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  1. Stuart Silvers (2011). What Place for the A Priori? Teaching Philosophy 34 (4):446-451.
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  2. Stuart Silvers (2007). Adaptation, Plasticity, and Massive Modularity in Evolutionary Psychology: An Eassy on David Buller's Adapting Minds. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):793 – 813.
    Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature DAVID BULLER Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005 564 pages, ISBN: 0262025795 (hbk); $37.00.
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  3. Stuart Silvers (2003). Agent Causation, Functional Explanation, and Epiphenomenal Engines: Can Conscious Mental Events Be Causally Efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.
     
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  4. Stuart Silvers (2003). El externalismo externalizado exorcizando el contenido perceptual. Laguna 12:9-26.
    A pesar de toda la plausibilidad del externalismo en relación al significado lingüístico, la cuestión crucial es la de cómo el externalismo se enfrenes a nuestras intuiciones cartesianas mas profundas sobre el contenido de la experiencia consciente. La tradición cartesiana respecto a la experiencia consciente parece invulnerable al análisis externalista porque las propiedades fenomenológicas de los estados conscientes sitúan el lugar de la experiencia enteramente dentro del sujeto de la misma, y la bacen exclusivamente dependiente de él. Un externalismo consecuente (...)
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  5. Stuart Silvers (2003). Individualism, Internalism, and Wide Supervenience. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.
     
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  6. Stuart Silvers (1999). Cortical Conversations: A Review Essay on Cognition, Computation and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):525 – 534.
    The question is, How does the brain make its mind? In Cognition, computation and consciousness [Ito et al. (Eds) (1997) Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press], a variety of noted theoreticians from the fields of cognitive psychology, computer science, and philosophy postulate answer-blueprints rather than full-blown explanatory solutions to this most nettlesome question. Coming to the problem from quite different starting points and perspectives, they nevertheless succeed in reaching consensus on the idea that the contingencies of the brain's evolution (...)
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  7. Stuart Silvers (1997). Nonreductive Naturalism. Theoria 12 (28):163-84.
    Nonreductive naturalism holds that we can preserve the (scientifically valued) metaphysical truth of physicalism while averting the methodological mistakes of reductionism. Acceptable scientificexplanation need not (in some cases cannot and in many cases, should not) be formulated in the language of physical science. Persuasive arguments about the properties of phenomenal consciousnesspurport to show that physicalism is false, namely that phenomenal experience is a nonphysical fact. I examine two recent, comprehensive efforts to naturalize phenomenal consciousness and argue thatnonreductive naturalism yields a (...)
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  8. Stuart Silvers (1996). Rational Reconstruction and Immature Science. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):93 – 109.
    The distinction between mature and immature science is controversial. Laudan (1977) disavows the idea of immature science while Von Eckardt (1993) claims that cognitive science is just that (an immature science) and modifies Laudan's Research Tradition methodology to argue its rational pursuability . She uses the (Kuhnian) idea of a framework of shared characteristics (FSC) to identify the community of cognitive scientists. Diverse community assumptions pertaining specifically to human cognitive capacities (should) consolidate cognitive research efforts into a coherent and rationally (...)
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  9. Stuart Silvers (1992). A Stitchwork Quilt: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Cognitive Relativism. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):391 – 410.
    The work of cognitive psychologists, philosophical naturalists, post-modernists, and other such epistemic subversives conspires to endanger the well being of traditional analytic epistemology. Stephen Stich ( et tu Stich) has contributed his design for epistemology's coffin. I look hard at his proposed radical revision of epistemology. The ostensible target of Stich's analysis is the traditional enterprise of analytic epistemology. It is, however, the conceptual pillars that underpin both the traditional analytic and naturalist epistemologies that are the primary focus. It is (...)
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  10. Stuart Silvers (1992). Cognitive Spontaneity, Coherence, and Internalism in the Justification of Empirical Belief. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):107-118.
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  11. Stuart Silvers (1991). On Naturalizing the Semantics of Mental Representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (March):49-73.
  12. Stuart Silvers (1989). Introduction: Some Remarks on Meaning and Mental Representation. In , Representation: Readings in the Philosophy of Mental Representation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  13. Stuart Silvers (1989). Representational Capacity, Intentional Ascription, and the Slippery Slope. Philosophy of Science 56 (3):463-473.
    A long-standing objection to Fodor's version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) argues that in ascribing intentional content to an organism's representational states there needs to be some way of distinguishing between the kinds of organisms that have such representational capacity and those kinds that haven't. Without a principled distinction there would be no way of delimiting the appropriate domain of intentional ascription. As Fodor (1986) suggests, if the objection holds, we should have no good reason for withholding intentional (...)
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  14. Stuart Silvers (ed.) (1989). Representation: Readings In The Philosophy Of Mental Representation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    One kind of philosopher takes it as a working hypothesis that belief/desire psychology (or, anyhow, some variety of prepositional attitude psychology) is ...
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  15. Stuart Silvers (1973). The Critical Theory of Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 4 (1):108-132.
  16. Stuart Silvers (1967). Book Review:Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 34 (2):202-.
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  17. Stuart Silvers (1967). On Our Knowledge of the Social World. Inquiry 10 (1-4):96-97.
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  18. Stuart Silvers (1966). On Gödel's Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica (1-2):1-8.
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  19. Stuart Silvers (1964). Some Comments on Quine's Analysis of Simplicity. Philosophy of Science 31 (1):59-61.
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