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Profile: Stephen Hetherington (University of New South Wales)
  1.  195 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington, Gettier Problems. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Gettier problems or cases are named in honor of the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who discovered them in 1963. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original article had a dramatic (...)
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  2.  140 DLs
    Stephen C. Hetherington (1983). Tooley's Theory of Laws of Nature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):101 - 106.
  3.  139 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2008). Knowing-That, Knowing-How, and Knowing Philosophically. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):307-324.
    This paper outlines how we may understand knowing-that as a kind of knowing-how-to, and thereby as an ability. (Contrast this form of analysis with the more commonly attempted reduction, of knowing-how-to to knowing-that.) The sort of ability in question has much potential complexity. In general, questioning can, but need not, be part of this complexity. However, questioning is always an element in the complexity that is philosophical knowing. The paper comments on the nature of this particular form of knowing.
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  4.  104 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2011). Knowledge and Knowing: Ability and Manifestation. In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter 1.
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  5.  81 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier's Challenge: A Case Study. Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
    Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s form of (...)
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  6.  70 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2010). Elusive Epistemological Justification. Synthese 174 (3):315 - 330.
    What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.
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  7.  69 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (1998). Actually Knowing. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):453-469.
  8.  64 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2011). Abnormality and Gettier Situations: An Explanatory Proposal. Ratio 24 (2):176-191.
    Analytic epistemologists reach regularly for favoured ‘intuitions’. And the anti-luck intuition (as Duncan Pritchard calls it) is possibly one of the best-entrenched epistemological intuitions at present, seemingly guiding standard reactions to Gettier situations. But why is that intuition true (if it is)? This paper argues that the anti-luck intuition (like the ability intuition) rests upon something even more deeply explanatory – the normality intuition. And to recognise this is to understand better what most epistemologists want from a concept of knowledge. (...)
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  9.  60 DLs
    Stephen Cade Hetherington (1991). On Being Epistemically Internal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):855-871.
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  10.  57 DLs
    Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.) (2006). Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press.
    How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Contributors: Paul M. Churchland, Catherine Z. Elgin, Richard (...)
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  11.  56 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2006). So-Far Incompatibilism and the so-Far Consequence Argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.
    The consequence argument is at the core of contemporary incompatibilism about causal determinism and freedom of action. Yet Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele have shown how, on a Humean conception of laws of nature, the consequence argument is unsound. Nonetheless, this paper describés how, by generalising their main idea, we may restore the essential point and force (whatever that might turn out to be) of the consequence argument. A modified incompatibilist argument — which will be called the so-far consequence argument (...)
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  12.  56 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (1999). Knowing Failably. Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):565-587.
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  13.  55 DLs
    Stephen C. Hetherington (1991). Kripke and McGinn on Wittgensteinian Rule-Following. Philosophia 21 (1-2):89-100.
  14.  54 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington, Fallibilism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory, view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved commonsense views. Some epistemologists have taken fallibilism to imply skepticism, according to which none of those claims or views are ever well justified or knowledge. In fact, though, it is (...)
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  15.  50 DLs
    Stephen Cade Hetherington (2011). How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. John Wiley & Sons.
    This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a ...
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  16.  48 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2001). A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:307-324.
    How can a person avoid being Gettiered? This paper provides the first answer to that question that is both fallibilist and purely internalist. It is an answer that allows the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge to survive Gettier’s attack (albeit as a nonreductionist analysis of knowledge).
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  17.  43 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2001). Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    What is knowledge? How hard is it for a person to have knowledge? Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge confronts contemporary philosophical attempts to answer those classic questions, offering a theory of knowledge that is unique in conceiving of knowledge in a non-absolutist way.
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  18.  38 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Gettier-Illusion: Gettier-Partialism and Infallibilism. Synthese 188 (2):217-230.
    Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge.
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  19.  34 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (ed.) (2006). Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science.
    AcknowledgementsContributors1. Introduction: The art of precise epistemology Stephen HetheringtonPart A. Epistemology as scientific?2.
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  20.  34 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2001). Why There Need Not Be Any Grue Problem About Inductive Inference as Such. Philosophy 76 (1):127-136.
    I argue that Goodman's puzzle of grue at least poses no real challenge about inductive inference. By drawing on Stove's characterisation of Hume's characterisation of inductive inference, we see that the premises in an inductive inference report experienced impressions; and Goodman can be interpreted as posing a real challenge about inductive inference only if we treat an epistemic subject's observations more as logical contents and less as experienced impressions. So, even though the grue puzzle was effective against its stated logicist (...)
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  21.  32 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2006). Knowledge's Boundary Problem. Synthese 150 (1):41 - 56.
    Where is the justificatory boundary between a true belief’s not being knowledge and its being knowledge? Even if we put to one side the Gettier problem, this remains a fundamental epistemological question, concerning as it does the matter of whether we can provide some significant defence of the usual epistemological assumption that a belief is knowledge only if it is well justified. But can that question be answered non-arbitrarily? BonJour believes that it cannot be – and that epistemology should therefore (...)
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  22.  32 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2006). Scepticism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice. Philosophia 34 (3):303-310.
    It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what (...)
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  23.  31 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2013). Concessive Knowledge-Attributions: Fallibilism and Gradualism. Synthese 190 (14):2835-2851.
    Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism.
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  24.  31 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2013). Where is the Harm in Dying Prematurely? An Epicurean Answer. Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):79-97.
    Philosophers have said less than is needed about the nature of premature death, and about the badness or otherwise of that death for the one who dies. In this paper, premature death’s nature is clarified in Epicurean terms. And an accompanying argument denies that we need to think of such a death as bad in itself for the one who dies. Premature death’s nature is conceived of as a death that arrives before ataraxia does. (Ataraxia’s nature is also clarified. It (...)
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  25.  30 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2009). Sceptical Possibilities? No Worries. Synthese 168 (1):97 - 118.
    This paper undermines a paradigmatic form of sceptical reasoning. It does this by describing, and then dialectically dissolving, the sceptical-independence presumption, upon which that form of sceptical reasoning relies.
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  26.  29 DLs
    Stephen Cade Hetherington (1992). Gettier and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):277 – 285.
  27.  29 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Extended Knower. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):207 - 218.
    Might there be extended cognition and thereby extended minds? Rightly, that possibility is being investigated at present by philosophers of mind. Should epistemologists share that spirit, by inquiring into the possibility of extended knowing and thereby of extended knowers? Indeed so, I argue. The key to this shift of emphasis will be an epistemologically improved understanding of the implications of epistemic externalism.
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  28.  28 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2008). Not Actually Hume's Problem: On Induction and Knowing-How. Philosophy 83 (4):459-481.
    Philosophers talk routinely of 'Hume's problem of induction'. But the usual accompanying exegesis is mistaken in a way that has led epistemologists to conceive of 'Hume's problem' in needlessly narrow terms. They have overlooked a way of articulating the conceptual problem, along with a potential way of solving it. Indeed, they have overlooked Hume's own way. In explaining this, I will supplement Hume's insights by adapting Ryle's thinking on knowledge-how and knowledge-that. We will also see why Hume's 'sceptical solution' was (...)
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  29.  24 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (forthcoming). Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy, by Peter Unger. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  30.  23 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2000). Re: Brains in a Vat. Dialectica 54 (4):307–312.
    The hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is one which we believe to be false. Could it possibly be true, however? Metaphysical realists accept that our believing it to be false does not entail its falsity. They also accept that if –as brains in a vat –we were to say or think “We are brains in a vat”, then we would be correct. Ever the claimed foe of the metaphysical realist, though, Hilary Putnam argues that the brains‐in‐a‐vat hypothesis (...)
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  31.  23 DLs
    Stephen Cade Hetherington (1996). Gettieristic Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):83 – 97.
  32.  22 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2002). Epistemic Responsibility. The Monist 85 (3):398-414.
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  33.  21 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2014). Not an Article. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):213-214.
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  34.  20 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2014). Scepticism and Perceptual Justification Edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):817-818.
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  35.  20 DLs
    Stephen Cade Hetherington (1996). Foley's Evidence and His Epistemic Reasons. Analysis 56 (2):122–126.
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  36.  20 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2009). The Cogito: Indubitability Without Knowledge? Principia 13 (1):85-92.
    How should we understand both the nature, and the epistemic potential, of Descartes’s Cogito? Peter Slezak’s interpretation of the Cogito’s nature sees it strictly as a selfreferential kind of denial: Descartes cannot doubt that he is doubting. And what epistemic implications flow from this interpretation of the Cogito? We find that there is a consequent lack of knowledge being described by Descartes: on Cartesian grounds, indubitability is incompatible with knowing. Even as the Cogito halts doubt, therefore, it fails to be (...)
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  37.  19 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2007). Review of Mitchell Green, John N. Williams (Eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (8).
  38.  17 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2013). Knowledge Can Be Lucky. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 164.
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  39.  16 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2002). Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):83 - 102.
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  40.  16 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2015). Some Editorial Optimism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):1-2.
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  41.  16 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington & Karyn Lai (2012). Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian Philosophy. Philosophy 87 (03):375-393.
    For a while now, there has been much conceptual discussion about the respective natures of knowledge-that and knowledge-how, along with the intellectualist idea that knowledge-how is really a kind of knowledge-that. Gilbert Ryle put in place most of the terms that have so far been distinctive of that debate, when he argued for knowledge-how's conceptual distinctness from knowledge-that. But maybe those terms should be supplemented, expanding the debate. In that spirit, the conceptual option of practicalism has recently entered the fray. (...)
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  42.  16 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2009). Ginet on A Priori Knowledge: Skills and Grades. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 54 (2):32-40.
    2. Ginet envisages a person’s fully understanding ‘what the sentence p says’ – which is the person’s fully understanding ‘what is said by one who utters p in normal circumstances in order to assert that p’ (p. 3). The understanding involved is direcError: Illegal entry in bfchar block in ToUnicode CMapted at meaning. It is one’s ‘understanding the parts and the structure of the sentence’ (ibid.). In the next section, I say more about the details of such understanding. First, though, (...)
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  43.  15 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2007). Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):41-69.
    If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism-the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in whichknowledge has to be robust. Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology’s supposed conceptual (...)
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  44.  15 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2011). The Cartesian Dreaming Argument for External-World Skepticism. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
  45.  15 DLs
    Stephen Cade Hetherington (1997). Scepticism on Scepticism. Philosophia 25 (1-4):323-330.
  46.  14 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2010). Shattering a Cartesian Sceptical Dream. Principia 8 (1):103-117.
    Scepticism about external world knowledge is frequently claimed to emerge from Descartes’s dreaming argument. That argument supposedly challenges one to have some further knowledge — the knowledge that one is not dreaming that p — if one is to have even one given piece of external world knowledge that p. The possession of that further knowledge can seem espe-cially important when the dreaming possibility is genuinely Cartesian (with one’s dreaming that p being incompatible with the truth of one’s accompany-ing belief (...)
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  47.  12 DLs
    Stephen Cade Hetherington (1996). Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology. Westview Press.
    Despite the problems students often have with the theory of knowledge, it remains, necessarily, at the core of the philosophical enterprise. As experienced teachers know, teaching epistemology requires a text that is not only clear and accessible, but also capable of successfully motivating the abstract problems that arise.In Knowledge Puzzles, Stephen Hetherington presents an informal survey of epistemology based on the use of puzzles to illuminate problems of knowledge. Each topic is introduced through a puzzle, and readers are invited to (...)
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  48.  12 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2005). Knowing (How It Is) That P: Degrees and Qualities of Knowledge. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):129-152.
    Pode o conhecimento de uma dada verdade admitir gradações? Sim, de fato, segundo o gradualismo deste artigo. O artigo introduz o conceito do saber-como que p – isto é, o conceito de saber como é que p. Saber-como que p é claramente gradual – admitindo gradações, dado que se pode saber mais ou menos como é que p. E a vinculação que este artigo faz entre sabercomo que p e saber que p revela que este último tipo de conhecimento também (...)
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  49.  11 DLs
    Stephen Hetherington (2002). The Grue Possibility as a Sceptical Possibility? Philosophia 29 (1-4):253-260.
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