Search results for 'Substance' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  55
    David Wiggins (2001). Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, which thoroughly revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance (1980), David Wiggins retrieves and refurbishes in the light of twentieth-century logic and logical theory certain conceptions of identity, of substance and of persistence through change that philosophy inherits from its past. In this new version, he vindicates the absoluteness, necessity, determinateness and all or nothing character of identity against rival conceptions. He defends a form of essentialism that he calls individuative essentialism, and (...)
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  2. Maria Rosa Antognazza (2015). Leibniz’s Theory of Substance and His Metaphysics of the Incarnation. In Paul Lodge & T. W. C. Stoneham (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance and Identity. Routledge 231-252.
    This paper explores the development of Leibniz’s metaphysics of the Incarnation in the context of his philosophy. In particular it asks to what extent Leibniz’s repeated endorsement of the traditional analogy between the union in humankind of soul (mind) and body, and the union in Christ of divine and human natures, could be accommodated by his more general metaphysical doctrines. Such an investigation highlights some of the deepest commitments in Leibniz’s theory of substance as well as detect in it (...)
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  3.  74
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015). Leibniz on Substance in the Discourse on Metaphysics. In T. Stoneham & P. Lodge (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance. Routledge
    In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz put forward his famous complete-concept definition of substance. Sometimes this definition is glossed as stating that a substance is an entity with a concept so complete that it contains all its predicates, and it is thought that it follows directly from Leibniz’s theory of truth. Now, an adequate definition of substance should not apply to accidents. But, as I shall point out, if Leibniz’s theory of truth is correct then an accident (...)
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  4.  65
    Daniel von Wachter (2007). God as Substance Without Substance Ontology. In Christian Kanzian & Muhammed Legenhausen (eds.), Substance and Attribute: Western and Islamic Traditions in Dialogue.
    This article spells out the reasons for calling God a substance and argues that theism nevertheless does not require substance ontology. It is compatible with an alternative ontology which I call stuff ontology.
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  5.  16
    Daniel von Wachter (2007). God as Substance Without Substance Ontology. In Christian Kanzian & Muhammed Legenhausen (eds.), Substance and Attribute: Western and Islamic Traditions in Dialogue. Ontos Verlag 237-245, http://epub.ub.uni-muen.
    Theism does not require substance ontology but is compatible with an alternative ontology which I call stuff ontology.
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  6. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Descartes's Independence Conception of Substance and His Separability Argument for Substance Dualism. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:165-190.
    I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably strong. (...)
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  7.  39
    Ann Whittle (2016). A Defense of Substance Causation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):1-20.
    That there is no substance causation is often treated as the default position. My aim in this paper is primarily one of burden shifting: opponents of substance causation must do more to defend their position. After outlining the thesis I wish to defend, I present a simple argument for substance causation, arguing that opponents of substance causation owe us an explanation of why this argument is unsound. I end by answering objections to the view that substances (...)
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  8. William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
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  9.  74
    Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz (1997). Substance: Its Nature and Existence. Routledge.
    Substance: Its Nature and Existence investigates the very nature and existence of individual substances, including both living things and inanimate objects. It provides an accessible introduction to the history and contemporary debates of this important and often complex issue. Starting with a critical survey of the main historical attempts by Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke and Hume to provide an analysis of substance, the authors present the view that a substance must satisfy an independence condition which could not (...)
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  10. Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones (2013). Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn't Established Substance Dualism. Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to Unger’s (...)
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  11.  62
    Hylarie Kochiras (2009). Gravity and Newton's Substance Counting Problem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (3):267-280.
    A striking feature of Newton’s thought is the very broad reach of his empiricism, potentially extending even to immaterial substances, including God, minds, and should one exist, a non-perceiving immaterial medium. Yet Newton is also drawn to certain metaphysical principles—most notably the principle that matter cannot act where it is not—and this second, rationalist feature of his thought is most pronounced in his struggle to discover ‘gravity’s cause’. The causal problem remains vexing, for he neither invokes primary causation, nor accepts (...)
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  12. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Bundle Theory's Black Box: Gap Challenges for the Bundle Theory of Substance. Philosophia 42 (1):115-126.
    My aim in this article is to contribute to the larger project of assessing the relative merits of different theories of substance. An important preliminary step in this project is assessing the explanatory resources of one main theory of substance, the so-called bundle theory. This article works towards such an assessment. I identify and explain three distinct explanatory challenges an adequate bundle theory must meet. Each points to a putative explanatory gap, so I call them the Gap Challenges. (...)
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  13. Hylarie Kochiras (2012). By Ye Divine Arm: God and Substance in De Gravitatione. Religious Studies 2012 (September):1-30.
    This article interprets Newton’s De gravitatione as presenting a reductive account of substance, on which divine and created substances are identified with their characteristic attributes, which are present in space. God is identical to the divine power to create, and mind to its characteristic power. Even bodies lack parts outside parts, for they are not constructed from regions of actual space, as some commentators suppose, but rather consist in powers alone, maintained in certain configurations by the divine will. This (...)
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  14. Karolina Hübner (2014). Spinoza's Thinking Substance and the Necessity of Modes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):3-34.
    The paper offers a new account of Spinoza's conception of “substance”, the fundamental building block of reality. It shows that it can be demonstrated apriori within Spinoza's metaphysical framework that (i) contrary to Idealist readings, for Spinoza there can be no substance that is not determined or modified by some other entity produced by substance; and that (ii) there can be no substance (and hence no being) that is not a thinking substance.
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  15. Paul Gould (2013). How Does an Aristotelian Substance Have its Platonic Properties? Issues and Options. Axiomathes 23 (2):343-364.
    Attempts to explicate the substance-property nexus are legion in the philosophical literature both historical and contemporary. In this paper, I shall attempt to impose some structure into the discussion by exploring ways to combine two unlikely bedfellows—Platonic properties and Aristotelian substances. Special attention is paid to the logical structure of substances and the metaphysics of property exemplification. I shall argue that an Aristotelian-Platonic account of the substance-property nexus is possible and has been ably defended by contemporary philosophers.
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  16.  24
    Eric Schliesser (2011). Newton's Substance Monism, Distant Action, and the Nature of Newton's Empiricism: Discussion of H. Kochiras “Gravity and Newton's Substance Counting Problem”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):160-166.
    This paper is a critical response to Hylarie Kochiras’ “Gravity and Newton’s substance counting problem,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 267–280. First, the paper argues that Kochiras conflates substances and beings; it proceeds to show that Newton is a substance monist. The paper argues that on methodological grounds Newton has adequate resources to respond to the metaphysical problems diagnosed by Kochiras. Second, the paper argues against the claim that Newton is committed to two speculative doctrines (...)
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  17. Stephen H. Daniel (2008). Berkeley's Stoic Notion of Spiritual Substance. In New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought. Humanity Books
    For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley's notion of mind differs from Locke's in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, Berkeley redefines what it means for the mind to be a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of 17th century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. This view of mind, (...)
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  18.  76
    Patrick Toner (2011). Independence Accounts of Substance and Substantial Parts. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):37 - 43.
    Traditionally, independence accounts of substance have held pride of place. Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes and Spinoza—among many others—accepted independence accounts in one form or another. The general thrust of such views is that substances are those things that are apt to exist in themselves. In this paper, I argue that several contemporary independence theories of substance—including those of Kit Fine, E.J. Lowe and Michael Gorman—include an ad hoc element that renders them unacceptable. I'll also consider the theories of Hoffman (...)
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  19.  58
    Stephen H. Daniel (2013). How Berkeley Redefines Substance. Berkeley Studies 24:40-50.
    In several essays I have argued that Berkeley maintains the same basic notion of spiritual substance throughout his life. Because that notion is not the traditional (Aristotelian, Cartesian, or Lockean) doctrine of substance, critics (e.g., John Roberts, Tom Stoneham, Talia Mae Bettcher, Margaret Atherton, Walter Ott, Marc Hight) claim that on my reading Berkeley either endorses a Humean notion of substance or has no recognizable theory of substance at all. In this essay I point out how (...)
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  20.  51
    E. J. Lowe (2012). A Neo-Aristotelian Substance Ontology: Neither Relational nor Constituent. In Tuomas E. Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press 229-248.
    Following the lead of Gustav Bergmann ( 1967 ), if not his precise terminology, ontologies are sometimes divided into those that are ‘relational’ and those that are ‘constituent’ (Wolterstorff 1970 ). Substance ontologies in the Aristotelian tradition are commonly thought of as being constituent ontologies, because they typically espouse the hylemorphic dualism of Aristotle ’s Metaphysics – a doctrine according to which an individual substance is always a combination of matter and form. But an alternative approach drawing more (...)
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  21. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2013). Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance and Thought. Oxford University Press.
    This book is comprised of two parts. The first four chapters concentrate on the metaphysics of substance, while the last two address Spinoza’s metaphysics of thought. These two parts are closely connected, and several crucial claims in the last two chapters rely on arguments advanced in the first four. I intentionally use the term ‘metaphysics of thought’ rather than ‘philosophy of mind’ for two main reasons. First, the domain of thought in Spinoza is far more extensive than anything associated (...)
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  22. Ian Proops (2004). Wittgenstein on the Substance of the World. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):106–126.
    The *Tractatus* contains an argument that there are simple, necessarily existent objects, which, being simple, are suited to be the referents of the names occuring in the final analysis of propositions. The argument is perplexing in its own right, but also for its invocation of the notion of "substance". I argue that if one locates Wittgenstein's conception of substance in the Kantian tradition to which his talk of "substance" alludes, what emerges is an argument that is very (...)
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  23. Rob Lovering (2013). The Substance View: A Critique. Bioethics 27 (5):263-70.
    According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human (...)
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  24. Peter Nichols (2010). Substance Concepts and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):255-270.
    According to one argument for Animalism about personal identity, animal , but not person , is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that tells us what we are essentially. Person supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it is a functional concept that answers the question “what do we do?” without telling us what we are. Since person is not a substance concept, it cannot provide the criteria for our coming into or going out of existence; animal (...)
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  25.  32
    Joshua Hoffman (1994). Substance Among Other Categories. Cambridge University Press.
    This book revives a neglected but important topic in philosophy: the nature of substance. The belief that there are individual substances, for example, material objects and persons, is at the core of our common-sense view of the world yet many metaphysicians deny the very coherence of the concept of substance. The authors develop a novel account of what an individual substance is in terms of independence from other beings. In the process many other important ontological categories are (...)
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  26. Phil Corkum (2013). Substance and Independence in Aristotle. In B. Schnieder, A. Steinberg & M. Hoeltje (eds.), Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Supervenience, and Response-Dependence. Basic Philosophical Concepts Series, Philosophia Verlag 36-67.
    Individual substances are the ground of Aristotle’s ontology. Taking a liberal approach to existence, Aristotle accepts among existents entities in such categories other than substance as quality, quantity and relation; and, within each category, individuals and universals. As I will argue, individual substances are ontologically independent from all these other entities, while all other entities are ontologically dependent on individual substances. The association of substance with independence has a long history and several contemporary metaphysicians have pursued the connection. (...)
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  27.  75
    Rob Lovering (2014). The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2). Bioethics 28 (7):378-86.
    In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow-up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part (...)
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  28.  85
    Yitzhak Melamed (2015). A Glimpse Into Spinoza’s Metaphysical Laboratory: The Development of Spinoza’s Concepts of Substance and Attribute. In Yitzhak Y. Melamed (ed.), The Young Spinoza. Oxford University Press 272-286.
    At the opening of Spinoza’s Ethics, we find the three celebrated definitions of substance, attribute, and God: E1d3: By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed [Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat]. E1d4: By attribute I (...)
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  29. Nicholas Everitt (2000). Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.
    Substance dualism, that most unpopular of current theories of mind, continues to find interesting and able defenders.1 I shall focus on one set of arguments supplied by one of the current defenders, and I shall argue that these arguments fail. That in itself is a matter of some interest, since it is always reassuring to be able to demonstrate that unpopular doctrines are rightly unpopular. But I hope that a further interest will attach to the refutation, in that it (...)
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  30. Gábor Forrai (2010). Locke on Substance in General. Locke Studies 10:27-59.
    Locke’s conception of substance in general or substratum has two relatively widespread interpretations. According to the traditional one, substance in general is the bearer of properties, a pure subject, something which sustains properties but itself has no properties. According to the other interpretation, substance is general is something like real essence: an underlying structure which is responsible for the fact that certain observable properties form stable, recurrent clusters. I will argue that both interpretation are partly right, and (...)
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  31. Pierfrancesco Basile (2012). Russell on Spinoza's Substance Monism. Metaphysica 13 (1):27-41.
    Russell’s critique of substance monism is an ideal starting point from which to understand some main concepts in Spinoza’s difficult metaphysics. This paper provides an in-depth examination of Spinoza’s proof that only one substance exists. On this basis, it rejects Russell’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of reality as founded upon the logical doctrine that all propositions consist of a predicate and a subject. An alternative interpretation is offered: Spinoza’s substance is not a bearer of properties, as Russell (...)
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  32.  52
    Ruth Garrett Millikan (2000). On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts. Cambridge University Press.
    Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as different (...)
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  33.  38
    Eric Yang (2015). The Compatibility of Property Dualism and Substance Materialism. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3211-3219.
    Several philosophers have argued that property dualism and substance materialism are incompatible positions. Recently, Susan Schneider has provided a novel version of such an argument, claiming that the incompatibility will be evident once we examine some underlying metaphysical issues. She purports to show that on any account of substance and property-possession, substance materialism and property dualism turn out incompatible. In this paper, I argue that Schneider’s case for incompatibility between these two positions fails. After briefly laying out (...)
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  34. Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
    Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (1) (...)
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  35. Barry Smith (1987). The Substance of Brentano's Ontology. Topoi 6 (1):39-49.
    This paper is a study of Brentano’s ontology, and more specifically of his theory of substance and accident as put forward toward the end of his life in the materials collected together as the Kategorienlehre or Theory of Categories. Here Brentano presents an auditious (re-)interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of substance and accidence. We show that on the Brentano initially defends, it is space which serves as the single substance upon which all other entities depend as accidents of (...)
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  36. Boris Hennig (2008). Substance, Reality, and Distinctness. Prolegomena 7 (1):2008.
    Descartes claims that God is a substance, and that mind and body are two different and separable substances. This paper provides some background that renders these claims intelligible. For Descartes, that something is real means it can exist in separation, and something is a substance if it does not depend on other substances for its existence. Further, separable objects are correlates of distinct ideas, for an idea is distinct (in an objective sense) if its object may be easily (...)
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  37. Gabor Forrai (2010). Locke on Substance in General. Locke Studies 10 (27):27-59.
    Locke’s conception of substance in general or substratum has two relatively widespread interpretations. According to one, substance in general is the bearer of properties, a pure subject, something which sustains properties but itself has no properties. I will call this interpretation traditional, because it has already been formulated by Leibniz. According to the other interpretation, substance is general is something like real essence: an underlying structure which is responsible for the fact that certain observable properties form stable, (...)
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  38.  56
    Stefano Di Bella (2005). The Science of the Individual: Leibniz's Ontology of Individual Substance. Springer.
    In his well-known Discourse on Metaphysics , Leibniz puts individual substance at the basis of metaphysical building. In so doing, he connects himself to a venerable tradition. His theory of individual concept, however, breaks with another idea of the same tradition, that no account of the individual as such can be given. Contrary to what has been commonly accepted, Leibniz’s intuitions are not the mere result of the transcription of subject-predicate logic, nor of the uncritical persistence of some old (...)
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  39.  45
    Frank A. Lewis (1991). Substance and Predication in Aristotle. Cambridge University Press.
    This book takes up the central themes of Aristotle's metaphysical theory and the various transformations they undergo prior to their full expression in the Metaphysics. Aristotle's metaphysics is bedevilled by classic puzzles involving such notions as form, predication, universal, and substance, which result from his attempt to adapt the various requirements on primary substance developed in his earlier works so that they fit the very different metaphysical picture in his later work. Professor Lewis argues that Aristotle is himself (...)
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  40.  2
    Hylarie Kochiras (2009). Gravity and Newton’s Substance Counting Problem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):267-280.
    A striking feature of Newton’s thought is the very broad reach of his empiricism, potentially extending even to immaterial substances, including God, minds, and should one exist, a non-perceiving immaterial medium. Yet Newton is also drawn to certain metaphysical principles—most notably the principle that matter cannot act where it is not—and this second, rationalist feature of his thought is most pronounced in his struggle to discover ‘gravity’s cause’. The causal problem remains vexing, for he neither invokes primary causation, nor accepts (...)
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  41. Jiri Benovsky (2009). The Self : A Humean Bundle and/or a Cartesian Substance ? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (1):7 - 19.
    Is the self a substance, as Descartes thought, or is it 'only' a bundle of perceptions, as Hume thought ? In this paper I will examine these two views, especially with respect to two central features that have played a central role in the discussion, both of which can be quickly and usefully explained if one puts them as an objection to the bundle view. First, friends of the substance view have insisted that only if one conceives of (...)
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  42.  32
    Michael Gorman (2006). Substance and Identity-Dependence. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):103-118.
    There is no consensus on how to define substance, but one popular view is that substances are entities that are independent in some sense or other. E. J. Lowe’s version of this approach stresses that substances are not dependent on other particulars for their identity. I develop the meaning of this proposal, defend it against some criticisms, and then show that others do require that the theory be modified.
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  43. R. S. Woolhouse (1993). Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics. Routledge.
    This book introduces student to the three major figures of modern philosophy known as the rationalists. It is not for complete beginners, but it is an accessible account of their thought. By concerning itself with metaphysics, and in particular substance, the book relates an important historical debate largely neglected by the contemporary debates in the once again popular area of traditional metaphysics. in philosophy. (Do Not USE).
     
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  44.  2
    Kevin Lee Ladd & Meleah Ladd (2012). Religious / Spiritual: Differences in Substance or Style? (Ser “Religioso/a” Ou “Espiritualizado/A”: Diferenças Essenciais Ou de Estilo?) - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2012v10n28p1280. [REVIEW] Horizonte 10 (28):1280-1294.
    Enquanto estudiosos debatem os termos “espiritualizado/a” e “religioso/a”, surgem no cenário pessoas que prontamente se auto-identificam como sendo “espiritualizadas mas não religiosos/as” (SNR) ou “religiosas mas não espiritualizadas” (RNS) ou ainda como sendo, simultaneamente, “espiritualizadas e religiosas” (BSR), ou então, “nem espiritualizadas nem religiosas (NONE). Este estudo investigou como estas categorias auto identificatórias relacionam-se à essência e estilo das orações das pessoas e outras características com base em crenças religiosas. Participantes ( N = 103) responderam a uma pesquisa via internet. (...)
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  45.  79
    Joshua Hoffman (2011). Metametaphysics and Substance: Two Case Studies. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 21 (4):491-505.
    This paper examines an often-ignored aspect of the evaluation of metaphysical analyses, namely, their ontological commitments. Such evaluations are part of metaphysical methodology, and reflection on this methodology is itself part of metametaphysics. I will develop a theory for assessing what these commitments are, and then I will apply it to an important historical and an important contemporary metaphysical analysis of the concept of an individual substance (i.e., an object, or thing). I claim that in evaluating metaphysical analyses, we (...)
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  46.  47
    Edward Slowik (2001). Descartes and Individual Corporeal Substance. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1):1 – 15.
    This essay explores the vexed issue of individual corporeal substance in Descartes' natural philosophy. Although Descartes' often referred to individual material objects as separate substances, the constraints on his definitions of matter and substance would seem to favor the opposite view; namely, that there exists only one corporeal substance, the plenum. In contrast to this standard interpretation, however, it will be demonstrated that Descartes' hypotheses make a fairly convincing case for the existence of individual material substances; and (...)
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  47.  87
    Gad Freudenthal (1995). Aristotle's Theory of Material Substance: Heat and Pneuma, Form and Soul. Oxford University Press.
    This book offers an original new account of one of Aristotle's central doctrines. Freudenthal He recreates from Aristotle's writings a more complete theory of material substance which is able to explain the problematical areas of the way matter organizes itself and the persistence of matter, to show that the hitherto ignored concept of vital heat is as central in explaining material substance as soul or form.
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    Leone Gazziero (2016). "Aucun attribut universel n’est une substance" (Aristotelis Metaphysica, Z, 13, 1038b 35). Aristote critique des Idées de Plato. Annuaire de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études 123:121-142.
    Y a-t-il des Idées et peut-on démontrer qu’elles existent ? Parmi les protagonistes anciens de la controverse qui a opposé partisans et adversaires des Idées, Aristote mérite une attention toute particulière. De fait, si – au moment où Aristote intervient dans le débat autour de l’hypothèse des Idées – ce débat a déjà une histoire, c’est avec lui que cette histoire atteint une maturité qui est à la fois d’ordre doctrinal et doxographique. De fait, non seulement Aristote est le premier (...)
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    Jay F. Rosenberg (2000). Identity and Substance in Hume and Kant. Topoi 19 (2):137-145.
    According to Hume, the idea of a persisting, self-identical object, distinct from our impressions of it, and the idea of a duration of time, the mere passage of time without change, are mutually supporting "fictions". Each rests upon a "mistake", the commingling of "qualities of the imagination" or "impressions of reflection" with "external" impressions (perceptions), and, strictly speaking, we are conceptually and epistemically entitled to neither. Among Kant's aims in the First Critique is the securing of precisely these entitlements. Like (...)
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  50. Kathrin Koslicki (2015). In Defense of Substance. Grazer Philosophische Studien 91:59-80.
    In his “Farewell to Substance: A Differentiated Leave-Taking”, Peter Simons reaches the provocative conclusion that the concept of substance, as it is employed by metaphysicians, has become obsolete, since in the end there may be nothing at all which answers to it. No harm is done, Simons allows, if we continue to retain an everyday notion of substance, as long as we are aware of the limitations of this practice: there is no reason in general to expect (...)
     
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