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Profile: Stephen Darwall (Yale University)
  1. Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
    The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...
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  2. Stephen L. Darwall (1983). Impartial Reason. Cornell University Press.
  3.  42
    Stephen L. Darwall (2002). Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton University Press.
  4. Stephen L. Darwall (1977). Two Kinds of Respect. Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
    S. 39: "My project in this paper is to develop the initial distinction which I have drawn between recognition and appraisal respect into a more detailed and specific account of each. These accounts will not merely be of intrinsic interest. Ultimately I will use them to illuminate the puzzles with which this paper began and to understand the idea of self-respect." 42 " Thus, insofar as respect within such a pursuit will depend on an appraisal of the participant from the (...)
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  5.  58
    Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) (1997). Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford University Press.
    What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, on core metaethical issues. Reinvigorated (...)
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  6. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton (1992). Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends. Philosophical Review 101 (1):115-189.
  7. Stephen Darwall (2010). Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second‐Personal. Ethics 120 (2):257-278.
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  8. Stephen Darwall (1998). Empathy, Sympathy, Care. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):261–282.
    In what follows, I wish to discuss empathy and sympathy’s relevance to ethics, taking recent findings into account. In particular, I want to consider sympathy’s relation to the idea of a person’s good or well-being. It is obvious and uncontroversial that sympathetic concern for a person involves some concern for her good and some desire to promote it. What I want to suggest is that the concept of a person’s good or well-being is one we have because we are capable (...)
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  9. Stephen Darwall (2013). Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I. OUP Oxford.
    Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy.
     
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  10. Brendan Dill & Stephen Darwall (2014). Moral Psychology as Accountability. In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford University Press 40-83.
    Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we argue that the implicit aim of the central (...)
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  11. Stephen Darwall (2010). Precis: The Second-Person Standpoint. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):216-228.
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  12.  91
    Stephen Darwall (2007). Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson. Ethics 118 (1):52-69.
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  13. Stephen Darwall (2006). The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will. Ethics 116 (2):263-284.
    It is a commonplace that ‘autonomy’ has several different senses in contemporary moral and political discussion. The term’s original meaning was political: a right assumed by states to administer their own affairs. It was not until the nineteenth century that ‘autonomy’ came (in English) to refer also to the conduct of individuals, and even then there were, as now, different meanings.1 Odd as it may seem from our perspective, one that was in play from the beginning was Kant’s notion of (...)
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  14. Stephen Darwall (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, concluding that neither the (...)
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  15.  20
    Stephen Darwall (2012). Bi-Polar Obligation. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:333.
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  16. Stephen Darwall (1998). Philosophical Ethics. Westview Press.
    Why is ethics part of philosophy? Stephen Darwall's Philosophical Ethics introduces students to ethics from a distinctively philosophical perspective, one that weaves together central ethical questions such as "What has value?" and "What are our moral obligations?" with fundamental philosophical issues such as "What is value?" and "What can a moral obligation consist in?"With one eye on contemporary discussions and another on classical texts,Philosophical Ethics shows how Hobbes, Mill, Kant, Aristotle, and Nietzsche all did ethical philosophy how, for example, they (...)
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  17. Stephen Darwall (2003). Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value. Ethics 113 (3):468-489.
    Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it.1 Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and Price, not to mention sentimentalists like (...)
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  18.  80
    Stephen Darwall (2004). Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (2):43 - 59.
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  19. Stephen Darwall (2010). Moral Obligation: Form and Substance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):31-46.
    Beginning from an analysis of moral obligation's form that I defend in The Second-Person Standpoint as what we are answerable for as beings with the necessary capacities to enter into relations of mutual accountability, I argue that this analysis has implications for moral obligation's substance. Given what it is to take responsibility for oneself and hold oneself answerable, I argue, it follows that if there are any moral obligations at all, then there must exist a basic pro tanto obligation not (...)
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  20. Stephen L. Darwall (2001). Because I Want It. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):129-153.
    How can an agent's desire or will give him reasons for acting? Not long ago, this might have seemed a silly question, since it was widely believed that all reasons for acting are based in the agent's desires. The interesting question, it seemed, was not how what an agent wants could give him reasons, but how anything else could. In recent years, however, this earlier orthodoxy has increasingly appeared wrongheaded as a growing number of philosophers have come to stress the (...)
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  21. Stephen Darwall (2009). Authority and Second Personal Reasons for Acting. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press
     
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  22.  76
    Stephen Darwall (2011). Justice and Retaliation. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):315-341.
    Punishment and Reparations are sometimes held to express retaliatory emotions whose object is to strike back against a victimizer. I begin by examining a version of this idea in Mill's writings about natural resentment and the sense of justice in Chapter V of Utilitarianism. Mill's view is that the ?natural? sentiment of resentment or ?vengeance? that is at the heart of the concept of justice is essentially retaliatory, therefore has ?nothing moral in it,? and so must be disciplined or moralized (...)
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  23. Stephen L. Darwall (1992). Internalism and Agency. Philosophical Perspectives 6:155-174.
    have come in for increasing attention and controversy. A good example would be recent debates about moral realism where question of the relation between ethics (or ethical judgment) and the will has come to loom large.' Unfortunately, however, the range of positions labelled internalist in ethical writing is bewilderingly large, and only infrequently are important distinctions kept clear.2 Sometimes writers have in mind the view that sincere assent to a moral (or, more generally, an ethical) judgment concerning what one should (...)
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  24.  61
    Stephen Darwall (2014). Agreement Matters: Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. Philosophical Review 123 (1):79-105.
    Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the “Triple Theory,” which allies Rule Consequentialism with Kantian and Scanlonian Contractualism against Act Consequentialism as a theory of moral right. This critical notice argues that what underlies this change is a view of the deontic concept of moral rightness (...)
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  25.  83
    Stephen Darwall (2010). “But It Would Be Wrong”. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):135-157.
    Is the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but to the reasons for valuing something in which its value consists. Would a warranted attitude account of moral obligation and wrongness, not entail, therefore, that being morally obligatory or wrong gives no reason for action itself? I argue that this is not true. Although warranted attitude theories of (...)
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  26. Stephen Darwall (2011). Authority, Accountability, and Preemption. Jurisprudence 2 (1):103-119.
    Joseph Raz's 'normal justification thesis' is that the normal way of justifying someone's claim to authority over another person is that the latter would comply better with the reasons that apply to him anyway were he to treat the former's directives as authoritative. Darwall argues that this provides 'reasons of the wrong kind' for authority. He turns then to Raz's claim that the fact that treating someone as an authority would enable one to comply better with reasons that apply to (...)
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  27. Stephen Darwall (2006). Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press 282--320.
  28. Stephen Darwall (2008). Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect. In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. Walter De Gruyter
  29. Stephen Darwall (1997). Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction. In Stephen L. Darwall (ed.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford University Press 305--312.
     
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  30.  74
    Stephen Darwall (2007). Moral Obligation and Accountability. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Clarendon Press
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  31.  75
    Stephen L. Darwall (1986). Agent-Centered Restrictions From the Inside Out. Philosophical Studies 50 (3):291 - 319.
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  32. Stephen Darwall, George Sher, Michael Ridge, François Schroeter & Christian List (2006). 10. Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Eds., Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Eds., Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Pp. 435-440). [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (2).
     
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  33.  33
    Stephen Darwall (1997). Self-Interest and Self-Concern. Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):158.
    In what follows I consider whether the idea of a person's interest or good might be better understood through that of care or concern for that person for her sake, rather than conversely, as is ordinarily assumed. Contrary to desire-satisfaction theories of interest, such an account can explain why not everything a person rationally desires is part of her good, since what a person sensibly wants is not necessarily what we would sensibly want, insofar as we care about her. First, (...)
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  34. Stephen Darwall (2013). Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics Ii. OUP Oxford.
    Stephen Darwall expands upon his argument for a second-personal framework for morality, in which morality entails mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He explores the role of the framework in relation to cultural ideas of respect and honor; the development of "modern" moral philosophy; and interpersonal relations.
     
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  35.  1
    Stephen Darwall (1998). The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):992-995.
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  36. Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) (2003). Consequentialism. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Consequentialism collects, for the first time, both the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of this important position. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
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  37. Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) (2003). Contractarianism, Contractualism. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Contractualism/Contractarianism collects, for the first time, both major classical sources and central contemporary discussions of these important approaches to philosophical ethics. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
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  38.  61
    Stephen Darwall (1999). Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (2):139–164.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http: //www.jstor.org/about/terms. html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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  39.  34
    Stephen Darwall (2006). Reply to Feldman, Hurka, and Rosati. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 130 (3):637 - 658.
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  40.  71
    Stephen Darwall (2011). Being With. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):4–24.
    What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to mutual relating. This means, I argue, that being with is a second-personal phenomenon in the sense I discuss in The Second-Person Standpoint. People who are with each other are in (...)
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  41.  41
    Stephen Darwall (2012). Grotius at the Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94 (3):296-325.
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  42.  7
    Stephen Darwall (2013). Morality and Principle. In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press 168.
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  43. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton (eds.) (1996). Moral Discourse and Practice. Oxford University Press Usa.
    What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, on core metaethical issues. Naturalist (...)
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  44.  55
    Stephen Darwall (2000). Normativity and Projection in Hobbes's Leviathan. Philosophical Review 109 (3):313-347.
  45.  54
    Stephen Darwall (2009). The Second-Person Standpoint An Interview with Stephen Darwall. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1):118-138.
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  46. Stephen Darwall (1985). Kantian Practical Reason Defended. Ethics 96 (1):89-99.
    There are two ways in which philosophical controversialists can approach a classical opponent of their views. They can attempt to refute him, or they can try to show that, while generally assumed to be an opponent, the philosopher really was not, at least when he was thinking clearly. Of these two strategies, the latter, if it can be pulled off, is dialectically..
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  47.  19
    Stephen L. Darwall (1988). Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press 407--430.
  48.  33
    Stephen L. Darwall (1995). The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought", 1640-1740. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major work in the history of ethics, and provides the first study of early modern British philosophy in several decades. Professor Darwall discerns two distinct traditions feeding into the moral philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the one hand, there is the empirical, naturalist tradition, comprising Hobbes, Locke, Cumberland, Hutcheson, and Hume, which argues that obligation is the practical force that empirical discoveries acquire in the process of deliberation. On the other hand, there is (...)
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  49.  89
    Stephen Darwall (2005). Virtue Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):589 – 597.
  50. Stephen L. Darwall (1990). Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals. Noûs 24 (2):257-267.
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