(Portuguese translation) in Immanuel Kant: Perspectivas Internacionais (Immanuel Kant: International Perspectives), ed. and tr. Amos Nascimento (Piracicaba, Brazil: UNIMEP University Press, forthcoming 2006).
"Amor fati"—"Love your fate!" "Say 'yes' to life and recognize that you are a 'destiny'." "Languagefalsifiesreality.""TranscendyourmereÂly human nature and become superman!" These are just a few of..
       As is appropriate for an introductory text, Douglas Burnham’s book opens with a chapter providing general background information on Kant, a systematic overview of the whole Critical philosophy, a sketch of the basic issues dealt with in the third Critique, and an explanation of the overall structure of Kant’s book. Here and throughout Burnham’s book each section ends with a helpful summary, with diagrams and other convenient “lists†being supplied along the way for (...) added clarity. For the most part, these summaries are reliable. The author’s interpretations, however, occasionally suffer from some rather unfortunate mistakes. For example, when contrasting the categories with the principles (p.14), Burnham cites the principle of non-contradiction as the primary example; yet Kant’s expressed reason for mentioning this “principle†in A150- 3/B189-93 is to contrast it with the principles that function as applications of the categories. Likewise, while Burnham’s catalogue of the four “parts of sensibility†(pp.13-14), composed by grouping imagination (reproductive and productive) together with sensation and pure intuition, makes for an intriguing interpretation, especially as applied to the third Critique, he does not inform his (unknowing) student reader that the position he presents is far from being expressed so unambiguously in Kant’s text.        The main content of Burnham’s book is divided into five chapters that follow a more or less predictable – though sometimes rather idiosyncratic – order. Chapter 1 explains three of the four “moments†of beauty, but does so in a manner that wholly neglects Kant’s own understanding of their architectonic unity. Burnham discusses the second moment (universality) first, the first moment (disinterestedness) second, and the fourth moment (necessity) third! Moreover, he then devotes the entirety of Chapter 2 to a discussion of the third moment (purposiveness).. (shrink)
The following Glossary lists Kant's most important technical terms, toÂgether with a simple definition of each. (The terms 'judicial', 'perspective' and 'standpoint' are the only ones Kant himself does not use as technical terms.) It was originally written as a study aide to help make the intricate web of Kant's termiÂnology comprehensible to students who had little or no faÂmilÂiarÂiÂty with Kant's writings. Where relevant, the opposite term is given in curved brackets at the end of the definition. When a (...) word defined herein (or a slightÂly different form of such a word) is used in the course of defining some other word in this Glossary, its first occurrence in that definition will be in italics. (shrink)
When Nietzsche called Kant the "Chinaman of Königsberg",[1] were his mental capacities already beginning to slip, or was he just looking for laughs? Kant, after all, was German. He was born in the then bustling Prussian port city of Königsberg (now called Kaliningrad), lying on the Baltic Sea, about 75 miles northeast of Gdansk, across the Gulf of Danzig. Königsberg is over 5000 miles from Beijing, and even further from the now bustling..
I am as it were mentally paralyzed even though physically I am reasonably well. I see before me the unpaid bill of my uncompleted philosophy, even while I am aware that philosophy, both as regards its means and its ends, is capable of completion. It is a pain like that of Tantalus though not a hopeless pain. The project on which I am now working concerns the "Transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics." It must be completed, (...) or else a gap will remain in the critical philosophy. Reason will not give up her demands for this .. (shrink)
Kant-s use of the word -object- (Objekt or Gegenstand) is a potential source of much confusion and ambiguity. Sometimes he uses it in a broad sense, either nontechnically to refer to an ordinary - thing- encountered in imÂmediate experience, or technically to refer to anything which stands in some potential, actual or necessary relation to the knowing subject. At other times he uses it in a narrower sense to refer to an object in general as it is viewed at one (...) of several stages in the knowing process. Consequently, its meaning is not always evident when Kant uses it without a qualifying adjective [cf. B20: 76 and G12:778]. The first step to coping with this situation is to recÂognize that he explains the role of the object in his theory of knowledge (i.e., in systemt) primarily by implementing six technical -. (shrink)
In opposition to the common belief that philosophy is a discipline belonging solely in the university, where it can be safely insulated from influencing or being influenced by the way ordinary people live their lives, a movement has arisen over the past decade or so, commonly known as “Philosophical Practice.” Some trace its early organization back to 1992, when several French philosophers and friends casually met one Sunday morning in a Paris café to discuss an issue of mutual concern. A (...) journalist, overhearing them planning a follow-up meeting and mistakenly thinking it would be open to the general public, announced it in the local press, and the first “Café Philo” was born. Soon the popularity of the weekly gatherings that began cropping up in cafés all over Paris and throughout France came to the attention of philosophers elsewhere, who had already been interested in practical ways of luring philosophy out of the Academy and back into the public square (where it began, in pre-Platonic Athens). Contacts were made between counselors who were already using philosophical ideas and methods to assist clients in overcoming personal problems, consultants who had already been hired by big businesses to assist them in thinking philosophically about various corporate problems, and teachers who were already interested in minimizing current social problems by introducing “philosophy for children” into primary and secondary school curricula. Starting in 1995, annual conferences began to be held, where philosophers engaged in these and other non-academic activities could share their ideas and encourage others to regard philosophy as more than just an academic discipline. Soon after attending the Third International Conference on Philosophical Practice, in July of 1997, I began exploring various ways of involving myself in philosophical activities outside the university. At that.. (shrink)
The words "analysis" and "synthesis" are among the most widely used and misused terms in the history of philosophy. They were originally used in geometrical reasoning during the age of Euclid to describe two opposing, but complementary, methods of arguing (roughly equivalent to deduction and induction). Since then philosophers have used them not only in this way, but also to refer to distinctions of various sorts between types of judgment or classes of propositions. To some they are regarded as defining (...) differences of kind, while others regard them as defining differences of degree. Moreover, they have been connected in numerous different ways with other distinctions, such as "a priori vs. a posteriori" or "necessary vs. contingent". Some philosophers have become so frustrated at the ambiguity attached to the various uses of the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" that they have given up all hope of assigning a coherent meaning to this distinction. (shrink)
When I was a teenager growing up in the U.S.A., there was a popular little book entitled How To Be A Christian Without Being Religious . It defined Christianity in terms of a living relationship of faith, arguing that Christians need not adopt any specific thoughts or actions that could be called "religious". Although the book deeply influenced me at the time, I have since come to see that it has some serious flaws. While it is true that Christianity is, (...) or at least ought to be, primarily a living, personal relationship with the God Man, Jesus Christ, this does not negate the importance of "being religious", but rather heightens its value and significance. (shrink)
In a recent study of 1 Corinthians 12:7 11, the Hong Kong Monthly Meeting explored how Quakers might interpret Paul’s presentation of nine “spiritual gifts” (or “manifestations” phanerosis in Greek] of God’s spirit). The nine gifts can be neatly grouped into three categories, using Matthew 7:7 (“Ask, and it shall be given to you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you”) as a basis: the three “vocal” gifts (the spirit’s manifestation in response to our (...) asking) are tongues, interpretation, and prophecy; the three “visual” gifts (the spirit’s manifestation in response to our seeking) are knowledge, wisdom, and discernment; and the three “victorious” gifts (the spirit’s manifestation in response to our knocking) are faith, miracles, and healing. In a series of three post Meeting discussions, we examined how Quakers might recover some of the meaningfulness of these classical distinctions, which have often been merely cast aside as a result of the overly literal way they are often interpreted in some Christian denominations. During the Meeting for Worship prior to the first discussion, one participant read the whole of Acts 2 as a voice ministry. During the discussion, we came to realize that this chapter, where the gift of speaking in tongues is first mentioned in the Bible, is a profound statement of our need to express the language of love . This is where the church begins. Speaking in tongues has the effect of universalizing God’s Word by opening it up to all cultures and peoples. The gift breaks through the boundaries of human language, making “that of God in each of us” a living reality. Sadly, some Christians use this gift as a divisive tool to isolate and alienate one “special” group of believers (those who “know how to speak in tongues”) from all others. To do this is to miss the point. It is no accident that Peter’s sermon in Acts 2 reminds us that “whoever calls upon the name of the Lord shall be saved” (verse 21): asking is the doorway to spiritual understanding. Asking for guidance from God is often difficult because of our pride, and so the gift of a language we do not own or even understand can have the beneficial effect of humbling us.. (shrink)
Bloom's now famous manifesto for the salvation of American academia ("Back to the classics!") is worthy of serious consideration. His appraisal of current trends, such as the tendency to move away from theoretical traditions and towards practical or technical degrees, is often penetrating. (A good example is his discussion of the MBA degree: the degree itself is unobjectionable; but the value modern society places on it is a reflection of the "values" of modern society -values which have a destructive side (...) to them.). (shrink)
A purely rational belief is ... the signpost or compass by which the speculative thinker can orient himself in his rational excursions in the field of supersensuous objects. But to the man of ordinary but (morally) sound reason, it can show the way for both the theoretical and the practical standpoint, in a manner entirely suitable to the end to which he is destined. This rational belief must also be made the basis of every other belief—indeed of every revelation. [Kt20:142].
Then some Pharisees and scribes came to Jesus from Jerusalem, saying, "Why do your disciples transgress the tradition of the elders?" .... And he answered and said to them, "And why do you yourselves transgress the commandment of God for the sake of your tradition?" [Matthew 15:1 3].
Such a bold statement is likely to surprise some readers. A typical response might be: "I didn't know Kant had a philosophy of prayer!" Those who are familiar with Kant's writings on religion are more likely to respond by assuming the content of what follows will be entirely negative. For on the rare occasions when commentators refer to Kant's views on prayer, they tend to depict his position as one that aims to render prayer superfluous to the practice of "true (...) religion".[2] Webb, for instance, claims Kant condemned "a supposed personal intercourse with God in prayer" as "a harmful and demoralizing self-illusion".[3] There is undoubtedly some truth to this conventional portrayal of Kant's position: as we shall see, it is not difficult to find pas sages where Kant comes down hard on those for whom prayer is a means of manipulating God and/or avoiding personal responsibility. But is there another side to prayer that Kant regards as more palatable, if not necessary to the practice of true religion? (shrink)
There is a common assumption among philosophers, shared even by many Kant scholars, that Kant had a naive faith in the absolute validity of Euclidean geometry, Aristotelian logic, and Newtonian physics, and that his primary goal in the Critique of Pure Reason was to provide a rational foundation upon which these classical scientific theories could be based. This, it might be thought, is the essence of his attempt to solve the problem which, as he says in a footnote to the (...) second edition Preface, "still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general" -namely, "that the existence of things outside us...must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to.. (shrink)
What does it mean to have a "Christian Higher Education"? Does it mean "getting a degree from a college which calls itself 'Christian'"? I think not. For many graduates of so called "Christian colleges" come away with an education which, in many respects, is less authentically Christian than the education they would get at some secular institutions!
The October 1987 issue of CONVIVIUM (No. 25, pp. 48 54) contains an article by R.T. Allen entitled "Polanyi and Truth" (hereafter "PT"), in which the author claims to "take up the challenge posed by Mr. S. Palmquist's 'A Kantian Critique of Polanyi's "Post Critical Philosophy"' (CONVIVIUM No. 24, March 1987 [pp. 1 11])." In that article (hereafter "KCP") I intended to "use Kant's philosophy as a sounding board to help pinpoint some unfortunate misunderstandings contained in PK" ("KCP" 2). I (...) presupposed, for the purpose of that rather modest task, an interpretation of Kant's philosophy which I had developed in full elsewhere. In deference to any readers who questioned or failed to understand this interpretation as summarized in "KCP", I referred in the footnotes to seven of the articles I have written in its defense (see "KCP" 10 11). (shrink)
The surprising comment Wittgenstein makes at the end of his Tractatus suggests that, even though the analysis of words is the proper method of doing philosophy, the ultimate aim may be to experience silence. Whereas Wittgenstein never explains what he meant by his cryptic conclusion, Kant provides numerous clues as to how the same position can be understood in a more complete and systematic way. A clear distinction between the meaning of “silence,” “noise” and “sound” provides a helpful way of (...) understanding how philosophers can devote so much effort to analyzing words even though their quest is ultimately fulfilled only in silence. (shrink)
This question is relevant not only to students working towards a degree in religious studies, but to every thinking human being. For a person’s conception of how religion ought to be studied will determine to a large extent that person’s view of the value (or lack of value) of being religious, whether or not that person actually studies religion in depth. I say “to a large extent” because this is only one of two key factors which determine a person’s religious (...) disposition. The other important factor is what a person actually finds as a result of engaging in a religious quest. (shrink)
How important is the first sentence of an article or book? We all know it is very important, at least when it comes to the level of interest a piece of writing will generate in the reader. A dull, lifeless first paragraph sets a boring tone for the whole piece—a tone that is difficult to change later on, no matter how interesting the topic may be. But why should the first sentence or paragraph be any more significant than the others? (...) Is there anything about what comes first in life that makes it somehow more meaningful—or perhaps, meaningful in a different way—than other , subsequent events? This, in its broadest sense, is the question of initiation. (shrink)
Kant's Critical philosophy is notorious for its terminological ambiguity and apparent inconsistency. The interpretive confusion that often results is at least a contributing factor to the conclusion of many commentators, such as Strawson, that large chunks of Kant's System (e.g., his 'transcendental idealism') are 'unintelligible' and 'incoherent'. [1] Yet I believe, with Kant [Kt1: Axxi], that if his works are approached with 'the patience and impartiality of a judge' (and perhaps even with 'the benevolent assistance of a fellow worker '), (...) rather than with a set of analytical tools with which to dissect his every sentence, then almost all of his theories can be understood in surprisingly simple and consistent terms. Accordingly, I shall make a further step in this chapter towards the substantiation of this supposition by interpreting and interrelating some of the fundamental epistemological distinctions which serve to structure all three Critiques. (shrink)
an earlier article [2] in which I argued that the basic principles of Kant's Critical philosophy and of Kant's own application of it to religion and theology are thoroughly consistent with a Christian way of thinking, acting and being. Perovich begins his reply with a fairly accurate summary of my "perspectival" method of interpreting Kant (pp.95 96). Unfortunately, when he describes my proposal as to how a perspectival interpretation of Kant can show the Christian philosopher a whole new way of (...) responding to the Critical philosophy (pp.96 99), Perovich fails to portray my position quite so astutely; as a result, he is easily able to unveil problems which appear to be "fatal" (p.99) to my interpretation, supposedly rendering it "demonstrably wrong as an interpretation of Kant's views" (p.96). In this rejoinder I shall respond to such accusations by clarifying this aspect of my perspectival interpretation; in so doing, I will argue that the solution Perovich himself suggests as a "revision" of Kant (pp.99f) is in fact Kant's own position. (shrink)
Few commentators (if any) would question Schrader's poignant observation that 'the doctrine of the thing in itself presents the single greatest stumbling block in the Kantian philosophy' [S5:49]. Understanding what Kant meant by the doctrine i.e., the role it plays both in his overall System and in his transcendental idealism can help prevent it from being discarded 'as a perversity' [49], inasmuch as it can be interpreted in such a way that it makes quite good sense [see VI.2]. Yet even (...) the most coherent interpretation could not prevent the philosopher who demands knowledge from 'stumbling' over it; for, according to Kant, the thing in itself is by definition unknowable. In V.3 we saw, however, that there is one alternative to faith as the ultimate justification for its employment which, if successful, would satisfy even the most persistent skeptic: viz., to justify the thing in itself by constructing a valid transcendental argument for the necessity of its existence. Since any appeal to faith would thereby be rendered superfluous, we must now examine more carefully the possibility of realizing this goal. For, although Kant himself did not believe he required such a transcendental argument, it may be possible to reconstruct his System on the basis of a slightly different presupposition, such as that the thing in itself can, in fact, be proved to exist and to have certain knowable characteristics. Hence, in this Appendix I shall analyze the logical consistency of an affirmative answer to the metacritical question: Is the thing in itself knowable? Our answer to this question will inevitably determine to a large extent how we should approach the task of interpreting the elements of Kant's Critical philosophy (as in Part Three), so it is important to deal with it seriously. (shrink)
1. The Problem of Transcendental Theology Kant's transcendental philosophy begins with an attempt to solve the theoretical problem of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. In solving this epistemological problem Kant demonstrates how transcendental knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the synthetic a priori conditions for the possibility of experience) is possible only when its application is confined to the realm of empirical knowledge (i.e., to experience). He argues that space, time, and the twelve categories form the transcendental boundary line between (...) what we can and cannot know. But this 'solution' itself calls attention to an even more significant problem: what is the status of that which lies outside the boundary of possible empirical knowledge? Kant reveals as early as CPR xxix xxxi1 that this metaphysical problem of how to verify the fundamental human ideas of 'God, freedom, and immortality', upon which he believes all religion and morality depend, constitutes the deepest and most urgent form of the 'transcendental problem'. It should therefore come as no surprise when he devotes the entire Transcendental Dialectic, the largest section of the first Critique, to the task of solving this ubiquitous perplexity of human reason. According to Kant our ideas of God, freedom, and immortality inevitably arise in the human mind as a result of our attempts to unify and systematize our empirical knowledge. In other words, reason naturally seeks for something beyond the limits of empirical knowledge which can supply unity and coherence to the diversity of facts which fall within that boundary. The problem is that the transcendental conditions which enable us to gain knowledge in the empirical world are unable to perform their function with respect to such ideas, because the ideas abstract from all sensible content, whereas the transcendental conditions (space, time and the categories) all require such content. As is well known, Kant devoted considerable effort in the Transcendental Dialectic to the task of pointing out the implications of this transcendental problem for rational psychology (with its proofs of the immortality of the soul), rational cosmology (with its proofs of transcendental freedom), and rational theology (with its proofs of the existence of God).. (shrink)
When composing “Echoes” I set out to express in an artistic form the cognitive dissonance we sometimes feel between the depth of divine Presence in our experience and the often perplexing shallowness of the various “presences” we experience in our daily life. By starting out with a reference to “every time” and “every space”, the first stanza highlights the contrast between these mundane presences and what religious believers might call “God’s Voice”. If the poem has a “primary” message, it is (...) that God is in all these perplexing presences, though not always (or ever?) in a way that enables us to explain or fully comprehend that Presence with neat rational formulae. (shrink)
In the second edition Preface of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant responds to an anonymous review of the first edition. We present the first English translation of this obscure book review. Following our translation, we summarize the reviewer's main points and evaluate the adequacy of Kant's replies to five criticisms, including two replies that Kant provides in footnotes added in the second edition. A key issue is the reviewer's claim that Religion adopts an implied standpoint, described using (...) transcendental terminology. Kant could have avoided much confusion surrounding Religion, had he taken this review more seriously. We therefore respond to three objections that Kant failed to address: how the Willer distinction enables the propensity to evil to be viewed as coexisting with freedom of choice; how moral improvement is possible, even though the propensity to evil is necessary and universal; and how a can be regarded as. (shrink)
Normal 0 false false false EN-US ZH-TW X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";} Although significant differences undoubtedly exist between Daoism and Kant’s philosophy, the two systems also have some noteworthy similarities. After calling attention to a few such parallels and sketching the outlines of Kant’s philosophy of religion, this article focuses on an often-neglected feature of the latter: the four guiding principles of (...) what Kant calls an “invisible church” (universality, purity, freedom, and unchangeableness). Numerous passages from Lao Z i’s classic text, Dao-De-Jing , seem to uphold these same principles, thus suggesting that they can also be interpreted as core features of a Daoist philosophy of life. A crucial difference, h owever, is that members of a Daoist church would focus on contentment, whereas Kantian churches modeled on Christianity (the religious tradition Kant favored) would strive for perfection . T he article therefore concludes by considering what a synthesis might look like, if a Kantian church were to be based on a Daoist interpretation of these four fundamental principles. (shrink)
Although Kant had a high regard for Jesus as a moral teacher, interpreters typically assume that his philosophy disallows belief in Jesus as God. Those who regard Kant as a moral reductionist are especially likely to offer a negative construal of the densely-argued subsection of his 1793 Religion that relates directly to this issue. The recent “affirmative” trend in Kant-scholarship provides the basis for an alternative reading. First, theologians must regard Jesus as human so that belief in Jesus can empower (...) believers to become good. Second, theologians may refer to Jesus as divine by identifying his disposition as exemplifying the “archetype of perfect humanity.” Third, Judeo-Christian history poses an empirical problem that theologians can solve by interpreting Jesus’s divinity according to the schematism of analogy. While this does not constitute a robust (identifiably Christian) doctrine of Jesus’s divinity, it does provide clear guidelines for formulating such a tenet of historical faith. (shrink)
This article extends the metaphorical trial posed by the authors of In Defense of Kant’s Religion by cross-examining them with two challenges. The firstchallenge is for the authors to clarify their claim that they are the first interpreters to present “a holistic and linear interpretation” of Kant’s Religion that portrays it as containing a “transcendental analysis” of religious concepts, given that several of the past interpreters whose works they survey in Part 1 conduct a similar type of analysis. The second (...) is to compare the assumption pervading Part 2 of their book, that Kant conducts his first “experiment” in the first three Pieces and the second experiment in the Fourth Piece of Religion, with the previously defended view that the two experiments are weaved throughout all four Pieces. After observing several dangers this assumption poses for affirmative interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of religion, I conclude by showing how the authors’ problem-driven hermeneutic led them to downplay various portions of Kant’s text. (shrink)
After reviewing the history of the “affirmative” approach to interpreting Kant’s Religion, I offer four responses to the symposium papers in the previous issue of Faith and Philosophy. First, incorrectly identifying Kant’s two “experiments” leads to misunderstandings of his affirmation of Christianity. Second, Kant’s Critical Religion expounds a thoroughgoing interpretation of these experiments, and was not primarily an attempt to confirm the architectonic introduced in Kant’s System of Perspectives. Third, the surprise positions defended by most symposium contributors render the “affirmative” (...) label virtually meaningless. Finally, if Kant is read as constructing perspectival philosophy, not theology, the compatibility of his positions with Christianity stands. (shrink)
Recent perspectival interpretations of Kant suggest a way of relating his epistemology to empirical science that makes it plausible to regard Einstein’stheory of relativity as having a Kantian grounding. This first of two articles exploring this topic focuses on how the foregoing hypothesis accounts for variousresonances between Kant’s philosophy and Einstein’s science. The great attention young Einstein paid to Kant in his early intellectual development demonstrates the plausibility of this hypothesis, while certain features of Einstein’s cultural-political context account for his (...) reluctance to acknowledge Kant’s influence, even though contemporary philosophers who regarded themselves as Kantians urged him to do so. The sequel argues that this Kantian grounding probably had a formative influence not only on Einstein’s discovery of the theory of relativity and his view of the nature of science, but also on his quasi-mystical, religious disposition. (shrink)
Edited by Stephen Palmquist, founder of the Hong Kong Philosophy Café and well known for both his Kant expertise and his devotion to fostering philosophical ...
After reviewing Kant’s well-known criticisms of the traditional proofs of God’s existence and his preferred moral argument, this paper presents a detailedanalysis of a densely-packed theistic argument in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Humanity’s ultimate moral destiny can be fulfilled only through organized religion, for only by participating in a religious community (or “church”) can we overcome the evil in human nature. Yet we cannot conceive how such a community can even be founded without presupposing God’s existence. Viewing (...) God as the internal moral lawgiver, empowering a community of believers, is Kant’s ultimate rationale for theistic belief. (shrink)
Although Kant is often interpreted as an Enlightenment Deist, Kant scholars are increasingly recognizing aspects of his philosophy that are more amenable to theism. If Kant regarded himself as a theist, what kind of theist was he? The theological approach that best fits Kant’s model of God is panentheism, whereby God is viewed as a living being pervading the entire natural world, present ‘in’ every part of nature, yet going beyond the physical world. The purpose of Kant’s restrictions on our (...) knowledge of God is not to cast doubt on God’s existence, but to preserve a mystery in God’s reality so that God is always more than the world as we experience it. The same God who is theoretically unknowable is also an aspect of the moral substratum of the physical world. Kant’s moral Trinity (God as righteous Lawgiver, benevolent Ruler, and just Judge) permeates everything, as the ultimate unifier of reason and nature. This Paper was delivered during the 2007 APA Pacific Mini-Conference on Models of God, together with papers published in Philosophia 35:3–4. (shrink)
In Part One of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant repeatedly refers to a “proof ” that human nature has a necessary and universal “evil propensity,” but he provides only obscure hints at its location. Interpreters have failed to identify such an argument in Part One. After examining relevant passages, summarizing recent attempts to reconstruct the argument, and explaining why these do not meet Kant’s stated needs, I argue that the elusive proof must have atranscendental form (called quasi-transcendental (...) because Kant never uses “transcendental” in Religion). With deceptive simplicity, the section titles of Part One, viewed as components in an architechtonic system of religion, constitute steps in just such a proof. (shrink)
In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant outlines a system of church government that strikes many as an unworkable ideal. The “invisible church” is to be structured according to four basic principles that correspond directly to the categories from the first Critique. Whereas ordinary political systems must involvecoercion, a church is to be a free association of persons governed by non-coercive, internally legislated moral laws. Is this a realistic blueprint for church government? Kant’s metaphor of a “household” as (...) the best way to regard the relationship between the “People of God” provides a much-neglected key to understanding how Kant’s ideal can be implemented. A new and technically more accurate definition of “theocracy”, as a system not of humanly-headed religious despotism but of divinely protected autonomous friendship, clarifies how Kant’s plan is not only realistic but currently implemented in some religious communities today. (shrink)
After sketching the historical development of “emergence” and noting several recent problems relating to “emergent properties”, this essay proposes that properties may be either “emergent” or “mergent” and either “intrinsic” or “extrinsic”. These two distinctions define four basic types of change: stagnation, permanence, flux, and evolution. To illustrate how emergence can operate in a purely logical system, the Geometry of Logic is introduced. This new method of analyzing conceptual systems involves the mapping of logical relations onto geometrical figures, following either (...) an analytic or a synthetic pattern (or both together). Evolution is portrayed as a form of discontinuous change characterized by emergent properties that take on an intrinsic quality with respect to the object(s) or proposition(s) involved. Causal leaps, not continuous development, characterize the evolution of human life in a developing foetus, of a thought out of certain brain states, of a new idea (or insight) out of ordinary thoughts, and of a great person out of a set of historical experiences. The tendency to assume that understanding evolutionary change requires a step-by-step explanation of the historical development that led to the appearance of a certain emergent property is thereby discredited. (shrink)
I begin with a few general suggestions about what it means to be a Christian. I then summarize the new interpretation of Kant as proposing a ‘System of Perspectives,’ which I have set out in greater detail elsewhere. After discussing the important notions of ‘criticism,’ ‘perspective’ and ‘system’ as they operate in Kant’s thought, the bulk of the essay is devoted to an assessment of the theological implications of Kant’s System, I conclude that, contrary to popular opinion, particularly among some (...) Christian theologians, Kant’s intentions were theologically constructive, and moreover, that his System is thoroughly consistent with the Christian perspective. (shrink)
This is a series of two articles examining Kant’s attitude toward mystical experiences and the relation between his interest in these and his interest in constructing a Critical system of metaphysics.“The Critical Dreams” begins by questioning the traditional division between “Critical” (1770 onwards) and “pre-Critical” periods in Kant’s development. After explaining Kant’s Critical method, his 1766 book, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer ... is examined and found to contain all the essential elements of that method. The onlykey element which is missing (...) is his “Copernican” insight. Although Hume may have played an important role in the early 1760’s in awakening Kant to the importance of his Critical method, this Copernican insight seems to have its roots more in Swedenborg than in Hume. Moreover, [DREAMS] itself should no longer be interpreted as evincing a sceptical or empirical stage in Kant’s development, but can now be seen as setting for Kant the problem which his Critical System was intended to solve. [DREAMS] suggests the two strands of this problem: (1) How is mystical experience possible? and (2) How is metaphysics possible? [DREAMS] offers a Critical answer to the first question, but does not fully develop its implications. (shrink)
In a recent article in this journal Phil. Math., II, v.4 (1989), n.2, pp.? ?] J. Fang argues that we must not be fooled by A.J. Ayer (God rest his soul!) and his cohorts into believing that mathematical knowledge has an analytic a priori status. Even computers, he reminds us, take some amount of time to perform their calculations. The simplicity of Kant's infamous example of a mathematical proposition (7+5=12) is "partly to blame" for "mislead[ing] scholars in the direction of (...) neglecting the temporal element"; yet a brief instant of time is required to grasp even this simple truth. If Kant were alive today, "and if he had had a little more mathematical savvy", Fang explains, he could have used the latest example of the largest prime number (391,581 x 2 216,193 - 1) as a better example of the "synthetic a priori" character of mathematics. The reason Fang is so intent upon emphasizing the temporal character of mathematics is that he wishes to avoid "the uncritical mixing of ... a theology and a philosophy of mathematics." For "in the light of the Computer Age today: finitism is king!" Although Kant's aim was explicitly "to study the 'human' ... faculty", Fang claims that even he did not adequatley emphasize "the clearly and concretely distinguishable line of demarcation between the human and divine faculties.". (shrink)
The previous chapter provided not only concrete evidence that Kant's System is based on the principle of perspective [II.2-3], but also a general outline of its perspectival structure [II.4]. The task this sets for the interpreter is to establish in greater detail the extent to which the System actually does unfold according to this pattern. This will be undertaken primarily in Parts Two and Three. But before concluding Part One, it will be helpful to examine in more detail the logical (...) structure of the relationships between the various parts of Kant's System, and how they fit together to compose what we have called Kant's 'Copernican Perspective'. (shrink)
