Search results for 'Substance dualism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Robert K. Garcia (2014). Descartes's Independence Conception of Substance and His Separability Argument for Substance Dualism. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:165-190.
    I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism (...)
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  2. William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
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  3. Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones (2013). Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn't Established Substance Dualism. Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is (...)
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  4. Ursuia Goodenough Vertical, Joseph A. Bracken Supervenience, Dennis Bielfeldt Can Western Monotheism Avoid & Substance Dualism (2001). Think Pieces T 0 Gregory R. Peterson Religion as Orienting Worldview. Zygon 36:192.
     
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  5. Nicholas Everitt (2000). Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.
    Substance dualism, that most unpopular of current theories of mind, continues to find interesting and able defenders.1 I shall focus on one set of arguments supplied by one of the current defenders, and I shall argue that these arguments fail. That in itself is a matter of some interest, since it is always reassuring to be able to demonstrate that unpopular doctrines are rightly unpopular. But I hope that a further interest will attach to the refutation, in (...)
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  6.  41
    Gerald K. Harrison (2016). A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism. Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects (...)
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  7. Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
    Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any (...)
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  8.  58
    José Gusmão Rodrigues (2014). There Are No Good Objections to Substance Dualism. Philosophy 89 (2):199-222.
    This article aims to review the standard objections to dualism and to argue that will either fail to convince someone committed to dualism or are flawed on independent grounds. I begin by presenting the taxonomy of metaphysical positions on concrete particulars as they relate to the dispute between materialists and dualists, and in particular substance dualism is defined. In the first section, several kinds of substance (...) are distinguished and the relevant varieties of this kind of dualism are selected. The remaining sections are analyses of the standard objections to substance dualism : It is uninformative, has troubles accounting for soul individuation, causal pairing and interaction, violates laws of physics, is made implausible by the development of neuroscience and it postulates entities beyond necessity. I conclude that none of these objections is successful. (shrink)
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  9. E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.
    Non-Cartesian substance dualism maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of (...)
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  10.  51
    Kenneth E. Himma (2005). When a Problem for All is a Problem for None: Substance Dualism, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):81-92.
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  11.  31
    Eric Yang (2015). The Compatibility of Property Dualism and Substance Materialism. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3211-3219.
    Several philosophers have argued that property dualism and substance materialism are incompatible positions. Recently, Susan Schneider has provided a novel version of such an argument, claiming that the incompatibility will be evident once we examine some underlying metaphysical issues. She purports to show that on any account of substance and property-possession, substance materialism and property dualism turn out incompatible. In this paper, I argue that Schneider’s case for incompatibility between these two positions fails. (...)
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  12.  60
    Igor Gasparov (2013). Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1).
    n this paper I would like to defend the three interconnected claims. The first one is based on that fact that the definition of substance dualism proposed recently by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of this doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for the genuine substance dualism in contrast to quasi-dualisms and provide the definition for the genuine substance dualism which (...)
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  13. Dean Zimmerman (2010). From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119 - 150.
    Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an (...)
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  14. Penelope Mackie (2011). Property Dualism and Substance Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199.
    I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind. I take issue with Zimmerman's contention that the vagueness of ‘garden variety’ material objects such as brains or bodies makes them unsuitable candidates for the possession of phenomenal properties. I also argue that the (...)
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  15. Eleonore Stump (1995). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism. Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):505-531.
    The major Western monotheisms, and Christianity in particular, are often supposed to be committed to a substance dualism of a Cartesian sort. Aquinas, however, has an account of the soul which is non-Cartesian in character. He takes the soul to be something essentially immaterial or configurational but nonetheless realized in material components. In this paper, I argue that Aquinas’s account is coherent and philosophically interesting; in my view, it suggests not only that Cartesian dualism isn’t essential to (...)
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  16. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008). Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his (...)
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  17.  23
    Kenneth Einar Himma (2011). Explaining Why This Body Gives Rise to Me Qua Subject Instead of Someone Else : An Argument for Classical Substance Dualism. Religious Studies 47 (4):431 - 448.
    Since something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else.In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to pose a counter-example to any form of non-reductive physicalism relying on the (...)
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  18. Geoffrey Madell (2010). The Road to Substance Dualism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):45-60.
    The common materialist view that a functional account of intentionality will eventually be produced is rejected, as is the notion that intentional states are multiply realisable. It is argued also that, contrary to what many materialists have held, the causation of behaviour by intentional states rules out the possibility of a complete explanation of human behaviour in physical terms, and that this points to substance dualism. Kant's criticism of the Cartesian self as a substance, endorsed by P. (...)
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  19.  35
    John Spackman (2013). Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1054-1065.
    There has in recent years been a significant surge of interest in non-materialist accounts of the mind. Property dualists hold that all substances (concrete particulars that persist over time) are material, but mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Substance dualists maintain that the mind or person is a non-material substance. This article considers the prospects for substance dualism given the current state of the debate. The best known type of substance dualism, Cartesian (...), has traditionally faced a number of objections, but many contemporary philosophers have sought to avoid these by formulating novel versions of the view. I identify three central claims held in common by all forms of substance dualism, consider recent arguments for these claims, and assess how successfully different types of substance dualism respond to the traditional objections. I argue that most contemporary forms of the view still face one or more of three major challenges, from bundle theories of the self, from the recently developed “phenomenal concepts strategy”, and from worries about explanatory simplicity. (shrink)
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  20.  17
    Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (2008). Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from an important objection.
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  21.  21
    Nicholas Everitt (2000). Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.
    In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: such an inference would be either (...)
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  22.  17
    N. M. L. Nathan (2011). Substance Dualism Fortified. Philosophy 86 (2):201-211.
    You have a body, but you are a soul or self. Without your body, you could still exist. Your body could be and perhaps is outlasted by the immaterial substance which is your soul or self. Thus the substance dualist. Most substance dualists are Cartesians. The self, they suppose, is essentially conscious: it cannot exist unless it thinks or wills or has experiences. In this paper I sketch out a different form of substance dualism. I (...)
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  23.  2
    Kenneth Einar Himma (2010). Explaining Why This Body Gives Rise to Me Qua Subject Instead of Someone Else: An Argument for Classical Substance Dualism: Kenneth Einar Himma. Religious Studies 47 (4):431-448.
    Since something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else. In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to pose a counter-example to any form of non-reductive physicalism relying on (...)
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  24. Michael Barnes Norton (2011). Imagination, Geometry, and Substance Dualism in Descartes's Rules. Gnosis 11 (3):1-19.
    In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes elevates arithmetic and geometry to the status of paradigms for all the sciences, because of the potential for certainty in their results. This emphasis on certainty is present throughout the Cartesian corpus, but in the Rules and other early works the substance dualism characteristic of Cartesian philosophy is not as obvious. However, when several key concepts from this early work are considered together, it becomes clear that Cartesian (...) necessarily follows. The most important of these concepts are: Descartes’s rejection of the Scholastic theory of sense data in favor of a telecommunicative theory of perception; his innovative reconceptualization of mathematics in which he treats number and magnitude as interchangeable, making use of the symbolism of algebra; his frequent use of visual metaphors to describe perception in general, as well as other cognitive activity. It is in consideration of this third point that Descartes’s treatment of the imagination shows its importance, for the relationship of the imagination to the intellect parallels that of geometric figures to algebraic formulae. Though the role of the imagination in the Rules seems to make the status of a dualist ontology in this work more ambiguous, this paper will argue that in fact it is precisely in the treatment of imagination that one can find the traces of a fully developed substance dualism. (shrink)
     
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  25. Lynda Gaudemard (forthcoming). Descartes's Conception of the Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue, against some scholars, that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. Since a mode considered as a general property, and not as an instance (...)
     
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  26.  72
    Richard Swinburne (2009). Substance Dualism. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):501 - 513.
    Events are the instantiations of properties in substances at times. A full history of the world must include, as well as physical events, mental events (ones to which the substance involved has privileged access) and mental substances (ones to the existence of which the substance has privileged access), and, among the latter, pure mental substances (ones which do not include a physical substance as an essential part). Humans are pure mental substances. An argument for this is that (...)
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  27.  16
    José Gusmão Rodrigues (2014). There Are No Good Objections to Substance Dualism. Philosophy 89 (2):199-222.
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  28. Alfred Mele (forthcoming). Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will? In W. Sinnot-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4: Free Will and Responsibility. MIT Press
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  29. Stewart Goetz (2012). Is N. T. Wright Right About Substance Dualism? Philosophia Christi 14 (1):183-192.
     
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  30. Jaegwon Kim (2001). Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
     
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  31. J. P. Moreland (2011). Substance Dualism and the Argument From Self-Awareness. Philosophia Christi 13 (1):21-34.
     
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  32.  11
    Joshua R. Farris (2015). Substance Dualism and Theological Anthropology. Philosophy and Theology 27 (1):107-126.
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  33. Richard Swinburne (2007). From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism. In Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine. Clarendon Press
     
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  34. Dean Zimmerman (2007). Three Introductory Questions: Is Analytic Philosophical Theology an Oxymoron? Is Substance Dualism Incoherent? What's in This Book, Anyway? In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press 1--32.
     
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  35. E. J. Lowe (2009). Substance Dualism : A Non-Cartesian Approach. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
     
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  36.  22
    Dennis Bielfeldt (2001). Can Western Monotheism Avoid Substance Dualism? Zygon 36 (1):153-177.
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  37. Howard Robinson (2011). Substance Dualism and its Rationale. In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. OUP/British Academy
     
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  38.  6
    Andrew Loke (2012). Immaterialist, Materialist, and Substance Dualist Accounts of Incarnation. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 54 (4).
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  39. Richard Swinburne (1997). The Modal Argument for Substance Dualism. In The Evolution of the Soul. (Revised Edition)
     
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  40. Substantially Duelled (2008). Substance Dualism Substantially Duelled. In Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer & Christian Weidemann (eds.), Richard Swinburne. Christian Philosophy in a Modern World. Ontos 11--113.
     
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  41.  37
    Steven M. Duncan, Objections to Dualism.
    In this essay, I discuss the standard objections to substance dualism and conclude that they are far less formidable than is usually supposed.
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  42.  12
    Gregory Brown (1986). Dualism and Substance as Substratum in Descartes and Bonaventure. Modern Schoolman 63 (2):119-132.
  43. Liam P. Dempsey (2010). An Early'sensation-Based'argument for Dualism. Locke Studies 10:159-177.
    This paper considers a seventeenth century argument for (substance) dualism propounded by Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth that appeals to the nature of secondary qualities or sensations. I argue that, despite the widespread acceptance of the primary/secondary quality distinction, this argument is relatively unique for its time since seventeenth century arguments for dualism generally appeal, not to sensory qualities, but to thought, language, rationality, and volition. Indeed, for many, sensations are the most embodied of mental phenomena. I draw (...)
     
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  44. John P. Wright (2002). Substance Versus Function Dualism in Eighteenth-Century Medicine. In John P. Wright & Paul Potter (eds.), Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem From Antiquity to Enlightenment. Clarendon Press
     
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  45. D. Jehle (2006). Kim Against Dualism. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):565-78.
    This paper presents and evaluates Jaegwon Kim’s recent argument against substance dualism. The argument runs as follows. Causal interaction between two entities requires pairing relations. Pairing relations are spatial relations, such as distance and orientation. Souls are supposedly nonspatial, immaterial substances. So it is hard to see how souls could enter into paired causal relations with material substances. I show that Kim’s argument against dualism fails. I conclude by sketching a way the substance dualist (...)
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  46. Marleen Rozemond (1995). Descartes's Case for Dualism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1):29-63.
    Descartes's dualism, and his argument for it, are often understood in terms of the modal notion of separability. I argue that the central notions, substance and real distinction, should not be understood this way. Descartes's well-known argument for dualism relies implicitly on views he spells out in the Principles of Philosophy, where he explains that a substance has a nature that consists in a single attribute, and all its qualities are modes of that nature. (...)
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  47. Susan Schneider (2012). Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76.
    I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.
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  48.  31
    C. Stephen Evans & Brandon L. Rickabaugh (2015). What Does It Mean to Be a Bodily Soul? Philosophia Christi 17 (2):315-330.
    Evangelical scholars have recently offered criticisms of mind-body dualism from the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and neuroscience. We offer several arguments as to why these reasons for abandoning mind-body dualism fail. Additionally, we offer a positive thesis, a dualism that brings together the best aspects of the Cartesian view and the Thomistic view of human persons. The result is a substance dualism that treats the nature of embodiment quite seriously. This view explains why we, as (...)
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  49. Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke van Horn (2011). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: (...)
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  50.  63
    K. Mitch Hodge (2008). Descartes Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption That Humans Are Intuitive Cartesian Dualists. Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (3-4):387-415.
    This article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are different substances, that the mind and (...)
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