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Profile: Steinvor Tholl Arnadottir (University of Stirling, Cambridge University)
  1. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (forthcoming). Overdetermination and Elimination. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    I focus on two arguments, due to Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks, that move from claims about the sufficiency of one class of causes to the reduction or elimination of another class of entity, via claims about overdetermination. I argue that in order to validate their move from sufficiency to reduction or elimination, both Kim and Merricks must assume that there can be no ‘weak overdetermination’; i.e., that no single effect can have numerically distinct but dependently sufficient causes occurring at (...)
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  2. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2013). Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.
    : A key consideration in favour of animalism—the thesis that persons like you and me are identical to the animals we walk around with—is that it avoids a too many thinkers problem that arises for non-animalist positions. The problem is that it seems that any person-constituting animal would itself be able to think, but if wherever there is a thinking person there is a thinking animal distinct from it then there are at least two thinkers wherever there is a thinking (...)
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  3. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir & Tim Crane (2013). There is No Exclusion Problem. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press 248.
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  4. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2010). Functionalism and Thinking Animals. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):347 - 354.
    Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker’s argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the (...)
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