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Profile: Stephen Hetherington (University of New South Wales)
  1. Stephen Hetherington (forthcoming). "Scepticism and Perceptual Justification" Edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  2. Stephen Hetherington (2014). Not an Article. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):213-214.
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  3. Stephen Hetherington (2014). Transient Global Amnesia and Kantian Perception. Think 13 (38):69-72.
    Kant's monumental Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) begins with his account of perception. Look around you. An experience is the result. You seem to see a chair and a person, say even perhaps of its content – are coming to you from the world, according to Kant. What else is involved?
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  4. Stephen Hetherington (2013). Concessive Knowledge-Attributions: Fallibilism and Gradualism. Synthese 190 (14):2835-2851.
    Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism.
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  5. Stephen Hetherington (2013). Knowledge Can Be Lucky. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 164.
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  6. Stephen Hetherington (ed.) (2013). Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Guided Anthology. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  7. Stephen Hetherington (2013). Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Actions. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):18-39.
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  8. Stephen Hetherington (2013). Where is the Harm in Dying Prematurely? An Epicurean Answer. Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):79-97.
    Philosophers have said less than is needed about the nature of premature death, and about the badness or otherwise of that death for the one who dies. In this paper, premature death’s nature is clarified in Epicurean terms. And an accompanying argument denies that we need to think of such a death as bad in itself for the one who dies. Premature death’s nature is conceived of as a death that arrives before ataraxia does. (Ataraxia’s nature is also clarified. It (...)
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  9. Claudio Almeida & Stephen Hetherington (2012). Guest Editorial. Synthese 188 (2):143-143.
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  10. Stephen Hetherington (2012). Libraries and Fallible Knowledge. Think 11 (31):65-72.
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  11. Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Extended Knower. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):207 - 218.
    Might there be extended cognition and thereby extended minds? Rightly, that possibility is being investigated at present by philosophers of mind. Should epistemologists share that spirit, by inquiring into the possibility of extended knowing and thereby of extended knowers? Indeed so, I argue. The key to this shift of emphasis will be an epistemologically improved understanding of the implications of epistemic externalism.
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  12. Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Gettier-Illusion: Gettier-Partialism and Infallibilism. Synthese 188 (2):217-230.
    Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge.
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  13. Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier's Challenge: A Case Study. Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
    Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s form of (...)
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  14. Stephen Hetherington & Mark Colyvan (2012). Alan Saunders (1954–2012). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):823-824.
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  15. Stephen Hetherington & Karyn Lai (2012). Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian Philosophy. Philosophy 87 (03):375-393.
    For a while now, there has been much conceptual discussion about the respective natures of knowledge-that and knowledge-how, along with the intellectualist idea that knowledge-how is really a kind of knowledge-that. Gilbert Ryle put in place most of the terms that have so far been distinctive of that debate, when he argued for knowledge-how's conceptual distinctness from knowledge-that. But maybe those terms should be supplemented, expanding the debate. In that spirit, the conceptual option of practicalism has recently entered the fray. (...)
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  16. Stephen Hetherington (2011). Abnormality and Gettier Situations: An Explanatory Proposal. Ratio 24 (2):176-191.
    Analytic epistemologists reach regularly for favoured ‘intuitions’. And the anti-luck intuition (as Duncan Pritchard calls it) is possibly one of the best-entrenched epistemological intuitions at present, seemingly guiding standard reactions to Gettier situations. But why is that intuition true (if it is)? This paper argues that the anti-luck intuition (like the ability intuition) rests upon something even more deeply explanatory – the normality intuition. And to recognise this is to understand better what most epistemologists want from a concept of knowledge. (...)
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  17. Stephen Hetherington (2011). Knowledge and Knowing: Ability and Manifestation. In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter. 1.
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  18. Stephen Hetherington (2011). The Cartesian Dreaming Argument for External-World Skepticism. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
  19. Stephen Cade Hetherington (2011). How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. John Wiley & Sons.
    This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a ...
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  20. Stephen Hetherington (2010). Elusive Epistemological Justification. Synthese 174 (3):315 - 330.
    What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.
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  21. Stephen Hetherington (2010). Free Will as a Sceptical Threat to Knowing. Principia 3 (1):139-154.
    Sceptics standardly argue that a person lacks knowledge due to an inability to know that some dire possibility is not being actualised in her believing that p. I argue that the usual sceptical Inventory of such possibilities should include one' s possibly having had some freedom in forming one's belief that p. A sceptic should conclude that wherever there might have been some such freedom, there is no knowledge that p. (This is not to say that sceptics would be correct (...)
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  22. Stephen Hetherington (2010). Shattering a Cartesian Sceptical Dream. Principia 8 (1):103-117.
    Scepticism about external world knowledge is frequently claimed to emerge from Descartes’s dreaming argument. That argument supposedly challenges one to have some further knowledge — the knowledge that one is not dreaming that p — if one is to have even one given piece of external world knowledge that p. The possession of that further knowledge can seem espe-cially important when the dreaming possibility is genuinely Cartesian (with one’s dreaming that p being incompatible with the truth of one’s accompany-ing belief (...)
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  23. Stephen Hetherington (2009). Ginet on A Priori Knowledge: Skills and Grades. Veritas 54 (2).
    2. Ginet envisages a person’s fully understanding ‘what the sentence p says’ – which is the person’s fully understanding ‘what is said by one who utters p in normal circumstances in order to assert that p’ (p. 3). The understanding involved is direcError: Illegal entry in bfchar block in ToUnicode CMapted at meaning. It is one’s ‘understanding the parts and the structure of the sentence’ (ibid.). In the next section, I say more about the details of such understanding. First, though, (...)
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  24. Stephen Hetherington (2009). Review of Nicholas Rescher, Ideas in Process: A Study on the Development of Philosophical Concepts. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (8).
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  25. Stephen Hetherington (2009). Sceptical Possibilities? No Worries. Synthese 168 (1):97 - 118.
    This paper undermines a paradigmatic form of sceptical reasoning. It does this by describing, and then dialectically dissolving, the sceptical-independence presumption, upon which that form of sceptical reasoning relies.
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  26. Stephen Hetherington (2009). The Cogito: Indubitability Without Knowledge? Principia 13 (1):85-92.
    How should we understand both the nature, and the epistemic potential, of Descartes’s Cogito? Peter Slezak’s interpretation of the Cogito’s nature sees it strictly as a selfreferential kind of denial: Descartes cannot doubt that he is doubting. And what epistemic implications flow from this interpretation of the Cogito? We find that there is a consequent lack of knowledge being described by Descartes: on Cartesian grounds, indubitability is incompatible with knowing. Even as the Cogito halts doubt, therefore, it fails to be (...)
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  27. Stephen Hetherington (2009). Yes, but How Do You Know?: Introducing Philosophy Through Sceptical Ideas. Broadview Press.
    Yes, But How Do You Know? is an invitation to think philosophically through the use of sceptical ideas. Hetherington challenges our complacency and asks us to reconsider what we think we know. How much can we discover about our surroundings? What sort of beings are we? Can we trust our own reasoning? Is science all it is cracked up to be? Can we acquire knowledge of God? Are even the contents of our own minds transparent? In inviting, lucid prose, Hetherington (...)
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  28. Stephen Hetherington (2008). Knowing-That, Knowing-How, and Knowing Philosophically. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):307-324.
    This paper outlines how we may understand knowing-that as a kind of knowing-how-to, and thereby as an ability. (Contrast this form of analysis with the more commonly attempted reduction, of knowing-how-to to knowing-that.) The sort of ability in question has much potential complexity. In general, questioning can, but need not, be part of this complexity. However, questioning is always an element in the complexity that is philosophical knowing. The paper comments on the nature of this particular form of knowing.
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  29. Stephen Hetherington (2008). Not Actually Hume's Problem: On Induction and Knowing-How. Philosophy 83 (4):459-481.
    Philosophers talk routinely of 'Hume's problem of induction'. But the usual accompanying exegesis is mistaken in a way that has led epistemologists to conceive of 'Hume's problem' in needlessly narrow terms. They have overlooked a way of articulating the conceptual problem, along with a potential way of solving it. Indeed, they have overlooked Hume's own way. In explaining this, I will supplement Hume's insights by adapting Ryle's thinking on knowledge-how and knowledge-that. We will also see why Hume's 'sceptical solution' was (...)
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  30. Stephen Hetherington (2008). Review of Keith Hossack, The Metaphysics of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
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  31. Stephen Hetherington (2007). Is This a World Where Knowledge has to Include Justification? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):41–69.
    If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism-the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in whichknowledge has to be robust. Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology’s supposed conceptual (...)
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  32. Stephen Hetherington (2007). Review of Mitchell Green, John N. Williams (Eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (8).
  33. Stephen Hetherington (2007). Self-Knowledge: Beginning Philosophy Right Here and Now. Broadview Press.
    Self-Knowledge introduces philosophical ideas about knowledge and the self. The book takes the form of a personal meditation: it is one person's attempt to reflect philosophically upon vital aspects of his existence. It shows how profound philosophy can swiftly emerge from intense private reflection upon the details of one's life and, thus, will help the reader take the first steps toward philosophical self-understanding. Along the way, readers will encounter moments of puzzlement, then clarity, followed by more perplexity and further insights, (...)
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  34. Stephen Hetherington (2006). 5. In , How to Know (That Knowledge-That is Knowledge-How). Oxford University Press. 71-94.
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  35. Stephen Hetherington (ed.) (2006). Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science.
    AcknowledgementsContributors1. Introduction: The art of precise epistemology Stephen HetheringtonPart A. Epistemology as scientific?2.
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  36. Stephen Hetherington (ed.) (2006). How to Know (That Knowledge-That is Knowledge-How). Oxford University Press.
     
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  37. Stephen Hetherington (2006). Introduction: Epistemological Progress. In , Epistemology Futures. Clarendon Press.
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  38. Stephen Hetherington (2006). Knowledge's Boundary Problem. Synthese 150 (1):41 - 56.
    Where is the justificatory boundary between a true belief’s not being knowledge and its being knowledge? Even if we put to one side the Gettier problem, this remains a fundamental epistemological question, concerning as it does the matter of whether we can provide some significant defence of the usual epistemological assumption that a belief is knowledge only if it is well justified. But can that question be answered non-arbitrarily? BonJour believes that it cannot be – and that epistemology should therefore (...)
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  39. Stephen Hetherington (2006). Knowledge That Works: A Tale of Two Conceptual Models. In , Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. 219--240.
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  40. Stephen Hetherington (2006). Review of Nicholas Rescher, Philosophical Dialectics: An Essay on Metaphilosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (7).
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  41. Stephen Hetherington (2006). Scepticism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice. Philosophia 34 (3):303-310.
    It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what (...)
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  42. Stephen Hetherington (2006). So-Far Incompatibilism and the so-Far Consequence Argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.
    The consequence argument is at the core of contemporary incompatibilism about causal determinism and freedom of action. Yet Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele have shown how, on a Humean conception of laws of nature, the consequence argument is unsound. Nonetheless, this paper describés how, by generalising their main idea, we may restore the essential point and force (whatever that might turn out to be) of the consequence argument. A modified incompatibilist argument — which will be called the so-far consequence argument (...)
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  43. Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.) (2006). Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press.
    How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Contributors: Paul M. Churchland, Catherine Z. Elgin, Richard (...)
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  44. Stephen Hetherington, Fallibilism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory, view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved commonsense views. Some epistemologists have taken fallibilism to imply skepticism, according to which none of those claims or views are ever well justified or knowledge. In fact, though, it is (...)
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  45. Stephen Hetherington, Gettier Problems. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Gettier problems or cases are named in honor of the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who discovered them in 1963. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original article had a dramatic (...)
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  46. Stephen Hetherington (2005). Knowing (How It Is) That P: Degrees and Qualities of Knowledge. Veritas 50 (4).
    Pode o conhecimento de uma dada verdade admitir gradações? Sim, de fato, segundo o gradualismo deste artigo. O artigo introduz o conceito do saber-como que p – isto é, o conceito de saber como é que p. Saber-como que p é claramente gradual – admitindo gradações, dado que se pode saber mais ou menos como é que p. E a vinculação que este artigo faz entre sabercomo que p e saber que p revela que este último tipo de conhecimento também (...)
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  47. Stephen Hetherington (2005). Lucretian Death: Asymmetries and Agency. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3):211 - 219.
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  48. Stephen Hetherington (2005). Photosinthesis: How Deceptive Images Imperil Knowledge. Think 4 (10):99-107.
    An epistemological investigation into photography.
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  49. Stephen Hetherington (2003). Alternate Possibilities and Avoidable Moral Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):229 - 239.
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