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  1. Steven Rappaport (2001). Economic Models as Mini-Theories. Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (2):275-285.
    Economic thinking is largely the construction of models and their use in various cognitive activities. So, understanding the conduct of inquiry in economics requires understanding economic models and their various uses. This paper connects models to a somewhat improved version of Laudan's distinction between mini-theories and global theories. Specifically, the paper indicates that economic models are mini-theories, and says something about the relations between models and the broader networks of beliefs that constitute global theories in economics. But the claim that (...)
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  2. Steven Rappaport (1998). Relativism and Truth: A Reply to Davson-Galle. Philosophia 26 (3-4):519-524.
    In a previous article in _Philosophia, I claim that one can be a metaphysical relativist without being a truth relativist. One premise my argument for this claim relies on is (R2) truth relativism is inconsistent with the deflationary theory of truth. Peter Davson-Galle criticizes my argument for (R2), and also argues directly for the falsity of (R2). I try to show that Davson-Galle's effort to undermine (R2) founders due to his blurring the distinction between a taxonomy or classification system on (...)
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  3. Steven Rappaport (1997). Relativism and Truth: A Rejoinder to Lynch. Philosophia 25 (1-4):423-428.
    In a previous article appearing in _Philosophia, I claimed that metaphysical relativism (the world does not come presorted but rather symbol users impose taxonomies on it) does not entail truth relativism (statements are true only relative to a framework). Michael Lynch has said that the _argument I gave for this claim is defective. My argument uses the premise that truth relativism is inconsistent with the deflationary theory of truth. Lynch argues that this premise is false. However, I show that Lynch's (...)
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  4. Steven Rappaport (1996). Abstraction and Unrealistic Assumptions in Economics∗. Journal of Economic Methodology 3 (2):215-236.
    Economics has been persistently criticized for its heavy reliance on unrealistic assumptions. Some people reply to this criticism by saying that the unrealistic assumptions of economics result from abstraction from unimportant details, and abstraction is necessary for knowledge of a complex real world. So, far from unrealistic assumptions detracting from the epistemic worth of economics, such assumptions are essential for economic knowledge. I call this line of argument ?the Abstractionist Defense?. After clarifying abstraction, unrealistic assumptions and kindred notions, I show (...)
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  5. Steven Rappaport (1996). Inference to the Best Explanation: Is It Really Different From Mill's Methods? Philosophy of Science 63 (1):65-80.
    Peter Lipton has attempted to flesh out a model of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) by clarifying explanation in terms of a causal model. But Lipton's account of explanation makes an adequate explanation depend on a principle which is virtually identical to Mill's Method of Difference. This has the result of collapsing IBE on Lipton's account of it into causal inference as conceived by the Causal-Inference model of induction. According to this model, many of our inductions are inferences from (...)
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  6. Steven Rappaport (1995). Economic Models and Historical Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (4):421-441.
    In investigating their models, economists do not appear to engage much in the activities many philosophers take to be essential to scientific understanding of the world, activities such as testing hypotheses and establishing laws. How, then, can economic models explain anything about the real world? Borrowing from William Dray, an explanation of what something really is, as opposed to an explanation of why something happens, is the subsumption of the explanandum under a suitable concept. One way economic models explain real-world (...)
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  7. Steven Rappaport (1995). Is Economics Empirical Knowledge? Economics and Philosophy 11 (01):137-.
  8. Steven Rappaport (1993). Basic Beliefs and the Regress of Justification: A Reply to Yalcin. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):527-533.
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  9. Steven Rappaport (1993). Discussion: Basic Beliefs and the Regress of Justification: A Reply to Yalcin. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):527-533.
    In a previous paper "A Mistake About Foundationalism" [_The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1992) Vol. 30:111-125] I try to show that the conception of foundationalism used by critics like Sellars and Lehrer distort the foundationalist's idea of a basic belief. Foundationalists view basic beliefs as ones that do not depend on other beliefs. The Sellars-Lehrer conception misrepresents the way the foundationalist's basic beliefs are independent of other beliefs. In a reply to my paper, Yalcin criticizes my line or argument, trying (...)
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  10. Steven Rappaport (1993). Must a Metaphysical Relativist Be a Truth Relativist? Philosophia 22 (1-2):75-85.
  11. Steven Rappaport (1992). A Mistake About Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):111-125.
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  12. Steven Rappaport (1990). Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry, Subroto Roy. London: Routledge, 1989, Ix + 236 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 6 (02):332-.
  13. Steven Rappaport (1989). Bonjour's Objection to Traditional Foundationalism. Dialogue 28 (03):433-.
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  14. Steven Rappaport (1989). The Modal View of Economic Models. Philosophica 44:61-80.
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  15. Steven Rappaport (1988). Arguments, Truth, and Economic Methodology. Economics and Philosophy 4 (01):170-.
  16. Steven Rappaport (1988). Economic Methodology. Economics and Philosophy 4 (01):110-.
  17. Steven Rappaport (1986). The Modal View and Defending Microeconomics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:289 - 297.
    What Daniel Hausman has called 'the simple criticism of economic theory' affirms that neoclassical microeconomic models include false statements, and therefore economists cannot rationally accept such models. Hausman considers, but rejects, the modal view of economic models as a defense of neoclassical theory against the simple criticism. I attempt to show that, on the contrary, the modal view can be used to defend neoclassical micro theory. The modal view distinguishes theoretical from applied economic models. Theoretical models afford true descriptions of (...)
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  18. Steven Rappaport (1974). Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (1):117-120.
  19. Steven Rappaport (1973). Aune's Wittgenstein on the Empiricist Thesis. Philosophical Studies 24 (4):258 - 263.
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