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Profile: Stewart Cohen (University of Arizona)
  1. Stewart Cohen (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.
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  2. Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
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  3. Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
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  4. Stewart Cohen (1998). Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):289 – 306.
    (1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 289-306. doi: 10.1080/00048409812348411.
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  5. Stewart Cohen (2010). Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and a Priori Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.
  6. Stewart Cohen (1984). Justification and Truth. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
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  7. Stewart Cohen (2000). Contextualism and Skepticism. Noûs 34 (s1):94-107.
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  8.  18
    Stewart Cohen (2005). Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):417 - 430.
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  9.  43
    Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña (2013). Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):15-29.
    Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in (...)
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  10. Keith Lehrer & Stewart Cohen (1983). Justification, Truth, and Coherence. Synthese 55 (2):191-207.
    A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher level convictions about probabilities, which (...)
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  11.  61
    Stewart Cohen (2013). Equal Weight View. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press 98.
  12.  44
    Stewart Cohen (2005). Knowledge, Speaker and Subject. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):199–212.
    I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.
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  13. Stewart Cohen (1986). Knowledge and Context. Journal of Philosophy 83 (10):574-583.
  14. Stewart Cohen (2005). Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):417–430.
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  15. Stewart Cohen (2001). Contextualism Defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):87 - 98.
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  16. Stewart Cohen (1987). Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards. Synthese 73 (1):3 - 26.
    This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in (...)
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  17.  35
    Stewart Cohen (1998). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143 - 159.
    This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles-an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument. In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the (...)
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  18.  20
    Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña (2013). Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply. Inquiry 56 (4):400-415.
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  19.  93
    Stewart Cohen (2004). Knowledge, Assertion, and Practical Reasoning. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):482–491.
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  20.  85
    Stewart Cohen (1998). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143-159.
    This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles-an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument. In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the (...)
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  21. Stewart Cohen (2010). Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):718-730.
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  22.  87
    Stewart Cohen (2004). Contextualism and Unhappy-Face Solutions: Reply to Schiffer. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):185-197.
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  23. Stewart Cohen (2012). Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):447-455.
  24. Stewart Cohen (1988). ``How to Be a Fallibilist&Quot. Philosophical Perspectives 2:581-605.
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  25. Stewart Cohen (2000). Contextualism and Skepticism. Philosophical Issues 10 (1):94-107.
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  26.  22
    Stewart Cohen (2000). Replies. Noûs 34 (s1):132-139.
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  27. Stewart Cohen (1991). Skepticism, Relevance, and Relativity. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Basil Blackwell 17--37.
     
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  28. Stewart Cohen (2009). Knowledge as Aptness. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):121--125.
    I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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  29. Stewart Cohen (2000). Replies. Philosophical Issues 10 (1):132-139.
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  30.  14
    Stewart Cohen (2000). Contextualismo y escepticismo. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):113-126.
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  31.  34
    Stewart Cohen (2003). Greco's Agent Reliabilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):437–443.
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  32.  46
    Stewart Cohen (1998). Review: Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):913 - 918.
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  33. Stewart Cohen (2008). Ascriber Contextualism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
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  34.  24
    Stewart Cohen (1995). Is There an Issue About Justified Belief? Philosophical Topics 23 (1):113-127.
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  35.  35
    Stewart Cohen (1981). Defeasibility and Background Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 39 (3):263 - 273.
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  36.  32
    Stewart Cohen (2004). Reply to Baumann. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):429 - 433.
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  37.  1
    Stewart Cohen (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Noûs 33 (s13):57-89.
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  38.  6
    Keith Lehrer & Stewart Cohen (1983). Dretske on Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):73.
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    Stewart Cohen (2000). Replies to Klein, Hawthorne, Prades. Noûs 34:132 - 139.
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  40.  4
    Stewart Cohen (2000). Respuesta a mis comentadores. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):151-158.
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  41.  8
    Stewart Cohen (1999). Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1043-1048.
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    Stewart Cohen (2003). Review: Greco's Agent Reliabilism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):437 - 443.
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  43.  6
    Stewart Cohen (1999). Review: Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1043 - 1048.
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  44. Stewart Cohen (2005). Contextualism Defended. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell, Pub. 56-62.
     
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  45. Stewart Cohen (2005). Contextualism Defended Some More. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell, Pub. 67-71.
     
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  46. Stewart Cohen (1985). Reliability and Justification. The Monist 68:149-158.
     
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  47. Stewart Cohen (2008). 1. The Main Idea. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press 417.
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