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Profile: Stephen Andrew Butterfill (University of Warwick)
  1. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Categorical Perception : Not What It Seems.
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  2. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Does Eve Need Adam? (Reply to Guenther Knoblich).
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  3. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Joint Action : Conceptual Tools for Scientific Research.
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  4. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Joint Action : Shared Intentions and Collective Goals.
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  5. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Joint Action and Knowing Others' Minds.
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  6. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Joint Action and the Emergence of Mindreading.
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  7. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Joint Action Without Shared Intention.
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  8. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Mindreading and Joint Action.
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  9. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Minimal Theory of Mind.
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  10. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Minimal Theory of Mind and Joint Action.
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  11. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Pluralism About Joint Action.
    Shared Emotions, Joint Attention and Joint Action, Centre for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark, 26 October 2010.
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  12. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Talking About and Seeing Blue.
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  13. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Which Joint Actions Ground Social Cognition.
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  14. Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia (2014). Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
    Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, (...)
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  15. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2013). Interacting Mindreaders. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.
    Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader’s target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions (...)
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  16. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2012). Joint Action and Development. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (246):23-47.
    Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint action, an account compatible (...)
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  17. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2011). Infants' Representations of Causation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):126-127.
    It is consistent with the evidence in The Origin of Concepts to conjecture that infants' causal representations, like their numerical representations, are not continuous with adults', so that bootstrapping is needed in both cases.
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  18. Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz (2011). Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):137-146.
    Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? Content Type Journal Article Pages 137-146 DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0062-3 Authors Stephen A. Butterfill, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK Natalie Sebanz, Centre for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, & Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158 Journal Volume Volume 2 Journal Issue Volume 2, Number 2.
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  19. Günther Knoblich, Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz, Psychological Research on Joint Action : Theory and Data.
    When two or more people coordinate their actions in space and time to produce a joint outcome, they perform a joint action. The perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes that enable individuals to coordinate their actions with others have been receiving increasing attention during the last decade, complementing earlier work on shared intentionality and discourse. This chapter reviews current theoretical concepts and empirical findings in order to provide a structured overview of the state of the art in joint action research. We (...)
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  20. Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl & Stephen Andrew Butterfill (eds.) (2011). Tool Use and Causal Cognition. OUP Oxford.
    What cognitive abilities underpin the use of tools, and how are tools and their properties represented or understood by tool-users? Does the study of tool use provide us with a unique or distinctive source of information about the causal cognition of tool-users? -/- Tool use is a topic of major interest to all those interested in animal cognition, because it implies that the animal has knowledge of the relationship between objects and their effects. There are countless examples of animals developing (...)
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  21. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2010). Children's Selective Learning From Others. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):551-561.
    Psychological research into children’s sensitivity to testimony has primarily focused on their ability to judge the likely reliability of speakers. However, verbal testimony is only one means by which children learn from others. We review recent research exploring children’s early social referencing and imitation, as well as their sensitivity to speakers’ knowledge, beliefs, and biases, to argue that children treat information and informants with reasonable scepticism. As children’s understanding of mental states develops, they become ever more able to critically evaluate (...)
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  22. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.
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  23. Erika Nurmsoo, Elizabeth Robinson & Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2010). Children's Selective Learning From Others. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):551-561.
    Psychological research into children’s sensitivity to testimony has primarily focused on their ability to judge the likely reliability of speakers. However, verbal testimony is only one means by which children learn from others. We review recent research exploring children’s early social referencing and imitation, as well as their sensitivity to speakers’ knowledge, beliefs, and biases, to argue that children treat information and informants with reasonable scepticism. As children’s understanding of mental states develops, they become ever more able to critically evaluate (...)
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  24. Ian Apperly & Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2009). Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States? Psychological Review; Psychological Review 116 (4):953.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans' capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years of age (H. Wellman, D. Cross, & J. Watson, 2001; H. Wimmer & J. Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false-belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (K. H. Onishi & R. Baillargeon, 2005; L. Surian, S. Caldi, & D. Sperber, 2007). Nonhuman animals also fail critical (...)
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  25. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2009). Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification * By SANFORD C. GOLDBERG. [REVIEW] Analysis 69 (3):582-585.
  26. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Review of Anti-Individualism : Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification, by Goldberg, S. C. [REVIEW]
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  27. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Review of Self-Knowing Agents by O'Brien, L. [REVIEW]
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  28. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2009). Self-Knowing Agents. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 118 (3):413-415.
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  29. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2009). Seeing Causings and Hearing Gestures. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):405-428.
    Can humans see causal interactions? Evidence on the visual perception of causal interactions, from Michotte to contemporary work, is best interpreted as showing that we can see some causal interactions in the same sense as that in which we can hear speech. Causal perception, like speech perception, is a form of categorical perception.
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  30. Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly (2009). Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States? Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...)
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  31. Teresa McCormack, Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Christoph Hoerl & Patrick Burns (2009). Cue Competition Effects and Young Children's Causal and Counterfactual Inferences. Developmental Psychology 45 (6):1563-1575.
    The authors examined cue competition effects in young children using the blicket detector paradigm, in which objects are placed either singly or in pairs on a novel machine and children must judge which objects have the causal power to make the machine work. Cue competition effects were found in a 5- to 6-year-old group but not in a 4-year-old group. Equivalent levels of forward and backward blocking were found in the former group. Children's counterfactual judgments were subsequently examined by asking (...)
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  32. Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Review of The Rational Imagination : How People Create Alternatives to Reality, by Byrn, R. M. J. [REVIEW]
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  33. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2008). Review: Ruth M. J. Byrne: The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1065-1069.
  34. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2007). What Are Modules and What is Their Role in Development? Mind and Language 22 (4):450–473.
    Modules are widely held to play a central role in explaining mental development and in accounts of the mind generally. But there is much disagreement about what modules are, which shows that we do not adequately understand modularity. This paper outlines a Fodoresque approach to understanding one type of modularity. It suggests that we can distinguish modular from nonmodular cognition by reference to the kinds of process involved, and that modular cognition differs from nonmodular forms of cognition in being a (...)
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  35. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2004). Review: Thinking Without Words. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):733-736.
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  36. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2001). Two Kinds of Purposive Action. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):141–165.
    It is normally assumed that there is only one kind of purposive action. This article argues that there are two kinds of purposive action, which require different models of explanation. One kind of action is done without awareness of reasons; another kind of action is done because the agent is aware of reasons for that action. The argument starts by noting that philosophers disagree about what explains action. Some claim that actions are explained by impersonal facts, such as facts about (...)
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