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Profile: Stephen Barker (Nottingham University)
  1. Mark Jago & Stephen Barker (2012). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
    Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including their roles in causation, chance-making (...)
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  2. Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context (...)
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  3. Stephen Barker (2013). The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers. Mind 112 (487):605-653.
    This paper argues that the new metaphysics of powers, also known as dispositional essentialism or causal structuralism, is an illusory metaphysics. I argue for this in the following way. I begin by distinguishing three fundamental ways of seeing how facts of physical modality — facts about physical necessitation and possibility, causation, disposition, and chance — are grounded in the world. The first way, call it the first degree, is that the actual world or all worlds, in their entirety, are the (...)
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  4. Stephen Barker (2012). Expressivism About Making and Truth-Making. In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge University Press 272-293.
    My goal is to illuminate truth-making by way of illuminating the relation of making. My strategy is not to ask what making is, in the hope of a metaphysical theory about is nature. It's rather to look first to the language of making. The metaphor behind making refers to agency. It would be absurd to suggest that claims about making are claims about agency. It is not absurd, however, to propose that the concept of making somehow emerges from some feature (...)
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  5. Benjamin Smart & Stephen Barker (2012). The Ultimate Argument Against Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws. Analysis 72 (4):714-723.
    Alexander Bird argues that David Armstrong’s necessitarian conception of physical modality and laws of nature generates a vicious regress with respect to necessitation. We show that precisely the same regress afflicts Bird’s dispositional-monist theory, and indeed, related views, such as that of Mumford and Anjum. We argue that dispositional monism is basically Armstrongian necessitarianism modified to allow for a thesis about property identity.
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  6. Stephen Barker (2006). Truth and the Expressing in Expressivism. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press 299.
     
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  7. Stephen J. Barker & Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (2015). Irony and the Dogma of Force and Sense. Analysis 75 (1):9-16.
    Frege’s distinction between force and sense is a central pillar of modern thinking about meaning. This is the idea that a self-standing utterance of a sentence S can be divided into two components. One is the proposition P that S’s linguistic meaning and context associates with it. The other is S’s illocutionary force. The force/sense distinction is associated with another thesis, the embedding principle, that implies that the only content that embeds in compound sentences is propositional content. We argue that (...)
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  8. Stephen Barker (2011). Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds? Noûs 45 (3):557-576.
    The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A-worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C-worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non-trivial truth-values under physical determinism. I show that the possible-worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity (...)
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  9. Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe (2003). Paradoxes of Multi-Location. Analysis 63 (2):106–114.
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  10. Stephen Barker & Mark Jago (2014). Monism and Material Constitution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):189-204.
    Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We motivate (...)
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  11. Stephen Barker (2015). Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-Existent Without Meinongian Metaphysics. Erkenntnis 80 (S2):215-234.
    Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to the Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what our relationship as (...)
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  12.  87
    Stephen Barker (2014). Pure Versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature. In Guy Fletcher & Mike Ridge (eds.), Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern
Metaethics. Oxford University Press 199-222.
    Can hybridism about moral claims be made to work? I argue it can if we accept the conventional implicature approach developed in Barker (Analysis 2000). However, this kind of hybrid expressivism is only acceptable if we can make sense of conventional implicature, the kind of meaning carried by operators like ‘even’, ‘but’, etc. Conventional implictures are a form of pragmatic presupposition, which involves an unsaid mode of delivery of content. I argue that we can make sense of conventional implicatures, but (...)
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  13. Stephen J. Barker (2000). Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature? Analysis 60 (267):268–279.
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  14. Stephen J. Barker (2007). Semantics Without the Distinction Between Sense and Force. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press
    At the heart of semantics in the 20th century is Frege’s distinction between sense and force. This is the idea that the content of a self-standing utterance of a sentence S can be divided into two components. One part, the sense, is the proposition that S’s linguistic meaning and context associates with it as its semantic interpretation. The second component is S’s illocutionary force. Illocutionary forces correspond to the three basic kinds of sentential speech acts: assertions, orders, and questions. Forces (...)
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  15. Stephen Barker (2003). Truth and Conventional Implicature. Mind 112 (445):1-34.
    Are all instances of the T-schema assertable? I argue that they are not. The reason is the presence of conventional implicature in a language. Conventional implicature is meant to be a component of the rule-based content that a sentence can have, but it makes no contribution to the sentence's truth-conditions. One might think that a conventional implicature is like a force operator. But it is not, since it can enter into the scope of logical operators. It follows that the semantic (...)
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  16. Stephen Barker (2014). Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability. Analysis 74 (2):201-209.
    I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes. According to the solution, AUS, its undecidable whether paradoxical sentences are grounded or ungrounded. From this it follows that their alethic status is undecidable. We cannot assert, in principle, whether paradoxical sentences are true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. AUS involves no ad hoc modification of logic, denial of the T-schema's validity, or obvious (...)
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  17. Stephen Barker (2009). Dispositional Monism, Relational Constitution and Quiddities. Analysis 69 (2):242-250.
    Let us call dispositional monism the view that all natural properties have their identities fixed purely by their dispositional features, that is, by the patterns of stimulus and response in which they participate. DM implies that natural properties are pure powers: things whose natures are fully identified by their roles in determining the potentialities of events to cause or be caused. As pure powers, properties are meant to lack quiddities in Black's sense. A property possesses a quiddity just in case (...)
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  18.  46
    Stephen J. Barker (2004). Renewing Meaning: A Speech-Act Theoretic Approach. Clarendon Press.
    Stephen Barker presents his first, ambitious book in the philosophy of language, setting out a radical alternative to standard theories of meaning.
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  19. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
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  20.  95
    Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe (2005). Endurance is Paradoxical. Analysis 65 (285):69-74.
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  21.  17
    Stephen Barker (forthcoming). Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreover, the only component of a sentence’s content that embeds in compound sentences, like belief reports or conditionals, is the propositional content. I argue that a careful analysis of irony shows this view cannot be maintained. Irony is a purely pragmatic form of content that embeds (...)
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  22. Stephen J. Barker, Global Expressivism.
    There is a wide-spread belief amongst theorists of mind and language. This is that in order to understand the relation between language, thought, and reality we need a theory of meaning and content, that is, a normative, formal science of meaning, which is an extension and theoretical deepening of folk ideas about meaning. This book argues that this is false, offering an alternative idea: The form of a theory that illuminates the relation of language, thought, and reality is a theory (...)
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  23. Stephen Barker (2003). Counterfactual Analyses of Causation: The Problem of Effects and Epiphenomena Revisited. Noûs 37 (1):133–150.
    I argue that Lewis's counterfactual theory of causation, given his treatment of counterfactuals in terms of world-comparative similarity faces insuperable problems in the form of the problem of effects and the problem of epiphenomena.
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  24.  68
    Stephen J. Barker (1993). Conditional Excluded Middle, Conditional Assertion, and 'Only If'. Analysis 53 (4):254 - 261.
  25.  99
    Stephen J. Barker (1994). Causation, Facts and Coherence. Analysis 54 (3):179 - 182.
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  26. Stephen Barker (2002). Review: Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (443):633-639.
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  27.  81
    Stephen Barker (1996). Parsing If-Sentences and the Conditions of Sentencehood. Analysis 56 (4):210–218.
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  28.  21
    James Allan, Robert F. Anderson, Shane Andre, Pall S. Ardal, R. F. Atkinson, Luigi Bagolini, Annette Baier, Stephen Barker, Marcia Baron & Donald L. M. Baxter (1993). An Index of Hume Studies: 1975-1993. Hume Studies 19 (2):327-364.
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  29.  30
    Stephen Barker (1997). Material Implication and General Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):195-211.
    This paper falls into two parts. In the first part, I argue that consideration of general indicative conditionals, e.g., sentences like If a donkey brays it is beaten, provides a powerful argument that a pure material implication analysis of indicative if p, q is correct. In the second part I argue, opposing writers like Jackson, that a Gricean style theory of pragmatics can explain the manifest assertability conditions of if p, q in terms of its conventional content – assumed to (...)
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  30.  82
    Stephen J. Barker (1998). Predetermination and Tense Probabilism. Analysis 58 (4):290–296.
  31.  51
    Stephen Barker (1991). Even, Still and Counterfactuals. Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (1):1 - 38.
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  32.  71
    Stephen J. Barker (2002). Troubles with Horgan and Timmons' Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):235-255.
    Emotivist, or non-descriptivist metaethical theories hold that value-statements do not function by describing special value-facts, but are the mere expressions of naturalistically describable motivational states of (valuing) agents. Non-descriptivism has typically been combined with the claim that value-statements are non-cognitive: they are not the manifestations of genuine belief states. However, all the linguistic, logical and phenomenological evidence indicates that value-statements are cognitive. Non-descriptivism then has a problem. Horgan and Timmons propose to solve it by boldly combining a non-descriptivist thesis about (...)
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  33.  27
    Stephen Barker (2012). Truth-Making and the Alethic Undecidability of the Liar. Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21):13 - 31.
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  34.  68
    Stephen F. Barker (1984). How Wrong Was Kant About Geometry? Topoi 3 (2):133-142.
  35.  23
    Stephen J. Barker (1994). The Consequent-Entailment Problem Foreven If. Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (3):249 - 260.
    A comprehensive theory ofeven if needs to account for consequent ‘entailing’even ifs and in particular those of theif-focused variety. This is where the theory ofeven if ceases to be neutral between conditional theories. I have argued thatif-focusedeven ifs,especially if andonly if can only be accounted for through the suppositional theory ofif. Furthermore, a particular interpretation of this theory — the conditional assertion theory — is needed to account foronly if and a type of metalinguistic negation ofQ if P. We therefore (...)
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  36.  10
    Joyce Appleby, Elizabeth Covington, David Hoyt, Michael Latham, Allison Sneider, David Armitage, Armand Himy, Quentin Skinner, Allison Assiter & Stephen Barker (1998). Adler, Mortimer. The Common Sense of Politics. New York: Fordham Uni-Versity Press, 1996. Xxv and 263 Pp. Cloth $29.95; Paper $18.00.–. The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense. New York: Fordham University Press, 1996. Xv and 361 Pp. Cloth $29.95; Paper $18.00.–. How to Think About War and Peace. New York: Fordham University. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 31:117-126.
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  37. Stephen Barker (2004). Analysing Chancy Causation Without Appeal to Chance-Raising. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge
     
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  38.  36
    Stephen F. Barker (1982). Intensionality and Intentionality. Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be (...)
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  39.  4
    Stephen Francis Barker (2006). Lewis on Implication. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):10-16.
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  40.  8
    Stephen Francis Barker (1957). Induction and Hypothesis. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
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  41.  16
    Stephen Barker (1999). The Problematics of Techno-Prescience. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (3):101-110.
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  42.  49
    Stephen Francis Barker (2006). Lewis on Implication. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):10-16.
  43.  7
    Stephen Barker (2003). Comments: The Experiential Thesis. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (Supplement):57-61.
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  44.  35
    Stephen Barker (2009). Threshold (Pro-)Positions: Touch, Techné, Technics. Derrida Today 2 (1):44-65.
    Touching on Nancy and Derrida offers a glimpse not only into the thesis both of Jean-Luc Nancy's critique of touch and of Derrida's Le Toucher, but also into the threshold of a technology of (the) sense to come. This glimpse is an interrogation, and one that is both historic and historical, in the sense that Derrida, in addressing Jean-Luc Nancy's work, has presented us with an encyclopedic history of touch in the philosophic tradition from Aristotle to Nancy, one in which (...)
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  45. Stephen Francis Barker (1974). The Elements of Logic. New York,Mcgraw-Hill.
  46.  20
    Stephen F. Barker (1999). James' “The Will To Believe”. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:69-76.
    In “The Will to Believe,” William James affirms that we have some control over what we believe and asks how this control should be exercised. He rejects the evidentialists’ view that we ought to believe only when intellectual grounds make it quite sure that the belief is true. For him, “options” are choices among contrary beliefs. Some options are “living,” “forced,” and “momentous.” James’ thesis concerns belief-options that have these three features and where proof as to the truth is unavailable. (...)
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  47.  20
    Stephen J. Barker (1995). Towards a Pragmatic Theory of 'If'. Philosophical Studies 79 (2):185 - 211.
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  48.  22
    Stephen Barker (1983). Hume on the Logic of Design. Hume Studies 9 (1):1-18.
  49.  23
    Stephen F. Barker (1992). What is a Profession? Professional Ethics, a Multidisciplinary Journal 1 (1-2):73-99.
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  50. Stephen Francis Barker & Tom L. Beauchamp (eds.) (1976). Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations. University City Science Center.
     
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