Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early (...) distinction, then one has a satisfactory anti-physicalistic, anti-dualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of sub- personal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level. (shrink)

This paper attempts in the first instance to clarify the application of the personal/sub-personal distinction to psychoanalysis and to indicate how this issue is related to that of psychoanalysis" epistemology. It is argued that psychoanalysis may be regarded either as a form of personal psychology, or as a form of jointly personal and sub-personal psychology, but not as a form of sub-personal psychology. It is further argued that psychoanalysis indicates a problem (...) with the personal/sub-personal distinction itself as understood by Dennett A revised view of the distinction, which is argued to reflect its true metaphysical significance, is proposed. (shrink)

What is the relationship between the concepts of the predictive processing theory of brain functioning and the everyday concepts with which people conduct and explain their mental lives? To answer this question, we focus on predictive processing explanations of mental disorder that appeal to false inference. After distinguishing two concepts of false inference, we survey four ways of understanding the relationship between explanations of mental phenomena at the personal and sub-personal level. We then argue that if predictive processing (...) accurately accounts for psychological and socio-cultural dynamics, then personal and sub-personal concepts must display a looping relationship that can impact the nature of at least some mental phenomena. In particular, explaining the phenomenon of delusion in terms of the sub-personal concept of false inference should change the nature of delusional experiences themselves. (shrink)

In a way that is rarely even attempted, and even more rarely actually pulled off, Susan Hurley, in her book Consciousness in Action, brings scientific ideas into contact with mainstream philosophy. It is not at all unusual for empirical results from cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience to be raised in discussion of issues in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind--Dennett and the Churchlands, for example, have been doing so for years. But Hurley attempts to draw empirical results even (...) closer to the center of philosophy, using them to make points about metaphysics and epistemology more broadly, especially PutnamÂ’s Twin Earth cases. We are very fond of Hurley's book, and we agree with nearly all of her conclusions. We do think, though, that there are two important cases where Hurley has misunderstood scientific work. First, we think she misunderstand dynamical systems theory; second, we think her criticism of ecological psychology is misplaced. In neither case do these misunderstandings derail HurleyÂ’s overall project--indeed, the former of them makes her conclusions all the more plausible. We consider them in order. (shrink)

The theory of evolution: The rise and impact of evolutionary ideas, by R. Scoon. Evolution in its relation to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of culture, by F.S.C. Northrop. The genetic nature of differences among men, by T. Dobzhansky. Evolutionary thought in America: Evolution and American sociology by R.E.L. Faris. The impact of the idea of evolution on the American political and constitutional tradition, by E.S. Corwin. Evolutionism in American economics, 1800-1946, by J.J. Spengler. The influence of evolutionary (...) theory upon American psychological thought, by E.G. Boring. Naturalism in American literature, by M. Cowley. The idea of organic expression and American architecture, by D.D. Egbert. Evolution and moral theory in America, W.F. Quillian, Jr. Evolution and theology in America, by S. Persons. (shrink)

This paper argues that cognitive psychology's practice of explaining mental processes in terms which avoid invoking phenomenology, and the person-level self-conception with which it is associated in common sense psychology, leads to a hybrid Cartesian dualism. Because phenomenology is considered to be fundamentally irrelevant in any scientific explanation of the mind, the person-level is regarded as scientifically invisible: it is a ghost-like housing for sub-personal computational cognition. The problem of explaining how the sub-personal and sub-phenomenological machinery (...) of mind is related to person-level experience is as troublesome for cognitive psychology as the problem Descartes faced in explaining how the ghost (the non-corporeal mind) is related to the machine (the material body).This paper outlines the historical roots of cognitive dualism, showing how it has come to recapitulate a number of puzzling conceptual dichotomies that have hindered scientific and philosophical psychology since Kantian constructivism. It then defends the view that cognitive psychology's commitment to the sub-personal explanatory level leads to exaggerated deflationary claims about the explanatory significance of phenomenology, and the personlevel framework. It is argued that phenomenological description must function as a constraint upon, and guide for, theory formation in cognitive psychology (as illustrated in the work of the cognitive neuro-psychologist A.R. Luria). Phenomenology must be brought into a kind of reflective equilibrium with the cognitive and neuro-sciences. (shrink)

This is an important work. It is sub-titled “Reality orion?” and makes a valiant effort to reinstate the notion of person as the keyconcept in psychology. There is a preface by Professor Oeser, of the University of Melbourne, which gives a good indication of what the book is about, and incidentally does great credit to the faculty of psychology in Melbourne. “When” says Professor Oeser, “about the middle of the nineteenth century, the science of experimental psychology was (...) born, the infant was crippled by an array of physical and physiological instruments. It was starved on a diet of psychophysics, and later of rats….” Instead of a preoccupation with psychophysics and rats, Oeser contends that the science should concern itself with “the person”, and lauds Lafitte for the devastating way in which he has dealt with “the perversions or pseudo-sciences of some psychometricians, psycho-analysts and rat-lovers”. This is trenchant writing, and Lafitte in the substance of the work lives up to the promise of the foreword, both in ideas and in style. (shrink)

From a phenomenological perspective, skin is an important boundary. My model here is the psychology of interpersonal relations . It is the behaviour of O that is visible from the perspective of P, the perceiver. Whether or not one is justified in going beyond the evidence available is a matter of some controversy in psychological circles e.g. between behaviourists and gestalt psychologists . Here the skin is an important boundary, at least in the visual modality. The divergence in perspective (...) between actor and observer is due to the fact that they occupy two different points in space/time . There is less of a divergence in perspective between speaker and listener since they could both be one and the same person . Skinner , in a pun on his own name, observed that in speech skin is not at all an important boundary. The implications for social psychology of this asymmetry between vision and speech are explored more fully . An attempt is made to identify when the skin is and when it is not a significant boundary. The history of psychology is briefly reviewed in the light of this distinction. (shrink)

Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, such that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Phenomenologists deny this, contending that we can directly perceive people's mental states. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception offered by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. I agree that their phenomenological claims have bite at the personal level, distinguishing direct social perception from conscious theorizing and (...) simulation. Their appeals to phenomenology and other arguments do not, however, rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of the sub-personal processes underlying social perception. While I here remain uncommitted about the plausibility of sub-personal theorizing and simulation, I argue that phenomenologists must do more in order to reject these accounts. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper explores the role of aesthetic judgements in mathematics by focussing on the relationship between the epistemic and aesthetic criteria employed in such judgements, and on the nature of the psychological experiences underpinning them. I claim that aesthetic judgements in mathematics are plausibly understood as expressions of what I will call ‘aesthetic-epistemic feelings’ that serve a genuine cognitive and epistemic function. I will then propose a naturalistic account of these feelings in terms of sub-personal processes of representing (...) and assessing the relation between cognitive processes and certain properties of the stimuli at which they are directed. (shrink)

This study examined cognitive representations of routine action, through the assessment of level of agency, in individuals with sub-clinical checking. The level of agency stems from Action Identification Theory [Vallacher, R. R., Wegner, D. M. . Levels of personal agency: Individual variation in action identification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, 660–671], which states that how actions are usually identified reflects the predominant accessibility of internal representation . Furthermore, this framework proposed that altered action regulation is related (...) to low-level of agency . In the current study, the main result indicated that checking symptoms were related to a low-level of agency, that is, individuals with sub-clinical checking identified habitual actions on the basis of instrumental aspects. This seems to indicate that checkers may act with a lack of goal representations. The results are discussed in terms of the role of low-level of agency in checking phenomena and related cognitive dysfunction. (shrink)

How do we know what other speakers say? Perhaps the most natural view is that we hear a speaker's utterance and infer what was said, drawing on our competence in the syntax and semantics of the language. An alternative view that has emerged in the literature is that native speakers have a non-inferential capacity to perceive the content of speech. Call this the perceptual view. The disagreement here is best understood as an epistemological one about whether our knowledge of what (...) speakers say is epistemically mediated by our linguistic competence. The present paper takes up the question of how we should go about settling this issue. Arguments for the perceptual view generally appeal to the phenomenology of speech comprehension. The present paper develops a line of argument for the perceptual view that draws on evidence from empirical psychology. The evidence suggests that a speaker's core syntactic and semantic competence is typically deployed sub-personally. The point is not just that the competence is tacit or unconscious, but that the person is not the locus of the competence. I argue that standing competence can enter into the grounds for knowledge only if it is subject to a certain sort of epistemic assessment, an assessment that is appropriate only if the person is the locus of that competence. If the person is not the locus of a speaker's core linguistic competence, as the psychological evidence suggests, then that competence does not enter into the grounds for our knowledge of what speakers say. If this line of argument is right, it has implications for the epistemology of perception and for our understanding of how empirical psychology bears on epistemology generally. (shrink)

Although fairness is a key moral trait, limited research focuses on participants' observed fairness behavior because moral traits are generally measured through self-report. This experiment focused on day-to-day interpersonal fairness rather than impersonal justice, and fairness was assessed as observed behavior. The experiment investigated whether a self-reported fairness trait would moderate a situational influence on observed fairness behavior, such that individuals with a stronger fairness trait would be less affected by a situational influence than those with a weaker fairness trait. (...) We used an iterated resource game in which participants could withdraw resources as they chose, and we manipulated the number of resources bogus players withdrew. The number of resources participants withdrew was the behavioral measure of fairness. Results confirmed the expected moderation of the unfairness manipulation by a fairness trait on observed behavior. Those reporting a stronger fairness trait were unaffected by the manipulation, whereas those reporting a weaker fairness trait were more strongly influenced. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The aim of this study is to determine how stakeholder engagement can be adapted for the conduct of COVID‐19‐related clinical trials in sub‐Saharan Africa. Nine essential stakeholder engagement practices were reviewed: formative research; stakeholder engagement plan; communications and issues management plan; protocol development; informed consent process; standard of prevention for vaccine research and standard of care for treatment research; policies on trial‐related physical, psychological, financial, and/or social harms; trial accrual, follow‐up, exit trial closure and results dissemination; and post‐trial access (...) to trial products or procedures. The norms, values, and practices of collectivist societies in Sub‐Saharan Africa and the low research literacy pose challenges to the conduct of clinical trials. Civil‐society organizations, members of community advisory boards and ethics committees, young persons, COVID‐19 survivors, researchers, government, and the private sector are assets for the implementation and translation of COVID‐19 related clinical trials. Adapting ethics guidelines to the socio‐cultural context of the region can facilitate achieving the aim of stakeholder engagement. (shrink)

This article explored health determinants on successful, healthy ageing in sub-Saharan Africa, using the case of Ramotswa in Botswana. The study used contextual, descriptive and qualitative approaches. It also explored the integrative nature of determinants to healthy and successful ageing by examining the biopsychological and physiological challenges. The article made use of the pastoral theological approach in understanding the complexity of ageing and revealing solutions for mitigating the health challenges encountered by older persons. While the article was theological in its (...) approach, it acknowledged the interconnectedness with other disciplines, such as sociology and psychology, as fundamental in dealing with this topic. The findings revealed the elderly caregivers’ need for emotional support. This study maintained that emotional support could minimise the burden on elderly caregivers, because reports during the study indicated that elderly caregivers experienced a mixture of emotions such as loneliness, frustration, anger, depression, guilt, anxiety, love, acceptance and warmth, which could have negative consequences on them. Contribution: In conclusion, the article suggested that given the complexity of the understanding of successful and healthy ageing, as well as the integrative nature of determinants of successful ageing, it is crucial for caregivers and policymakers to avoid a blanket approach in dealing with elderly persons in a context of care. (shrink)

Choice modellers are frequently criticized for failing to provide accurate representations of the neuro-psychological substrates of decisions. Several authors maintain that recent neuro-psychological findings enable choice modellers to overcome this alleged shortcoming. Some advocate a realistic interpretation of neuro-psychological models of choice, according to which these models posit sub-personal entities with specific neuro-psychological counterparts and characterize those entities accurately. In this article, I articulate and defend three complementary arguments to demonstrate that, contrary to emerging consensus, even the best available (...) neuro-psychological models of choice cannot be justifiably given this realistic interpretation. Moreover, I explicate what challenges will continue to hamper neuro-psychological modellers’ attempts to substantiate a realistic interpretation of their models. In doing so, I draw on the literature on scientific modelling to advance the ongoing philosophical discussion concerning the ontological status of the sub-personal entities posited in distinct decision sciences, the resemblance relations that supposedly connect choice models and the neuro-psychological substrates of decisions, and what conditions these models must satisfy to be regarded as realistic representations of their target systems. (shrink)

Background. The study of entrepreneurial activity has undergone intense development in recent decades. Traditionally this topic has been addressed from three approaches: economic, sociological and psychological. In the study of enterprising personality, two fundamental perspectives stand out: the use of general personality traits, like the Big Five, and the use of more specific traits related to entrepreneurial spirit, such as self-efficacy, autonomy, innovation, optimism, and others. The objective of this study is to provide validity evidence for a new instrument for (...) measuring eight specific dimensions of entrepreneurial personality (BEPE). Method. The sample was composed of 1,170 adults from the general population (59.9% women). The average age was 42.34 years with a standard deviation of 12.96. Of the sample, 13% were self-employed. Internal factorial structure and reliability of BEPE were examined. The relationships with other variables and the discriminative capacity of the BEPE between different groups of workers were analyzed. Results. First order factor analyses show the essential unidimensionality of each of the eight proposed sub-scales, with factorial weights ranging between 0.341 and 0.825. A second-order factor analysis was carried out, obtaining a general dimension of entrepreneurial personality. With regards to reliability, the eight BEPE sub-scales gave high alpha coefficient values, between 0.825 and 0.899, as did the total battery (0.97). BEPE sub-scales show a high canonical correlation with the Big Five personality factors (.795), and with the sub-scales of the Measure of Entrepreneurial Talents and Abilities questionnaire (.815). Conclusions. The BEPE questionnaire for the evaluation of the eight fundamental specific dimensions of the entrepreneurial personality presents adequate psychometric properties. Its relationships with other measures of personality traits are in line with what is expected. Therefore, the BEPE is a new measurement instrument that can be used with confidence both in the applied field and in research. (shrink)

It has become widely recognized that religiousness has a predictable pattern of small associations with Big Five personality dimensions, and has some intersections with cultural psychology. But just how large are those culture-religiosity intersections, and are there additional associations with personality when one extends beyond the restricted spectrum represented by Big Five traits? Moreover, do the answers to these questions depend on how religiousness is defined and measured? I argue that, both conceptually and empirically, religiousness itself meets the criteria (...) for a personality dimension (including stability, heritability, and other grounds), and is simultaneously for the most part a cultural phenomenon reflecting often widely shared sets of beliefs, values, worldviews, and norms. The patterns of modest associations with other personality dimensions, from the Big Five and beyond, are consistent with both arguments. A distributive model of culture, under which culture is aggregated personalities (and especially mindsets) helps make sense of these relations. Tradition-oriented religiousness tends to have a prominent position in enduring-order (as contrasted with evolving-order) cultures, which helps account for its occasional expressions in political religion. In contrast, mystical spirituality is more prone to manifest as a sub-cultural phenomenon peripheral to mainstream culture. But for either conception—religiousness or spirituality—the same personality-and-culture propositions appear to hold. Nonetheless, religiousness seems not totally reducible to a variable for personality or cultural psychology, and considerations are introduced regarding what that irreducible element is most likely to be. (shrink)

This study employed interpretivist, grounded theory method and utilized semi-structured interviews to explore how 31 African migrant high school and university students from eight sub-Saharan African representative countries and currently residing in Townsville, Australia, perceived the roles of their parents in their career development. The study findings revealed that the support and encouragement received from parents underpinned the youths’ perceptions of their parents as influential in their career trajectories. Though participants acknowledged their indebtedness to parents and the system that nurtured (...) them, they faced a dilemma conforming to parental preference or personal conviction, which presented “a fork in the career decision-making road.” Study findings indicate that participants’ reactions and strategies for negotiating parental approval differ based on entry status and gender. Most participants, particularly those with professional entry status, conformed to their parents’ career choice for fear of failure, while a few who followed their personal interests negotiated parental approval through dialogue and educating parents. Male participants with humanitarian entry status opposed their parents’ career preferences and followed their own personal interests. Taken together, all participants had strong desire to obtain parental approval and whether sought early or later, the main focus for all participants was prioritizing family needs and obligations. The practical implications of these findings for all stakeholders are discussed. (shrink)

Husserl characterizes sleep with the idea of “the relaxation of the will.” One finds a similar approach in the work of Maine de Biran, who explains sleep as “the suspension of the will.” More recently, Brian O’Shaughnessy and Matthew Soteriou have argued that mental actions constitute wakeful consciousness. In clinical practice, patients with disorders of consciousness who show “purposeful” behavior are classified as “minimally conscious,” while those in an “unresponsive wakeful state” merely behave reflexively. To what extent and how are (...) these proposals justified? This question pushes both the first- and the third-personal approaches to their limits: in an unconscious state, like a coma, one cannot reflect upon oneself; likewise, one cannot infer from physiological data whether someone is phenomenally conscious. This work offers a critical review of these proposals regarding the constitutive role for agency in phenomenal consciousness. It then presents revised versions of O’Shaughnessy’s and Soteriou’s Arguments from Synthesis and from Self-Consciousness. The argument is that everything of which one is phenomenally conscious is either a potential reason for a possible agentive power exertion, or just that power exertion itself. The “self” referred to in “self”-consciousness is either the agent or a “non-agent,” carrying out functions for the agent. Agency is therefore constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. The resulting view helps to solve the Combination Problem for panpsychism, by suggesting that agency is what raises sub-personal micro-consciousness to the personal level. The view may also justify the notion of a “Minimally Conscious State” in clinical practice. (shrink)

The coherence objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that it is impossible for one individual to have both the attributes of God and the attributes of a human being. This article examines Thomas Aquinas’s answer to this objection. I challenge the dominant, mereological interpretation of Aquinas’s position and, in light of this challenge, develop and defend a new alternative interpretation of Aquinas’s response to this important objection to Christian doctrine.

This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and facts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level (...) phenomena, the demands of explanatory adequacy require postulating horizontal explanatory relations. (shrink)

This cross-sectional study, which included men aged 20–40 years, aimed to determine the relationships among type D personality, depressive symptoms and lower urinary tract symptoms in young men. An internet-based questionnaire was administered, and General demographics, International Prostate Symptom Scores, Type D Scale-14 scores, and Depression and Somatic Symptom Scale scores were analyzed. A total of 3,127 men were included; of these, 762 reported moderate/severe lower urinary tract symptoms, and 1,565 met the criteria for type D personality. Men with type (...) D personality had significantly higher body mass index and total and sub-scores for the International Prostate Symptom Score and Depression and Somatic Symptom Scale. Furthermore, the type D personality group had a higher prevalence of lower urinary tract symptoms, particularly voiding symptoms. Univariate analysis revealed that all parameters, except for body mass index, were significant predictors of moderate/severe lower urinary tract symptoms. Multivariate analysis showed that age >30 years, type D personality, and depressive and somatic Depression and Somatic Symptom Scale sub-scores were independent predictors of moderate/severe lower urinary tract symptoms. Regarding Type D Scale-14 subscales, social inhibition, rather than negative affectivity, impacted moderate/severe lower urinary tract symptoms. Mediation analysis revealed that depressive symptoms mediated the relationship between type D personality and lower urinary tract symptoms. This study established correlations between type D personality, depressive symptoms, and lower urinary tract symptoms. As previous studies suggested that patients with type D personality are less likely to consult and adhere to treatment, and are at higher risk for depression, urologists should therefore actively recognize patients with TDP. (shrink)

Background: Alexithymia is a personality trait which is characterized by an inability to identify and describe conscious emotions of oneself and others.Aim: The present study aimed to determine whether various measures of mental health, interoception, psychological flexibility, and self-as-context, predicted through linear associations alexithymia as an outcome. This also included relevant mediators and non-linear predictors identified for particular sub-groups of participants through cluster analyses of an Artificial Neural Network output.Methodology: Two hundred and thirty participants completed an online survey which included (...) the following questionnaires: Toronto alexithymia scale; Acceptance and Action Questionnaire 2 ; Positive and Negative Affect Scale, Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale 21 ; Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness ; and the Self-as-Context scale. A stepwise backwards linear regression and mediation analysis were performed, as well as a cluster analysis of the non-linear ANN upper hidden layer output.Results: Higher levels of alexithymia were associated with increased psychological inflexibility, lower positive affect scores, and lower interoception for the subscales of “not distracting” and “attention regulation.” SAC mediated the relation between emotional regulation and total alexithymia. The ANNs accounted for more of the variance than the linear regressions, and were able to identify complex and varied patterns within the participant subgroupings.Conclusion: The findings were discussed within the context of developing a SAC processed-based therapeutic model for alexithymia, where it is suggested that alexithymia is a complex and multi-faceted condition, which requires a similarly complex, and process-based approach to accurately diagnose and treat this condition. (shrink)

Philosophers interested in the "paradox of self-Deception" have argued that self-Deception either (a) does not occur; (b) occurs but is unintelligible; or (c) can be explained by reference to sub-Components of a single personality. I argue that self-Deception can be explained as a variety of weakness of the will, Without the realist's mythology of dual or triple selves.

People whose person-making capacities or status are diminished or who lack them altogether are mostly ignored in mainstream theories of recognition. This entry clarifies the conceptual landscape around and some of the key questions about recognition in relation to these people. The concept of personhood is analyzed into three different sub-concepts – juridical, moral and psychological – and the connection of these to recognition on relevant concepts of recognition is discussed.

This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub‐personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and farts at the sub‐personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level (...) phenomena, the demands of explanatory adequacy require postulating horizontal explanatory relations. (shrink)

What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior? Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain? Answers to these and other questions were developed in Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework for views that (...) are now considered foundational in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. -/- Content and Consciousness Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches, and taking into account the findings and progress which have taken place during more than four decades. This book includes original and critical contributions about the relations between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality, rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive psychiatry. (shrink)

Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) enable one to control peripheral ICT and robotic devices by processing brain activity on-line. The potential usefulness of BCI systems, initially demonstrated in rehabilitation medicine, is now being explored in education, entertainment, intensive workflow monitoring, security, and training. Ethical issues arising in connection with these investigations are triaged taking into account technological imminence and pervasiveness of BCI technologies. By focussing on imminent technological developments, ethical reflection is informatively grounded into realistic protocols of brain-to-computer communication. In particular, (...) it is argued that human-machine adaptation and shared control distinctively shape autonomy and responsibility issues in current BCI interaction environments. Novel personhood issues are identified and analyzed too. These notably concern (i) the “sub-personal” use of human beings in BCI-enabled cooperative problem solving, and (ii) the pro-active protection of personal identity which BCI rehabilitation therapies may afford, in the light of so-called motor theories of thinking, for the benefit of patients affected by severe motor disabilities. (shrink)

Character-trait attribution is an important component of everyday social cognition that has until recently received insufficient attention in traditional accounts of folk psychology. In this paper, I consider how the case of character-trait attribution fits into the debate between mindreading-based and broadly ‘pluralistic’ approaches to folk psychology. Contrary to the arguments of some pluralists, I argue that the evidence on trait understanding does not show that it is a distinct, non-mentalistic mode of folk-psychological reasoning, but rather suggests that (...) traits are ordinarily understood as mentalistic dispositions. I also examine several ways in which trait attribution might also serve regulative, ‘mindshaping’ functions by promoting predictable norm-governed behavior, and argue that mindreading plays several important roles in these cases as well. I conclude that an appreciation of the relationship between trait attribution and mindreading is crucial to understanding the role it plays in our folk psychology. (shrink)

I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub‐personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub‐personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to (...) understand better what content ascription at the sub‐personal level actually means. When we do we can see how Dennett presents both a philosophical account of consciousness and informed empirical speculation on the nature of its sub‐personal underpinnings. Consciousness is a product of certain capacities that are intelligible only at the personal level, capacities that are neither present at the sub‐personal level of brain mechanism nor present in ‘sub‐persons’, e.g. some, if not all, non‐human animals. (shrink)

Personality Psychology: Current Status and Prospects For the Future I want to consider the current status and future of the field of personality psychology, often basing my observations on my own research and theoretical interests. Let me begin by summarizing what I have to say in terms of three points of emphasis: First, the field of personality can be viewed in terms of three disciplines—trait, social cognitive, and psychodynamic—each associated with its own empirical procedures and observations. That is, (...) each is associated with its own form of personality data but all represent relevant data. Second, there is a need in the field for a dynamic systems perspective, one that emphasizes the interplay among the parts of the personality system in the course of the person's ongoing transactions with the physical and interpersonal environment. Third, in the future personality psychologists increasingly will have to integrate findings from biopsychology and neuroscience into their theories and research questions. This raises the question of how they can create bridges across levels of analysis and avoid the problem of reductionism. In other words, there is the issue of how personality psychologists will address the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad, says a Nigerian proverb. These words of wisdom re-echo in traditional approaches to mental health ethics in sub-Saharan Africa. Among many cultures in Nigeria, it is customary to subject persons with mental health illness, especially those who present with violent behavior, to physical restraint and beatings. The belief is that such subjugation could restore mental health in the early stages of madness. Physical restraint and beatings only form a part (...) of the healing process, as it also has communitarian cum spiritual aspects. The healing process is carried out by family members or community, who share in the life of the mentally ill person. Their... (shrink)

A human who open their eyes to life finds themselves within a religious tradition and culture. They encounter religious objects and places, meets religious people and live in communication with them. They learn about religion from their family and their surroundings; they see people who perform their religious worship, and from time to time, they themselves participate in these worships. They ask questions, do research, and turn to the use of religious words and concepts. Childhood period has a significant impact (...) on the formation of religious belief, attitudes and behaviours in adulthood, in other words, on the construction of religious identity. The study examined the origins of individual and collective religious identity, religious experiences from childhood to adulthood and cultural contexts. Thus, it was investigated that how participants constructed their religious identities by making sense of the reference frameworks that they acquired from religious narratives and traditions. In this context, the factors that shape and define the construction of religious identity have been analysed in two dimensions, theoretical and field research. 60 participants aged 25 to 75 living in Kahramanmaraş were interviewed in between 2021 and 2022. The study analysed findings about how adult religious individuals build their religious identities using phenomenological patterns from qualitative data collection methods. In the study, the participants were selected with the purposeful sampling method identified with the phenomenological pattern and the study conducted 40-160 minutes of face-to-face in-depth interviews with semi- structured questions prepared separately for 5 main and 13 sub-categories. The data obtained was analysed and categorised using the MAXQDA 12 package program. At this point in our research, the question of what are the factors that influence the formation and maintenance of a person’s religious identity is sought in the framework of the research findings. According to the findings obtained as a result of the study which is based on the basic approaches of role theory it has been observed that the family factor is prominent in building an individual’s religious identity. In addition to the influence of parents on family members in shaping religious identity, it has been observed that some participants are influenced by extended family members such as grandparents. On the other hand, it has been found that schools and courses attended under the referral of the family or the society, the religious officials and religious groups met, and media programmes followed are factors that influence the building of the individual’s religious identity after the family. It has been determined that religious texts and folkloric elements provide stereotyped roles in making choices such as the style of clothing eating and drinking, which are symbolically reflected in the individual’s life, in the implementation of religious orders and moral principles, in short, the construction of religious identity. (shrink)

Research on personality psychology is making important contributions to psychological science and applied psychology. This second edition of The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology offers a one-stop resource for scientific personality psychology. It summarizes cutting-edge personality research in all its forms, including genetics, psychometrics, social-cognitive psychology, and real-world expressions, with informative and lively chapters that also highlight some areas of controversy. The team of renowned international authors, led by two esteemed editors, ensures a wide range (...) of theoretical perspectives. Each research area is discussed in terms of scientific foundations, main theories and findings, and future directions for research. The handbook also features advances in technology, such as molecular genetics and functional neuroimaging, as well as contemporary statistical approaches. An invaluable aid to understanding the central role played by personality in psychology, it will appeal to students, researchers, and practitioners in psychology, behavioral neuroscience, and the social sciences. (shrink)

Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind Franklin and Marshall College Lancaster, PA 17604-3003 USA .

Starting from Dennett's distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of description, I consider the relationships amongst three levels: the personal level, the level of information-processing mechanisms, and the level of neurobiology. I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal level and the sub-personal level of information-processing mechanisms as interaction without reduction . Even given a nonreductionist conception of persons, philosophical theorizing sometimes supports downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level. (...) An example of a downward inference is provided and an objection is considered. (shrink)

In this paper I examine and reply to a deflationary challenge brought against virtue ethics. The challenge comes from critics who are impressed by recent psychological evidence suggesting that much of what we take to be virtuous conduct is in fact elicited by narrowly specific social settings, as opposed to being the manifestation of robust individual character. In answer to the challenge, I suggest a conception of virtue that openly acknowledges the likelihood of its deep, ongoing dependence upon particular social (...) relationships and settings. I argue that holding this conception will indeed cause problems for some important strands of thought in virtue ethics, most notably in the tradition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. But an approach to virtue ethics modeled on David Hume's treatment of virtue and character in A Treatise of Human Nature promises to escape these problems. (shrink)

The activity of thought is deeply perplexing. Anyone resistant to its consignment to the domain of sub‐personal psychology, or to quasi‐behaviouristic elimination, needs to address such matters as why it is that thinking seems to elude capture in consciousness, and what the nature of self‐ascription may be. This paper takes up from an earlier discussion by Claudio Costa (‘ “I’m Thinking” ’Ratio 2001) and argues that his account of thinking is flawed. It also argues, in opposition to Costa, (...) that self‐reflexivity is real and is required to account for the ownership of thoughts. Finally, it identifies an argument from self‐awareness to the conclusion that the subject of thought is not a material object. (shrink)

Scientific psychology involves both identifying and classifying phenomena of interest (description) and revealing the causes and mechanisms that contribute towards these phenomena arising (explanation). Within personality psychology, some propose that aspects of behavior and cognition can be explained with reference to personality traits. However, certain conceptual and logical issues cast doubt upon the adequacy of traits as coherent explanatory constructs. This paper discusses ?explanation? in psychology and the problems of circularity and reification. An analysis of relations and (...) intrinsic properties is then developed to address the logical requirements necessary for circumventing these problems. An examination of McCrae and Costa's defense of traits as explanatory constructs, in terms of ?tendencies? and ?dispositions? highlights logical issues that prevent traits, so defined, from explaining trait-like behaviors and cognitions. The logical requirements for a coherent trait-explanatory account are outlined and possible explanatory directions in trait-approaches are discussed. The ongoing tendency towards fallacious reasoning in psychology and suggestions for preventing this are further examined. (shrink)

In this book Frank Dumont presents personality psychology with a fresh description of its current status as well as its prospects. Play, sex, cuisine, creativity, altruism, pets, grieving rituals, and other oft-neglected topics broaden the scope of this fascinating study. This tract is imbued with historical perspectives that reveal the continuity in the evolving science and research of this discipline over the past century. The author places classic schemas and constructs, as well as current principles, in the context of (...) their socio-political catalysts. He further relates this study of the person to life-span developmental issues and to cultural, gender-specific, trait-based, genetic/epigenetic, and evolutionary research findings. Personality psychology has recently reconciled itself to more modest paradigms for describing, explaining, and predicting human behaviour than it generated in the 19th and 20th centuries. This book documents that transformation, providing valuable information for health-service professionals as well as to teachers, researchers, and scientists. (shrink)

This paper aims to expand the range of empirical work relevant to the extended cognition debates. First, I trace the historical development of the person-situation debate in social and personality psychology and the extended cognition debate in the philosophy of mind. Next, I highlight some instructive similarities between the two and consider possible objections to my comparison. I then argue that the resolution of the person-situation debate in terms of interactionism lends support for an analogously interactionist conception of extended (...) cognition. I argue that this interactionism might necessitate a shift away from the dominant agent-artifact paradigm toward an agent–agent paradigm. If this is right, then social and personality psychology—the discipline(s) that developed from the person-situation debate—opens a whole new range of empirical considerations for extended cognition theorists which align with Clark & Chalmers original vision of agents themselves as spread into the world. (shrink)

The activity of thought is deeply perplexing. Anyone resistant to its consignment to the domain of sub‐personal psychology, or to quasi‐behaviouristic elimination, needs to address such matters as why it is that thinking seems to elude capture in consciousness, and what the nature of self‐ascription may be. This paper takes up from an earlier discussion by Claudio Costa (‘ “I’m Thinking” ’Ratio 2001) and argues that his account of thinking is flawed. It also argues, in opposition to Costa, (...) that self‐reflexivity is real and is required to account for the ownership of thoughts. Finally, it identifies an argument from self‐awareness to the conclusion that the subject of thought is not a material object. (shrink)