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Profile: Stephanie Collins (University of Manchester)
  1. Stephanie Collins (2013). Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
    Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss (...)
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  2.  33
    Stephanie Collins (forthcoming). The Claims and Duties of Socioeconomic Human Rights. Philosophical Quarterly.
    A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection,’ and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic consideration’. I propose a detailed structure for these rights and their correlative duties, (...)
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  3. Stephanie Collins (2015). Distributing States' Duties. Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (3).
    In order for states to fulfil (many of) their moral obligations, costs must be passed to individuals. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.
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  4.  63
    Stephanie Collins (2014). Are 'Coalitions of the Willing' Moral Agents? Ethics and International Affairs 28 (1):online only.
    In this reply to an article of Toni Erskine's, I argue that coalitions of the willing are moral agents. They can therefore bear responsibility in their own right.
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  5. Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith (forthcoming). The Transfer of Duties: From Individuals to States and Back Again. In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups.
    Individuals sometimes pass their duties on to collectives, which is one way in which collectives can come to have duties. The collective discharges its duties by acting through its members, which involves distributing duties back out to individuals. Individuals put duties in and get (transformed) duties out. In this paper we consider whether (and if so, to what extent) this general account can make sense of states' duties. Do some of the duties we typically take states to have come from (...)
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  6.  22
    Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith (2015). Collectives’ and Individuals’ Obligations: A Parity Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-21.
    Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug (...)
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  7.  50
    Stephanie Collins (2013). Duties to Make Friends. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):907-921.
    Why, morally speaking, ought we do more for our family and friends than for strangers? In other words, what is the justification of special duties? According to partialists, the answer to this question cannot be reduced to impartial moral principles. According to impartialists, it can. This paper briefly argues in favour of impartialism, before drawing out an implication of the impartialist view: in addition to justifying some currently recognised special duties, impartialism also generates new special duties that are not yet (...)
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    Stephanie Collins (2015). Distributing States' Duties. Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (2):n/a-n/a.
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  9.  90
    Stephanie Collins (2015). The Core of Care Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Chapter 1 Introduction This chapter briefly explains what care ethics is, what care ethics is not, and how much work there still is to be done in establishing care ethics’ scope. The chapter elaborates on care ethics’ relationship to political philosophy, ethics, feminism, and the history of philosophy. The upshot of these discussions is the suggestion that we need a unified, precise statement of care ethics’ normative core. The chapter concludes by giving an overview of (...)
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