknak (2010). Understanding Quine in Terms of the Aufbau: Another Look at Naturalized Epistemology. In Marcin Milkowski Konrad Talmud-Kaminski (ed.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications
    I argue that Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s “radical” (FLPV; TDE 39) and “phenomenalistic” (FSS 15-16) reductionism—as it is manifest in the Aufbau—may be understood in terms of a broader historical context. In particular, it may be understood as a rejection of a contemporary variant of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. As a result, Quine’s motivation to adopt naturalism may be understood independently of his pragmatic concerns. According to Quine, it was simply unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) to adopt a Carnapian phenomenalistic/mentalistic (...)
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  7.  21
    Stefanie Rocknak (2005). Facing Death; The Desperate at its Most Beautiful. Phenomenological Inquiry, A Review of Philosophical Ideas and Trends 29:71-101.
  8.  17
    Stefanie Rocknak (2013). Review of The Lost Carving: A Journey Into the Heart of Making, by David Esterly (Viking: New York, 2012). [REVIEW] Popular Woodworking Magazine 1.
  9.  54
    Stefanie Rocknak (2013). Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of Quine's understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, especially as it is conveyed in his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism.".
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  10.  6
    Stefanie Rocknak (1997). Translation From German to English: “Robinson in the Heart of Europe; Jan Patocka Twenty Years Later” by Ludger Hagedorn. Institüt Für Die Wissenshaften Vom Menschen Newsletter, 57:33-36.
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  11.  8
    Stefanie Rocknak (2015). Frederick Schmitt,Hume's Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 448 Pp. £55.00 Hb. ISBN 9780199683116. [REVIEW] Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 (2):152-158.
  12.  23
    Stefanie Rocknak (2001). A Tradition Ignored: Review Essay of John Symons' on Dennett. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 2 (3):343-358.
    Although Symons' recent book, On Dennett (Wadsworth, 2002), provides scientists with ahelpful, general introduction to Dennett'sthought, it presents a skewed version of the history of the philosophy of mind. In particular, the continental tradition is almost entirely ignored, if not glibly dismissed. As aresult, the unwary reader of this book wouldnever realize that Dilthey, Sartre and Husserl,like Dennett, offer a ``middle ground'' between naturalistic realism and naturalistic eliminativism. However, unlike Dennett, the respective positions of Dilthey, Sartre and Husserl are not (...)
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  13.  6
    Stefanie Rocknak (2001). Husserl’s Phenomenologization of Hume. Philosophy Today 45 (9999):28-36.
  14.  9
    Stefanie Rocknak (2000). Critique and Totality. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 22 (1):343-347.
    Review of Pierre Kerszberg's book Critique and Totality.
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  15.  2
    James E. Taylor & Stefanie Rocknak (2011). Hume and the Problem of Induction. In Michael Bruce Steven Barbone (ed.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell 174--179.
  16. Stefanie Rocknak (forthcoming). Hume and the External World. In Angela Coventry & Alex Sager (eds.), The Humean Mind.
    Hume’s understanding of the external world, particularly, his conception of objects, or what he occasionally refers to as “bodies,” is the subject of much dispute. For instance, some scholars think that Hume had a “phenomenonalist” reading of the external world, where objects are impressions, i.e. they are literally what we see, touch, taste or hear (see, for example, (Grene 1994), (Bennett 1971), (Steinberg 1981) and (Dicker 2007)). Others think that according to Hume, objects are “intentional,” i.e. they are the objects (...)
     
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  17. Stefanie Rocknak (2011). Hume's Negative Argument Concerning Induction. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
    Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come from? “Why [do] we conclude that […] particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects?” (Hume 2002, 1.3.2.15) In 1.3.6 of the Treatise, Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason. However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists of Hume’s “negative” argument concerning induction. This argument has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention. How could causal inferences be justified (...)
     
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  18.  27
    Stefanie Rocknak (2012). Imagined Causes: Hume’s Conception of Objects. Springer.
    This book provides the first comprehensive account of Hume’s conception of objects in Book I of the Treatise. What, according to Hume, are objects? Ideas? Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? Through a close textual analysis, I show that Hume thought that objects are imagined ideas. However, I argue that he struggled with two accounts of how and when we imagine such ideas. On the one hand, Hume believed that we always and universally imagine that objects are (...)
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  19. Stefanie Rocknak (2008). Pam and Jim on the Make : The Epistemology of Self-Deception (US). In Jeremy Wisnewski (ed.), The Office and Philosophy: Scenes From the Unexamined Life. Blackwell Pub.
     
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  20. Stefanie Rocknak (2000). Review of Pierre Kerszberg’s Critique and Totality. [REVIEW] Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 22 (1):343-347.
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  21. Stefanie Rocknak (1999). The Synthetic Relation in Hume. The Dialectic of the Universal and the Particular, Ed. By Jonathan Hanen, Institüt Für Die Wissenshaften Vom Menschen; Junior Fellows Conferences, 4:121-165.
     
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