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  1. Stephen Schiffer, Communication.
    S produces the sounds “It’s snowing” in the presence of A, and A instantaneously comes to know that it’s snowing. S has communicated to, or told, A that it’s snowing, and, as a result of S’s speech act, A came to know that it was snowing. Philosophical interest in communication turns on four inter-related questions. The first is about the logical structure of communication, or, more specifically, about whether communication is a relation that holds among three things just in case (...)
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  2. Stephen Schiffer, Quandary and Intuitionism: Crispin Wright on Vagueness.
    SI is a paradox because it presents four appearances that cannot all be veridical: first, it appears to be valid—after all, it’s both classically and intuitionistically valid; second, its sorites premiss, (2), seems merely to state the obvious fact that in the sorites march from 2¢ to 5,000,000,000¢ there is no precise point that marks the cutoff between not being rich and being rich; third, premiss (1), which asserts that a person with only 2¢ isn’t rich, is surely true; and (...)
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  3. Stephen Schiffer, The Two-Stage Theory of Meaning.
    A central claim of Paul Horwich’s 1998 book Meaning was that meaning properties reduce to acceptance properties, where  a meaning property is a property of the form e means m for x, e being “a word or phrase—whether it be spoken, written, signed, or merely thought (i.e. an item of ‘mentalese’)” (44);  an acceptance property for an expression e relative to a person x is a relation of the form x is disposed to accept an e-containing sentence of (...)
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  4. Stephen Schiffer, What is Vagueness?
    There are two things we must know in order to know what vagueness is. We must know what kinds of things can be vague. Evidently, predicate and sentence types can be vague, but what about tokens of those types? What about statements and other speech acts? What about abstract entities such as properties and propositions? And what about names and the boundaries of physical objects? Then, of course, for each kind of thing that can be vague, we must know in (...)
     
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  5. Stephen R. Schiffer, An Introduction to Content and its Role in Explanation.
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  6. Stephen R. Schiffer, Mental Content and Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.
    David’s epistemic understanding of two-dimensional semantics has these two features. First, although he considers at least two construals of epistemically possible worlds, on one of them they are centered metaphysically possible worlds. Second, David intends epistemic two-dimensional semantics to yield a theory of propositional-attitude content, as well as having application to the semantics of natural language expressions. These two features come together in David’s “The Components of Content,” where he deploys the apparatus of epistemic two-dimensional semantics to provide an account (...)
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  7. Stephen Schiffer (forthcoming). Meaning and Formal Semantics in Generative Grammar. Erkenntnis.
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  8. Stephen Schiffer (2013). Meaning In Speech and In Thought. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):141-159.
    If we think in a lingua mentis, questions about relations between linguistic meaning and propositional-attitude content become questions about relations between meaning in a public language (p-meaning) and meaning in a language of thought (t-meaning). Whether or not the neo-Gricean is correct that p-meaning can be defined in terms of t-meaning and then t-meaning defined in terms of the causal-functional roles of mentalese expressions, it's apt to seem obvious that separate accounts are needed of p-meaning and t-meaning, since p-meaning, unlike (...)
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  9. Stephen Schiffer (2010). Vague Properties. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic. Oxford University Press. 109--130.
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  10. Stephen Schiffer (2009). Evidence= Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism? In Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 183--202.
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  11. J. L. Austin, Anthony Brueckner, Noam Chomsky, Donald Davidson, Keith Donnellan, Michael Dummett, Gareth Evans, Gottlob Frege, H. P. Grice, Paul Horwich, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, John McDowell, Michael McKinsey, Ruth Millikan, Stephen Neale, Hilary Putnam, W. V. Quine, Bertrand Russell, Nathan Salmon, Stephen Schiffer, John Searle, P. F. Strawson, Alfred Tarski & Ludwig Wittgenstein (2007). Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  12. Stephen Schiffer (2007). Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188-195.
    In his important book Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley advances a proposal about knowledge and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions which he calls interest-relative invariantism. A theory of knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘A knows that S’ is invariantist.
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  13. Stephen Schiffer (2007). Propositions, What Are They Good For? In R. Schantz (ed.), Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy: Prospects for Meaning Vol. 3. Walter de Gruyter.
    Although there is a vast literature on whether propositional attitudes are relations to propositions, a crucial question that ought to lie at the heart of this debate is not often enough seriously addressed. This is the question of the contribution propositions make to the ways in which we benefit from having our propositional-attitude concepts, if those concepts are concepts of relations to propositions. Unless propositions can be shown to confer a benefit that no non-propositions could provide, we should probably doubt (...)
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  14. Stephen Schiffer (2006). Facing Facts' Consequences. Mind 114:135-83.
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  15. Stephen Schiffer (2006). Précis of the Things We Mean. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):208–210.
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  16. Stephen Schiffer (2006). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):233–243.
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  17. Stephen Schiffer (2006). 13.1 the Face-Value Theory of Belief Reports. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 267.
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  18. Stephen Schiffer (2006). Two Perspectives on Knowledge of Language. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):275–287.
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  19. Stephen R. Schiffer (2006). A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports. Noûs 40 (2):361-368.
    (1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms.
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  20. Stephen R. Schiffer (2006). Propositional Content. In Ernest LePore & B. Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oup Oxford.
    To a first approximation, _propositional content_ is whatever _that-clauses_ contribute to what is ascribed in utterances of sentences such as Ralph believes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph said _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph hopes _that Tony Curtis is alive_. Ralph desires _that Tony Curtis is alive_.
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  21. The Things We Mean & Stephen Schiffer (2005). The Things We Mean, by Stephen Schiffer. Disputatio.
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  22. Stephen Schiffer (2005). Paradox and the A Priori. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 1--273.
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  23. Stephen Schiffer (2005). Pleonastic Propositions. In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court. 353--81.
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  24. Stephen Schiffer (2005). Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions. Mind 114 (456):1135-1183.
    The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is not the (...)
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  25. Stephen Schiffer (2004). Skepticism and the Vagaries of Justified Belief. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):161-184.
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  26. Stephen Schiffer (2004). The Vagaries of Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 119:161 - 184.
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  27. Stephen Schiffer (2003). Knowledge of Meaning. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press.
     
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  28. Stephen R. Schiffer (2003). Two-Dimensional Semantics and Propositional Attitude Content. In The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press.
  29. Stephen R. Schiffer (2003). The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Schiffer presents a groundbreaking account of meaning and belief, and shows how it can illuminate a range of crucial problems regarding language, mind, knowledge, and ontology. He introduces the new doctrine of 'pleonastic propositions' to explain what the things we mean and believe are. He discusses the relation between semantic and psychological facts, on the one hand, and physical facts, on the other; vagueness and indeterminacy; moral truth; conditionals; and the role of propositional content in information acquisition and explanation. (...)
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  30. Stephen Schiffer (2002). Amazing Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):200-202.
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  31. Stephen Schiffer (2002). A Normative Theory of Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):186–192.
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  32. Stephen Schiffer (2002). Review: A Normative Theory of Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):186 - 192.
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  33. Stephen Schiffer (2002). Moral Realism and Indeterminacy. Philosophical Issues 12 (Realism and Relativism):286-304.
    I’m going to argue for something that some of you will find repugnant but which I can’t help thinking may be true—namely, that there are no determinate moral truths. As will become apparent, my interest in moral discourse as manifested in this paper derives more than a little from my interest in the theory of meaning. Moral discourse has always presented a puzzle for the theory of meaning and philosophical logic, and I take myself to be following the advice of (...)
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  34. Stephen Schiffer (2001). A Little Help From Your Friends? Legal Theory 7 (4):421-431.
    When I was invited to participate in this symposium, I welcomed what I thought would be the opportunity to apply my views about the semantics and logic of vague language to the real-life problems of vagueness legal theorists worry about. I confess to having formed my ambition without a very clear sense of what jurisprudential problems might be illuminated by general theories of vagueness. To be sure, I was able to guess that a symposium on Vagueness and Law must have (...)
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  35. Stephen Schiffer (2000). Horwich on Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):527–536.
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  36. Stephen Schiffer (2000). Propositional Attitudes in Direct-Reference Semantics. In K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier. 14--30.
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  37. Stephen Schiffer (2000). Pleonastic Fregeanism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:1-15.
    Fregeans hold that propositional attitudes are relations to structured propositions whose basic constituents are concepts, or modes of presentation, of the objects and properties our beliefs are about. It is widely thought that there are compelling objections to the Fregean theory of mental and linguistic content. However, as I try to show, these objections are met by the version of Frege’s theory which I call Pleonastic Fregeanism.
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  38. Stephen Schiffer (2000). Review: Horwich on Meaning. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):527 - 536.
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  39. Stephen Schiffer (2000). Replies to García-Carpintero, Horwich, Valdivia, Marqueze, Barnett. Noûs 34:321 - 343.
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  40. Stephen Schiffer (2000). Vagueness and Partial Belief. Noûs 34 (s1):220 - 257.
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  41. Stephen Schiffer (1999). The Epistemic Theory of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):481-503.
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  42. Stephen Schiffer (1998). Two Issues of Vagueness. The Monist 81 (2):193--214.
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  43. Stephen R. Schiffer (1998). Doubts About Implicit Conceptions. Philosophical Issues 9:89-91.
  44. Stephen R. Schiffer (1998). Meanings and Concepts. Lingua E Stile 33 (3):399-411.
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  45. John P. Carriero, Peter J. Markie, Stephen Schiffer, Robert Delahunty, Frederick J. O'Toole, David M. Rosenthal, Fred Feldman, Anthony Kenny, Margaret D. Wilson, John Cottingham & Jonathan Bennett (1997). Descartes's Meditations: Critical Essays. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  46. Stephen Schiffer (1997). Williamson on Our Ignorance in Borderline Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):937 - 943.
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