Search results for 'Stefden Branden' (try it on Scholar)

  1.  19
    Stefden Branden & Bert Broeckaert (forthcoming). The Ongoing Charity of Organ Donation. Contemporary English Sunni Fatwas on Organ Donation and Blood Transfusion. Bioethics.
    Background: Empirical studies in Muslim communities on organ donation and blood transfusion show that Muslim counsellors play an important role in the decision process. Despite the emerging importance of online English Sunni fatwas, these fatwas on organ donation and blood transfusion have hardly been studied, thus creating a gap in our knowledge of contemporary Islamic views on the subject. Method: We analysed 70 English Sunni e-fatwas and subjected them to an in-depth text analysis in order to reveal the key concepts (...)
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  2. Nathaniel Branden (1989). Judgment Day My Years with Ayn Rand. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  3. Nathaniel Branden & Ayn Rand (1999). My Years with Ayn Rand.
     
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  4.  15
    Nathaniel Branden (1999). The Art of Living Consciously: The Power of Awareness to Transform Everyday Life. Fireside/Simon & Schuster.
    The Art of Living Consciously Is an Operating Manual for Our Basic Tool of Survival In The Art of Living Consciously, Dr. Nathaniel Branden, our foremost authority on self-esteem, takes us into new territory, exploring the actions of our minds when they are operating as our life and well-being require -- and also when they are not. No other book illuminates so clearly what true mindfulness means: * In the workplace * In the arena of romantic love * In (...)
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  5.  9
    Barbara Branden (2007). Atlas Shrugged at Fifty. Journal of Libertarian Studies 21 (4):5-10.
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  6. Nathaniel Branden (1971). Comments on Professor Mannison's Address. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):362.
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  7. Nathaniel Branden (1970). Objectivism. Jeffrey Norton.
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  8. Nathaniel Branden (1973). On the Concept of Mental Health. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):216.
     
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  9. Nathanial Branden (1970). Rational Egoism - Continued. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):305.
     
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  10. Nathaniel Branden (1970). Rational Egoism: A Reply to Professor Emmons. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):196.
     
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  11. Nathaniel Branden (2000). The Moral Revolution in Atlas Shrugged.
     
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  12. W. J. Branden (2000). White on White. Critical Inquiry 27:90-121.
     
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  13.  12
    Theodore Hailperin & Ontologically Neutral Logic (2001). Kenneth Harris and Branden Fitelson/Comments on Some Completeness Theorems of Urquhart and Méndez & Salto 51–55 Dominic Gregory/Completeness and Decidability Results for Some Propositional Modal Logics Containing “Actu. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 30:617-618.
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  14.  2
    Roger E. Bissell (2014). Barbara Branden's Bibliography. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 14 (1):5-9.
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  15.  1
    George P. Klubertanz (1966). "The Virtue of Selfishness," by Ayn Rand, with Additional Articles by Nathaniel Branden. Modern Schoolman 43 (3):329-329.
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  16. John Hospers (1970). Ethical Egoism: Introduction to Nathaniel Branden's Essay. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):190.
     
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  17. R. S. Pierce (1977). Abian Alexander. Boolean Rings. Branden Press Publishers, Boston 1976, Ix + 394 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 42 (4):588-589.
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  18. Chris Matthew Sciabarra (2015). Assessing the Legacy of Nathaniel Branden. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 15 (1):1-2.
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  19. Branden Fitelson (2003). A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence. Analysis 63 (3):194–199.
    Let E be a set of n propositions E1, ..., En. We seek a probabilistic measure C(E) of the ‘degree of coherence’ of E. Intuitively, we want C to be a quantitative, probabilistic generalization of the (deductive) logical coherence of E. So, in particular, we require C to satisfy the following..
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  20.  88
    Branden Fitelson (2010). Strengthening the Case for Knowledge From Falsehood. Analysis 70 (4):666-669.
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  21.  54
    Branden Fitelson (1999). The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.
    Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of (...)
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  22. Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson (2012). An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.
    To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad B -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function b — and perhaps even reasons to have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is pragmatically bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not clear (...)
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  23.  66
    Branden Fitelson (2001). Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
    According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E (incrementally) confirms (or supports) a hypothesis H (roughly) just in case E and H are positively probabilistically correlated (under an appropriate probability function Pr). There are many logically equivalent ways of saying that E and H are correlated under Pr. Surprisingly, this leads to a plethora of non-equivalent quantitative measures of the degree to which E confirms H (under Pr). In fact, many non-equivalent Bayesian measures of the degree to which E confirms (or (...)
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  24. Branden Fitelson & David Jehle (2009). What is the “Equal Weight View'? Episteme 6 (3):280-293.
    In this paper, we investigate various possible (Bayesian) precisifications of the (somewhat vague) statements of “the equal weight view” (EWV) that have appeared in the recent literature on disagreement. We will show that the renditions of (EWV) that immediately suggest themselves are untenable from a Bayesian point of view. In the end, we will propose some tenable (but not necessarily desirable) interpretations of (EWV). Our aim here will not be to defend any particular Bayesian precisification of (EWV), but rather to (...)
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  25.  59
    Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2002). Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.
    Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.
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  26. Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori (2008). Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal (...)
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  27.  63
    Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran, Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.
    Taking Joyce’s (1998; 2009) recent argument(s) for probabilism as our point of departure, we propose a new way of grounding formal, synchronic, epistemic coherence requirements for (opinionated) full belief. Our approach yields principled alternatives to deductive consistency, sheds new light on the preface and lottery paradoxes, and reveals novel conceptual connections between alethic and evidential epistemic norms.
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  28.  82
    Branden Fitelson (2007). Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation. Synthese 156 (3):473 - 489.
    Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a "middle way" (...)
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  29.  19
    Branden Fitelson, Two Technical Corrections to My Coherence Measure.
    Note: This is not an ad hoc change at all. It’s simply the natural thing say here – if one thinks of F as a generalization of classical logical entailment. The extra complexity I had in my original (incorrect) definition of F was there because I was foolishly trying to encode some non-classical, or “relavant” logical structure in F. I now think this is a mistake, and that I should go with the above, classical account of F. Arguments about relevance (...)
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  30. Branden Fitelson & Richard Feldman (2012). Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence. Analysis 72 (1):85-88.
    In this note, I consider various precisifications of the slogan ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. I provide counter-examples to each of these precisifications (assuming an epistemic probabilistic relevance notion of ‘evidential support’).
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  31.  37
    Juan Comesaña & Eyal Tal (2015). Evidence of Evidence is Evidence. Analysis 75 (4):557-559.
    Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s principle is trivially true.
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  32. Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne (2010). How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens. In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer 247--275.
    The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe attempts (...)
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  33.  25
    Florian Steinberger (2016). Explosion and the Normativity of Logic. Mind 125 (498):385-419.
    Logic has traditionally been construed as a normative discipline; it sets forth standards of correct reasoning. Explosion is a valid principle of classical logic. It states that an inconsistent set of propositions entails any proposition whatsoever. However, ordinary agents presumably do — occasionally, at least — have inconsistent belief sets. Yet it is false that such agents may, let alone ought to, believe any proposition they please. Therefore, our logic should not recognize explosion as a logical law. Call this the (...)
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  34. Branden Fitelson (2008). Goodman's "New Riddle". Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.
    First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy (...)
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  35.  78
    Branden Fitelson (2006). Logical Foundations of Evidential Support. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):500-512.
    Carnap’s inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an “increase in firmness” (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap’s main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of “logical probability”. The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap’s epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap’s goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in favor of bridging (...)
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  36. Branden Fitelson (2006). The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
    Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain how this inconsistency affects (...)
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  37.  25
    Branden Fitelson (2008). A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):111-125.
    (new version: 10/30/07). Click here to download the companion Mathematica 6 notebook that goes along with this paper.
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  38.  82
    Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2000). Measuring Confirmation and Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
  39.  40
    Branden Fitelson (2001). A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S123-.
    outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C.S. Peirce. When we want to consider how degree of confirmation varies with changing I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of con-.
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  40. Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson (2003). Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation. Analysis 63 (277):23–31.
    We give an analysis of the Monty Hall problem purely in terms of confirmation, without making any lottery assumptions about priors. Along the way, we show the Monty Hall problem is structurally identical to the Doomsday Argument.
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  41. Branden Fitelson & Christopher Hitchcock (2011). Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength. In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press 600--627.
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  42. Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman (2005). Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.
    has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification. Some background on Quine–Duhem Strevens's simplifying idealization Indications that (I) oversimplifies Q–D Strevens's argument (...)
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  43.  97
    Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober (1998). Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):115–129.
    In Chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga constructs two arguments against evolutionary naturalism, which he construes as a conjunction E&N .The hypothesis E says that “human cognitive faculties arose by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary thought directs our attention (p.220).”1 With respect to proposition N , Plantinga (p. 270) says “it isn’t easy to say precisely what naturalism is,” but then adds that “crucial to metaphysical naturalism, of course, is the view that there is (...)
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  44.  46
    Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson (2003). Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation. Analysis 63 (1):23-31.
  45.  43
    Branden Fitelson (2002). Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622.
    Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X—even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunction H & X less strongly than E confirms (...)
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  46.  83
    Branden Fitelson (2010). The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
    The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on the Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, re-examining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
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  47. Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall (2006). Probability. In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge
    There are two central questions concerning probability. First, what are its formal features? That is a mathematical question, to which there is a standard, widely (though not universally) agreed upon answer. This answer is reviewed in the next section. Second, what sorts of things are probabilities---what, that is, is the subject matter of probability theory? This is a philosophical question, and while the mathematical theory of probability certainly bears on it, the answer must come from elsewhere. To see why, observe (...)
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  48.  36
    James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson (2004). Discussion: Re‐Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence. Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514.
    Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X—even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new‐and‐improved Bayesian account that overcomes the problem of (...)
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  49. Paul Teller, Stefano Gattei, Kent W. Staley, Eric Winsberg, James Hawthorne, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Peter Achinstein & Mathias Frisch (2004). 10. Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution (Pp. 550-570). Philosophy of Science 71 (4).
     
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  50.  39
    Branden Fitelson (2012). Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 79 (1):167-174.
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