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Profile: Steven L. Reynolds (Arizona State University)
  1. Steven L. Reynolds (2013). Effective Sceptical Hypotheses. Theoria 79 (3):262-278.
    The familiar Cartesian sceptical arguments all involve an explanation of our experiences. An account of the persuasive power of the sceptical arguments should explain why this is so. This supports a diagnosis of the error in Cartesian sceptical arguments according to which they mislead us into regarding our perceptual beliefs as if they were justified as inferences to the best explanation. I argue that they have instead a perceptual justification that does not involve inference to the best explanation and that (...)
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  2. Steven L. Reynolds (2013). Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
    Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we (...)
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  3. Steven L. Reynolds (2011). Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations. Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.
    Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as S ought to believe that p , or S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p . However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make (...)
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  4. Steven L. Reynolds (2009). Making Up the Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):315-335.
    A recent account of the meaning of 'real' leads to a view of what anti-realism should be that resembles fictionalism, while not being committed to fictionalism as such or being subject to some of the more obvious objections to that view. This account of anti-realism explains how we might 'make up' what is true in areas such as mathematics or ethics, and yet these made-up truths are resistant to alterations, even by our collective decisions. Finally it is argued that the (...)
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  5. Steven L. Reynolds (2008). Why We Should Prefer Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):79-93.
    This paper discusses Plato’s question from the Meno : Why should we prefer knowledge that p over mere true belief that p? I find I just do prefer knowledge, and not for any further benefit that I am aware of in the particular case. But I should have that preference, because given our practice of approving of testimony only if uttered with knowledge, I could fail to prefer knowledge, when other things seem to me to be equal, only by having (...)
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  6. Steven L. Reynolds (2006). Realism and the Meaning of 'Real'. Noûs 40 (3):468–494.
    A new account of the semantic function (character) of ‘real’ and ‘really’ is defended. ‘Really’ as a sentential operator typically indicates that a report of what has been represented elsewhere ends and subsequent discourse is to be taken as making claims about the world. ‘Real’ and ‘really’ as applied to nouns or predicate phrases indicate that something is not being called an F merely because it represents an F. A way of drawing the distinction between realism and anti-realism based on (...)
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  7. Steven L. Reynolds (2003). The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference Objection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):146-154.
  8. Steven L. Reynolds (2002). Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.
    Various considerations are adduced toshow that we require that a testifier know hertestimony. Such a requirement apparentlyimproves testimony. It is argued that the aimof improving testimony explains why we have anduse our concept of knowledge. If we were tointroduce a term of praise for testimony, usingit at first to praise testimony that apparentlyhelped us in our practical projects, it wouldcome to be used as we now use the word``know''.
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  9. Steven L. Reynolds, Ryan Takenaga & Luminosity Argument (2002). James M. Joyce/Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One's Own Actions 69–102. Philosophical Studies 110 (295).
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  10. Steven L. Reynolds (2000). The Argument From Illusion. Noûs 34 (4):604-621.
    In an attempt to revive discussion of the argument from illusion this paper amends the classic version of the argument to avoid Austin's main objection. It then develops and defends a version of the intentional object reply to the argument, arguing that an "unendorsed story" account of reports of dreams and hallucinations avoids commitment to nonexistent objects.
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  11. Steven L. Reynolds (1998). Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):529-558.
    A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking (perhaps not too clearly) that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the (...)
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  12. Steven L. Reynolds (1997). Mental Reality. International Studies in Philosophy 29 (4):144-145.
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  13. Steven L. Reynolds (1994). Proxy Functions and Inscrutability of Reference. Analysis 54 (4):228 - 235.
    Quine's proxy function argument for the inscrutability of reference fails, for proxy function reinterpretations do not in fact have either the same connections to sensory stimuli or the same logical interconnections as do the standard interpretations. This is so in spite of the guarantee of sameness of truth value.
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  14. Steven L. Reynolds (1993). Gareth B. Matthews, Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 13 (5):245-247.
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  15. Steven L. Reynolds (1993). Skeptical Hypotheses and 'Omniscient' Interpreters. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):184 – 195.
  16. Steven L. Reynolds (1992). Descartes and First Person Authority. History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (2):181-189.
    Although Descartes apparently needs first person authority for his anti-skeptical project, his scattered remarks on it appear to be inconsistent. Why did he neglect this issue? According to E M Aurley, Descartes was answering Pyrrhonian skeptics, who could not consistently challenge him on it. This paper argues instead that Descartes assumed that his first person premises were certain qua clear and distinct perceptions, leaving first person authority a side issue.
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  17. Steven L. Reynolds (1992). Self-Recognition. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):182-190.
  18. Steven L. Reynolds (1991). Knowing How to Believe with Justification. Philosophical Studies 64 (3):273-292.
    Non-propositional experiences can help justify beliefs, contrary to recent claims made by Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour. It is argued that a perceptual belief is justified if there are no undermining beliefs and it was arrived at in response to an experience through an adequate exercise of properly learned recognitional skills.
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  19. Steven L. Reynolds (1989). Imagining Oneself to Be Another. Noûs 23 (5):615-633.