Search results for 'Stefden Branden' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Stefden Branden & Bert Broeckaert (forthcoming). The Ongoing Charity of Organ Donation. Contemporary English Sunni Fatwas on Organ Donation and Blood Transfusion. Bioethics.score: 240.0
    Background: Empirical studies in Muslim communities on organ donation and blood transfusion show that Muslim counsellors play an important role in the decision process. Despite the emerging importance of online English Sunni fatwas, these fatwas on organ donation and blood transfusion have hardly been studied, thus creating a gap in our knowledge of contemporary Islamic views on the subject. Method: We analysed 70 English Sunni e-fatwas and subjected them to an in-depth text analysis in order to reveal the key concepts (...)
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  2. Nathaniel Branden (1999). The Art of Living Consciously: The Power of Awareness to Transform Everyday Life. Fireside/Simon & Schuster.score: 60.0
    The Art of Living Consciously Is an Operating Manual for Our Basic Tool of Survival In The Art of Living Consciously, Dr. Nathaniel Branden, our foremost authority on self-esteem, takes us into new territory, exploring the actions of our minds when they are operating as our life and well-being require -- and also when they are not. No other book illuminates so clearly what true mindfulness means: * In the workplace * In the arena of romantic love * In (...)
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  3. Barbara Branden (2007). Atlas Shrugged at Fifty. Journal of Libertarian Studies 21 (4):5-10.score: 30.0
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  4. W. J. Branden (2000). White on White. Critical Inquiry 27:90-121.score: 30.0
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  5. George P. Klubertanz (1966). "The Virtue of Selfishness," by Ayn Rand, with Additional Articles by Nathaniel Branden. The Modern Schoolman 43 (3):329-329.score: 9.0
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  6. Theodore Hailperin & Ontologically Neutral Logic (2001). Kenneth Harris and Branden Fitelson/Comments on Some Completeness Theorems of Urquhart and Méndez & Salto 51–55 Dominic Gregory/Completeness and Decidability Results for Some Propositional Modal Logics Containing “Actu. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 30:617-618.score: 9.0
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  7. Branden Fitelson (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1103-1105.score: 6.0
    The early twentieth century witnessed a shift in the way philosophers of science thought about traditional 'problems of induction'. Keynes championed the idea that Hume's Problem was not a problem about causation (which had been the traditional reading of Hume) but rather a problem about induction. Moreover, Keynes (and later Nicod) viewed such problems as having both logical and epistemological components. Hempel picked up where Keynes and Nicod left off, by formulating a rigorous formal theory of inductive logic. This spawned (...)
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  8. Branden Fitelson & David Jehle (2009). What is the “Equal Weight View'? Episteme 6 (3):280-293.score: 3.0
    In this paper, we investigate various possible (Bayesian) precisifications of the (somewhat vague) statements of “the equal weight view” (EWV) that have appeared in the recent literature on disagreement. We will show that the renditions of (EWV) that immediately suggest themselves are untenable from a Bayesian point of view. In the end, we will propose some tenable (but not necessarily desirable) interpretations of (EWV). Our aim here will not be to defend any particular Bayesian precisification of (EWV), but rather to (...)
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  9. Branden Fitelson & Richard Feldman (2012). Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence. Analysis 72 (1):85-88.score: 3.0
    In this note, I consider various precisifications of the slogan ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. I provide counter-examples to each of these precisifications (assuming an epistemic probabilistic relevance notion of ‘evidential support’).
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  10. Branden Fitelson (2008). Goodman's "New Riddle". Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.score: 3.0
    First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy (...)
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  11. Branden Fitelson (2006). The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.score: 3.0
    Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain how this inconsistency affects (...)
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  12. Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall (2006). Probability. In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.score: 3.0
    There are two central questions concerning probability. First, what are its formal features? That is a mathematical question, to which there is a standard, widely (though not universally) agreed upon answer. This answer is reviewed in the next section. Second, what sorts of things are probabilities---what, that is, is the subject matter of probability theory? This is a philosophical question, and while the mathematical theory of probability certainly bears on it, the answer must come from elsewhere. To see why, observe (...)
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  13. Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson (2003). Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation. Analysis 63 (277):23–31.score: 3.0
    We give an analysis of the Monty Hall problem purely in terms of confirmation, without making any lottery assumptions about priors. Along the way, we show the Monty Hall problem is structurally identical to the Doomsday Argument.
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  14. Branden Fitelson & Christopher Hitchcock (2011). Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength. In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. 600--627.score: 3.0
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  15. Branden Fitelson, A Concise Analysis of Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude.score: 3.0
    Popper [3] offers a qualitative definition of the relation “p q” = “p is (strictly) closer to the truth than (i.e., strictly more verisimilar than) q”, using the notions of truth (in the actual world) and classical logical consequence ( ), as follows.
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  16. Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson (2012). An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.score: 3.0
    To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad B -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function b — and perhaps even reasons to have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is pragmatically bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not clear (...)
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  17. Branden Fitelson & Alan Hájek, Declarations of Independence.score: 3.0
    According to orthodox (Kolmogorovian) probability theory, conditional probabilities are by definition certain ratios of unconditional probabilities. As a result, orthodox conditional probabilities are undefined whenever their antecedents have zero unconditional probability. This has important ramifications for the notion of probabilistic independence. Traditionally, independence is defined in terms of unconditional probabilities (the factorization of the relevant joint unconditional probabilities). Various “equivalent” formulations of independence can be given using conditional probabilities. But these “equivalences” break down if conditional probabilities are permitted to have (...)
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  18. James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson, An Even Better Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.score: 3.0
    Think of confirmation in the context of the Ravens Paradox this way. The likelihood ratio measure of incremental confirmation gives us, for an observed Black Raven and for an observed non-Black non-Raven, respectively, the following “full” likelihood ratios.
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  19. Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori (2008). Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.score: 3.0
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal (...)
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  20. Branden Fitelson (2010). Pollock on Probability in Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 148 (3):455 - 465.score: 3.0
    In Thinking and Acting John Pollock offers some criticisms of Bayesian epistemology, and he defends an alternative understanding of the role of probability in epistemology. Here, I defend the Bayesian against some of Pollock's criticisms, and I discuss a potential problem for Pollock's alternative account.
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  21. Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne (2010). How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens. In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. 247--275.score: 3.0
    The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe attempts (...)
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  22. Branden Fitelson (2010). FEW 2009 Special Issue: Preface. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):591-591.score: 3.0
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  23. Branden Fitelson, Accuracy & Coherence.score: 3.0
    This talk is (mainly) about the relationship two types of epistemic norms: accuracy norms and coherence norms. A simple example that everyone will be familiar with.
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  24. Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran, Partial Belief, Full Belief, and Accuracy–Dominance.score: 3.0
    Arguments for probabilism aim to undergird/motivate a synchronic probabilistic coherence norm for partial beliefs. Standard arguments for probabilism are all of the form: An agent S has a non-probabilistic partial belief function b iff (⇐⇒) S has some “bad” property B (in virtue of the fact that their p.b.f. b has a certain kind of formal property F). These arguments rest on Theorems (⇒) and Converse Theorems (⇐): b is non-Pr ⇐⇒ b has formal property F.
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  25. Branden Fitelson & Lara Buchak, Advice-Giving and Scoring-Rule-Based Arguments for Probabilism.score: 3.0
    Dutch Book Arguments. B is susceptibility to sure monetary loss (in a certain betting set-up), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the DBT and the Converse DBT. Representation Theorem Arguments. B is having preferences that violate some of Savage’s axioms (and/or being unrepresentable as an expected utility maximizer), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the RT.
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  26. Branden Fitelson & Lara Buchak, Separability Assumptions in Scoring-Rule-Based Arguments for Probabilism.score: 3.0
    - In decision theory, an agent is deciding how to value a gamble that results in different outcomes in different states. Each outcome gets a utility value for the agent.
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  27. Jeanne Peijnenburg, Branden Fitelson & Igor Douven (2012). Introduction to the Special Issue: Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies. Synthese 184 (1):1-1.score: 3.0
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  28. Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober (1998). Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):115–129.score: 3.0
    In Chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga constructs two arguments against evolutionary naturalism, which he construes as a conjunction E&N .The hypothesis E says that “human cognitive faculties arose by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary thought directs our attention (p.220).”1 With respect to proposition N , Plantinga (p. 270) says “it isn’t easy to say precisely what naturalism is,” but then adds that “crucial to metaphysical naturalism, of course, is the view that there is (...)
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  29. Branden Fitelson, “Survey” of Formal Epistemology: Some Propaganda and an Example.score: 3.0
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  30. Branden Fitelson, Knowledge From Falsehood.score: 3.0
    It is useful to note how (CC) differs from closure: (C) If S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p and S knows that p, then S knows that q. I won’t be discussing (C) today, but here is a useful contrast.
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  31. Branden Fitelson (2010). The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.score: 3.0
    The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on the Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, re-examining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
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  32. Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne (2010). How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens. In. In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. 247--275.score: 3.0
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  33. Branden Fitelson (1999). How Not to Detect Design. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 66 (3):472 - 488.score: 3.0
    As every philosopher knows, “the design argument” concludes that God exists from premisses that cite the adaptive complexity of organisms or the lawfulness and orderliness of the whole universe. Since 1859, it has formed the intellectual heart of creationist opposition to the Darwinian hypothesis that organisms evolved their adaptive features by the mindless process of natural selection. Although the design argument developed as a defense of theism, the logic of the argument in fact encompasses a larger set of issues. William (...)
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  34. Branden Fitelson, Using Mathematica to Understand the Computer Proof of the Robbins Conjecture.score: 3.0
    mathematicians for over 60 years. Amazingly, the Argonne team's automated theorem-proving program EQP took only 8 days to find a proof of it. Unfortunately, the proof found by EQP is quite complex and difficult to follow. Some of the steps of the EQP proof require highly complex and unintuitive substitution strategies. As a result, it is nearly impossible to reconstruct or verify the computer proof of the Robbins conjecture entirely by hand. This is where the unique symbolic capabilities of Mathematica (...)
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  35. Branden Fitelson (2012). Contrastive Bayesianism. In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.score: 3.0
    Bayesianism provides a rich theoretical framework, which lends itself rather naturally to the explication of various “contrastive” and “non-contrastive” concepts. In this (brief) discussion, I will focus on issues involving “contrastivism”, as they arise in some of the recent philosophy of science, epistemology, and cognitive science literature surrounding Bayesian confirmation theory.
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  36. Branden Fitelson (2001). Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madisonscore: 3.0
    According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E (incrementally) confirms (or supports) a hypothesis H (roughly) just in case E and H are positively probabilistically correlated (under an appropriate probability function Pr). There are many logically equivalent ways of saying that E and H are correlated under Pr. Surprisingly, this leads to a plethora of non-equivalent quantitative measures of the degree to which E confirms H (under Pr). In fact, many non-equivalent Bayesian measures of the degree to which E confirms (or (...)
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  37. Branden Fitelson (2010). Strengthening the Case for Knowledge From Falsehood. Analysis 70 (4):666-669.score: 3.0
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  38. Neera K. Badhwar, Raja Halwani Ed., Sex and Ethics: Essays On.score: 3.0
    I. Introduction Sex has been thought to reveal the most profound truths about individuals, laying bare their deepest desires and fears to their partners and themselves. In ‘Carnal Knowledge,’ Wendy Doniger states that this view is to be found in the texts of ancient India, in the Hebrew Bible, in Renaissance England and Europe, as well as in contemporary culture, including Hollywood films.1 Indeed, according to Josef Pieper, the original, Hebrew, meaning of ‘carnal knowledge’ was ‘immediate togetherness, intimate presence.’ [i] (...)
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  39. Branden Fitelson, Epistemological Critiques of ‘Classical’ Logic: Two Case Studies.score: 3.0
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  40. Branden Fitelson (2011). Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):666-672.score: 3.0
    This (brief) note is about the (evidential) “favoring” relation. Pre-theoretically, favoring is a three-place (epistemic) relation, between an evidential proposition E and two hypotheses H1 and H2. Favoring relations are expressed via locutions of the form: E favors H1 over H2. Strictly speaking, favoring should really be thought of as a four-place relation, between E, H1, H2, and a corpus of background evidence K. But, for present purposes (which won't address issues involving K), I will suppress the background corpus, so (...)
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  41. Branden Fitelson (2007). Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation. Synthese 156 (3):473 - 489.score: 3.0
    Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a "middle way" (...)
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  42. Branden Fitelson (2006). Logical Foundations of Evidential Support. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):500-512.score: 3.0
    Carnap’s inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an “increase in firmness” (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap’s main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of “logical probability”. The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap’s epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap’s goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in favor of bridging (...)
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  43. Branden Fitelson, Goodman's “Grue” Argument in Historical Perspective.score: 3.0
    The talk is mainly defensive. I won’t offer positive accounts of the “paradoxical” cases I will discuss (but, see “Extras”). I’ll begin with Harman’s defense of classical deductive logic against certain (epistemological) “relevantist” arguments.
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  44. Branden Fitelson & Edward N. Zalta (2007). Steps Toward a Computational Metaphysics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):227-247.score: 3.0
    In this paper, the authors describe their initial investigations in computational metaphysics. Our method is to implement axiomatic metaphysics in an automated reasoning system. In this paper, we describe what we have discovered when the theory of abstract objects is implemented in PROVER9 (a first-order automated reasoning system which is the successor to OTTER). After reviewing the second-order, axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we show (1) how to represent a fragment of that theory in PROVER9's first-order syntax, and (2) how (...)
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  45. Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2000). Measuring Confirmation and Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.score: 3.0
  46. Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2002). Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.score: 3.0
    Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.
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  47. Branden Fitelson (2012). Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 79 (1):167-174.score: 3.0
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  48. Branden Fitelson (1999). The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.score: 3.0
    Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of (...)
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  49. Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman (2005). Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.score: 3.0
    has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. Some background on Quine–Duhem Strevens's simplifying idealization Indications that (I) oversimplifies Q–D Strevens's argument (...)
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