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  1. Stephen Jacobson (2011). Contextualism, Skepticism, and Invariantism. Principia 14 (3):375-391.
    Michael Williams e Keith DeRose defendem suas diferentes versões de contextualismo com base em que o contextualismo fornece uma explicação melhor do uso ordinário de termos epistêmicos que competidores invariantistas. Um objetivo deste trabalho é explicar por que seus argumentos não têm sucesso. Um objetivo adicional é mostrar que a disputa entre contextualistas e invariantistas tal como apresentada por Williams e DeRose é uma interpretação limitada da disputa: há importantes posições contextualistas e invariantistas que estão fora do alcance de seus (...)
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  2. Stephen Jacobson (2001). Contextualism and Global Doubts About the World. Synthese 129 (3):381 - 404.
    Several recent contextualist theorists (e.g. David Lewis, Michael Williams, andKeith DeRose) have proposed contextualizing the skeptic. Their claim is that oneshould view satisfactory answers to global doubts regarding such subjects as theexternal world, other minds, and induction as requirements for justification incertain philosophical contexts, but not in everyday and scientific contexts. Incontrast, the skeptic claims that a satisfactory answer to a global doubt in eachof these areas is a context-invariant requirement for justified belief. In this paper,I consider and reject (...)
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  3. Stephen Jacobson (2000). A Companion to the Philosophers. Philosophical Inquiry 22 (4):105-108.
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  4. Stephen Jacobson (1997). Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms. Synthese 110 (3):343-355.
    In his book, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, John Pollock argues that all externalist theories of justification should be rejected on the grounds that they do not do justice to the action-guiding character of epistemic norms. I reply that Pollocks argument is ineffective — because not all externalisms are intended to involve action-guiding norms, and because Pollock does not give a good reason for thinking that action-guiding norms must be internalist norms. Second, I consider rehabilitating Pollocks argument by restricting his conclusion (...)
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  5. Stephen Jacobson (1992). Alston on Iterative Foundationalism and Cartesian Epistemology. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):133 - 144.
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  6. Stephen Jacobson (1992). 'In Defense of Truth and Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73:335-46.
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  7. Stephen Jacobson (1992). Internalism in Epistemology and the Internalist Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):415 – 424.
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