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Profile: Stephanie Beardman (Barnard College)
  1. Stephanie Beardman (2013). A Non-Factualist Defense of the Reflection Principle. Synthese 190 (15):2981-2999.
    Are there plausible synchronic constraints on how a subject thinks of herself extended over time? At first glance, Bas van Fraassen’s principle of Reflection seems to prescribe the sort of epistemic authority one’s future self should be taken by one to have over one’s current epistemic states. (The gist of this principle is that I should now believe what I’m convinced I will believe tomorrow.) There has been a general consensus that, as a principle concerning epistemic authority, Reflection does not (...)
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  2. Stephanie Beardman (2012). Altruism and the Experimental Data on Helping Behavior. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):547 - 561.
    Philosophical accounts of altruism that purport to explain helping behavior are vulnerable to empirical falsification. John Campbell argues that the Good Samaritan study adds to a growing body of evidence that helping behavior is not best explained by appeal to altruism, thus jeopardizing those accounts. I propose that philosophical accounts of altruism can be empirically challenged only if it is shown that altruistic motivations are undermined by normative conflict in the agent, and that the relevant studies do not provide this (...)
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  3. Stephanie Beardman (2007). The Special Status of Instrumental Reasons. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):255 - 287.
    The rationality of means-end reasoning is the bedrock of the Humean account of practical reasons. But the normativity of such reasoning can not be taken for granted. I consider and reject the idea that the normativity of instrumental reasoning can be explained – either in terms of its being constitutive of the very notion of having an end, or solely in terms of instrumental considerations. I argue that the instrumental principle is itself a brute norm, and that this is consistent (...)
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  4. Stephanie Beardman (2004). Review: Alchemies of the Mind. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 101 (9):484-491.
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  5. Stephanie Beardman (2004). Alchemies of the Mind. Journal of Philosophy 101 (9):484-491.
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  6. Stephanie Beardman (2000). Response to Gustafson's Comments. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):121 – 122.
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  7. Stephanie Beardman (2000). The Choice Between Current and Retrospective Evaluations of Pain. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):97-110.
    Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues have made an interesting discovery about people's preferences. In several experiments, subjects underwent two separate ordeals of pain, identical except that one ended with an added amount of diminishing pain. When asked to evaluate these episodes after experiencing both, subjects generally preferred the longer episode--even though it had a greater objective quantity of pain. These data raise an ethical question about whether to respect such preferences when acting on another's behalf. John Broome thinks that it (...)
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