7 found
Sort by:
  1. Stephen J. Boulter (2012). Can Evolutionary Biology Do Without Aristotelian Essentialism? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70:83-103.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Stephen J. Boulter (2007). The “Evolutionary Argument” and the Metaphilosophy of Commonsense. Biology and Philosophy 22 (3):369-382.
    Recently in these pages it has been argued that a relatively straightforward version of an old argument based on evolutionary biology and psychology can be employed to support the view that innate ideas are a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge. While sympathetic to the view that the “evolutionary argument” is pregnant with philosophical implications, I show in this paper how it needs to be developed and deployed in order to avoid serious philosophical difficulties and unnecessary complications. I sketch a revised (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Stephen J. Boulter (2004). Metaphysical Realism as a Pre-Condition of Visual Perception. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.
    In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Stephen J. Boulter (2002). Hume on Induction: A Genuine Problem or Theology's Trojan Horse? Philosophy 77 (1):67-86.
    In this paper I offer a straight solution to Hume's problem of induction by defusing the assumptions on which it is based. I argue that Hume's problem only arises if we accept (i) that there is no necessity but logical necessity, or (ii) that it is unreasonable to believe that there is any form of necessity in addition to logical necessity. I show that Hume's arguments in favour of (i) and (ii) are unsound. I then offer a suggestion as to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Stephen J. Boulter (2000). Could Aquinas Reject Semantic Realism? Reply to de Anna. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):515-518.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Stephen J. Boulter (1998). Could Aquinas Accept Semantic Anti-Realism? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):504-513.
  7. Stephen J. Boulter (1997). Putnam's 'Home Coming'. Philosophy 72 (282):595-601.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation