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  1. Stephen J. Barker, Global Expressivism.
    There is a wide-spread belief amongst theorists of mind and language. This is that in order to understand the relation between language, thought, and reality we need a theory of meaning and content, that is, a normative, formal science of meaning, which is an extension and theoretical deepening of folk ideas about meaning. This book argues that this is false, offering an alternative idea: The form of a theory that illuminates the relation of language, thought, and reality is a theory (...)
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  2. Stephen J. Barker (2010). Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non-Objective Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):183-199.
    I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ‘Vegemite is tasty’ (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context (...)
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  3. Stephen J. Barker (2007). Semantics Without the Distinction Between Sense and Force. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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  4. Stephen J. Barker (2004). Renewing Meaning: A Speech-Act Theoretic Approach. Clarendon Press.
    Stephen Barker presents his first, ambitious book in the philosophy of language, setting out a radical alternative to standard theories of meaning.
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  5. Stephen J. Barker (2002). Troubles with Horgan and Timmons' Nondescriptivist Cognitivism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):235-255.
    Emotivist, or non-descriptivist metaethical theories hold that value-statements do not function by describing special value-facts, but are the mere expressions of naturalistically describable motivational states of (valuing) agents. Non-descriptivism has typically been combined with the claim that value-statements are non-cognitive: they are not the manifestations of genuine belief states. However, all the linguistic, logical and phenomenological evidence indicates that value-statements are cognitive. Non-descriptivism then has a problem. Horgan and Timmons propose to solve it by boldly combining a non-descriptivist thesis about (...)
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  6. Stephen J. Barker (2000). Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature? Analysis 60 (267):268–279.
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  7. Stephen J. Barker (1998). Predetermination and Tense Probabilism. Analysis 58 (4):290–296.
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  8. Stephen J. Barker (1995). Towards a Pragmatic Theory of 'If'. Philosophical Studies 79 (2):185 - 211.
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  9. Stephen J. Barker (1994). Causation, Facts and Coherence. Analysis 54 (3):179 - 182.
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  10. Stephen J. Barker (1994). The Consequent-Entailment Problem Foreven If. Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (3):249 - 260.
    A comprehensive theory ofeven if needs to account for consequent ‘entailing’even ifs and in particular those of theif-focused variety. This is where the theory ofeven if ceases to be neutral between conditional theories. I have argued thatif-focusedeven ifs,especially if andonly if can only be accounted for through the suppositional theory ofif. Furthermore, a particular interpretation of this theory — the conditional assertion theory — is needed to account foronly if and a type of metalinguistic negation ofQ if P. We therefore (...)
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  11. Stephen J. Barker (1993). Conditional Excluded Middle, Conditional Assertion, and 'Only If'. Analysis 53 (4):254 - 261.