Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, StevenHorst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)
It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the eliminativist, and in (...) this sense some kinds of "belief" (dispositional states, infra-conscious states and the Freudian unconscious) are indeed "theoretical" and hence possible candidates for elimination, while others (consciously occurring thoughts like judgements and perceptual Gestalten) are not theoretical and hence not candidates for elimination. (shrink)
Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.1 The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention from philosophers (...) has been the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). CTM was first articulated by Hilary Putnam (1960, 1961), but finds perhaps its most consistent and enduring advocate in Jerry Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994). It is this theory, and not any broader interpretations of what it would be for the mind to be a computer, that I wish to address in this paper. What I shall argue here is that the notion of symbolic representation employed by CTM is fundamentally unsuited to providing an explanation of the intentionality of mental states (a major goal of CTM), and that this result undercuts a second major goal of CTM, sometimes refered to as the vindication of intentional psychology. This line of argument is related to the discussions of derived intentionality by Searle (1980, 1983, 1984) and Sayre (1986, 1987). But whereas those discussions seem to be concerned with the causal dependence of familiar sorts of symbolic representation upon meaning-bestowing acts, my claim is rather that there is not one but several notions of meaning to be had, and that the notions that are applicable to symbols are conceptually dependent upon the notion that is applicable to mental states in the fashion that Aristotle refered to as paronymy. That is, an analysis of the notions of meaning applicable to symbols reveals that they contain presuppositions about meaningful mental states, much as Aristotle's analysis of the sense of healthy that is applied to foods reveals that it means conducive to having a healthy body, and hence any attempt to explain mental semantics in terms of the semantics of symbols is doomed to circularity and regress. I shall argue, however, that this does not have the consequence that computationalism is bankrupt as a paradigm for cognitive science, as it is possible to reconstruct CTM in a fashion that avoids these difficulties and makes it a viable research framework for psychology, albeit at the cost of losing its claims to explain intentionality and to vindicate intentional psychology. I have argued elsewhere (Horst, 1996) that local special sciences such as psychology do not require vindication in the form of demonstrating their reducibility to more fundamental theories, and hence failure to make good on these philosophical promises need not compromise the broad range of work in empirical cognitive science motivated by the computer paradigm in ways that do not depend on these problematic treatments of symbols. (shrink)
Most contemporary philosophers of mind claim to be in search of a 'naturalistic' theory. However, when we look more closely, we find that there are a number of different and even conflicting ideas of what would count as a 'naturalization' of the mind. This article attempts to show what various naturalistic philosophies of mind have in common, and also how they differ from one another. Additionally, it explores the differences between naturalistic philosophies of mind and naturalisms found in ethics, epistemology, (...) and philosophy of science. Section 1 introduces a distinction between two types of project that have been styled 'naturalistic', which I call philosophical naturalism and empirical naturalism . Sections 2 to 6 canvass different strands of philosophical naturalism concerning the mind, followed by a much briefer discussion of attempts to provide empirical naturalizations of the mind in Section 7 . Section 8 concludes the essay with a consideration of the relations between philosophical and empirical naturalism in philosophy of mind, arguing that at least some types of philosophical naturalism are incompatible with empirical naturalism. (shrink)
This is a relatively breezy version of an exploration of some issues about how to provide a theory of concepts and conceptual semantics. I have also written more conventional versions of some of this material (without the Three Bears motif), though those are set in a broader context.
This paper presents the lineaments of a new account of concepts. The foundations of the account are four ideas taken from recent cognitive science, though most of them have important philosophical precursors. The first is the idea that human conceptuality shares important continuities with psychological faculties of other animals, and indeed that there is a well-distinguished hierarchy of such faculties that extend up and down the phylogenetic scale. While it would very likely be a mistake to look at some conglomeration (...) of these simpler abilities and assert that we have produced a reductive account of human conceptuality, an examination of these will lend insights into essential features of human conceptuality in a non-reductive, non-exhaustive manner. The second idea is that an important function of both human concepts and of their protoconceptual ancestors in the animal kingdom is to make distinctions or discriminations. We shall thus look at the human conceptual apparatus as being, in large part, a discrimination engine. How are these discriminations realized in humans and other beings? Presumably, some discriminative mechanisms are innate, while others are acquired through learning. But how is learning accomplished? The third idea from cognitive science is that adaptive discrimination is realized through neural networks, and that the properties of this realizing system explains familiar features of human thought that seem puzzling when viewed through other lenses, such as the logical analysis of language. The fourth and. (shrink)
Over the past thirty years, it is been common to hear the mind likened to a digital computer. This essay is concerned with a particular philosophical view that holds that the mind literally is a digital computer (in a specific sense of “computer” to be developed), and that thought literally is a kind of computation. This view—which will be called the “Computational Theory of Mind” (CTM)—is thus to be distinguished from other and broader attempts to connect the mind with computation, (...) including (a) various enterprises at modeling features of the mind using computational modeling techniques, and (b) employing some feature or features of production-model computers (such as the stored program concept, or the distinction between hardware and software) merely as a guiding metaphor for understanding some feature of the mind. This entry is therefore concerned solely with the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) proposed by Hilary Putnam  and developed most notably for philosophers by Jerry Fodor [1975, 1980, 1987, 1993]. The senses of ‘computer’ and ‘computation’ employed here are technical; the main tasks of this entry will therefore be to elucidate: (a) the technical sense of ‘computation’ that is at issue, (b) the ways in which it is claimed to be applicable to the mind, (c) the philosophical problems this understanding of the mind is claimed to solve, and (d) the major criticisms that have accrued to this view. (shrink)
The New Semantics (NS) introduced by Kripke and Putnam is often thought to block antiphysicalist arguments that involve an inference from an explanatory gap to a failure of supervenience. But this “NS Rebuttal” depends upon two assumptions that are shown to be dubious. First, it assumes that mental-kind terms are among the kinds of terms to which NS analysis is properly applied. However, there are important differences in this regard between the behavior of notions like ‘pain’ and notions like ‘water’, (...) as Kripke himself has argued. Second, even on the assumption that NS analysis is appropriate to mental-kind terms, it is further assumed that this would block the anti-physicalist premise that an abiding and principled explanatory gap would entail a failure of metaphysical supervenience. But the paradigm examples of NS analysis show nothing of the sort. What they show is that there are a posteriori necessities (e.g., “water contains hydrogen”) that cannot be inferred from the sense of natural kind terms. But they do not show that such necessities cannot be derived from an adequate scientific understanding of the phenomena in question. Indeed, such derivations are often available with kinds like water, but seem unavailable with mental kinds like ‘pain’ and ‘belief’. (shrink)
Philosophy has both a critical and a speculative mode. In its critical mode, philosophy examines the assumptions and the reasoning of some body of discourse, often with an eye towards showing that its adherents have claimed more than they have justified, or that they are employing assumptions that are problematic or mutually inconsistent. You might say that critical philosophy “puts the brakes on” other intellectual projects. In its speculative mode, philosophy does just the opposite: it runs ahead of the evidence, (...) speculating about how some combination of ideas might be developed in ways that are interesting and fruitful. Most of what goes on in philosophy journals is done in the critical mode. Most of what the public thinks of as “philosophy”, and the things that we refer to as someone’s philosophy—Plato’s philosophy, Aristotle’s philosophy—is done in the speculative mode. (shrink)
This response to Silberstein's review undertakes two tasks. First, it attempts to clarify aspects of Cognitive Pluralism and its relationship to anti-reductionism. Second, it engages Silberstein's claim that traditional metaphysics of mind is dead, or at least should no longer be pursued.
Since the seventeenth century, our understanding of the natural world has been one of phenomena that behave in accordance with natural laws. While other elements of the early modern scientific worldview may be rejected or at least held in question—the metaphor of the world as a great machine, the narrowly mechanist assumption that all physical interactions must be contact interactions, the idea that matter might actually be obeying rules laid down by its Divine Author – the notion of natural law (...) has continued to play a pivotal role in actual scientific practice, in our philosophical interpretations of science, and in their its metaphysical implications. (shrink)
The SPP is, among other things, a place where we discuss nagging and perennial problems on the bordermarches between philosophy and the sciences. Sometimes problems are nagging and perennial because they are deep and difficult. And sometimes they are merely an artifact, a shadow cast by our own way of formulating the problem. I should like to suggest to you that philosophy of mind suffers badly from being the last refuge of the best philosophy of science of the 1950's, and (...) that some of its problems are in fact illusions that could be dispelled by consideration of more recent developments in the philosophy of science. In particular, philosophy of psychology has been plagued by a famous contrast between its "ceteris paribus" laws and the "exceptionless" laws of the physical sciences. This has led to doubts about the scientific status of psychology, the status of psychological kinds as natural kinds, and even their ontological legitimacy. I argue here that this problematic is a consequence of assuming a particular analysis of scientific laws as (exceptionless) universally quantifed claims. This analysis has largely been rejected in contemporary philosophy of science. And more recent analyses that take notice of the role of idealization in scientific modeling both dissolve the nagging problem and shed new light upon differences between the sciences. (shrink)
Recent debates about the metaphysics of mind have tended to assume that inter-theoretic reductions are the norm in the natural sciences. With this assumption in place, the apparent explanatory gaps surrounding consciousness and intentionality seem unique, fascinating, and perhaps metaphysically significant. Over the past several decades, however, philosophers of science have largely rejected the notions that inter-theoretic reduction is either widespread in the natural sciences or a litmus for the legitimacy of the special sciences. If we adopt a post-reductionist philosophy (...) of science, with a commitment to theory pluralism, the epistemic statuses of the standard positions in philosophy of mind (reductionism, non-reductive physicalism, dualism) are all significantly changed. Moreover, central problems of recent philosophy of mind – reducibility and the explanatory gap – seem themselves to be in need of rethinking if reductions are rare and the sciences have “explanatory gaps all the way down.” This article examines the prospects of the standard metaphysical positions, plus two types of pluralism, in light of post-reductionist philosophy of science. (shrink)
This article examines the notions of “intuitive” and “counterintuitive” beliefs and concepts in cognitive science of religion. “Intuitive” states are contrasted with those that are products of explicit, conscious reasoning. In many cases the intuitions are grounded in the implicit rules of mental models, frames, or schemas. I argue that the pathway from intuitive to high theological concepts and beliefs may be distinct from that from intuitions to “folk religion,” and discuss how Christian theology might best interpret the results of (...) studies in cognitive psychology of religion. (shrink)
continent. 1.3 (2011): 195-200. To begin with, let us open a distance: allow me, here, in this beginning, as if there could be a beginning, to distance my self from you. For, and to re-call Nancy, “[t]here can only be relation […] if we start with an absolute distancing, without which there would be no possibility of proximity, of identity or strangeness, of subjectivity or thinghood.”1 The origin, we might deduce with Nancy, is a distancing;2 the origin is as distancing; (...) original distance is all there is , always. Becoming, if we give credence to Deleuze and Guattari, “constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man´s-land, a non-localizable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the proximity of the other– and the border-proximity is indifferent to both contiguity and to distance.”3 Yet it is precisely through distance (which is nothing but a becoming in-difference, a becoming-in-different) that such contiguity originates; and vice versa. We reiterate the Deleuzian mantra of becoming without being, with this becoming be(com)ing nothing but a becoming at distance, becoming as distance, becoming [is] as becoming a distance. This address (and I am indeed addressing the very possibility of addressing you) will be about an estrangement of the I, “[f]or it is not the other which is another I, but the I which is an other, a fractured I.”4 Evidently, all too evidently perhaps, the point here is thus not to reach “the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I.”5 We are in-different to this I, we are always already at distance to this our I: the I does not become present; rather, the I does not stop coming.6 Becoming, then, is always already a beginning, the beginning of the be-coming of another coming. The becoming: always a yet, yet to be-come. And this be-coming must never be actualized; becoming must remain an accident. Being, if you allow this metaphysical faux pas, being is based upon its rupture; following Nancy, the essence of being “is the shock of the instant [le coup]. Each time, ‘Being’ is always an instance [un coup] of Being.”7 Becoming, always becoming its own instance, [is] only as an instantaneous withdrawal of (its) presence; the essence of its essence “consists in the withdrawal of its own existence.”8 What shall be unfolded here, therefore, is an ontology of such fracture. Unlike origin-al ontologies9 that are concerned with essence rather than being, the ontology proposed here does not believe in (its) originality. This ontology, if you allow me yet another inappropriate de-nomination, is concerned with becoming as such rather than with (its) Wesen, or, to stress Spinoza, with the (indefinite) striving for abidance, for remaining (in) itself.10 This ontology, questioning its raison” d'être, namely de-fining what “there is”, is hence itself a fissure, fissuring itself. Becoming, however, becoming has become a platitude. Eluding its re-presentationability, becoming has become univocal itself, self-fulfills Deleuze´s prophecy: “There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal. ”11 Univocity: to speak with one voice. One for all, all for one, and God. Claiming that being is one difference (i.e. a one made out of differences), Deleuze does not add a different voice, but continues this tradition. For him, “the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences [….] Being is the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are not the same. It is ‘equal’ for all, but they themselves are not equal.”12 Thus, with univocity, “it is not the differences which are and must be: it is being which is Difference, in the sense that it is said of difference.&rdquo13 This, certainly, negates difference as such; difference as such cannot be mediated. The chicken is the egg, and vice versa. Here, we shall proceed differently; here difference shall be inscribed into difference itself. We remember, becoming is in-difference, becoming is a(s) distancing. What comes out here, in, to, this distance, is an immediate and, at the same time, doomed attempt to name this distance: to name this a distance, to name this distance as distance. Thus what comes up here is the name of the be tween, a name that bears this name through naming: that bears this distance in its very name. This distance, this gap within the name marks, then, a difference, not an opposition. To inscribe such a presence of in-difference, to name this distance qua naming is, however, “not to (re)present it or to signify it, but to let come to one and over one what merely presents itself at the limit where inscription itself withdraws (or ex-scribes itself, writes itself outside itself).”14 To let come to one what comes, always comes; to let come over one the impossibility of such ex-scription. For every ex-scription bears the inscription of its abandonment. How, one must ask, how to ex-scribe the coming without coming out of this coming? After all, the aim here is to conceive becoming as becoming: as such, becoming is becoming in becoming. This coming of the becoming is, as insinuated before, a(s a) be tween. It is through the be tween, with the be tween being its fissure, that be-coming is. Becoming, conceived as such, [is] as Heideggerian Entwurf.15 Generally translated as projection and/or plan, the Entwurf is above all to be seen as a “throwing-free,” as an opening towards the leap, as (a) leaping towards (its) becoming, a becoming that cannot be fore-seen. For it is InZwischen [in the in-between, but also meantime] that we are: We are always someone-, somewhere else. And it is precisely this Zwischen that sur-mounts the Heideggerian χωρισμ?ς (Kluft), the divide, the either:or;16 an incursion of the be tween, wherein we [are], whereto we are to be dis-placed.17 A passage towards the unknown, towards momentary sites, finite event-uations. “We” happens only once. It is, however, the lack of significance that makes (for) the be tween: be tweens are trivia(l). The be tween has no sense, but makes (for) such sense, each time. The middle cannot be made, the middle makes: itself. Composed of differences, be tweens give way to their differences. Within this middle, there is always an Other– and that may be the point. As the rhizome, becoming has “no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo.”18 Becoming thus “is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle. A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the border or line of flight or descent running perpendicular to both.”19 The middle is not mediocre; the middle is no where. This middle, we recall Deleuze and Guattari, “is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but […] a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away.”20 This is why [t]his ‘between’, as its name implies, has neither a consistency nor continuity of its own. It does not lead from one to the other; it constitutes no connective tissue, no cement, no bridge. Perhaps it is not even fair to speak of a ‘connection’ to its subject; it is neither connected nor unconnected; it falls short of both; even better, it is that which is at the heart of a connection, the interlacing [….] The ‘between’ is the stretching out [distension] and distance opened by the singular as such.21 Becoming, seen as such, seen as distancing, is becoming in and as difference: Difference (of being) is itself differant. It withdraws still further from itself, and from there still calls itself forth. It is withdrawn further than any assignation to a ‘difference of being’ (or in a ‘different being’, or in any Other) could ever remove it, and it is altogether yet to come, more so than any annunciation could say.22 Let us, then, insert such différance in,to the be tween itself; let us let the be tween to come, to become itself. The be tween, being itself multivocal, might be that by which becoming is given;23 the be tween, however, does not confine itself to a mere de-signation of differences; evidently, the be tween is in itself différant. It is the between that in turn designates these differences within the different. It is, obviously, through a distancing that they relate to each other: as and through differences. Different in themselves, different to each other, they substantiate these differences. Both originate in these differences, and both can be conceived only with, in these differences. The between is not to be seen as copy, the be tween not to be seen as model. And just as nonbeing precedes being, be tween antecedes (its) becoming. Yet, there is neither an after nor is there a before. All there [is] is Gleichursprünglichkeit, equi-originality; a “unique, fleeting moment[…]Is perhaps at this point, along with the I—with the estranged I, set free at this point and in a similar manner—is perhaps at this point an Other set free?”24 Perhaps. For it is only at this point, within this very passage of and towards the in between, that the possibility of (our) presence is opened. Only in be tweens becoming is, [is] an absent-ed presence, always. The be tween allows for openings, opens itself towards such opening, minds its gap. For it is with,in such fissures that we become. Be tween itself [is] only when absent; always already beyond themselves, be tweens [are] only when they are not. It is, then, only through an absense of sense that (its) presence is witnessed a presence which, to write with Nancy: [It] is not essence, but […] birth to presence: birth and death to the infinite presentation of the fact that there is no ultimate sense, only a finite sense, finite senses, a multiplication of singular bursts of sense resting on no unity or substance. And the fact, too, that there is no established sense, no establishment, institution or foundation of sense, only a coming, and comings-to-be of sense.25 Once be-come, (its) sense is to be with-drawn; it is only by such with-drawal that sense is made, that our I is to be sensed. To come, to become in the be tween, then, is a be-coming distant towards its sense, sense is present distance, is a “distant presence,”26 is a presence that is constantly fleeting. This presence (and note the intonation) is not deferred in that it were re-located to another moment or another place, but this presence presents itself in its difference to itself. For Nancy, there is no origin of sense: it presents itself, and that is all there is to it.27 Yet, it presents itself only once, and through absence, always already. Distance grounds presence, and this is why presence has no ground/Be-Gründung. And sense eludes (its) sens-ation. Is it, then, a sense, a sense to be sensed? Does the be tween, then, bear a meaning at all? How to sense the sense of such be tween? It is, once more, the lack of significance that allows for the be tween. De-void of meaning, it is to be sensed. In order to be sensed, it has to be let (gone). Thus, for the be tween to be between, a certain Gelassenheit is needed; towards the either, towards the or. There is no here for the be tween. All there [is] are finite distances. Be tween: A twofold folding, a folding of betweens that are in be tween, always already. Evading its presenc/iation, it is with,in the be tween that the between originates. And it is here, where there is no inter, where there [is] only a trans, perhaps, that we become into our transmediate existence, it is here where the impossible possibility of finitude is opened. It is here, in this end, were we have to think finitude, here, in this end (and how to end an end), where we re-turn to a finite thinking sensu Nancy. To begin with, here, in this end, as if there could be an end, differences are finitudes. Differences require a finite thinking, a thinking of finitude as such, an absolute finitude, “absolutely detached from all infinite and senseless completion or achievement. Not a thinking of limitation, which implies the unlimitedness of a beyond, but a thinking of the limit as that on which, infinitely finite, existence arises, and to which it is exposed.”28 An unlimited limit, but a limit, and no limit that opens into infinity: Finitude [is] not in.finitude. While infinitude does not free itself from the principle of identity and/or a last foundation,29 it is with,in (the idea of) finitude that differences un- and re-fold. Deleuze, of course, dissents.30 Deleuze, if you allow me this hasty conclusion, does not differenciate between finitude and infinitude. He does neither think finitude outside of representation nor does he apply difference to the supposed opposition of finitude:infinitude—rather, he argues, the “entire alternative between finite and infinite applies very badly to difference, because it constitutes only an antinomy of representation”. He is furthermore convinced that infinite representation “suffers from the same defect as finite representation: that of confusing the concept of difference in itself with the inscription of difference in the identity of the concept in general”.31 Difference, however, ought to be related to difference, not to (its) opposition. They differ in themselves, not only in degree. And finitude names the condition of and for our becoming-in-the-world. Only in finitude we are. It is here where existence exists, it is here where existence becomes into its existence: a once that is always already at once. Here, existentia is no longer thought of as Vorhandenheit,32 as presence. Becoming-in-finitude, our becoming is a becoming-towards-absence. Consequently, and as yet again contrasted with traditional ontology, which apprehends being as and in relation to (its) presence, as present/ation of this its presence, we tried to deploy an ontology of finitude here. This finite ontology, this ontology of the fracture, allocates a passage towards the limit, wherein ousia is no longer conceived as presence, but thought (of) as ap_ousiai: as absence/s. A withdrawal of its relation to– (presence), a thinking-it-as-such. As such, becoming is no(t) present. Becoming as such is to be somewhere else, a becoming-elsewhere, a becoming absent; it is only through the always-absent be tween that becoming is. It is here were we have to abandon, were we have to absent our selves. Our self, as every self, “has its originarity in the loss of self”; to exist, then, “is a matter of going into exile.”33 NOTES 1 Jean-Luc Nancy. “Res ipsa et ultima.” Trans. Steven Miller. In A Finite Thinking . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2003. p. 315 2 Jean-Luc Nancy.“Of Being Singular Plural.” In Being Singular Plural . Trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O'Bryne Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2000. p. 16 3 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus . Trans. Brian Massumi. New York: continuum. 2004. p. 323f. 4 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition . Trans. Paul Patton New York: continuum. 2004. p. 324 5 Deleuze and Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. p. 4 6 Jean-Luc Nancy. “Elliptical Sense.” Trans. Jonathan Derbyshire. In A Finite Thinking . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2003. p. 104 7 Jean-Luc Nancy. “Being Singular Plural.” p. 33 8 Jean-Luc Nancy “Elliptical Sense” p. 95 9 As elaborated by Theodor W. Adorno, Ontologie und Dialektik . Ed. Rolf Tiedemann Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002. p. 36 10 “Jedes Ding strebt danach, soweit es an ihm liegt, in seinem Sein zu verharren.” And: “Das Streben, womit jedes Ding in seinem Sein zu verharren strebt, schließt keine bestimmte, sondern eine unbestimmte Zeit in sich.” Baruch Spinoza. Die Ethik . Ed. Heinz-Joachim Fischer. Wiesbaden: marixverlag. 2007. p. 145 11 Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition . p. 44. And, as he elaborates further, there are “three principal moments in the history of the philosophical elaboration of the univocity of being. The first is Duns Scotus, who only thought univocal being; Spinoza, who instead of understanding univocal being as indifferent makes it an object of affirmation, that is, univocal being is identical with a unique and infinite substance; and Nietzsche with his eternal return.” p. 48. 12 Ibid. 45. 13 Ibid. 48. 14 Jean-Luc Nancy. “Elliptical Sense.” p. 110 15 “Entwurf: daß der Mensch sich vom Seienden, ohne daß dies als ein solches schon eröffnet wäre, loswirft in das Seyn.” Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) , Gesamtausgabe, III. Abteilung: Unveröffentlichte Abhandlungen, Vorträge-Gedachtes, Band 65. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1989. p. 452 16 Ibid. 14. “Zumal im anderen Anfang muß sogleich—zufolge dem Fragen nach der Wahrheit des Seyns—der Sprung in das ´Zwischen´ vollzogen werden. Das 'Zwischen' des Da-seins überwindet den χωρισμ?ς, nicht indem es zwischen dem Seyn (der Seiendheit) und dem Seienden als gleichsam vorhandenen Ufern eine Brücke schlägt, sondern indem es das Seyn und das Seiende zugleich in ihre Gleichzeitigkeit verwandelt. Der Sprung in das Zwischen erspringt erst das Da-sein und besetzt nicht einen bereitstehenden Standplatz.” 17 Ibid. 317. “Das Dasein ist in der Geschichte der Wahrheit des Seins der wesentliche Zwischenfall, d.h. der Ein-fall jenes Zwischen, in das der Mensch ver-rückt werden muß, um erst wieder er selbst zu sein.” Ein-fall here means both “idea” and “invasion.” 18 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus . p. 27 19 Ibid. 323. 20 Ibid. 28. 21 Jean-Luc Nancy. “Being Singular Plural.” p. 5 22 Jean-Luc Nancy. “Elliptical Sense.” p. 101 23 See Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition . p. 280 24 Paul Celan, “The Meridian” Trans. Jerry Glenn. In Jacques Derrida's Sovereignities in Question—The Poetics of Paul Celan . Ed. & Trans. Thomas Dutoit & Outi Pasanen. New York: Fordham University Press. 2005. p. 180 25 Jean-Luc Nancy. “A Finite Thinking.” Trans. Edward Bullard, Jonathan Derbyshire, and Simon Sparks. In A Finite Thinking . p. 27 26 See Nancy's sense as “Präsenz-auf-Distanz” In Jean-Luc Nancy. Das Vergessen der Philosophie . Ed. Peter Engelmann. Trans. Horst Brühmann. Wien: Edition Passagen. p. 48 27 Ibid. 97 28 Jean-Luc Nancy. “A Finite Thinking.” p. 27 29 Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition . p. 60 30 Ibid. 332 31 Ibid. 61 32 Martin Heidegger. Sein und Zeit . Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. 2006. p. 42 33 Jean-Luc Nancy. “Being Singular Plural.” p. 78  . 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Some naturalistic theories of consciousness give an essential role to teleology.1 This teleology is said to arise due to natural selection. Thus it is claimed that only certain states, namely, those that have been selected for by evolutionary pro- cesses because they contribute to (or once contributed to) an organism’s fitness, are conscious states. These theories look as if they are assigning a creative role to natural selection. If a state is conscious only if it has been selected for, then (...) selec- tion appears to be able to create a new feature of states, namely, their conscious nature. Yet, intuitively, natural selection cannot create anything. Natural selec- tion chooses certain features that already exist and makes them more (or less) prevalent in a population, but it cannot bring features into existence itself. Natu- ral selection can select for conscious states, but it cannot create them. This con- clusion has recently been argued for by StevenHorst (1999). If it is right, then teleological theories of conscious states should be rejected. A state cannot become a conscious experience in virtue of having been selected for by evolu- tionary process. (shrink)
This is a critical review of six books: Peter Carruthers, _Language, Thought, and Consciousness; David Chalmers, _The Conscious Mind; Fred Dretske, _Naturalizing the Mind; StevenHorst, _Symbols, Computation and Intentionality; Jaegwon Kim, _Philosophy of Mind; and Michael Tye, _Ten Problems of Consciousness. The review focuses on what these authors have to say about consciousness.
In this essay an attempt will be made to trace the origins and history of the accusation that Jews are cannibals. Its origins go back much further into history than most people know, and for that reason it is this aspect of our topic that will receive the most attention. At the same time, it will be demonstrated that this anti-Jewish myth has an unprecedented tenacity, since it is still readily believed in by millions up until the present day. Part (...) I: Antiquity1Frist Encounters The encounters between Jews, on the one hand, and Greeks and Romans, on the.. (shrink)
This is a review of a book that tries to re-establish mind-body dualism by using (a) empirical research on near-death experiences, placebo effects, creativity, claiming even that parapsychology should become a respected part of science, and (b) Frederic W. H. Myers' (1843-1901) metaphor of the brain as a kind of receiving device that records what the irreducible mind sends as messages. Among other things, we criticize the lack of philosophical clarity about mind-body relation, and question the book's tendency to refer (...) to past and current parapsychological literature as reliable. (shrink)
K. -W. Niebuhr (2008). Life and Death in Pseudo-Phocylides. In van der Horst, Pieter Willem, Alberdina Houtman, Albert de Jong, van de Weg & Magdalena Wilhelmina Misset (eds.), Empsychoi Logoi--Religious Innovations in Antiquity: Studies in Honour of Pieter Willem van der Horst. Brill.score: 6.0
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Graduate studies at Western
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