Search results for 'Sue Weinberg' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sue M. Weinberg (1992). John Locke: Drafts for the "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" and Other Philosophical Writings (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (3):459-461.score: 240.0
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  2. Sue M. Weinberg (1999). Hypatia's Daughters: Fifteen Hundred Years of Women Philosophers (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1):164-165.score: 240.0
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  3. Sue Weinberg, Joshua Cohen, Adrian M. S. Piper, Linda Nicholson & Alison Jaggar (2001). Marcia Lind, 1951-2000. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (2):118 - 121.score: 240.0
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  4. Lawrence Blum, Claudia Card, Marilyn Friedman, Carol C. Gould, Mark S. Halfon, Virginia Held, Eva Feder Kittay, Leo Kittay, John W. Lango, Patricia S. Mann, Larry May, Diana T. Meyers, Kai Nielsen, Nel Noddings, Sara Ruddick, Michael Slote & Sue Weinberg (1998). Norms and Values: Essays on the Work of Virginia Held. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.score: 240.0
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  5. Steve Weinberg & Deni Elliott (1992). Book Review: Attack Journalism and Scandal: An Essay Review by Steve Weinberg. [REVIEW] Journal of Mass Media Ethics 7 (3):185 – 187.score: 180.0
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  6. Jonathan Weinberg (2006). What's Epistemology For? The Case for Neopragmatism in Normative Metaepistemology. In S. Hetherington (ed.), Epistemological Futures. Oxford University Press. 26--47.score: 60.0
    How ought we to go about forming and revising our beliefs, arguing and debating our reasons, and investigating our world? If those questions constitute normative epistemology, then I am interested here in normative metaepistemology: the investigation into how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs about how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs -- how we ought to argue about how we ought to argue. Such investigations have become urgent of late, for the (...)
     
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  7. Roger Sue (forthcoming). Du temps social aux temps sociaux. Rhuthmos.score: 60.0
    Extrait de R. Sue, Temps et ordre social. Sociologie des temps sociaux, Paris, PUF, 1994, p. 28-32. Nous remercions Roger Sue de nous avoir autorisé à reproduire ici ce texte. Il faut renoncer à faire une sociologie du temps en général. Renoncement difficile pour le sociologue toujours enclin à penser la société sous forme d'unité. Unité qui produirait son propre temps, un temps unique, le temps de la société. Cette illusion de l'unité est extrêmement forte lorsqu'il s'agit du temps, en (...)
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  8. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.score: 30.0
    In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is (...)
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  9. Shelley Weinberg (2011). Locke on Personal Identity. Philosophy Compass 6 (6):398-407.score: 30.0
    Locke’s account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness’. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features of one’s own thinking. (...)
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  10. Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.score: 30.0
    It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement—experimental philosophy—has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that (...)
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  11. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.score: 30.0
    Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers' training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people (...)
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  12. Shelley Weinberg (2012). The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.score: 30.0
    Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of personal identity. But the former (...)
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  13. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.score: 30.0
    Using empirical evidence to attack intuitions can be epistemically dangerous, because various of the complaints that one might raise against them (e.g., that they are fallible; that we possess no non-circular defense of their reliability) can be raised just as easily against perception itself. But the opponents of intuition wish to challenge intuitions without at the same time challenging the rest of our epistemic apparatus. How might this be done? Let us use the term “hopefulness” to refer to the extent (...)
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  14. Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2003). Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethnoepistemology. In S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics. Ashgate. 227--247.score: 30.0
    Throughout the 20th century, an enormous amount of intellectual fuel was spent debating the merits of a class of skeptical arguments which purport to show that knowledge of the external world is not possible. These arguments, whose origins can be traced back to Descartes, played an important role in the work of some of the leading philosophers of the 20th century, including Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, and they continue to engage the interest of contemporary philosophers. (e.g., Cohen 1999, DeRose 1995, (...)
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  15. Shelley Weinberg (2008). The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke's Essay. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (1):21-40.score: 30.0
    Locke has been accused of failing to have a coherent understanding of consciousness, since it can be identical neither to reflection nor to ordinary perception without contradicting other important commitments. I argue that the account of consciousness is coherent once we see that, for Locke, perceptions of ideas are complex mental acts and that consciousness can be seen as a special kind of self-referential mental state internal to any perception of an idea.
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  16. Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2010). Accentuate the Negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.score: 30.0
    Our interest in this paper is to drive a wedge of contention between two different programs that fall under the umbrella of “experimental philosophy”. In particular, we argue that experimental philosophy’s “negative program” presents almost as significant a challenge to its “positive program” as it does to more traditional analytic philosophy.
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  17. Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander & Jonathan Weinberg (2008). The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):138-155.score: 30.0
    A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case (...)
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  18. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2009). On Doing Better, Experimental-Style. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 145 (3):455 - 464.score: 30.0
    Timothy Williamson devotes significant effort in his The Philosophy of Philosophy to arguing against skepticism about judgment. One might think that the recent “experimental philosophy” challenge to the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence is a possible target of those arguments. However, this is not so. The structure of that challenge is radically dissimilar from that of traditional skeptical arguments, and the aims of the challenge are entirely congruent with the spirit of methodological improvement that Williamson himself exemplifies (...)
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  19. Rivka Weinberg (2008). Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):3 - 18.score: 30.0
    Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against Harmon’s (...)
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  20. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2012). Intuition & Calibration. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):15.score: 30.0
    The practice of appealing to esoteric intuitions, long standard in analytic philosophy, has recently fallen on hard times. Various recent empirical results have suggested that philosophers are not currently able to distinguish good intuitions from bad. This paper evaluates one possible type of approach to this problematic methodological situation: calibration. Both critiquing and building on an argument from Robert Cummins, the paper explores what possible avenues may exist for the calibration of philosophical intuitions. It is argued that no good options (...)
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  21. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Aaron Meskin (2006). Puzzling Over the Imagination: Philosophical Problems, Architectural Solutions. In Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford. 175-202.score: 30.0
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  22. Wesley Buckwalter, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, N. Ángel Pinillos, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian, Chris Weigel & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2012). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford Bibliographies Online (1):81-92.score: 30.0
    Bibliography of works in experimental philosophy.
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  23. Stephen P. Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2001). Jackson's Empirical Assumptions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):637-643.score: 30.0
  24. Aaron Meskin & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2003). Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (1):18-34.score: 30.0
    Recent theorists suggest that our capacity to respond affectively to fictions depends on our ability to engage in simulation: either simulating a character in the fiction, or simulating someone reading or watching the fiction as though it were fact. We argue that such accounts are quite successful at accounting for many of the basic explananda of our affective engagements in fiction. Nonetheless, we argue further that simulationist accounts ultimately fail, for simulation involves an ineliminably ego-centred element that is atypical of (...)
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  25. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals. Episteme 4 (1):66-92.score: 30.0
    Although radical forms of relativism are perhaps beyond the epistemological pale, I argue here that a more moderate form may be plausible, and articulate the conditions under which moderate epistemic relativism could well serve our epistemic goals. In particular, as a result of our limitations as human cognizers, we fi nd ourselves needing to investigate the dappled and difficult world by means of competing communities of highly specialized researchers. We would do well, I argue, to admit of the existence of (...)
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  26. Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2008). The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):138-155.score: 30.0
    A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer's appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case varyaccording to whether, and which, other thought-experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects (...)
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  27. Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan Weinberg (2010). Competence: What's In? What's Out? Who Knows? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):329-330.score: 30.0
    Knobe's argument rests on a way of distinguishing performance errors from the competencies that delimit our cognitive architecture. We argue that other sorts of evidence than those that he appeals to are needed to illuminate the boundaries of our folk capacities in ways that would support his conclusions.
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  28. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen J. Crowley (2009). Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):177-195.score: 30.0
    Standard philosophical methodology which proceeds by appeal to intuitions accessible "from the armchair" has come under criticism on the basis of empirical work indicating unanticipated variability of such intuitions. Loose constitutivity---the idea that intuitions are partly, but not strictly, constitutive of the concepts that appear in them---offers an interesting line of response to this empirical challenge. On a loose constitutivist view, it is unlikely that our intuitions are incorrect across the board, since they partly fix the facts in question. But (...)
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  29. Rivka Weinberg (2008). The Moral Complexity of Sperm Donation. Bioethics 22 (3):166–178.score: 30.0
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  30. Justin Weinberg & Kevin C. Elliott (2012). Science, Expertise, and Democracy. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):83-90.score: 30.0
  31. Rivka Weinberg (2009). It Ain't My World. Utilitas 21 (2):144-162.score: 30.0
    It seems we have some obligation to aid some others, but it's unclear why, to whom, and to what extent. Many consequentialists claim that we are obligated to help everyone to the marginal utility point but they do so without examining why we are obligated to aid others at all. I argue that we must investigate the basis of our duty to aid others in order to determine the nature and extent of our obligation. Although some consequentialists, notably, Kagan, Singer (...)
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  32. Shelley Weinberg (2010). Review of K. Joanna S. Forstrom, John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 17th-Century Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (12).score: 30.0
  33. Luc Faucher, Ron Mallon, Daniel Nazer, Shaun Nichols, Aaron Ruby, Stephen Stich & Jonathan Weinberg (2002). 18 The Baby in the Lab-Coat: Why Child Development is Not an Adequate Model for Understanding the Development of Science. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press.score: 30.0
  34. Richard Corry, Robert N. Brandon, H. Frederik Nijhout, Richard Dawid, Ron Mallon, Jonathan M. Weinberg & Hong Yu Wong (2006). Causal Realism and the Laws of Nature. In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan. 261-276.score: 30.0
  35. Daniel Nazer, Aaron Ruby, Shaun Nichols, Jonathan Weinberg, Stephen Stich, Luc Faucher & Ron Mallon (2002). The Baby in the Lab-Coat: Why Child Development is Not an Adequate Model for Understanding the Development of Science. In P. Carruthers, S. Stich & M. Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press.score: 30.0
    Alison Gopnik and her collaborators have recently proposed a bold and intriguing hypothesis about the relationship between scientific cognition and cognitive development in childhood. According to this view, the processes underlying cognitive development in infants and children and the processes underlying scientific cognition are _identical_. We argue that Gopnik’s bold hypothesis is untenable because it, along with much of cognitive science, neglects the many important ways in which human minds are designed to operate within a social environment. This leads to (...)
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  36. Justin Weinberg (2011). Is Government Supererogation Possible? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):263-281.score: 30.0
    Governments are subject to the requirements of justice, yet often seem to go above and beyond what justice requires in order to act in ways many people think are good. These kinds of acts – examples of which include putting on celebrations, providing grants to poets, and preserving historic architecture – appear to be acts of government supererogation. In this paper, I argue that a common view about the relationship between government, coercion, and justice implies that most such acts are (...)
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  37. Justin Weinberg (2011). Young , Iris Marion . Responsibility for Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 193. $35.00 (Cloth). Ethics 122 (1):224-228.score: 30.0
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  38. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen Crowley (2009). The X-Phi(Les): Unusual Insights Into the Nature of Inquiry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):227-232.score: 30.0
    Experimental philosophy (henceforth “XΦ”) takes seriously the idea that philosophical inquiry may benefit directly from quantitative empirical research. That view strikes many as deeply misguided, perhaps oxymoronic: experimentation is simply the wrong kind of investigatory technique for solving philosophical puzzles. But to think XΦ an oxymoron is to have an opinion about the relationship between scientific and philosophical inquiry – in particular, that philosophy and science are distinct, independent enterprises each pursuable on its own terms. We argue that this ‘separate (...)
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  39. Jonathan M. Weinberg (1998). John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996), XXIV + 191 Pp. [REVIEW] Noûs 32 (2):247–264.score: 30.0
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  40. Jonathan M. Weinberg (2008). Naturalism and Intuitions: Commentary on Steven Hales, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):263 – 270.score: 30.0
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  41. Rivka Weinberg (2013). Existence: Who Needs It? The Non‐Identity Problem and Merely Possible People. Bioethics 27 (9):471-484.score: 30.0
    In formulating procreative principles, it makes sense to begin by thinking about whose interests ought to matter to us. Obviously, we care about those who exist. Less obviously, but still uncontroversially, we care about those who will exist. Ought we to care about those who might possibly, but will not actually, exist? Recently, unusual positions have been taken regarding merely possible people and the non-identity problem. David Velleman argues that what might have happened to you – an existent person – (...)
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  42. Julius R. Weinberg (1962). Cogito, Ergo Sum: Some Reflections on Mr. Hintikka's Article. Philosophical Review 71 (4):483-491.score: 30.0
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  43. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Ron Mallon (2006). Innateness as Closed Process Invariance. Philosophy of Science 73 (3):323–344.score: 30.0
    Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness.
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  44. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Daniel Yarlett, Michael Ramscar, Dan Ryder & Jesse J. Prinz (2003). Jesse J. Prinz,Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. [REVIEW] Metascience 12 (3):279-303.score: 30.0
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  45. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Ellie Wang (2010). Naturalism's Perils, Naturalism's Promises: A Comment on Appiah's Experiments in Ethics. Neuroethics 3 (3):215-222.score: 30.0
    In his Experiments in Ethics, Appiah focuses mostly on the dimension of naturalism as a naturalism of deprivation - naturalism’s apparent robbing us of aspects of the world that we had held dear. The aim of this paper is to remind him of that naturalism has a dimension of plenitude as well - its capacity to enrich our conception of the world as well. With regard to character, we argue that scientific psychology can help provide a conception of character as (...)
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  46. Julius Weinberg (1937). A Possible Solution of the Heterological Paradox. Philosophical Review 46 (6):657-659.score: 30.0
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  47. Ron Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2006). Innateness as Closed Process Invariance. Philosophy of Science 73 (3):323-344.score: 30.0
    Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness.
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  48. Lee S. Weinberg & Richard E. Vatz (1982). The Insanity Plea: Szaszian Ethics and Epistemology. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (3):417-433.score: 30.0
    The traditional legal verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as well as the more recent verdict of guilty but mentally ill rest on often unquestioned epistemological assumptions about human behavior and its causes, unjustified reliance on forensic psychiatrists, and questionable, if not deplorable ethical standards. This paper offers a critique of legal perspectives on insanity, historical and current, based on the altermative epistemological and ethical assumptions of Thomas S. Szasz. In addition, we examine Szasz''s unique rhetorical analysis of (...)
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  49. Molly Gardner & Justin Weinberg (2013). How Lives Measure Up. Acta Analytica 28 (1):31-48.score: 30.0
    The quality of a life is typically understood as a function of the actual goods and bads in it, that is, its actual value. Likewise, the value of a population is typically taken to be a function of the actual value of the lives in it. We introduce an alternative understanding of life quality: adjusted value. A life’s adjusted value is a function of its actual value and its ideal value (the best value it could have had). The concept of (...)
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  50. Julius R. Weinberg (1935). Are There Ultimate Simples? Philosophy of Science 2 (4):387-399.score: 30.0
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